

Korean Denuclearization and Confidence Building Measures

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Cheju Forum for Peace and Prosperity

Cheju, ROK

28 June 2018

Outline

- High-level diplomacy
- Moon Jae-in's North Korea policy
- Past arms control and confidence building measures (CBMs)
- Has North Korea changed?
- The way forward
- Conclusion

High-level diplomacy

- Xi Jinping-Kim Jong-un summits in China
- Inter-Korean summits
 - Early in Moon's term; trying to avoid No Mu-hyun's mistakes
- 7th China-Japan-ROK trilateral in Tokyo (Abe, Moon, Li)
- Kim-Trump in Singapore
 - Top-down rather than bottom-up; similar to Carter-Kim Il-sung meeting in 1994
- Moon-Putin in Moscow
- Frequent shuttle diplomacy in first half of 2018
- Details? Goals and objectives? Convergent/divergent interests?
- Raised expectations

Moon Jae-in's North Korea policy

- Moon's national vision → “a nation of the people; and a Republic of Korea of Justice” with five subcomponents
 - A government of the people
 - An economy pursuing co-prosperity
 - Well balanced development across every region (of Korea)
 - A nation taking responsibility for individual lives
 - *The Korean Peninsula of peace and prosperity*
- The last element spells out Moon's North Korea policy

Moon Jae-in's North Korea policy

- NK policy is bounded by a vision of peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity. The vision is guided by:
 - Three goals
 - *Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of permanent peace*
 - Development of sustainable inter-Korean relations
 - Realization of a new economic community on the Korean Peninsula
 - Four strategies
 - *Taking a step-by-step and comprehensive approach*
 - *Tackling the issues of inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear threat simultaneously*
 - Ensuring sustainability through institutionalization
 - Laying the foundation for peaceful unification through mutually beneficial cooperation
 - Five principles
 - To Seize the initiative in resolving issues of the Korean Peninsula
 - To maintain peace with a strong defense
 - To foster inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect
 - To focus on interaction with the people and draw consensus
 - *To implement the policy through international cooperation*

Past arms control and CBMs

- 1953 Korean War Armistice
 - A demilitarized zone (DMZ), two-kilometers on each side of the military demarcation line (MDL), to separate combatants
 - Civil shipping in the Han River Estuary wherever each bank is controlled by opposing sides
 - Ceasing the introduction of reinforcing military personnel
 - The limitation of rotational military personnel
 - Ceasing or the introduction of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition except under specified conditions for replacement
 - The Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to enforce the armistice
 - The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) to monitor compliance by the opposing sides

Past arms control and CBMs

South Korea

- From 황진환, *한국의 안보와 군비통제* (서울: 봉명), 107 쪽.

North Korea

- Late 1950s
 - Non-aggression declaration
 - Withdraw USFK
 - Terminate U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
 - Reduce forces to 100,000 in both Koreas
- 1960s
 - Previous proposals + North-South peace treaty

Past arms control and CBMs

South Korea

- 1970s
 - N-S dialog & exchanges
 - N-S cease slandering each other
 - Peaceful use of DMZ
 - Both sides renounce the use of force
 - Non-aggression pact
 - Four-party talks

North Korea

- 1970s
 - Previous proposals + N-S mil-mil talks
 - Convert DMZ into a peace zone
 - Withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from the South
 - U.S.-DPRK peace treaty

Past arms control and CBMs

South Korea

- 1980s
 - Previous proposals + mutual military exchanges & observation of exercises
 - Mutual restraint in arms competition
 - N-S summits
 - N-S prime ministers talks

North Korea

- 1980s
 - Previous proposals + N-S political & mil-mil talks
 - N-S non-aggression pact
 - Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula
 - Terminate U.S.-ROK combined military exercises
 - Mutual reduction of military forces to 100,000

Past arms control and CBMs

- 1992 Basic Agreement
 - Non-aggression
 - South-North Joint Military Commission
 - Recognize Northern Limit Line (NLL) as maritime demarcation line in Yellow (West) Sea pending future settlement
- 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
 - No manufacturing, possession of nuclear weapons or fissile material
- 1994 DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework
- 2005 Joint Statement of Principles in the Six-Party Talks

Has North Korea changed?

- SK consistently has proposed CBMs, small/easy first & then big/difficult
- NK has proposed comprehensive, one-shot deals
- Arms control linked to political objectives & unification policy (for both Koreas)
- Has NK changed? Many optimists think so, but how can we be sure? What would the indicators be? How would it affect NK's position on arms control and CBMs?
- True peace requires tolerance & mutual coexistence
 - But inconsistent with dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, *sŏn'gun* ideology, the *pyŏngjin* line, and KWP Bylaws

The way forward

- If North Korea has only changed marginally, has it changed its approach to arms control and CBMS? One way to find out...
 - CTBT
 - CWC
 - UNSCR 1540
 - Yellow (West) Sea Peace Zone
 - Joint coast guard?
 - Legal code
 - Export controls, etc.
 - Conversion of long-range missile program into peaceful space launch program? Inter-Korean or regional space consortium? Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)? Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF)?
 - Outer Space Treaty; other outer space law

The way forward

- Sequencing matters
 - Credible commitment problems; repeated play & long-term horizon to build trust
 - But observable & measurable benchmarks are necessary (compliance & verification)
 - Issue linkage? Can non-governmental & non-market exchanges transform NK leadership's thinking & policy preferences?
 - Social science experiment → abstract social constructivist approach vs. positivist legalistic transactions approach
 - But if NK identity & interests truly are transformed, we should see evidence
 - Moon strategy requires “tackling the issues of inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear threat simultaneously”
 - But what timeline? What benchmarks are sufficient? What actors? What roles?

Conclusion

- Past arms control and CBMs have had limited success
- Shift in global geopolitics underway now?
 - Past shifts led to inter-Korean cooperation, but it was not sustained (1972, U.S.-PRC rapprochement, Nixon shocks; 1991-1992, end of the Cold War & collapse of the USSR and Eastern Bloc)
 - Will current shifts lead to inter-Korean cooperation? Fear of U.S. disorder/dysfunction and rising China?
- If NK denuclearization actually begins, issue of NK's peaceful use of nuclear energy & sanctions relief will emerge
 - Revised "KEDO-style" nuclear energy consortium? Inter-Korean? Regional? Waste management? Nuclear safety? NK re-entry into NPT?
- Multifaceted approach with many moving parts, different actors, different timelines
 - Requires international cooperation and coordination
 - If diplomacy fails, then back to default position of deterrence & containment, which also require international cooperation

Thank you

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