

JEJU FORUM 2020

FOR PEACE & PROSPERITY

Reinventing Multilateral Cooperation in Asia

Thursday, May 28 – Saturday, May 30, 2020

The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity will be held from Thursday, May 28 to Saturday, May 30, 2020. Please save the dates and be a valuable part of the Jeju Forum which will provide a dialogue platform to build peace and promote prosperity under the rapidly changing situation in the Asia Pacific region.



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| FINAL REPORT |

JEJU FORUM SINGAPORE 2019

October 29-31, 2019

Partnership for Peace and Prosperity



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OVERVIEW

The Jeju Forum, commemorating its 15th anniversary next year, has served as the premier dialogue platform aiming at promoting peace and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region since its inauguration in 2001.

The 14th Jeju Forum was successfully held in May, 2019 in Jeju, Korea under the theme of “Resilient Peace.” To maintain an active platform for discussion and expand its ideas, the Jeju Forum, in collaboration with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-Yusuf Ishak Institute (ISEAS), held the first Regional Forum of the Jeju Forum on October 30th, 2019 in Singapore, the host city of the historic North Korea-US summit in June 2018.

The first Regional Forum, under the theme of “Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” was attended by many distinguished guests and experts, including Ahn Young-jip, Ambassador of the ROK to Singapore; Stein Tønnesson, Former Director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Yoon Young-kwan, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROK; and Zhu Feng, Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University. Many participants traveled long distances to Singapore and enriched the first Regional Forum by passionately participating in discussions and delivering thought-provoking speeches.

The Forum had opening and closing sessions, three breakout sessions, and concluded with a Q&A. “Resilient Peace” was revisited in the first breakout session and prominent scholars added insightful perspectives to the concept of resilient peace, as explored in this year’s Jeju Forum. Dr. Stein Tønnesson actively contributed to the discussion and identified the essential elements for resilient peace. Conflict prevention and management mechanism, peaceful resolution of disputes, the promotion of human rights, trust-building measures, multilateral cooperation for economic co-prosperity and economic integration were identified to this end. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar explained the resilient peace mechanism from the perspective of Indonesia. They agreed that if the mechanism can take root at the regional ground level, then permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia can be cultivated.

In the second breakout session, the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the US and its implications on the ongoing conflict between the US and China was discussed. Dr. Zhu Feng pointed out that there is a belief in China that the US is identifying China as its first adversary and China must be prepared to undertake a “great fight.” In line with this observation, participants forged a consensus that these tensions will linger, if not be elevated and Professor Choe Wongi and Ms. Hoang Thi Ha suggested that it is not a matter of choosing a side in the geo-political turmoil. We then all agreed that, as the ASEAN Outlook and the New Southern Policy stipulate, what we need to focus on is building multi-lateral and substantial cooperation among ASEAN countries and the ROK to tide over the difficult situation.

Finally, through the third breakout session, participants took up the issue of the “New Southern Policy” initiated by the Moon Jae-in Administration of the ROK in recognition of the 30th anniversary of the ROK-ASEAN dialogue relations this year. Panelists exchanged views on how to make the policy more relevant to ASEAN centrality. It served as a timely opportunity to sound out the policy inclinations of different countries in the region, and the participants all came to an agreement that the New Southern Policy, as the ROK’s first official policy solely focusing on ASEAN, must go on regardless of any changes to the Government.

In the evening, the Jeju Forum hosted the “Jeju Forum Night” event to extend its network to the larger Singapore community. It invited many prominent opinion leaders in Singapore, as well as former participants of the Jeju Forum. Many scholars and researchers from various organizations such as ISEAS, RSIS, IISS-Asia and SIIA came to the event and graced the Jeju Forum Night with their presence including Tim Huxley, Executive Director of IISS-Asia, and Nicholas Fang, Director for Security and Global Affairs of SIIA.

The first Regional Forum of the Jeju Forum helped to successfully build and strengthen key networks with renowned institutions and encouraged potential participants and guests to take part in the Forum in the future. It was a particularly meaningful occasion to confirm that the Jeju Forum’s ongoing efforts and forward-thinking activities can help ignite broader audiences to carefully consider stimulating and nuanced themes and topics. The Jeju Forum will continue its role as a leading global dialogue platform pursuing peace and prosperity both in Asia and around the world. We kindly request your interest in, and support for, the Jeju Forum so that it can continue to promote discussions on peace and eventually help establish a lasting peace regime in Asia.



JEJU FORUM - ISEAS CONFERENCE



Opening Session



Welcoming Remarks

Choi Shing Kwok
Director, ISEAS-Ishak Institute



Welcoming Remarks

Kim Bong-hyun
President, Jeju Peace Institute



Congratulatory Remarks

Ahn Young-jip
Ambassador of the ROK to Singapore

JEJU FORUM-ISEAS Conference

Opening Session

o **Choi Shing Kwok** Good Morning, distinguished speakers and guests. On behalf of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, I warmly welcome you to the Jeju Forum-ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Conference on the Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. ISEAS is very honored to partner with the Jeju Peace Institute to organize this conference. I wish to thank Ambassador Kim Bong-Hyun, president of the Jeju Peace Institute for his generous support as well as his leadership in this important joint venture. We are also delighted to welcome His Excellency Ambassador Ahn Young-jip, the ROK ambassador to Singapore, and Prof Emeritus Yoon Young-Kwan, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the ROK. Your presence here is extremely meaningful

and we appreciate that you are taking the time to be part of this event. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks to the esteemed speakers and moderators, especially our friends who have travelled from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and of course Korea, and also from China as well as from Norway. I am sure we will gain a lot from the insights that you will share with us. This conference, along with other events to commemorate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN -ROK dialogue relations, presents a timely opportunity to celebrate the warm, robust and also mutually beneficial ties that both sides have cultivated over some decades. Korea's support for ASEAN's regional architecture has been crucial to its success.



Korea's substantial contributions to the East Asia Vision Group and East Asia Study Group, and the leadership and support of then President Kim Dea-jung, helped seed the idea for the East Asian Summit, one of the most important and influential regional platforms today. This fruitful partnership between ASEAN and Korea has contributed to a broader, more open and more inclusive regional framework that has served as the foundation for the peaceful and successful development of the region. Korea is, and will continue to be a very important partner of ASEAN. Last year, more than 10 million Southeast Asians visited Korea. Beyond the realm of good food and popular cultural personalities, there is a clear scope for ASEAN and Korea to collaborate in areas of infrastructure development, green technology, and also in smart cities. But apart from making incremental progress, I think we are now in a position of thinking about elevating the relationship and transforming the nature of cooperation between both sides. This is the shifting of geopolitical and strategic realities in the world today.

Stepped up regional cooperation is now more important than ever before to anchor the region as an oasis of peace and stability. ASEAN and Korea can contribute to this endeavor by further boosting trade, investment and people-to-people exchanges. Both parties can also work together for Korea's strategic and security presence in Southeast Asia so as to reinforce norms and values that are deeply held by the peoples of both ASEAN and Korea.

In this regard, ASEAN welcomes President Moon Jea-in's New Southern Policy initiatives that have already generated unprecedented momentum and a promise to build the most substantive, multi-dimensional and mutually beneficial Korean footprint in the region.



In the afternoon sessions, scholars from both Korea and ASEAN will discuss how to implement these very important initiatives for the benefit of the region and the world. However, any label of peaceful and prosperous development will ring hollow if it cannot be sustained for future generations. So, crucial elements of regional cooperation must be resilience to weather against unpredictable strategic dynamics. To avoid the coming challenges that all relationships face from time-to-time, we must develop the capacity to anticipate obstacles, rebound back from setbacks and become stronger in the face of such ups and downs.

These ideas have their roots and concepts in national resilience, formalized later and expanded to regional resilience by our Indonesian friends, and also changed and modified to resilience and innovation which was Singapore's ASEAN chairmanship initiative last year.

Undoubtedly, ASEAN and Korea have much to gain by working together to strengthen a collective resilience, and build competencies and capabilities that can also



be done together. In this inter-connective world of ours, regional cooperation is not only important but also imperative. What has come under heated contestation is not the fact of our inter-connectedness, but the divergent narratives surrounding this reality.

There exist multiple interpretations of Indo-Pacific, with ASEAN contributing to the composition through its ASEAN outlook on the Asia-Pacific, which was released at the 34th ASEAN summit this June. It is this topic that I am looking forward to discussing, and hearing the views on from our friends from Korea, China and Europe at this conference. I am sure that this discussion will be both informative and provocative. While concepts, visions and strategies can come and go, and are often beyond the control of ASEAN to manage, what is indispensable is the principles of ASEAN's centralities. We can make a contribution to all of them, including the different versions of Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN's concept of regional cooperation and connectivity with its aim of bringing all parties together for a broad and inclusive basis for peaceful and mutually beneficial collaboration through ASEAN-led mechanisms. We can hopefully play this intended role to reconcile competing visions for the region in the future. I am confident that this conference will serve as a forum for a meeting of minds on these rather difficult topics.

Once again, I wish to convey my sincere thanks to Ambassador Kim, and his diligent colleagues at the Jeju Peace Institute for helping to make this partnership with ISEAS possible. We look forward to further opportunities to collaborate with this institute as well as the Embassy of the ROK in the near future.

o **Kim Bong-hyun** Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, it is my great honor and privilege to be here today for the Jeju Forum-ISEAS Conference. The

ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute has been actively promoting scholarly debate on the search for practical solutions to the problems the Asian region has faced. Its areas of study include security, economic development, and political, social and cultural dynamism in the region.

The Jeju Peace Institute which I am representing hosts the Jeju Forum annually. This year marks the 14th anniversary of the Forum. In May this year, almost 400 prominent thinkers from 85 countries took part in the Forum, and they discussed various issues arranged in five areas, specifically Peace, Prosperity, Sustainability, Diversity and Global Jeju. The main issue of the Forum was "Resilient Peace." Academics say that the concept of resilient peace is not duly established yet. However, I believe, this concept is essential for building a permanent peace, and co-prosperity in every corner of the world including the Asia-Pacific region. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, argued that perpetual peace could be secured through universal democracy and international cooperation. I believe that ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN way are on the same page as Immanuel Kant in wanting to realize perpetual peace among ASEAN member countries. Therefore, it is quite pertinent for us to discuss the subject of resilient peace here in Singapore.

Also, as we note, the trade dispute between the US and China warns all of us to be cautious about a possible clash between the two global powers. In particular, the US is pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy, while China is promoting its "One belt one road policy." Many political observers including professor Graham Allison and John Mearsheimer are concerned about the possible collision of these two global powers somewhere in Asia. In this regard, we are going to

deal with the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US in our session today. The government of the ROK has designed a new policy towards ASEAN and India termed "New Southern Policy." I understand that the spirit of the New Southern Policy consists of the three elements, which are people, peace and prosperity. I hope that this policy will be more elaborated on in our session in the afternoon. We have not experienced any serious conflict or remorse between the ROK and ASEAN member countries and I think we can foster and upgrade our relationship even further. Jeju Island hosted the first ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit in 2009 and this year marks the 30th anniversary of the ASEAN-ROK dialogue partnership. Considering the second ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit is also scheduled to be held in Busan at the end of the November, I must say it is timely and relevant for this conference to take up the issue of the New Southern Policy of the ROK. Korea's efforts to expand its mutually beneficial relationship with ASEAN will continue.





o **Ahn Young-jip** Distinguished guests, let me echo the remarks of Director Choi in welcoming all participants to the Jeju Forum-ISEAS joint conference, and Ambassador Kim Bong-hyun too. Over the past one-and-a-half years that I have spent here, Singapore has surprised me in so many ways. One such aspect, and surely a reason to envy, is how Singapore serves as the think tank of ASEAN. Scholars and professionals from across the region and the globe, flock to Singapore for hundreds if not thousands of seminars and conferences. To me, Singapore seems like a freshly awake brain working at its highest capacity and high on the list of most representative institutions is the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. As for the Jeju Forum, it has engaged in multiple activities to promote peace in East Asia, not least through its annual event in May. Hundreds of renowned names both within and outside the political and diplomatic circles mark the date on their calendars. Under the leadership of Ambassador Kim Bong-hyun, who assumed the presidency in November last year,

the Jeju Forum has been making efforts to broaden its activities beyond Korea. Ambassador Kim is one of the very few diplomats who have handled posts dealing with bilateral and multilateral affairs at the senior level. I must say that the Jeju Forum is in good hands. I must also say that the Jeju Forum has found the right location and right partner in its endeavors to broaden its activities beyond Korea. That is Singapore and the ISEAS.

Distinguished guests, I find today's conference to be very timely because, more than anything else, the ASEAN-ROK commemorative event is to be held in less than four weeks. On November 25th to 26th, the city of Busan will host the leaders from ASEAN member countries to celebrate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-ROK relations. The summit will be one of the highlights of President Moon Jae-in's New Southern Policy, a topic of today's conference. In a sense, today's conference shows how the New Southern Policy has become a staple in Korea's everyday

diplomacy. Allow me to borrow from a poem titled "The Flower" by a renowned Korean poet Kim Chun-soo. The lines go as follows: "Until I called his name, he had been no more than a mere gesture. Then when I called his name, he came to me and became a flower." The previous Korean administration also had its policies toward the ASEAN region. But they were not blessed with a name. From time to time, they were overshadowed by more urgent day-to-day issues. The interesting thing about giving a name is that, however bureaucratic the name may appear, once christened, a policy stops receiving the political spotlight as if to prove that form dictates content. Once given a name, a policy starts to receive the resources necessary to produce a concrete outcome. Indeed, with the name "New Southern Policy," ASEAN has now become a flower to Korea.

During the past two-and-a-half years, President Moon Jae-in has pursued his New Southern Policy with unprecedented results and consistency. Now ASEAN has become an urgent day-to-day issue for policymakers. ASEAN is the second biggest trading partner of Korea after China. The total trading volume was USD 16 billion in 2018, and the ASEAN region was the number one destination for Korean travelers. There were over 11 million travelers going to and from ASEAN member countries. Two US-North Korea summits were held in ASEAN capitals. With the vision of a future community built on the three Ps, which are People, prosperity and peace, the Korean government has been working on 57 projects under 16 policy categories. Specific to Singapore, there have been other projects related to start-up exchanges, joint research and development for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and bio-medical technology among others. Distinguished guests, under the leadership of President

Yusof whose name ISEAS bears, efforts have been made to promote multiculturalism and the national identity. He put people first and energetically reached out to different racial and religious groups. People are at the heart of the administration of President Moon Jae-in and also the core of the New Southern Policy. It is also an ideal that both the ISEAS Yusof Ishak institute and the Jeju Forum have pursued. Hopefully today's seminar will be the first of the many steps that the two noble institutions will be taking together in pursuit of a partnership for peace and prosperity.



Session 1

In Search of Resilient Peace in Asia



Moderator

01 Kim Bong-hyun
President, Jeju Peace Institute

Speakers

02 Stein Tønnesson
Former Director, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

03 Park Ihn-hwi
Professor, Ewha Womans University

04 Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Research Professor, Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences

Session 1

In Search of Resilient Peace in Asia

o **Kim Bong-hyun** The title of this session is “In search of resilient peace in Asia”. As I said, the Jeju Forum this year took up this issue as the main theme of the Forum. There were a lot of discussions about the concept of resilient peace when I decided to choose this as the main theme of the Forum. I chose it as the main theme despite some people’s concern that it was a quite evasive concept to provoke more intellectual discussions, and I could see it happening during the Forum period. It occurred to me that, through today’s conference, we will have a better understanding of resilient peace and about how we can achieve it in the Asia-Pacific region. There are two different aspects with regard to resilient peace. One is the question of what is “Peace.” How can we define peace? We have Professor Stein Tønnesson as our panelist who probably has a clearer definition than I do. Once we understand the concept of peace, there is a further question of what is resilient peace. What is the difference between resilient peace and viable peace or perpetual peace as Immanuel Kant said? Due to the time constraint, I would like to confine the concept of peace to the “absence of war among nations,” among sovereign nations, for the sake of discussion today.

o **Stein Tønnesson** Let me start with the question mentioned by Mr. Kim about the definition of peace. I have three definitions here, which served as a basis for the March of the East-Asian Peace program at Uppsala University from 2011 to 2017. You may notice that the minimal definition of “peace” is the absence of war and armed conflict. Some people call it a “negative peace” but I prefer to call it a “minimal peace”. I want to emphasize that minimal peace is absolutely essential, because that is what saves life. The research program that I directed at Uppsala University, which had contributed to East-Asian countries, has three purposes. As a historian I was mainly interested in explaining what has already happened; but I will try to concentrate on resilience and viability, which is the future as I was asked to.

First, let us look at this stunning statistic. East-Asia was the center of world conflicts. From 1946-79, four out of five people killed in war or armed-conflicts worldwide were killed in this region. In the 1980s, this went down to just over 6%. The main war happening at that time still was in Cambodia. Then, it went down to between 1-2%. In 2017, it rose again to above 3% mainly because of the fighting in Mindanao, the Philippines. Then last year, it went down to less than 1%. And this is the region with more than 30% of the world’s population.

This is the basic graph that served as the basis for our research program. This is the estimate of the number of people who were killed in armed-conflicts worldwide from 1946 to 2018 and we divided it between East-Asia and the rest of the world. You can see that in the period up until 1980, 1979 was the last year of many people losing their life in East Asia. It is East Asia that dominated war in the world although that was what has been called the “short East Asian peace” in the period from 1954-1957. This is mainly because of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the first Indo-China war, and the Vietnam War. Then the last tip of the battle mountain was the war between China and Vietnam in 1979. The rest of the world had very different development with the 1980s’ being the worst decade because of the war in Afghanistan and between Iran and Iraq, and other wars in the Middle East. Then the period since 1990 has been stunningly peaceful in East Asia and you see that it is not even visible on the graph.

So what changes did happen in this period that formed the basis for the drop in armed fighting? I think there are three major factors, which are de-colonization, the stalemate in Korea of 1953, the stalemate that has now lost all the time since 1953, with many incidents.

But the kind of restraint shown on both side has contributed to East Asian peace. I call it the “First Korean contribution to the East Asian peace: Is this restraint on both sides?” in the recent article I wrote in a book published by the Yonsei University press. Then you have the same thing in the Taiwan Strait. Then, there is the end of the cycle of the wars in Indo-China with the peace agreement in Paris in 1991 as a big factor. There is the end of Chinese support to communists abroad, and you could also then say the end of the US support to rebel movements in this region, because the US changed its strategic focus to the Middle East in the late 1970s. My explanation in the end is that there was a change in the prioritization of governments in this region toward favoring economic growth.

This is my book “Explaining the East Asian Peace” and this, on its cover, is a cartoon that was drawn for a Japanese textbook published in 1947. It shows how the weapons from the military of Japan are being melted, and they come out of the kettle in the form of an office building, train, ship, truck and transmission tower. This represents the priority shift that happened in Japan. First, Japan is in my story of the East-Asian



peace in the vanguard because Japan has never fought at war at all since 1945. This priority shift has happened at different stages in different countries and started with some kind of political crisis. The crisis was extremely deep in Japan in 1945. There was consensus that arose among the governing elites that the main thing they could do to strengthen their nation was to build the economy i.e., the Economy-First Policy. If you want to build the economy, you have to have good relations with the leading superpowers in the world, which in this case was the US. Japan needed the American market, American technology, and needed to re-protect itself against America from slaughter attacks. If you want to have economic growth, you also need peace with your neighbors because they are the ones you want to trade with, and also the ones you might get into conflicts with, that will disturb the possibility of economic growth. You then finally need internal stability. There are some states that have a sort of internal stability through very effective repression, and there are others that have dominated by building a legitimate regime. There are different mixes of these. This is, in a way, my logical mechanism that played out in countries when they changed priorities, and the first priority change happened in Japan. The biggest one happened in China and this man was the one behind it who came to power when the new economy building consensus established itself in the Chinese Communist Party in 1978. He presided over the change and said, borrowing from Immanuel Kant, that war may be able to be avoided perpetually if we keep the peace for several decades.

This is the list of the years that I pinned to the priority changes in various countries, and these three countries are those I think have not really made this

priority change yet. Thailand has certainly got a lot of economic growth, but it has never really successfully shifted to a government consensus on economic growth policies. I think this has something to do with the military's role in Thai politics. And there is the Philippines where there have been some attempts at change by several presidents, but these have not been as successful as the other countries that I have on the left. North Korea also has been taking a step in that direction through Kim Jong-un's "Byungjin Policy," but it grossly depends on the success of the current rapprochement between the two Koreas. Then there are some countries that I am not sure where to put in this model. National priority shifts are at the bottom of this list. I see that as the push factor in the change toward peace policies. There are of course many other explanations as well, and they are discussed in the accompanying volume to the one I showed you before, which is called "Debating East Asian Peace." A lot of members of the program that I ran have advanced their alternative theses and also there are alternative concepts of peace. Some of them disagree with the use of the term "Peaceful East Asia" because they think it is not deep or resilient enough to qualify as peace.

The favorite explanation in Europe and the West over many years was that peace comes from democracy, because democratic countries rarely if ever fight with each other. This explanation does not work for East Asia because there are different sorts of regimes in East Asia. Then there is another strong explanation which is sometimes referred to as "capitalist peace." This also originates from Immanuel Kant's argument and it says when countries trade with each other and integrate their economies, they become inter-dependent which requires peace. This is a structural argument,



while my theory is more agent-oriented. I also think you can get peace when you have free-economic growth as a priority at the top, but I do not think inter-dependency inevitably leads to peace. Sometimes interdependency rather brings about conflicts. Some say that the production network of today has too much influence that can cause an economic catastrophe which makes war practically impossible to occur. I doubt it. If you have leaders with other priorities, I think they could get into that kind of escalation scenario anyway.

There are those who explain it with discourse on laws or norms. For instance, it is the kind of cultures that have spread to the whole region that is in the idea of the ASEAN consensus which is behind East Asian peace. This is part of the thinking in Kishore Mahbubani's "The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace." Alex Bellamy in his recent book "East Asia's

Other Miracle" explains East Asian peace from a combination of four factors: Consolidation of states, priority free-economic development which is my argument he embraced, multilateral norms and habits that are the ASEAN consensus which has been spread to the east, north east Asian as well through ASEAN +3 and through the east Asian summit, and the transformation of power politics. Power politics comes here as number five.

These are alternative explanations. As I wrote in this volume, there are also those who say that this is not the peace, and I established here the basis for saying that it is peace. However, I have to point out that East Asian peace is minimal peace. It is not a resilient peace as I would see it today. But it could be made resilient. It is fragile minimal peace, and only minimal peace for the regions that I have listed here. There are unresolved disputes, still ongoing internal armed

conflicts in these three countries and perhaps we should also count Papua. The threat from the growing rivalry between the US and China is perhaps the major factor, and there is increasing repression in some countries leading to reactions as you see in Hong Kong not to mention the spread of religious conflicts, although East Asia has been much more resilient to these than other regions of the world.

Let me spend the last minute to present a sort of ten-point program for resilient and viable peace. The first thing I would say is based on my idea that the priority of free-economic growth was a push factor. It could be transformed into a priority for green growth. If we could now set a competition between nations to establish green growth and reduce CO2 emission, this could be a factor that could lead to a priority that would also demand stability and international relations. Then there is the question of a new type of power relations that all countries in the world should see as a great priority in their diplomacy to secure continued cooperation between the two biggest powers, the US and China. I see the balancing policy in Singapore as a kind of model that other countries should refer to. The third is to use the ASEAN consensus, culture and informal diplomacy at all levels to try to achieve the program I am talking about. The fourth is strengthening international law and the national justice system, and respect international law by pointing out when integration law is broken. The fifth is to institutionalize integration between Southeast and Northeast Asia, including North Korea, in a green growth zone. The sixth is to reconcile historical identities. I have the list of many historic struggles that you see in the region for the time being where I think that historians can make a contribution through free-independent research. The seventh is to back up President Moon's

"sunshine policy." I see this as the third attempt started by Former President Kim Dae-jung who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. Now this is the driving force that is an irony of the President Trump's roles in it because he is the American president who supports it although he is a president not so much liked in other parts of the world. The contents of the sunshine policy of Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and President Moon Jae-in are basically similar. But I think it has the greatest hope of success this time. The eighth is in the maritime domain which is a favorite area of mine, and where I have worked much with Professor Zhu Feng. The ninth is to support internal peace processes in countries that still have armed conflicts like the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar. And finally it is a long term value change. Through education, the use of social media, promoting gender equality one of our findings in statistic research is that countries with a high level of gender equality are also countries that are very peaceful.

○ **Kim Bong-hyun** As Dr. Tønnesson said, we have enjoyed peace in East Asia since 1979 without a serious war among nations. So, we can say we are enjoying temporal peace in East Asia because national priority shifts have played a serious role in providing temporal peace in East Asia. National priorities are shifting from ideological struggles or political interests to economic interests which I think is the main force to push this temporal peace. I think Kim Jong-un wants to open North Korea by shifting its national priority to economic development just like Deng Xiaoping did in 1978. China very successfully opened its market and shifted its national priority.

I think Professor Park Ihn-hwi can give us a further

explanation about the possibility of North Korean system change and how we can bring North Korea into the peace process in East Asia.

○ **Park Ihn-hwi** In 1993 or 1994 when I was in the US for my graduate studies, I had a chance to read an article in Foreign Affairs published in 1992. The article was about the debate between two Asian leaders: former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, and former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. I remember they were discussing the "Asian way." Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew insisted that there should be Asian way or value, while President Kim Dae-jung said that there was no Asian value or Asian way. Now South Korea, under President Moon's NSP initiative, has begun expanding its diplomatic relations to Southeast Asia, which is drawing much attention in South Korea.

My presentation includes four issues. Firstly, what is the uniqueness of the East Asian region compared to other regions? The second issue is what is the connection between the East Asian regional order and the US-China competition, in particular after the Trump administration? The third issue is efforts the South Korean government puts in to achieve a better and peaceful East Asia region including previous government's policies on the South East Asia region. Lastly if I have enough time, I would like to make a comment on recent issues regarding North Korea in terms of East Asian security. According to scholars doing regional studies or security studies, there are 13 or 14 sub-regions in the world. Among them, Asia includes four regions which are East Asia, Southwest Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Compared to the other three regions, East Asia has very unique characteristics. Even though we are proud of the

thousands of years of pre-modern history, modern international relations in East Asia only began after the end of the World War II, just like the western sense of sovereignty and the specific meaning of the nation state after World War I. Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, bilateral relations initiated by the US in the East Asia region have been shaped over the Cold War era until today.

As Dr. Tønnesson mentioned, we watched some interesting structural changes in previous times such as the early 1970s Nixon Doctrine and Detente. The dramatic end of the Cold War also led to the dramatic expansion of East Asian diplomatic relations. People tend to divide East Asia into two regions, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. However, the financial crises in the late 1990s in several East Asian countries made the distinction between North and Southeast Asia blurred both in terms of policy suggestions and academic questions. According to the conventional and traditional understanding of Western scholars, there should be a spillover effect between economic



and social interdependence and security trust. But one of the interesting ironies is that no such spillover effect occurred in East Asia. If we narrow down the economic interdependence between Korea, China and Japan, the three countries' GDP is more than 25% of global GDP. Social interdependence and economic trade between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have dramatically increased. So in terms of politics, we are within the same life and same community. However, in terms of the political and security issue, we still have invisible and visible tensions and there is no mutual trust in the regional community that European countries have. So, someone may be suspicious regarding the Western view of the functionalism that expects the spillover effect as a natural one. Some may wonder if such a kind of spillover effect only happens or is applicable to European countries.

There are two different phases of regional orders in regions in East Asia. The first phase of the East Asia regional order is in the area of the economic and social terrain. The second uniqueness of regional order is in the political and security area. Dr. Tønnesson showed us an interesting comparison in the number of war casualties between East Asia and the rest of East Asia. There were two interesting grey areas in the 1950s, and 1970s. That is because there were only two major wars during the whole Cold War period and both wars happened in East Asia; one in Vietnam and the other in Korea. On that note, I am moving to my second point which is East Asia relations, regional security and peace, and US-China relations.

In recent years, we have often heard people say the G2 and the US and China's co-responsibility in leadership. Although I am not keen to use G2 in a global scale, I am well aware of the significance of the two countries in the East Asia area. Throughout the South China Sea

and territorial disputes, and global energy supplies in many criteria, the competition and rivalry between the US and China are heightening. East Asia's uniqueness in terms of regional order is very much originated by, or is a strong reflection of, the US-China competition.

The US-China competition has developed through three different types of steps. The first step was sometime around the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. I call the competition in this phase "event driven competition." The competition was about whether China violated copyright or not, whether the US invited the Dalai Lama to visit, or whether the US intervened or engaged in Chinese domestic issues. This is also known as "case-by-case" competition. The second stage of the US-China competition was between 2005 and 2010, called the "system and institution driven competition." After the first phase, China became interested in providing systems or institutions just like the US did after World War II. As the US designed the international order, China designed and created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and many China-centric systems and institutions. Finally, China paid serious attention to having the "Asia infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)." Now, the competition between the two countries is moving to the third stage which I call "global standards driven competition." The Huawei case and 5G technology competition is a well-known example. China is very much interested in who is providing technological global standards. East Asian countries' diplomatic position is getting more and more complicated especially in countries such as Korea, Vietnam, and maybe Taiwan and Australia also. They all are having difficulty in having an appropriate diplomatic position between the US and China. This is another uniqueness of the East Asia regional order.



The Trump administration's America first policy and Indo-Pacific initiative are making the distinction of the four sub-regions of Asia blurry by trying to integrate the Asia region to contain China's rise.

Moving to the third issue, I briefly mentioned what we have done; the South Korean governments' previous and current efforts to achieve better East Asia regional security and peace. As I mentioned before, we are concerned a lot about peacefully integrating Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Previous presidents such as President Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye and the current administration have all paid attention to making better relations between Korea and Southeast Asia. In particular, there was Lee Myung-bak's active approaches to Southeast Asia under the name of a free trade agreement. In terms of policies and academic discussions we used Northeast Asia a lot. But according to my understanding there is only one country under the name of Northeast Asia which is South Korea. China definitely has Northeast Asian interests, but no one identifies China, Japan or even Mongolia or

Russia and the US with the name of a Northeast Asia state. They may have noticed Asian concern or interest, but I would like to say Korea is the only one nation with the national identity of a Northeast Asia state. Because Korea is surrounded by all of the power countries, extending South Korea's diplomatic roots and communication channels over and beyond the Northeast Asia region is one of the critical national interests of the Korean government. So, things such as the US-Korea alliance and partnership, and South Korea's New Southern Policy are critical ways to guarantee and maximize Korea's national interest.

If I add one more thing regarding the North Korea issues, I think what they really want is achieving normal membership as a Northeast Asia or East Asia state. People say that there were five countries that were considered as the same nation after World War II. Those were Germany, China, Vietnam, Korea and debatably Yemen. Vietnam achieved its unification in the 1970s, Germany and Yemen achieved it in the early 90s. Considering that China is not divided between

mainland China and Taiwan according to the UN membership, Korea is the only country that remains divided after World War II.

o **Dewi Fortuna Anwar** There are some interfaces between these discussions, particularly in what professor Tønnesson said in his enumeration of peace. We might say that resilient peace is in strength, toughness, the ability to withstand Western pressures, and most importantly actually to recover from shocks. Because sometime we cannot avoid shocks, how quickly we can recover from that denotes resilience. In Southeast Asia, we pay equal importance to national resilience as to regional resilience. For us national resilience and regional resilience are two sides of the same coin. Resilience of these two is mutually imposing and this is, in part, the main state of peace in this part of the world. Mr. Choi mentioned that he wants to limit the discussion of peace to the absence of war between states. If that is the case, I think we can only have a very short paragraph to talk about Southeast Asia. Most East Asia countries are relatively new and multicultural nations, so identities are still contested. Some people want to establish an Islamic state, so do not say that ideology is over, because history is not yet over. So in this part of the world, it is not possible to limit the discussion about peace to the absence of conflicts between states. A lot of conflicts maybe driven by the geopolitics of big actors, but the theaters are regional states. The reason they fought a civil war between South Vietnam and North Vietnam was because it was the internal dynamics that led to the Vietnamese fighting the war. This can be repeated in many cases. Therefore, there are very close links between the three fields of concern. Regional power relations and policies matter, intra-regional relations



matter, and sometimes they are proxies of great powers but quite often, they also have their own autonomous policies. And the national dynamics of the regional members also matter.

As Dr. Choi mentioned in his remarks, the concept of national resilience was actually first proposed by the new Indonesian government in the mid-1960s. Between 1959 and 1965, Indonesia under President Sukarno carried out guided democracy and became very leftist. Although it was still formally a non-aligned country, President Jakarta developed very close relations with Phnom Pehn, Hanoi and Pyongyang. You can imagine that Indonesia had a very radical leftist outlook. But then there was a regime change in Indonesia with the collapse of Sukarno and the rise of the army dominated the new order regime in 1966, which changed the world's view. Inside of viewing the British and American presence as the primary threat to security, they now became less of a threat than communism and China. China that was regarded as a close ally became the new security threat. That led to a very different paradigm in Indonesia at that time. The focus of the army was very

internal and the idea of national resilience was actually a result of a military seminar and developed by the National Defense Institute, which has now been renamed the National Resilience Institute. Now the idea is that the country could be safe neither through foreign assistance nor through military alliances but through its own strength, the core strength. So, Indonesian has no military alliances. Indonesia takes the ideology that politics, economics, social and cultural factors are important links from the perspective of holistic comprehensive security. The weakness of one factor could actually undermine the strength of the others. Despite the fact that the new government was dominated by the military, it developed these new priorities that are called the "development trilogy," the three aspects which cannot be separated from each other. First is political stability, second is economic development, and the third is social equity. You cannot have economic development without political stability. You cannot have political stability without economic development. And you cannot really have political stability and economic development without ensuring social equality. However, Indonesia lived in a very unfriendly neighborhood, confronting Malaysia and Singapore at that time, because it was regarded as the part of the British Empire. In order to be able to focus on internal matters, there needs to be a concentration of resources. For that, you need to create a stable and peaceful regional environment. However, as it was a primary concern for Indonesia to overcome its internal weakness, its approach to regional cooperation was functional and rather limited so as not to bring about conflicts that could lead to a war. Indonesia has now ended its hostile policy to neighboring countries and started to participate in the development of ASEAN.

National resilience affects regional cooperation,

and vice versa. If a country is to successfully develop its national resilience, which means it develops its economic capacity, it develops its military capacity and all the other aspects that lead to strengthen state power. If each country is only concerned with national resilience, without structured regional cooperation, this can also lead to a security dilemma, because each country will be following its own policy which could lead to conflicts with a neighboring country. Therefore, ASEAN has developed the philosophy that national resilience must be coupled with regional resilience, and Indonesia brought this concept to the first ASEAN summit in 1976 in Bali. It comprised the sum total of national resilience. If a member is weak, then it causes a problem not only to itself as it usually has a spillover effect on other neighboring countries. Most weakness and conflict in one region invites external powers to intervene. This is the concept of fragility. If a country is resilient enough, it is not that easy for an external power to put one elite group against another and even promote war. So, it is very important to achieve the sum total of national resilience. But it



must be closely followed by the development of regional resilience through close regional cooperation.

The development of a regional code of conduct, which forbids the use of threats or the use of military threats in resolving conflicts, is also equally important. Also, in Bali, when the national resilience concept was adopted, ASEAN also adopted the treaty of amity cooperation in Southeast Asia. And because Southeast Asia had been used as a theater for proxy conflicts by the great powers, there was this desire that we need to protect ourselves from these nations. So, religious ideology is a consistent pursuit of Southeast Asia countries which always search for strategic autonomy. Striving for strategic autonomy that ensures regional affairs are the primary responsibility of regional member countries, particularly in the security arena and thus preventing foreign intervention in the affairs of the region. So, those are at least two elements that are national aspects and regional resilience in the intra ASEAN dimensions.

Lately, since ASEAN member states have become much more self-confident, they are becoming much more resilient at the national level, and ASEAN itself is becoming a growing concern and there are a lot of doubts as to whether it is really going to be viable. With ASEAN developing its community and its ability to widen this regional code of conduct, due to the treaty of amity and cooperation to external powers, or the protocol of TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia) that dialogue partners also signed, there is increasing confidence in managing relations, not simply insulating Southeast Asia. Before the 1990s, ZOPFAN (zone of peace and freedom and neutrality) was really emphasized which basically meant just go away and leave us alone in peace. You can give us assistance in economic development but



do not touch us on security issues. However, since the completion of the membership of ASEAN, the ASEAN 10, all ASEAN countries have become much more united, although it also has developed internal dynamics as well. On the one hand, regional resilience has become something more difficult to achieve given the diversity of member states, but on the other hand, ASEAN became much more out-looking. This is the third dimension of regional resilience, the extra-ASEAN dimension. It is the widening to an extra-regional code of conduct, managing peaceful relations with external powers, and ensuring no major power exercises too much influence. We do not call it a balancing; we call it a dynamic equilibrium. It is because balance tends to be much more of a zero-sum game while a dynamic equilibrium is actually a more inclusive and positive-sum game that does not denote hostility as such.

I will now talk about ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN-driven regional mechanism in the wider region which emphasizes inclusiveness, transparency and openness to promote peace and prosperity. It is Indo-Pacific. As you know, ASEAN, after 17 months of intensive lobbying

particularly driven by Indonesia, has adopted this “ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” which tries to ensure ASEAN centrality that the architecture should be inclusive. The Indo-Pacific belongs to all of us and it is not the US’s Indo-Pacific. Indonesia alone came up with the idea to develop the Indo-Pacific in 2013, long before the US came on board, and member countries have different concepts. Given the increasing connectivity between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, it is important that we recognize this geographic, geostrategic and geo-economic reality. It would be better for ASEAN to have a concept which we could share with our dialogue partners and which ensures ASEAN centrality, a dynamic equilibrium, and inclusivity. So, when we talk about resilient peace in this part of the world, we need to be able to talk about three dimensions simultaneously. It is not possible to have a separate peace. National resilience and regional resilience cannot be separated. In order to develop and sustain peace, we need to be able to see the links between or aspects of them. For Southeast Asia, economic development and political stability is very important and military aspect is the least important.

o **Kim Bong-hyun** Dr. Anwar explained the concept of resilience well. We cannot separate national resilience and regional resilience; after all they are linked very closely. If we think about the concept of resilience, naturally we think about the psychological aspect of the individual. If I have some kind of abnormal state of mind, then I start to think how can I recover from this abnormal state of mind and how can I overcome this abnormal state of mind. I think that is the resilience inside my body and my mind. I can call it resilience if I have some kind of mechanism or capability to restore my normal state of mind. We can apply this

mechanism to the person-to-person relationship and expand it to nation level relationships. Therefore, if any community wants to have this kind of recovery or resiliency, then they have to have the capability to recover from the abnormal state to a normal state.

I would like to ask several questions now. First, Dr. Tønnesson made 10 very relevant proposals. If I may, I want to categorize the proposal into three groups which are value-related proposals, cultural-related proposal and the proposal for lessening tension and increasing the common interest. How can you explain the case of the EU in terms of your proposals? How did the EU successfully establish a viable peace or perpetual peace? How do you think we can apply the EU case to the East Asia region based on your proposals?

o **Stein Tønnesson** One reason why I find East Asian peace more interesting than European peace is that East Asian peace has a weaker foundation. Because European peace is in a way over-determined because there is so much that keeps it up. It started a little bit the same way with a big crisis in World War II, and with Franko-German rapprochement afterwards, a coal and steel union, economic priorities and the integration between those two. But then you also got over the years, democratization of the whole region, a kind of value-based integration as well. And you got strong institutional cooperation in the EU. So, when you have all those three; democracy, institutionalized cooperation, and also economic integration, then you get “over-determined peace.” East Asia is not there, but East Asia has still kept the peace for a long time. How extraordinary this is. In my book, I start my story in 1946, but the story of armed conflict in East Asia really starts with the European war about 1839-40. I have

looked into the period from 1839 to 1979. I do not find one single decade when there was no one serious war in East Asia. One hundred and forty years of continuous wars. Now we have had 40 years of no war. So, I hope it is not temporary.

○ **Kim Bong-hyun** As the Chinese politician Deng Xiaoping said, if there is no war over some decades, then we may be able to have a permanent peace in East Asia.

Professor Park, I think there is very close economic integration and cooperation in East Asia on the one hand, but there is also mistrust lingering in terms of the political and ideological aspects. You also talked about distrust and economic inter-dependence in the East Asia region. How do you think we can overcome this discrepancy between these two elements?

○ **Park Ihn-hwi** That is not an easy question. People usually say that there are broadly speaking three critical factors behind the under-development of East Asian regionalism. The first one is the structural factor. In terms of political systems and ideological background we are very different. The second reason is related to social and historical background. The experience of colonization by Japan and experience of negative outcomes from Western countries' intervention in East Asian countries affected the region. The third variable is the domestic political condition. Some scholars say the lack of a winning coalition hinders the whole area in having a regional agenda. It becomes more evident when we compare the situation to the European case. However, on the other hand, we have seen so many East Asian "regionalisms" after the end of the Cold War, and after the 1990s in names such as the ARF, East Asian Summit, ASEAN +3, an interesting trilateral

cooperation between China, Japan and Korea, and the upcoming ASEAN-ROK Special Summit, and so on. Although these attempts are still in their early stages, we can expect a spillover effect of political trust sooner or later. For that purpose, we need a more lively working communication channel and have to raise some political and security issues for our regional discussion. Having a strong leadership is also very important though that is another difficult question to answer.

○ **Kim Bong-hyun** Dr. Anwar talked about the situation in Indonesia. I think the Indonesian people were very successful in making a very resilient domestic system. They developed the economy very fast. Indonesia now is one of the very strong economic regions in the world. Some expect it to be one of the top seven economies in the world in the coming decades. In regards to ASEAN centrality, Indonesia might prevail over ASEAN in terms of economic size, population and leadership from non-alignment founders. If Indonesia keeps developing its economy and political stability, then, Indonesia may surge as a new source of threats to other members of ASEAN or to East Asia. What is your opinion on this concern?

○ **Dewi Fortuna Anwar** If you remember, Indonesia was already very big before it joined ASEAN. It had already carried out a policy of confrontation against neighboring countries, so Indonesia was already hegemonic. Probably not to the extent of Japan in this region or Germany in Europe, but Indonesia already had been regarded as a regional bully. However, those policies led Indonesia to only become less secure. Back in the old days, Indonesia thought that confronting and asserting its hegemony would ensure freedom, movement and peace stability. However,

what Indonesia had learnt from it was that if you become a bully, your smaller friends find somebody bigger to fight you. That is actually human relations 101 that extends to international relations. Indonesia learned a hard lesson. Now, within ASEAN Indonesia is developing the policy called "leading from behind," a policy designed to be deliberately low profile. In fact, most literature argues that it is one of the reasons why ASEAN is so successful. Indonesia, the largest member, regards all other members as equals and is willing to be among equals. No hegemony is singled out.

People think that Indonesia is bigger with ASEAN, not without ASEAN. You cannot compete or work equally with the UN, the G20 or other big international communities alone. To manage this regional architecture and so on, you need a multi-lateral wave that can do it together. You cannot do it alone. ASEAN centrality can be legitimate only when it is a multilateral system. It is not workable as a dominant hegemonic system. As long as we have a rational leader, the system will prevail. To do that, we need to continue to educate our political elite. I hope that there will never be a time that Indonesia feels it needs to dominate ASEAN.

Q & A | _____

Q. I would like to ask Dr. Tønnesson about the grey zone tactics that are being used in other domains like cyberspace, or maritime space with the use of vessels, fishing vessels, to assert maritime and territorial claims in for example the South China Sea. They are incrementally below the threshold for conflict. However, they are expansionist, coercive and carry a high risk of escalation to conflict. So, I would like to seek your views on how you identify locate these grey zone tactics in the context of peace in the region? What other implications for regional peace do they have and what should we do about it?



A. Stein Tønnesson I think first there is a big difference between grey zone tactics that are the physical use of fishermen, and on the other hand of cyber war. These are two quite different things. Firstly, it is difficult to come up with a conflict prevention method when it comes to the use of something that is not officially military. These cues that have been established for maritime vessels or military ships can possibly be widened to also include coastguards because they are also officially under national control. But it is very difficult to deal with fishing vessels. So, the best thing to do there is for that practice to be discontinued. It is little bit unjust between nations because there are some nations that have mastered it and have in a way informally militarized the fishing vessels. China and Vietnam are of those kinds. Other countries like the Philippines do not master it at all. They do not have sufficient control of fishermen to organize this.

When it comes to cyber warfare, this is something I do not quite understand. I think possibly those who

are involved also do not understand the dimensions of it. That is because there are things that can be done now through hacking that we do not perceive the consequences of. In a way, confrontation and military confrontation have become unpredictable because it is possible that one side could destroy the logistics of the other side completely in an incident. It is not possible to say in advance who will do it first or who has the greatest capability to do it. So even if we widen this to the global perspective, I sometimes have to think about the change in the relationship between the major powers in that we had something called mutual assured destruction before, MAD. Now this has changed to MUD, mutually unpredictable destruction. This has put uncertainty into the international security affairs.

Q. Among the Dr. Tønnesson's ten points, Dr. Tønnesson mentioned the use of informal diplomacy. There is a growing trend of informal summit as well among different leaders. As a researcher when I followed the result of informal summits, it is more to improve the optics if there are tensions between different countries. And there is an increasing trend in problems, particularly in this region, from Chinese behavior. So, how do you see the successful role of informal diplomacy or summits in sustainable peace? And one more question why do you mention about depending on cross-straits integration in maritime cooperation. There are Chinese leaders who reiterate about the reunification of China. How do you see the difference between your idea of integration and their idea of reunification?

A. Stein Tønnesson There have been a number of academic exchanges both bilateral and multilateral in this area. But the reason why I highlighted it now is because I think some of it is under threat. It is



precisely in communication with China that I see this risk evaporating. Under the relationship between China and the US, this can also quickly be contaminated. It is extremely important to open channels with China, to Chinese researchers and think tanks, as well as on the official level. This is important for conflict prevention purposes, and also for the resolution of many different issues. So, I would like to see a program from the side of ASEAN countries to widen and expand issue-oriented cooperation, including China and preferably also Taiwan, in what we can call "epistemic communities" centered on certain specialties or issues that could be resolved. And I see potential for that also in the South China Sea particularly in resolving fishery crises because we see substantial risks that fishery catches will eventually go down. This is a problem for the whole region but it should be possible to cooperate on the matter.

I should add that reunification has been there all along. So, in 2005, the law was adopted that obliges China to react militarily if Taiwan declares its independence. But in spite of this, there has been growing cross strait cooperation under the previous

regime in Taiwan. This should be perfectly possible also now with some changes by both sides.

A. Dewi Fortuna Anwar This is related more to the coastguard area and also informal diplomacy. We are lucky that Scandinavian countries, in particular, are very interested in promoting their roles in this part of the world. I know for a fact that certain institutions in Geneva are promoting this collaboration. I think there is going to be a meeting between coastguards in Lombok, having China and the Philippines as claimants and Indonesia as a host. They are only begging to do this. Instead of just political scientists and IR people, it is very important for technical people to meet and get to know each other because at the end of the day, states are about people. When you say that there are differences between Coast Guards, you mean differences in terms of maritime activities that are track one-and-a-half and track two and they usually talk about technical issues with third party mediation which could be a useful model. So, what you have been doing is also very important.

Q. Dr. Tønnesson showed the graph of the number of casualties from military conflict in East Asia and some lists of factors which made it happen. One of them is the US strategic focus on the Middle East. I read that there was be a lot of armed conflict when the US strategy focused on East Asia, and when they moved to the Middle East there were a lot of conflicts there. Do you think the US is a troubleshooter or troublemaker? or if the US moves to Middle East after resolving East Asia's conflicts, does it mean that the US moving is not the cause of the change but the result of change?

A. Stein Tønnesson This is a matter of both. I think that in the period from 1945 until Nixon's visit to China and the normalization of US-China relations in 1979,

the US presence in East Asia was a trouble making presence to a great extent. When the focus moved to the Middle East, and you had strategic cooperation between China and the US, the US presence in East Asia turned to be a more stabilizing force. You can also see in Europe that the American presence in Europe has mainly been stabilizing, but in the Middle East, it has often been a troublemaking presence. When I compare China and the US, one of the comparisons I make is that the US is involved in active warfare almost always in some place. On the other hand, China has not interfered militarily in fighting abroad at any point since 1988.

A. Park Ihn-hwi Someone may say that the presence of American military power in East Asia is kind of troublemaking. But at the same time, the dispatch was also made by American strategic calculation. In the case of Middle East, the US wanted a regional based balancing system. Basically, let the countries within the region make the balance as we could see from the Iran and Iraq story with all the complicated regional factors. But in the case of East Asia by the end of the Cold War and at the end of the 1950s, the US decided to take a specific engagement. It decided to play a regional balancer role instead of the regional countries. This is somewhat because of the difference in American strategic calculation.



Session 2

Regional Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific



Moderator

- 01 Yoon Young-kwan**
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea
Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and International Relations

Speaker

- 02 Zhu Feng**
Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University
- 03 Choe Wongi**
Head of Center for ASEAN-India Studies, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
- 04 Hoang Thi Ha**
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- 05 Herman Kraft**
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Session 2

Regional Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific

o **Yoon Young-kwan** The second session will focus on the US-China competition and the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the US. I think nowadays I feel that I am living in a unique time in a sense that, for example, four or five years ago what I thought would be impossible to occur is occurring every week and every month these days. It is a time of great transition into a more unstable and disconcerting period in international relations, and one of the most important factors which influences the international field these days is the rising competition between the two big powers, the US and China. This competition is going on at the multilateral dimensional level and going on in every important issue and area like international trade, the military, technology and cyberspace, and even in terms of ideas or institutional norms. The US policymakers in recent years, especially since last year, tend to view China as a so-called revisionist power while Chinese policymakers tend to view the US as trying to contain China's rise.

The first topic I hope our panelists will talk on is what do they think about this kind of rising, confrontation or tension between the two powers; the US and China. Can or will there be a kind of compromise between the

two big powers or will this competition lead to a kind of military confrontation as some scholars in the West have been predicting? Are we entering a new Cold War period? Some people have been discussing the difference between the old Cold War and the new Cold War, differences and similarities etc.

My first question is what do you think about this rising competition between the US and China? The second question is on Indo-Pacific strategy. Some observers think that Indo-Pacific strategy began as an American response to the one-belt-one-road strategy of China. What does your country think of this Indo-Pacific strategy and does it respond individually or in collaboration with other countries? And the third question is naturally will ASEAN or some other likeminded countries find some room for mutual cooperation in this kind of difficult situation of confrontation between the two big powers. For example, the US and ASEAN had the first joint naval drill, a maritime exercise, two months ago. On the other hand, China has been ASEAN's largest trading partner for the last ten years. So, my question is what the response of ASEAN is on this issue and how can ASEAN and other countries like South Korea cooperate in responding to this kind of challenge?

o **Zhu Feng** China-US relations have experienced a tectonic shift since the Trump administration took a office in January of 2017. The main friction is trade, superficially, but their conflict runs deeper and wider, and is going all the way to reshape the contours of their ties which were labeled as the "most important but complicated bilateral relationship" during the Obama Administration. China's basic idea on President Trump's trade war offensive has dramatically changed since May 2019. As Mr. Huang Qifan, former mayor of Chongqing megacity and a well-known economic expert among Chinese officials, publically proclaimed recently, the main motivation of President Trump's tariff punches and export bans on Huawei signal that the US is aiming at "yao zhongguo ren de ming." (finishing China's economic life) Mr. Huang's hunch has broadly echoed across the nation. This reality definitively indicates why Beijing is dragging its feet in concluding a trade deal with Washington.

Despite different responses from regional member states individually, the entire region of East Asia has little interest in seeing an overwhelming confrontation between Beijing and Washington. The long-held

approach of the region to the great power competition between China and the US is almost certain: the region welcomes and endorse the American military and strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific as a counterbalancing force vis-a-vis China; while both the giants should maintain their cooperation and competition simultaneously in order to keep their competition from derailing. But now, it seems that such an approach is getting harder. No one knows how far China-US relations could deteriorate. As Ian Bremmer, American Political Scientist, reiterates, the world is entering an era of "geopolitical recession." Surely East Asia is not an exception. The US is now keeping China locked as its No. 1 adversary by announcing the Indo-Pacific strategy 2.0, and expanding American bases in the Pacific. Beijing is highly aware of the strong headwind from the US, and President Xi Jinping is calling for an undertaking of a "weida douzheng" (great fight) to counter wide-ranging the US-imposed pressure. Against this backdrop, stabilizing East Asia has never been more required to curb any escalation of the China-US strategic competition, and more importantly, to prevent the competition from surging into confrontation.





o **Yoon Young-kwan** I think Dr. Zhu Feng elaborated some important points such as China's growing over-confidence. That is an important factor which affects China's domestic as well as the international situation these days. Because the dream of national rejuvenation for China can be interpreted as a more assertive foreign policy pursued by China by its neighboring countries, I think how to calm the anxiety of the neighboring countries is an important issue. I wonder whether there will be some kind of policy adjustment by the Chinese side in regard to this toward a softer or more constructive direction in the future. I would like to ask for your views on that kind of possibility in the future. You also mentioned that you are expecting a positive role from middle power countries like ASEAN, or Korea. Let me be less diplomatic here. Many people say that China has been trying to divide and conquer in terms of dealing with ASEAN, and that may lead to a weakening of ASEAN's effort to be more autonomous and to take a more positive role as you described. How would you

respond to that kind of comment by observers? What do you expect the US should do in the near future and what do you expect China should do in terms of stabilizing the situation? What kind of measures can most countries take in more concrete terms?

o **Choe Wongi** I am closely attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, but I would like you to know that I am speaking in my individual capacity today as a researcher. I would like to touch upon three things. First, I will tell you my understanding of what the New Southern Policy is. The NSP is Korea's new foreign policy initiative. It is called policy elements. The second one I will talk about is the Korean perspective on Indo-Pacific cooperation, the topic of this session. Lastly, I will talk about how Koreans perceive ASEAN in this larger strategic context of the US-China rivalry. First of all, I will talk about the New Southern Policy. The NSP is not an all New Southern Policy because we have not had a southern policy before per se in the preceding years. Actually, the NSP is built on Korea's

decade's long engagement and cooperation with ASEAN countries. In that regard, I think there is a strong element of continuity from the Korean government's previous initiative toward this part of the region. What is new about the NSP is, for the first time in Korean diplomatic approaches, the Korean government committing itself to prioritize cooperation with ASEAN countries. This is unprecedented and new. If you look at Korea's traditional foreign policy approach, ASEAN countries have always been the secondary partners, not the primary ones. Now, from the general policy framework of the NSP, we are endeavoring to make efforts to prioritize our relationship with ASEAN countries. The new initiative is also a very general framework guided by three principles, the so-called three Ps; People, Prosperity and Peace. It is abstract values, guiding principles. The actual policy contents and packages are still being elaborated on and worked out. More and more things are coming to this general policy framework. In this regard, I think the ASEAN-ROK Special Summit scheduled to take place this coming November in Busan, which celebrates the 30th anniversary of Korea-ASEAN dialogue partnership, will become a major milestone in bringing about the cooperative projects and deliverables related to Korea-ASEAN cooperation. To my understanding, the NSP is a multi-dimensional initiative which contains multiple policy elements with at least three core policy elements. The first one is economic, the second is diplomatic and the third is strategic. Of course these three different policy dimensions are intertwined and related to each other on one hand, but they also show some different kind of dimensions on the other. It has been over two years since President Moon announced the NSP initiative when he visited Jakarta in November 2017. The most attention so far is given to the economic aspects of the NSP and it is obviously

the right way to go because enhancing mutually beneficial economic cooperation is very important. By focusing on economic cooperation, you can gain political capital domestically. You show your achievements to the domestic political audience and can raise your approval rates.

Let me talk about the diplomatic and strategic dimensions as well. The diplomatic and strategic dimensions are also very important and relevant regarding the question of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Most of all, the NSP is an effort to diversify Korea's foreign policy orientation. In Korean diplomatic practice and orientation, you always have a gap or a bias, which is only prioritizing our relationships with the major powers. Korea's bilateral relationship with the US has been most important, and maintaining a good relationship and having cooperation with China is also always important, and with Russia also to certain extent. When it comes to ASEAN, sometimes it has been important, and then forgotten some other times. If you look at Korea's external economic, political and diplomatic profile, our national interest goes way beyond the Korean peninsula, it encompasses more diverse relationships. If you look at this broader picture, ASEAN takes a very important role, so now we are implementing the NSP in order to correct this structural bias embedded in the Korean diplomatic approach. We want to keep a priority on the major powers on the one hand, and would like to build a new priority with ASEAN. Under the NSP initiative, ASEAN is not the secondary partner anymore. ASEAN is now Korea's priority partner and that is the aspiration embedded in the NSP. The third policy element is that this is the Korean government's new approach regarding regional cooperation and regional architecture building efforts. It is especially relevant and important in regard to the growing the US-China rivalry and strategic competition.



Now, I will talk about the Korean perspective on the Indo-Pacific strategy. Let me reiterate my colleague at the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When it comes to the Korean government's stance on the Indo-Pacific, it reiterates these four points which are called the four principles of regional cooperation and architecture building under the NSP. These are "openness," "transparency," "inclusiveness," and "ASEAN centrality." This point was clearly made recently by my senior colleague at the Korean ministry. Firstly, we aim for open regionalism. Secondly, we promote a transparent regional architecture. Thirdly, we prefer to have a regional architecture in this region that is inclusive of all the regional powers. We do not want any particular country whether it is small or large to be left out. Lastly, we would like to have regional cooperation or Indo-Pacific cooperation to be based on an ASEAN led multilateral mechanism. Under the NSP framework we lend strong support to ASEAN centrality. It is in our national interest for ASEAN to play a central role in regional cooperation in the wider context of the Indo-Pacific. Korea is open and willing to cooperate with any regional initiative

whether it is China's BRI or the US's free and open Indo-Pacific or India's Act East. As long as these regional initiatives contribute to enhancing regional connectivity and stability, we are willing to cooperate. It is not a matter for Korea to choose a side or to make a choice between the US and China. It would be inappropriate and inaccurate to frame Korea's approach as a matter of choice between them. It is not that Korea participates in the US's free and open Indo-Pacific at the expense of our cooperation with China. It is not that Korea becomes a part of China's BRI. I think these are misrepresentation of the Korean stance and perspective on the Indo-Pacific, and this ongoing great power rivalry between the US and China. We are striving to find common ground with any other regional initiative and willing to cooperate with them. As to the last part of my presentation, in this regard ASEAN is likeminded with us and we have a very strong element of strategic convergence with ASEAN whether it is economic cooperation, people to people exchanges, or regional architecture building. We particularly support the recent ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The major principles of regional cooperation under the framework of the NSP have a strong resonance with the fifteen principles outlined in para ten in the ASEAN outlook. Korea is willing and ready to join forces with ASEAN and India as well to promote an open, transparent and inclusive regional architecture. I think that is what they call middle power activism.

o **Yoon Young-kwan** One of advantages I have whenever I visit Singapore is that there are many renowned scholars and specialists specialized in ASEAN issues or China issues. Yesterday I had the privilege of meeting a very eminent scholar living in



Singapore and I talked with him for about an hour. I mentioned that Singapore is very wise and skillful in terms of international diplomacy at a time when the rising competition between China and the US going on, and I explained some examples of very prudent diplomacy by the Singaporean government. I asked his opinion on Singaporean and Korean diplomacy and he gave me a very interesting response. According to him, there is a big difference between Singapore and South Korea. He said that Singapore does not owe much to the US There are American troops, but not so many, while Korea has a lot to deal with North Korea, a de facto nuclear state. Now that I heard you talk about strategic convergence between ASEAN and South Korea, Korea is supporting ASEAN's centrality, and ASEAN led multi-lateral policies, I would like to ask you what your answer would be if someone asked you: Can Korea afford a minimalist approach in diplomacy?

o **Hoang Thi Ha** My presentation will be about the

ASEAN perspective of the Indo-Pacific and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which was adopted by ASEAN leaders in June this year; what this outlook means for ASEAN in the increasingly contested region and what is next; and the significance of ASEAN-Korea enhanced relations to the realization of the outlook objectives. The outlook itself seeks to assert ASEAN's voice so that the group and its member states are not left out in the emerging Indo-Pacific discourse on shipping, and the future regional order. To be accurate, the outlook is not even the ASEAN version of the Indo-Pacific. To me, it is more as the lens through which ASEAN looks at the broader Indo-Pacific landscape, as well as the competing visions of the major powers. And such an outlook is anchored in ASEAN's overriding objective of maintaining regional autonomy and ASEAN centrality. The outlook continues ASEAN's traditional open door policy which engages all ASEAN friends and partners and it subscribes to an open, inclusive and loose based regional order amid heightened tensions and pressure toward bi-polarization

in regional politics. The outlook also places emphasis on dialogue and functional economic cooperation; meanwhile it shies away from strategic competition and the narrative of containment. The outlook has two parts, the first part is the principles guiding the regional cooperation and order, and the second part is about priority, cooperation areas that ASEAN would like to pursue, which cover maritime cooperation, connectivity and sustainable development.

In terms of institutions, the outlook does not envisage the setup of any new mechanism. Instead, it emphasizes the need to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of ASEAN-led mechanisms. This is not new because for many years ASEAN and its dialogue partners have attempted a number of procedural and institutional reforms to improve the performance of its ASEAN-led mechanisms especially by the ASEAN regional Forums and East Asia Summit. However, the results have been quite underwhelming so far. In this sense, the outlook has specified the end, not the means, and exactly what to do and how to do it remains elusive. Moving forward, how ASEAN can give adequate expression and effect to the outlook most externally and internally remains to be seen. For example, internally it will take time for the Indo-Pacific construct to be internalized as part of ASEAN strategic culture. This is because ASEAN member states have adopted the outlook as ASEAN common script on the Indo-Pacific without internalizing it at the same level and to the same extent, and this dynamic will continue to play out even after the adoption of the outlook. Even as ASEAN member states have managed to get together and displayed some of the same appearance of unity through the adoption of the outlook, such unity is increasingly being stripped away of its substance when it comes to specific issues at critical moments.

Many critics of the outlook point out that it is no more than a list of familiar aspirations and hopes, which by themselves do not constitute policy or strategy. ASEAN should take this criticism to heart because it does not suffice nowadays just to say the same mantra and hope for the best. The jury is still out on whether the outlook would be able to force sufficient ASEAN strategic cohesion to effectively keep ASEAN member states together under the ASEAN roof against increasing external machinations. The outlook also reaffirms ASEAN's fundamental principles of respect for sovereignty, equality, freedom and respect for international law among others. The problem with ASEAN has never been the absence of principles governing interstate relations. We have the treaty of amity and cooperation and we have the Bali principles on mutually beneficial relations under the framework of the East Asian Summit. The problem has been more with the lack of the collective courage to give effect to such principles, especially by calling out their violations when they happen. Developments in the South China Sea are very much illustrating this point. Externally, the outlook has received support from all proponents of the original Indo-Pacific concept, namely Japan, Australia, India and even the US. Especially as they point to the convergence of the principles espoused in the ASEAN outlook and in all their Indo-Pacific articulations. Other dialogue partners such as New Zealand and the European Union, and encouragingly the ROK as well have also found elements that served their interests and have sought opportunities of collaboration with ASEAN. As for China, I have not seen any expression of official views and I would look forward to professor Zhu Feng's commentary on this ASEAN outlook. To me, a clinical reading of the outlook, one that is not colored by

Chinese engrained anxiety towards the term Indo-Pacific, would find that the outlook itself would be the least objectionable and the most favorable to China of all the Indo-Pacific versions out there. First of all, its inclusivity principle makes sure that China's rise to ASEAN is to be embraced, not to be shunned or to be contained. I have always thought that the principle of inclusiveness in the outlook is meant to ensure that all the other major powers are to be in the game, not to have South East Asia alone with China. Until recently, another interpretation given by an Indonesian diplomat and scholar really dawned on me because he said that inclusiveness in the outlook means that China is to be embraced, unlike the US version of the Indo-Pacific. The outlook itself also specifies that this outlook is inclusive in the sense that it embraces different ideas and initiatives, hopefully not in the non-critical way but more pragmatically and selectively. Another point is

that the outlook focus on connectivity and development can indeed dovetail with China's professed development focused approach to regional cooperation as well. In fact, the outlook offers a bit of everything to everyone if they care to look closely. Accordingly, platforms to pursue such cooperation should be flexible, agile, and contingent. For example, progress can be made through expediting the ongoing negotiations on the regional comprehensive economic partnership, the RCEP, all through incorporating these practical cooperation areas of connectivity, maritime cooperation and sustainable development into all platforms of ASEAN's external relations. I do not think ASEAN should expand its political capital to try to fix a particular institutional home for the implementation of the outlook especially through the East Asia Summit. This is because of the nature of the Indo-Pacific construct, also the proven, underwhelming performance of



mega great regional organizations like the Asia-Europe summit, the meeting of APEC, and also the current institution fatigue in the region. Behind ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms, the outlook also provides the legitimacy and a rallying point for interested ASEAN member states, individually to scale up the national bilateral, trilateral and mini-lateral initiatives, and leverage multiple existing, and emerging arrangements and facilities and resources available in the Indo-Pacific. On this point I would like to refer back to the comment made by Ambassador Ahn in his welcoming remarks this morning when he described the NSP or Korean engagement with South East Asia. To me it is the Indo-Pacific construct that has always been there, but once you have given it a name its existence comes into sharper clarity and focus, and then comes the attention and political spotlight and resources mobilized to implement it.

I will come to the last part of my presentation with regard to the role of the ROK in the implementation of this outlook. The ROK has a very important role in ASEAN's emerging Indo-Pacific discourse and also in ASEAN's persistent efforts to secure its strategic autonomy through a multi-polar, multi-lateral and multi-stakeholder regional order. This is because both ASEAN member states and Korea share quite similar strategic predicaments. Professor Yoon just mentioned that Singapore and Korea are different, but they both also are facing quite similar and fundamental strategic dilemmas. Both have enduring security interests of having an American presence and engagement in the region. They also have growing economic inter-dependence with or dependence on China. Both, therefore, have the strategic imperatives to diversify partnerships to hedge against uncertainties and vulnerabilities in relations with the two great powers. In the case of the



US, it is the worry about American retrenchment, and in the case of China, it is about increased economic coercion from Beijing. So, in the midst of the intensifying US-China strategic rivalry, it is natural for middle and small powers to hedge together to expand the menu of choice instead of seeing it be reduced to a binary choice. In this regard, the NSP is a good support and complements greatly ASEAN's implementation of the outlook on the Indo-Pacific, especially in economic connectivity areas. The economic focus of NSP dovetails well with the AOIP development approach. Therefore, it is encouraging to note that President Moon has visited all ASEAN member states, not only as a mere diplomatic gesture but also with a lot of business undertakings such as roads, rail-lines, ports and airports to be built, more tourists to visit, most supply choices to be available hopefully for the 5G rollout., more manufacturing and high tech basis to be established, more green and clean cities to be developed. All these economic undertakings would yield strategic dividends by diversifying markets and

production networks. I hope that it can be a part of the notion of middle power activism that Professor Zhu Feng just mentioned now.

o Yoon Young-kwan Thank you very much for sharing the insights and focus on the ASEAN outlook. Ms. Hoang Thi Ha has made some interesting comments in your presentation including the fact that the problem of ASEAN was never its absence of principles so much as the lack of collective courage in facing critical challenges. My question is, from a realistic point of view, if you could make some recommendation or your prescription in handling this issue. I mean, this is a very difficult and complicated issue, and I feel sorry that I am oversimplifying my question. I am playing the role of devil's advocate to keep all of us awake. You also mentioned the desirability of closer cooperation between Korean and ASEAN. In your view, what is the most urgent area or field that needs our attention from both Korea and ASEAN from a policy perspective? Now I will let you have Professor Kraft.

o Herman Kraft I do not really know how to proceed as Ms. Hoang already covered pretty much what I wanted to talk about regarding ASEAN. I can probably try to answer those three questions Prof Yoon introduced at the beginning of this session. I would like to talk about the third question on whether ASEAN can actually find room for true cooperation. I think all three questions are actually inter-related and reduced to the question of the Indo-Pacific after all. If you listen well to what Ms Hoang was actually saying, one of the things that comes out is that the ASEAN outlook for the Indo-Pacific is quite important and interesting in the sense that it implies a connection to continuity to the

existing security architecture that we actually have. In other words, from the very start of the first session, we have actually talked about the idea of what was the reason for the transformation of the region from one that was actually filled with conflict to one where you actually had a region where no conflict has taken place for so many decades. I think at least for the last two decades or so, the significant part of that has to do with the security architecture that has actually been based on the ASEAN-led mechanism that constitutes the framework for security around the region. One can extend the argument there saying ASEAN plays an important role and takes credit for it. But one of the points that Ms Hoang was actually making is that the importance and continuing success of that security architecture is dependent on two things. First is the idea of the lack of courage on the part of ASEAN states that actually act together to have one voice in confronting a significant difficult position. In that particular context, ASEAN has an inability to address this kind of question, questions its ability to play that central role that it keeps on emphasizing. And yet what you have in the outlook is a continued emphasis on the same things that we talked about regarding ASEAN, such as centrality, multilateralism, cooperation, connectivity and so on. In other words, if we think about it, what the outlook actually tells us is that we have problems and the conditions that ASEAN is facing right now are things that we actually have to address, but at the same time what the problem is, is that nothing new is actually being represented so to speak. What ASEAN is basically saying is we have to work harder and hope for different outcomes. I think Ms. Hoang was trying to say that this might be the problem. We cannot expect to do the same thing over and over again, and then suddenly expect that a

different outcome actually comes out of it.

So, a proper question will be: What is it that ASEAN needs to do that's different? And this question brings me to the issues that ASEAN is actually facing now. In other words, what is the Indo-Pacific outlook all about? It is a framework, the idea of a framework for the region that's based on the theme of the forum. How do we actually promote peace and prosperity amid a changing and transforming geo-political picture, a picture that is actually framed in the question posed by Professor Yoon before? First, intensifying competition between the US and China. Secondly, are the rival frames that are actually being promoted by both China and the US in terms of free ordering so to speak, the ordering that our current world orders. These are two questions that the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific actually tries to respond to. That is to say what ASEAN is trying to promote is that the best way to avoid conflict, to maintain peace, to keep this condition of prosperity right now, is for a continuation of the kind of architecture that we have actually had for the past twenty years. The question there is that if we can actually assure and guarantee its continuation given the problem that is actually being faced, what does the idea or the frame of Indo-Pacific really mean. Why is ASEAN actually promoting this particular framework? It actually responds to and attempts to re-appropriate so to speak. Indonesia actually talked about the idea of the Indo-Pacific in 2013. It was a concept that was actually brought forward. In a sense, it is an area of appropriation by ASEAN of what is essentially an indigenous concept that is being developed within Southeast Asia. At the same time, however, what the appropriation means is trying to fit in the frame that ASEAN needs to actually promote. It includes this basic point about centrality, multilateralism, or those things that are actually important to the architecture that we have now. This is in contrast to the kind of Indo-Pacific strategy that the US has been promoting, which is also different from the concept of the Indo-Pacific that Japan and India have actually been promoting.

The problem is that right now the dominant concept is actually out there, the one that the US has been pushing. That concept is very much all about the idea of strategic competition with China, the idea of trying to promote the rules based order which is essentially really about maintaining the status quo that exists now. The big difference, however, in the way that the US has been framing this idea of the Indo-Pacific is its attempt to frame the idea of burden sharing. This is to say how US allies in the region used to frame or think about the alliance with the US. It is now being reframed by President Trump's talking about we need to discuss this notion of what burden sharing means. This is to say that more allies of the US should take more responsibilities as far as security around the region is concerned. In other words, this is a framing of the region that ASEAN does not agree with. The important thing about the outlook is that what it attempts to do is to bring back the whole thing to, or the idea of what we need in order to maintain peace and prosperity, the concept of the security architecture that has been the taskforce center, the ASEAN led mechanism. In other words, what ASEAN is trying to do again is just to bring forward the idea that ASEAN needs to work harder. If we do not want the situation around the region to escalate into a situation that brings up conflict, then cooperation must be a continuing objective of all our efforts here.

Let me bring in two points, before I end my presentation, about middle power activism or middle "powership" so to speak. To a certain extent, this is where you can bring in cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea. This is to say that the common thing between the ASEAN states and South Korea is the idea that to a larger extent their influence is not on the material side but on the normative side or on the prescriptive side. And this makes sense. You are talking about small powers or middle powers who are actually trying to draw for themselves a region that cannot accommodate their interests. That is something that is possible as long as you do not have great power competition

framing the conditions around the region. I think that is where the problem actually arises now. What can be done about the intensifying great power competition? That is why the point being made by Ms. Hoang is that ASEAN needs to work harder on this particular point. The last point I would like to make is this. Since Prof Yoon asked us to talk about the respective countries, I will bring in the Philippines here. The Philippines is not representative of what the different countries around ASEAN actually do as far as these issues are concerned. Nonetheless, it is perhaps illustrative of certain things. In other words, if you look at the Philippines in terms of the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, or for that matter taking a look at the Philippines in relation to different aspirations and initiatives of ASEAN, to a large extent, once the representatives of the Philippine leave the meetings of ASEAN, very little is actually done in terms of pushing forward what those ASEAN initiatives are. In other words, the main problem that we actually have is the extent to which you have the individual countries of ASEAN, not only supporting true rhetoric, the initiatives of ASEAN, the things that ASEAN wants to push forward, but more importantly, actually operationalizing them in terms of their own respective policies. When Ms. Hoang talks about the idea of ASEAN not having courage for instance, I think you are talking about the collective action problem within ASEAN, especially when you are talking about very sensitive strategic issues. If the competition between the US and China is not a sensitive strategic issue, I do not know what is. At this point in time the question really is that is it really possible to push forward an activist ASEAN given two things. Firstly, the increasing dominance of the US-China competition across different levels and layers of relationships. Secondly, amidst the kind of inability on the part of ASEAN, of the ASEAN states, to actually promote its own collective strategic autonomy precisely because they are acting more in terms of preserving their national strategic autonomy as opposed to the idea of the strategic autonomy of ASEAN itself. This is where

my pessimism comes in as far as these issues are actually concerned. We were talking about the idea of regional resilience based on national resilience, the national resilience being defined in terms of the ability of different member states of ASEAN to actually resist intervention and interference from foreign powers. That particular point illustrates to us where regional resilience is lacking right now in order to be able to strongly promote the idea of ASEAN centrality in the face of this competition between the US and China.

Q & A

Q. My name is Termsak. I work work at ISEAS and I belong to the Thailand Studies Programme. Firstly, I cannot agree more with what Professor Kraft said about ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific. Claiming ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific is overextending our credibility. ASEAN is central in the Indian Ocean. What is ASEAN's interest in faraway places such as Asia, the Korean Peninsula and the Western Pacific? ASEAN is only central in South Asia and that is the true meaning of ASEAN centrality. I think we are overextending our credibility when we claim ASEAN centrality at the Indo-Pacific level. That is why I am a little bit worried that Ms. Hoang was talking about



implementation. At the Bali Concord III 2017, we had a more concrete commitment to create an ASEAN common platform by the year 2022. We have a plan of action on an annual basis as to how far we have implemented it and how much we have prepared to create that common ASEAN platform by the year 2022. We are now settling ASEAN with another major commitment to implement the Indo-Pacific outlook. As for an outlook, normally you do not have to implement anything. You just say what you believe, what you see and why you want to implement anything. For the Koreans, it is good that you admit that it was past diplomatic mistakes. There is a famous saying, "ASEAN needs Indonesia more than Indonesia needs ASEAN." I would like to say "The ROK needs ASEAN more than ASEAN needs the ROK." It does not matter for the past thirty years that the ROK considered ASEAN as secondary. ASEAN can exist without the ROK treating us as your parity. Now, the next thirty years you admit that you want to ally with ASEAN or other major powers. I think that is welcome. But I do not like the idea of linking ASEAN with India. I think we have two completely separate entities. I can assure you that we are very different. You need a dedicated ROK-India policy just like you need a dedicated ROK-ASEAN engagement.

I would like to ask Professor Choe that if you foresee in the near future, the ROK can live without the US alliance since you are already talking to a northern neighbor.

Also, to Professor Zhu Feng, it was an honor to listen to your humble expose of China. I think you can agree with me that we cannot completely blame either China or the US for what is happening in this world. You cannot expect us to join you in blaming either one. You need to see from our perspective that you already taught a very good geographic lesson in Hanoi 2010. Individually, we are small and China is big. What could be the rationale of the island reclamation in disputed areas in the South China Sea? You do not need that kind of construction. It is only to compete with the US in your global strategic competition. But by the way this is not the only thing happening in the world. ASEAN can choose many other middle powers to



work with. There are so many international issues that we can work with, even with China and the US. We can improve the UN, we can solve global climate problems. Do not always expect us to side with you in your competition with the US.

Q. Professor Zhu Feng, I am wondering about your opinion on this alleged accusation against China that the Chinese government would like to use its economic means to advance its political and strategic means and objectives in the Indo-Pacific. China especially with the One Belt One Road initiative (BRI) there is a great concern that it is virtually devastating local economies in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Indonesia, and there is also a worldwide effort to claim the Chinese government would like to manipulate its politics by bribing high ranking officials. What is your opinion on this?

A. Zhu Feng I think the BRI is about the confidence of a new generation of Chinese leaders. International relations and history tell us that every time a government wants to maneuver overseas commercial expenditure, other countries seek how to primarily respond to it. It is not the economy and, not commercial. It is always political and insecurity. Now in the American context, the BRI is Chinese geo-strategic leverage to compete

on an equal footing with American influence. So I would say stop bragging about such a stupid simulation. I see a lot of the mess left by the BRI project. The BRI is the biggest squandering of taxpayers' money. When the Western media and communities say the BRI is China's demonstration of geo-political ambition, I tell them not to overestimate it.

I have to say reclamation of the islands and the strategic ramifications is very much more complicated. On the one hand, I see a lot of Chinese nationalistic grieving in front of America's primacy in the region. A lot of Chinese believe they need to stand up to this. On the other hand, mature China could be less Americanized, then, we will probably be more welcomed. ASEAN people and ASEAN experts could help the Chinese learn how to behave in China's interest at the best.

A. Choe Wongi I think I did my presentation, but Mr. Termsak made it look like a confession. I hope it at least made a compassionate confession. ASEAN and India are both key partners in the NSP. We do have a differentiated approach. The bilateral trade volume with India is just over 20 billion dollars which is really a shame considering the size of both countries' economies. ASEAN is totally different. We cannot afford to have the same approach. To your question of whether we can live without the US alliance in the future, I think it largely depends on China, that is, if China can really tolerate a unified Korea with an alliance with the US.

A. Hoang Thi Ha I would like to answer Mr. Termsak's question briefly. I would like to clear this myth that adopting ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific means ASEAN has over extended or over reached in the whole Indo-Pacific region. Actually if you read the ASEAN outlook closely, we can see that ASEAN has been actually very realistic and humble by saying that we are not establishing any new mechanism and we will not change the current format and membership of ASEAN institutions. It is the lens through which ASEAN will look at the broader Indo-Pacific landscape. If not a geographic fact, it is a geopolitical or geo-economical fact already because Indonesia is looking west towards the Indian Ocean Rim countries for economic benefits

and Vietnam is intensifying its security relationship with India, and India is another big plank for the NSP of South Korea. So, it is something that ASEAN has kept in mind, and when I said that implementation of the Indo-Pacific, there is nothing wrong with it because the outlook has the two parts, the principle which is the normative part and also the practical cooperation part. There is nothing wrong to give effect and life to those principles and to practical cooperation because it serves the practical interests of ASEAN member states.

A. Herman Kraft I was asked about the Philippines, the idea of how it maneuvers or navigates. I think the point I was actually making was that if you look at all of the references to the present territory I think much of it has to do diplomatically with relationships or improving the relationship with China. While there is an attempt on the part of the present territory to actually improve relations with China that does not necessarily mean that we are moving towards China to the detriment of our relationship with the US. The point I like to make here is that the actions undertaken by the Philippines are similar to the kinds of calculations made by different countries, by different member states of ASEAN, in the sense that they look at things from a large national interest standpoint. In other words, the problem of ASEAN centrality is that it presumes that ASEAN has settled the question of what constitutes ASEAN strategic interests, and as long as these are questions settled more in favor of the individual interest of ASEAN countries than now, I think it would be difficult for ASEAN to really find an effective way by which you can actually talk about collective action as far as the Indo-Pacific.



Session 3

Enhancing Cooperation through the New Southern Policy



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Session 3

Enhancing Cooperation through the New Southern Policy

o **Lee Jaehyon** As Professor Choe wongi and other speakers touched upon, the NSP and small and medium powers' role in the US and China's strategic rivalry in previous sessions, pretty much of what I have prepared has been covered already. I will address two points. First one is the introduction and review of the NSP by the Korean government. Then, I will move on to policy proposals and recommendations for ASEAN, Korea and Southeast Asian countries to make joint efforts in the framework of the NSP.

There are three background stories to the NSP. It is my personal opinion and not an official background explanation from the Korean government reflecting the depth and width of Korea-ASEAN relations. ASEAN has very important economic influence on Korea. ASEAN is its number two trading partner and the second FDI destination as well as the second biggest market for overseas construction for Korea. More than 30% of South Korea's ODA goes to six ASEAN countries. ASEAN is one of its biggest partners in terms of people to people, social and cultural exchanges as well. Annually, more than 10 million people are coming and going from and to South Korea and ASEAN countries. Southeast Asian countries' priority in Korea's foreign policy agenda has

never been this high before President Moon introduced the NSP. The aim of the NSP is putting ASEAN on the same level as Korea's four major trading partners, China, the US, Russia and Japan. The second is the strategic network expansion. There is growing competition between China and the US. Regional countries are plagued by this struggle of superpowers and South Korea is not an exception. Korea would like to expand its friendship in the broader region and Southeast Asian countries could be its first target for a strategic network. The South Korean government has been saying that South Korea is a middle power and trying to learn how to play a proper role as one. Southeast Asian countries are the first target and partners for South Korea in its implementing middle power diplomacy. When it comes to South Korea's contribution in the region, there are three principles: Putting people's interests first in every single example of cooperation between Korea and Southeast Asian countries. Then there is prosperity. We had a mercantilist view before on Southeast Asia; how much economic benefit can we get in the Southeast Asian market, but the current Korean government takes a different approach; it puts an emphasis on mutual benefits. And there is peace. This is about

security and political cooperation between South Korea and Southeast Asian countries. What is novel in this peace cooperation is that we are done saying security cooperation but putting peace in front. This is a good discourse for small and medium countries to put forward against the superpowers. As to the performance of the NSP so far, firstly I would like to talk about the difference made in regards to direction and approach. We have established some new institutions such as the presidential committee on the NSP and the bureau for ASEAN affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To my knowledge, only South Korea and Australia have a separate bureau specialized in ASEAN matters among regional countries. South Korea also strengthened its representation to the ASEAN secretariat. The importance of these institutionalizations is that it gains momentum once you put institutions out there. Policies regarding Southeast Asian countries can be more effectively followed up throughout the succeeding administrations. Also, for the first time in Korean foreign diplomacy, President Moon had visited all the ASEAN countries over two years. These facts show that the South Korean government puts a lot of political will into deepening our partnership with Southeast Asian countries. There

has been a growing awareness of ASEAN's importance for South Korea's interests. This is quite crucial because a foreign policy such as the NSP cannot go any further without wide support from the audience. The US and North Korea summits in Singapore and Hanoi raised awareness of the importance of Southeast Asian countries for Korean interests.

We have three different areas of cooperation under the NSP: economic cooperation, social and cultural cooperation, and political security cooperation. Once governments open the door through MOUs or treaties etc, there will be no issues about economic and social and cultural cooperation. The private sector will catch on and develop it really quickly. However, political security cooperation is another story. It is entirely a government job. Among those three different pillars of cooperation between South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, political security cooperation, or peace cooperation if you will, is far behind the other two areas. The lagging looks prominent partially because political security cooperation is difficult to measure while economic, social and cultural cooperation are relatively easy to see and show by numbers such as GDP growth, trade expansion and investment growth





and so on. The other thing is both Southeast Asian countries and South Korea are quite sensitive when it comes to security cooperation. We have to look at other bigger powers surrounding us. Also, Southeast Asian countries and South Korea do not share common security threats. Although some countries have the same security issues such as the South China Sea, most of us have our own security threats. So, it is not easy to push forward political security cooperation.

My first proposal is deepening our strategic dialogue at the government level or on the track-two level. This is particularly meaningful when we get pressure or negative impacts from the superpowers' competition. The question is how to reduce the negative impact from the superpower rivalry, how to preserve strategic autonomy of regional countries, how to expand strategic room for the small and medium powers to maneuver, how to sustain and strengthen the rule based liberal order including the free trade order that has benefited regional countries

so far, and how to have influence on the new order emerging in this region for the benefit of small and medium countries.

I would also like to ask ASEAN to be more proactive. The ROK government has sent officers to the ASEAN capital and secretariat to listen to their opinions about the NSP, but at the same time I asked my friends to come up with their own proposal, demands and requests.

My last proposal has three points. For the continuity of the NSP beyond the ROK government, the ROK government has to think and look at how to further raise the awareness of the Korean people regarding the importance of Southeast Asia. Secondly, the ROK government has to upgrade its efforts to spread the message of the NSP to every corner of Southeast Asian countries. There are still experts in Southeast Asia who have never heard of the NSP, which requires additional diplomatic efforts to publicize it. Probably the ROK government can implement a kind of flagship project in the second term of the NSP. The ROK

government has to support the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific as a way to strengthen ASEAN centrality. Given the turbulent strategic environment that we are facing, it is quite crucial.

◦ **Hoo Chiew Ping** We definitely need more fora and dialogue between Southeast Asian institutions and South Korea because this area has been underexplored and we need more exposure. As Dr. Lee just mentioned, we need some flagship projects to raise awareness on the NSP and to make sure that the policy lasts over other administrations.

My presentation will focus on how to enhance ASEAN-ROK relations through the NSP. The NSP contains three Ps: Peace, People and Prosperity, which corresponds with ASEAN political security, social and cultural and economic community. This is where we can expect convergence. I propose three Cs as a concept for enhancing connectivity, convergence of interest and community building. Also, as Mr. Choi said in his opening remarks, we need to build collective resilience as well.

In terms of collectivity, what else is there that the ROK and ASEAN can do together? When I visited the ASEAN Korean Center and the presidential committee on the NSP in Korea, I talked to the ASEAN division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What I have been asked several times was what else we can do as well. I think there is a lack of innovative ideas on how to bring this relationship to be upgraded to another level. We can think of three ways that can bring about the convergence of interests between ASEAN member states and the ROK.

The first is infrastructure building because ASEAN has had proposals from China on various kinds of BRIs, and Japan has been a long-term partner of the region, and repackaged the initiative in its former

partnership for quality infrastructure. The ROK has a long history of investing in our infrastructure building. Malaysia's first Penang Bridge was built by Hyundai. Many roads and bridges including the latest case of linking to the site of Brunei were handled by Korean construction companies. Infrastructure building should be part of the ROK's diplomacy toward this region. South Korea presents a lot of opportunities. As Professor Dewi Fortuna mentioned earlier, our islands are not connected so even on the mainland of Southeast Asia, infrastructure is yet to be built to connect the east to the west, and the north to the south. South Korea can come to this region and enhance the connectivity. Maritime connectivity is another area. Bi-laterally each country has its own policy and I think we need to find an area of common cooperation to work on. There are a lot of areas we can work on including Malaysia's Look East policy 2.0. From my experience, South Korea is really ready to take proposals that can lead to initiatives. South Korea is very interested in ASEAN smart cities' networks and we have many working groups in different areas including cybersecurity and



all that. ASEAN-Korea also has its own business counsel and it is not just in a multilateral sense. Each country has also worked in a bilateral or multilateral mechanism within ASEAN which is a unique feature of ASEAN. As to the maritime connectivity, I was very happy to hear from Ms. Hoang when she asked a question about the Coast Guard and fishing community in Southeast Asia, and how best we can benefit from South Korea's cooperation. I think the Coast Guard is very big issue among ASEAN countries and that actually overlaps with the issue of fishing. Korea uses shipping roads that actually go mostly through the Malacca Strait which provides us more opportunity to work together. Korea actually has a maritime connectivity platform that connects Northern Europe and European Nations. I believe we can work together to build a similar platform for ASEAN. Other forms of naval and maritime corporation can be induced via the ADMM plus Korea, the ASEAN Korean Maritime Institution network and many other kinds of maritime diplomacy.

Last but not least, ASEAN and the two Koreas initiative. I think we are too afraid to talk about security

when it comes to ASEAN Korea relations. As Dr. Lee pointed out, a peace proposal is the most underdeveloped political security cooperation that lags far behind economic, social and cultural exchanges. According to my archive research on North Korea-Southeast Asian relations, most Southeast Asian countries do care about peace on Korean peninsula. Malaysia and Singapore have been trying to actively provide a facilitating role for the two Koreas. All ASEAN member states have relations with the two Koreas. In that sense, South Korea has an incentive to utilize the ASEAN platform or individual ASEAN states to advance its engagement with North Korea. South East Asian countries also have many NGOs already working in North Korea. So multilaterally, the ASEAN Regional Forum is the only official platform that North Korea is a member of, and to our treaty of amity and cooperation. They are also willing to participate in the ASEAN track-two network.

In December 2018, North Korea actually came to the ASEAN ISEAS chair, which was Myanmar at the time, to propose a roundtable on the Korean Peninsula

which we agreed to do and track-two members attended. Firstly, the lack of policy convergence. We have many policies that overlap with each other but no proposal from South Asia on how best to move forward. If we can actively and proactively take this role, it can act as an enhancing point for better relations. Secondly, there is positive and negative inducement when it comes to security cooperation including sanctions on North Korea and how best to engage North Korea without breaching the sanctions. Thirdly, because of the limited scope in expanding cooperation, we do not know what else to do. Now, traditional security issues actually cover climate change so if you follow North Korea closely, you will see how interested they are in climate change and its negative impacts. Although they are not so vocal about environmental issues, they have signed on to an international agreement on climate change and environmental reforestation. One of the first projects launched last year between South and North Korea was reforestation. Now that there is stagnation in inter-Korean relations, ASEAN can play a role here. ASEAN nationals can travel anywhere inside North Korea. If we can come up with some mechanism where South Korea supports ASEAN initiatives in North Korea, it can be a good way to advance relations. All in all, we need to focus on interconnectivity and realize we are all indispensable to each other. And we definitely need institutionalization in making joint efforts.

o **Tran Viet Thai** Let me address my presentation with four to five points. My first point is that we are entering a new era from our Vietnam angle. The post-Cold War era is now over. It is an era that has no

name yet. We do not know what it is and we do not know what to call it. One thing that is certain about it is that there are a lot of uncertainties. Recently, the US's abandoning Kurdish fighters actually had a big impact on our calculations in promoting relations with the US. There is a debate in Vietnam on how to promote relations with the US without being abandoned like the Kurds. Yesterday, the Department of State announced that President Trump, Vice President Pence and Secretary Pompeo will not attend the ASEAN summit in Bangkok which is another blow. President Trump appointed Mr. Robert O'Brien as a special envoy accompanied by Mr. Wilbur Ross. We see a lot of pressure upon our side because Mr. Wilbur Ross is the US trade representative. He will apply pressure on countries like Vietnam, Thailand or Indonesia during the trip upon the big trade volume we have with them. So the new era signals a lot of uncertainties.

My second point is that the role of middle powers and the role of regional organizations are and will be getting more and more important. Vietnam's foreign policy will be executed and implemented according to this trend in the years to come. We see increasing competition among major powers in the region centering around three countries: China, the US and Russia. The competition between China and the US is focused on the Asia-Pacific region. The tension between the US and Russia is about Europe and the Middle East. The Cold War era divided us into two camps along with ideological confrontation and a global nuclear arms race. Today's war also divides the world. The strategic competition between the US and China is increasing with China's BRI versus the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US, and this is forcing regional countries to take sides which is not good for all of us. Since the end of



the Cold War, Vietnam and ASEAN countries have not had to take sides. We have been integrating, and that integration has made us to make lots of achievements and good things. However, now, we cannot be sure whether or how long we can sustain the integration. Economic and trade competition is also increasing.

Recently, we hosted Mr. Randall Schriver, the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs of the US. He came to Vietnam to prepare for the upcoming visit to Vietnam by Mark Esper, the new defense secretary of the US. Mr. Schriver said that he wants the US-China relation to be competing rather than confronting. The scope and degree of competition is, however, unknown. There is uncertainty again that is now pushing for a lot of changes. We see that a diversion and shift of trade and investment has arisen which affects everybody including the global economy. We have to be well aware of that.

Last but not least is technological competition. With Huawei and 5G, it is a very clear and vivid example of how they compete. However, we see a lot of things such as artificial intelligence where competition keeps arising beyond Huawei. Because of so much fake news on Facebook, people sometime fail to grasp what is going on correctly, for example, about the South China Sea. It is not easy to live up to adequate standards when technology changes so many things so quickly. As Professor Zhu Feng mentioned, we now know that the increasing competition between the major powers will be long lasting. In my view, it is a zero-sum game, not win-win at all. There will be only one hegemony left in the region, and no G2 will be there. In the current competition, there are new elements coming in. In the past, there was sea, land and air. Now we see cyber and space added. We do not know



what is yet to come. It changes the region into a real region and a virtual region which is very different and has been left uncontrolled so far. We also see new dynamics for peace and development in the region.

The elevation of the status of ASEAN is not only being made by Korea. The EU including France has changed its position toward ASEAN as well. Although Korea is showing a fast change in its treatment of ASEAN, Korea is still little bit late in elevating ASEAN's status. We also see a lot of benefits in promoting relations with the ROK. For one thing, there is the security issue. Peace in the South China Sea and peace on the Korean Peninsula are very much inter-related. We tried very hard to host the second summit but I disagree with Dr. Hoo. I am not optimistic about North Korea's engagement. We have recently promoted some exchanges with North Korea and I was surprised to see the anti-US sentiment lingering in Pyongyang. It seems they are losing momentum as they were expecting the deadline to be the end of this year. They trusted only one person, President Trump,

but he is in a difficult situation now. ASEAN, Vietnam and Singapore did a good job in hosting the summits. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are very willing to help. But time is very limited now. If we miss this chance, we do not know how long it will take before we see another chance as it is only President Trump who is ready to have dialogue with North Korea. The rest of the regime is very anti-North Korea. ASEAN can enhance the dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK can also help ASEAN in many things such as supporting ASEAN's centrality, trust building, capacity building and ASEAN-led mechanisms. I see a lot of windows open for the ROK to contribute. However, I have to ask my Korean friends here how much political determination you have now and beyond President Moon's regime? You should not forget to maintain the determination and develop this opportunity.

As to the diversion of trade and investment, we see the movement is being made not only from China to Southeast Asia but to India and Brazil. Many ROK corporations are moving as well and I believe Southeast Asia can make a very good destination for them. We have a rising middle class, and creative and inexpensive human resources in Singapore, Myanmar and Vietnam for your corporations. The division can be mutually beneficial. People to people exchanges are not different. We see the K-pop wave, tourism and there is football I want to put an emphasis on as well. Mr. Park Hang-seo's popularity in Vietnam even prompted Thailand to choose a Japanese coach. I also heard that Indonesia is also considering hiring a Korean coach. The spin-off is inspiring. Just do not bring the Korean-Japanese competition to our region. I only hope to see the positive aspects of the two countries.

I will now talk about the upcoming ASEAN – ROK Commemorative Summit. We welcome President

Moon's initiative and the ROK for the 30th anniversary of the partnership of both sides. However, I would like to tell you that the NSP is a one-sided policy. I hope this summit can draw a joint vision, a joint plan of action and joint efforts in order to share interests, peace and prosperity. And again, I call for a further determination to make it last long over administrations. What kind of measures should we take to promote a mutually beneficial partnership? Firstly, build trust and maintain momentum. This is very important. We cannot lose momentum now. This kind of momentum does not come often. Secondly, widen practical cooperation. Let me emphasize on defense and security. Dr. Lee was wondering why security cooperation lags behind other cooperation between ASEAN and the ROK. One thing for sure is that we see a lot of potential in the Korean military system. But the ROK is now just focusing too much on the Korean Peninsula. As the situation is now changing, we highly recommend the ROK to spend more resources and efforts on promoting security and defense cooperation with ASEAN. This is a long-sighted strategic mindset in the new configuration in the region. Capacity building for ASEAN member countries, not only in the maritime domains but also cyber ones, and dealing with non-traditional security threats is also very helpful. Continuing its support for closing the gap in development among the ASEAN 6 and the ASEAN 10, and the list goes on. These are among the most important ways of enhancing cooperation for mutual benefit between the two sides.

○ **Tang Siew Mun** Thank you for your very frank insights. The challenge for us is that these are important issues. Can we widen the basket and explore other ways of cooperation? Dr. Lee, a part of the NSP is not



only for ASEAN per se but it is about ASEAN and India. There are two geographical focuses here. Please forgive me for asking this naughty question. What percentage do you think ASEAN and India each take up? Who do you love more in that sense? Another question from my colleague is what do you expect of the ROK as a middle power?

o Lee Jaehyon I expected this kind of situation to come up where I have to defend the Korean government's policy, though I am working in the private sector. As far as I am concerned, my love goes to Southeast Asia. As Professor Choe pointed out before, the ROK's trade goal by 2020 with India is 50 billion US dollars while it is 200 billion US dollars with Southeast Asia. It is four times bigger in terms of Chas four working groups in it. They are political security cooperation with ASEAN, economic cooperation with ASEAN, social and cultural cooperation with ASEAN, and the final one is India. In the beginning of the launch of the NSP, I had many chances to present the policy to the Korean people as well as to people in Southeast Asia.

Whenever I made a presentation, I used to show a picture of what we call the Northeast Asia Community Plus Initiative of the Korean government. It has got three different maps; the first one on the NSP, the second on the New Northern Policy (NNP) and, the third one focuses on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. In the NSP, we have policy toward Southeast Asia and a policy toward India. It is not like Korea is passing through ASEAN on the way to India. In the NSP, ASEAN and India are separate.

Q & A

Q. What do we expect from the ROK as a middle power? In an uncertain world, a middle power can provide some substitution to major power solutions. We expect the ROK to proceed with capacity building in many areas especially in economic development, institution capacity reforms, and maritime capability increases. We can also learn from the ROK on how to deal with complex situations in Northeast Asia, in particular in relations with major powers. We can also share the experience in the process of development, building a nation, building a society, and the law making process. However, it seems to me the ROK still looks at ASEAN for its own interests rather than putting itself in our shoes. The NSP was initiated merely because the ROK faced a problem with China and the US. The ROK needed to move its eggs into various baskets rather than taking Southeast Asia as real part of its game. So, there still is a lot of room for promotion which we should utilize.

Q. I think we can expect South Korea to take on more active roles as a middle power. I think activism used to be the characteristic shared by the strong leadership

of President Kim Dea-jung. His government proposed the Asian Vision Group and it eventually worked on the Southeast Asian leaders at that time and became the East Asian Summit. What we can do now with this institutionalized policy from Korea to Southeast Asia is that we can reinforce regional institutionalization, especially on the part that has not been working well so far which is an interregional reason with Northeast and Southeast Asia. If South Korea is willing to take out this initiative together with its ASEAN colleagues, I think that would be a good thing. In a way, South Korea has always been Southeast Asia in Northeast Asia because you need to hash among the great powers, and I think that converges very well with ASEAN is not choosing sides. With that, that will become the fundamental driving force to consolidate middle "powership."

Q. Middle power is now being revived. It can be a good research topic. ASEAN and the ROK can share the leadership in the wider region including the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN as a primary convener while the ROK as a new player can set an agenda and the two can learn from each other. To Dr. Tran, fear of abandonment, now is a honeymoon period between the US and Vietnam, the former enemy becoming a best friend. After the real lessons from real politics, there is hesitation. You should not be surprised in Southeast Asia as we had the Guam story in 1969. I would like to hear what they say in Vietnam about its relation with the US? You said there will be no G2 but we do not want division and enmity. We want a multiple order. If you think there is no one winner and they are playing a zero-sum game, where is Hanoi heading? Are you moving toward Beijing in fear of abandonment?

A. Tran Viet Thai I used the expression "the fear of abandonment" to describe what we are studying and how we are studying the situation. Next year will be the 25th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the US and Vietnam and there will be lots of commemorative events and activities. As to the discourse about the relations, I can summarize it into four positive and four negative things, the Chinese way of summarizing things. The first positive aspect is economic development. It has been made so fast and Vietnam is currently the number five trade surplus country. The second is that the emphasis is being put on trust building. The US is very careful in trust building with Vietnam. They are not abandoning us like the Kurds. A new framework of political relations has been developed. We hope it can be upgraded into a strategic partnership. The other positive is we are overcoming the past, the legacy of war with our joint endeavors. A lot of money and effort have been put into it such as detoxifying airfields and overcoming unexploded ordnance.

On the other hand, the first negative point is that we will be used merely bi-laterally and sometimes regionally within ASEAN plus the US But they view us mostly globally and just a little bit regionally. And the gap is very big. Secondly, there is a difference in priority. We want to focus more on the economy but the US puts more emphasis on security and defense. And there is the increasing competition between the US and China. We are very cautious to not be misinterpreted by either side; that we take one side against the other. We have a big community of more than two million Vietnamese Americans living in America because of our history. There is still a small portion of them who are anti-government. They make use of domestic politics in the US. to be anti-Vietnam.



Last but not least is that there is still a big gap in trust even though we are working very hard on closing the gap. The mindset is very different from each other and the discrepancy is quite big. I believe there will be no G2 and there will be only one winner in the end. I hope it can be ASEAN rather than China or the US. That is one of the reasons we are putting our collective efforts into making a united ASEAN.

Q. I would like to ask a question to Dr. Lee and Dr. Tran. Increased trade, investment and people exchanges are good news. However, when we see it on a country level, not on a regional level, I think there is an imbalance. For example, Vietnam took over 50% of Korean investment into ASEAN last year; 51.5% to be exact. It is a 60% increase year-on-year. My concern is that if one particular country occupies too much, other ASEAN countries might not be so supportive of the NSP. What do you think about this and how do you think we can deal with it?

A. Lee Jaehyon It is quite a difficult question. When it comes to trade and investment, Vietnam is the

largest beneficiary among Southeast Asian countries, but at the same time Vietnam has experienced the biggest trade deficit with South Korea. South Korea has a trade surplus of about 30 billion US dollars in the Southeast Asian market, and two third of the surplus is coming out of Vietnam. The imbalance amongst Southeast Asian countries is not a consequence of the NSP. At the beginning of the 1990s when South Korea started to make overseas investments, some Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were already predominantly trading with Japan, and it looked like there was no room for further investment, while Vietnam had just opened its market. So it was more convenient and tempting to invest in Vietnam for Korean corporations like Samsung Electronics. Once those companies made a success in investing in Vietnam, other companies in Korea looking for overseas investment naturally headed to Vietnam. The South Korean government is making every effort to cooperate with many ASEAN countries but it will take time to fill those historic gaps. This initial five years of the NSP is a beginning.

A. Tran Viet Thai Only recently has investment and trade between Vietnam and South Korea shown up, mainly because of the FTA between the two countries. It is partly because Vietnam is next to China and we offer a lot of preferential treatment, but I think things are changing. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are also offering preferential treatment. Trade and FTAs between South Korea and these countries are also increasing. Some say that the ROK is now over investing in and over concentrating on Vietnam and the ROK should be careful because its overreliance can backfire if something happens in Vietnam. I would like to make a comment on one bad habit of the ROK

investors in Vietnam. They enjoy preferential treatment so much that sometimes they even ask for more the next time. I think there soon will be time for an adjustment of this preferential treatment.

Q. I would like to ask to Dr. Lee. I wondered if I could have your reaction to Dr. Tran's admonition not to bring the Korean-Japan competition into the region. My next question is to Dr. Tran about the possibility of new summit meeting between South and North Korea, and trusting President Trump. You said Chairman Kim Jong-un only trusts President Trump. I think what you can trust is that President Trump will do what he thinks is necessary to win the election next year, and he is inclined to simply want to prove that he is the one who can get a deal. Considering that President Trump is the only person even in his administration who wants to make a deal with North Korea, do you think it would be possible to get the North Korean people to understand that they must negotiate with President Moon so that President Moon can serve what President Trump wants up on a silver platter?

A. Tran Viet Thai I think, for the North Koreans, the role of South Korea is now over. After North Korea started contact with the US directly, the facilitating role conducted by President Moon and South Korea showed its clear limits. I do not think there will be another summit between President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un at least for six months to a year. After having interactions with the delegation from and to North Korea, we realized that they do not trust anybody. The only person they think there is a chance to make any deal with is President Trump.

A. Lee Jaehyon It is not surprising to hear that North Koreans have no confidence in anybody in the world. And that is why it is so difficult to negotiate with them. However, it is not a matter of choice for Korea. It is about life and death and we have to solve the problem on the Korean Peninsula.

A. Tran Viet Thai North Koreans are extremely obsessed with the safety of their system and of their regime. And the problem of trust is most important for them.

A. Lee Jaehyon In my personal opinion, South Korea is definitely aware of the danger and uncomfortable feeling on Korea-Japan relations. Some people say this is a mini version of China-US relations because ASEAN countries and both countries involved have good relations. All I can say is that we will do whatever is necessary not to undermine the good relations.

A. Hoo Chiew Ping I want to respond to President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un's interaction. Recently, the North Korean side have actually expressed that they do not trust President Trump and his empty words anymore and requested the working group to change their attitude. I think that is quite consistent with the results of the last Hanoi summit. North Korea wants the working group to bring different proposals to the table. As to the investment and trade imbalance, there is a reason South Korea has over-invested in certain countries, and it could not promise the same amount of investment in countries like Laos or Cambodia. South Korea is finding a niche and I think it is good for the committee on the NSP to map out the potential niche market area among all 10 ASEAN members, and probably Timor-Leste too which has a visa-free arrangement with North Korea.



JEJU FORUM NIGHT



Jeju Forum Night

The Jeju Forum Singapore, the first regional event of the Jeju Forum, held the Jeju Forum Night as a networking opportunity with thinktank researchers and audiences in Singapore.

Under the slogan "Share the Light of Peace," the guests of the Jeju Forum Night shared the past, present, and future of the Jeju Forum, while revisiting its core values of peace and prosperity.

At this event, the theme for next year was announced and all of the participants expressed, in unison, high hopes for the success of the Jeju Forum 2020 and its contribution to peace and prosperity in Asia.

Following is the quote from the speech of Welcoming Remarks of Kim Bong-hyun, President of the Jeju Peace Institute and Chairman of Executive Committee of the Jeju Forum at the Jeju Forum Night.

"This year marks the 14th anniversary and the 15th Forum will be held from 28th until 30th of May next year in Jeju Island. Main theme of next year's Forum will be

Reinventing Multilateral Cooperation in Asia

Many political observers claimed that multilateral cooperation has been receding since President Trump was elected. Therefore, it would be relevant for the Jeju Forum to take up multilateral cooperation as a main theme. I expect Singapore and ASEAN join in the Forum and could contribute to reinventing multilateral cooperation for Asia and the world."



Jeju Forum Night in Singapore



Welcoming Remarks

Kim Bong-hyun
President, Jeju Peace Institute
Chairman, Executive Committee of the Jeju Forum



Congratulatory Remarks

Ahn Young-jip
Ambassador of the ROK to Singapore



Toast

Yoon Young Kwan
Former Minister Foreign Affairs & Trade of the ROK



Toast

Dato' Zainol Rahim Zainuddin
High Commissioner of Malaysia to Singapore



Congratulatory Video

Kim Sung-hwan
Former Minister Foreign Affairs & Trade of the ROK



Congratulatory Video

Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia







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