2002 *Jeju Peace Forum,* Guide for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia

In the new century, as the Free International City, Jeju Island is actively engaged in the role of becoming a Peace Hub in Northeast Asia.

Following this concept, in June, 2001, in order to commemorate the first anniversary of the North-South Korean Summit Talks which opened a new chapter in Korean History. To realize the peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia including the Korean Peninsula, the Jeju Peace Forum was held. Many renowned former state heads, political leaders, scholars, and messengers who have anticipated peace came to Jeju Peace Island, to participate in that forum.

In that forum, we reacknowledged the thick barrier which has the marred the peace on the Korean Peninsula in the Cold War structure during the past half century: dismantling is not that simple. Moreover, we could ensure that in the beginning of the 21st century, considering the situation, of the world we could we seek peaceful alternatives for co-existence and co-prosperity.

Focusing on that, after discussion for common peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia including the Korean Peninsula, we came up with the core goals for their implementation

Last year, the 2002 Jeju Peace Forum was held for the interim

overview of the biannual Jeju Peace Forum.

This book covers the recommendations of the experts in each field on the main subject for discussion in that forum, 'Rethinking and Re-engineering Peace in the 21st Century.'

The global trends show that recent world peace is somewhat guided by those in power. However, we are very aware that it is not the direction that the human society commonly pursues for a better life.

Regardless of race or region, peace is the precious mechanism of life. Therefore, I anticipate that this book will be a guide for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. we hope that it will be widely read by all the people who love and try to keep peace.

I'd like to wholeheartedly thank all as the participants and personnel who assisted with the 2002 Jeju Peace Forum.

The positive turnout is due to all of you who played a role as the positive leaders which in turn engineered a new chapter of peace in Northeast Asia including the Korean Peninsula, and furthermore, world peace.

Last but not least, my cordial thanks also goes out to the staff of the Jeju Development Institute who organized the 2002 Jeju Peace Forum, took recommendations from the discussion and made this book possible.

Thank you.

2003. 2

Koh Chung-suk, President of the Jeju Development Institute

A New World Order?
Unilateralism versus Multilateralism
in American Foreign Policy

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Introduction

American foreign policy is at a crossroads. A great debate has erupted over United States grand strategy -- that is, over how it defines and pursues its global interests. It is also a struggle among Washington policy elites (within and outside the Bush administration) for the defining vision of America's role in the world -- and the scope of its commitments and obligations to the international system. It is a struggle over the relative importance the United States attaches to power, military force, rules and institutions, sovereignty, and multilateral cooperation in the organization of post-Cold War world politics. It is also a struggle over foreign policy strategies toward adversary and rogue states -- in particular the core strategies of engagement, containment, and rollback. The debate is most explicit as it relates to the

campaign against terrorism, particularly in the American targeting of Iraq. Should the United States pursue a coercive approach toward "axis of evil" states or pursue a more multilateral approach emphasizing carrots and sticks? But the deeper debate goes beyond the fight against terrorism and concerns the long-term American approach to security and leadership.

Many people expected that a "great debate" would occur after the end of the Cold War, but at that dramatic historical juncture the United States guided by the first Bush and Clinton administrations pursued a policy of continuity and consolidation. The world changed less than many people thought it would. But today -- triggered by the war on terrorism and the "new realism" of the Bush administration -- a debate has finally emerged. Hawks in the Bush administration have brought into office remarkably radical ideas about American power and see a new neo-imperial role for the United States as it confronts terrorist networks and rogue states. Whether these ideas win the day will have huge consequences for America's relations with Asia, Europe, and the wider 21st century world order.

On a day-to-day basis, the debate about America's grand strategy is manifest in controversies over unilateralism versus multi-lateralism. The Bush administration has shown a skepticism about multilateral rules and obligations and a bias for acting alone to advance its own national interests. Its rejection of the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, and various arms control treaties in its first year in office are reflections of this new realist thinking. Allies and other governments around the world

have complained loudly about America's arrogance, its absence of self-restraint, and its unwillingness to consult or work multilaterally with other states. But it is important to stand back from the day-to-day controversies and see the deeper choices and visions that inform the current debate of American foreign policy. The United States has always been ambivalent about multi- lateralism and rule-based cooperation even though today's international environment makes it easier for the United States to go it alone and act without restraints.

The two grand strategies that compete for supremacy might be labeled "liberal multilateralism" and "realist unilateralism." The first is a vision of a partnership-based American leadership, organized around multilateral rules, institutions, and strategic cooperation among the major democratic powers. This is the status quo American grand strategy that was launched after World War II, thrived in the shadow of the Cold War, and emerged after the Cold War as the dominant impulse of Bush Sr. and Clinton foreign policy. The second grand strategy is not fully articulated by the new Bush administration but exists in the ideas and policy designs of many officials who are part of the foreign policy team. Many of these neo-conservative officials made their first appearance in the Reagan administration. They embrace a vision of a more unencumbered America that -- fortified by unchallenged military power -- invites ad hoc, coalition-based partnerships but ultimately stands willing to act along to pursue its national strategic interests. Realist primacy is a grand strategy that defines American foreign policy in terms of threats at the moment primarily terrorist

threats. In this view, engagement is seen as a secondary tool. Sticks are ultimately more effective than carrots. It puts little stock in treaties, international law and institutions, or multilateral agreements. At the extreme, this is a grand strategy with neo-imperial impulses.

This paper will explore the tensions in American foreign policy and the way these tensions are manifest in relations with East Asia and other parts of the world. I argue that the unilateralist, neo-conservative ideas in the Bush administration are not likely to disappear any time soon. American military power and the absence of counter-pressures and external restraints on the United States makes it easier for American foreign policy to be driven by ideology and the agendas of ideologically-oriented foreign policy elites. But the practical realities of tackling global security and economic problems and the pushing and hauling of inter-allied relations do, nonetheless, act as a break on the neo-imperial impulse. The history of hegemonic states -- or imperial great powers -- tells us a great deal about the dangers and self-defeating logic of aggressive unilateralism. But the history of American postwar involvement in organizing the existing world order also tells us that controversies over the exercise of American power is not new. Crises have come and gone in America's relations with its East Asian and European allies. When it comes to the future of the existing world order, it is still possible and likely that the "center will hold."

The hard-line policies of the Bush administration will make the United States less inclined to pursue an engagement approach

toward North Korea and other so-called rogue states. But there are countervailing pressures at work. If South Korea pursues an dialogue with the North and some concrete agreements can be achieved, this will make it difficult for the United States to pursue an exclusively coercive, sanctions-oriented approach. The logic of the Clinton administration's approach -- which emphasized step-by-step deals aimed at exchanging normalization of relations with North Korean for the ending of its nuclear and missile programs -- will eventually be rediscovered by the new foreign policy team.

At the end of the paper, I speculate more generally on the impact of September 11th on American foreign policy. The Bush administration's campaign against terrorism both reinforces and undermines America's existing relations with major regions and states. The administration's preoccupation with Iraq and its willingness to use force outside of its security partnerships has unsettled governments around the world. Its "axis of evil" vision of the security threats facing the United States also has unsettled other countries. But the preoccupation with terrorism has also provided some basis for the improvement of relations with Russia and China. In the past, when the United States found itself draw into a war in 1918, 1941, and during the Cold War it defined ambitious and lofty war aims. It sought to build a more stable and peaceful and mutually beneficial international order on the other side of the war. The Bush administration has not yet done this. It continues to be preoccupied by the threats themselves. What the world looks like in the years following this new global struggle against terrorism hinges in many ways on how the

United States defines its own grand strategy and articulates a postwar vision of world order.

American Power in a Changed World

Several world developments have conspired to trigger the new debate on American grand strategy. One obvious shift is the end of the Cold War, which has liberated the United States from the restraints of bipolar world order and the superpower stalemate. When the United States led the Cold War alliance against the Soviet bloc it was forced to make compromises and accommodate allies. Its power was put at the service of a larger group of countries -- the "free world" -- and a well developed higher purpose -- "containment." In the absence of this unifying threat it has been harder for the United States to define its grand purposes and roles.

During the 1990s, the United States did pursue a non-threat based grand strategy. Both the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration attempted to articulate a vision of world order that was not dependent on an external threat or an explicit policy of balance of power. Bush the elder talked about the importance of the Euro-Atlantic community and discussed ideas about a more fully integrated Asia Pacific region. In both the Atlantic and Pacific regions the Bush strategy was to offer a positive vision of alliance and partnership that was built around values, tradition, mutual self-interest, and the preservation of

stability. Likewise, in the absence of a Soviet threat the Clinton administration attempted to describe the post-Cold War order in terms of the expansion of democracy and open markets. What emerged was a liberal vision of order. Democracy provided the foundation for global and regional community. Trade and capital flows were seen as forces for political reform and integration. Institutional creations such as APEC, NAFTA, and the WTO were seen as tools for reinforcing economic openness and rule-based order.

During the 1990s the American alliance system was also recast to account for the disappearance of the Soviet threat. In Europe, NATO expansion became a tool of democracy promotion and the extension of Western political order into the former Soviet empire. Likewise, the East Asia, the important Nye report of 1995 defended American alliance commitments to Japan and Korea in terms of their role in promoting stability. The bilateral alliances provided security by providing durable order. This was the rationale for "deep engagement." The United States had a grand strategic interest in remaining a critical player in the East Asia and the alliance system was its calling card. More generally, the European and East Asian alliances forestalled the outbreak of regional security dilemmas and the rise of competitive regional blocks. Balance of power cooperation turned into a strategy of cooperative security and the pursuit of stability.

But the first decade after the end of the Cold War also shows the difficulties of pursuing a grand strategy that is not attached to a major threat. Many observers have argued that the United

States tended to drift in strategic terms during the 1990s. The Clinton administration is given credit for pursuing a coherent global economic strategy and to some extent this was their version of a global security strategy. The completion of a global trade round and the launching of the WTO are seen as major achievements that many thought were unlikely after the Cold War. But the United States also was less than consistent in its various foreign policy adventures humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and arms control. Republicans argue that the Democrats were undisciplined and preoccupied with the small stuff the third world misadventures and neglected the core strategic situation. The 1990s do seem to show the difficulties of pursuing a grand strategy without a specific geopolitical threat. The Bush administration has demonstrated the ways in which an explicit threat in this case post-September 11th terrorist threat can galvanize the foreign policy process and give the American president added political muscle.

A second development has been the remarkable rise of American military capacity, which has reduced the restraints on American power and opened up new strategic possibilities. The numbers are stunning. The United States spends roughly the same amount on defense as the next fourteen countries combined. Paul Kennedy notes this development. "For the past decade and well before that, the U.S. has been spending more on its defense forces, absolutely and relatively, than any other nation in history. While the European powers chopped their post-cold war military spending, China held its in check, and Russia's defense budget

collapsed in the 1990s, the U.S. Congress duly obliged the Pentagon with annual budgets ranging from $260 bn in the middle of the decade to this year's $329bn." Kennedy goes on to note: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. . . The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap. Britain's army was much smaller than European armies, and even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy. Charlemagne's empire was merely western European in its reach. The Roman empire stretched further afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison."[1]

This remarkable American military predominance has profoundly influenced world politics. It has not yet triggered a full backlash. There has not emerged an attempt by the other great powers to balance against American power even though realist students of history would say that such a balancing reaction is logical and to be expected. But there are several other implications of this new power asymmetry. First, in a world of such unbalanced power, the United States can impact the world more than the world can impact it. The bargaining advantages reside with the United States. It can walk away from negotiations more easily than other states whether the issue is global warming, responses to financial crises, or more traditional foreign policy matters. Other countries are more dependent on the United States than it is on them. This

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1) Paul Kennedy, "The Eagle has Landed," *The Financial Times*, 2-3 February 2002.

makes other countries uneasy.

Second, it is easier for the United States to militarily go it alone without alliance partners. It is the only country in the world that is not dependent on others for its security. It has no serious geopolitical challengers. It can decide when and where it uses its military power. As the experience in Afghanistan shows, the United States is alone in the capacity to project force. Its allies do not have the technological and military capacities to remain full partners with the United States on the battle field.

Finally, this asymmetry in military capacity skews the character of America's partnerships and reduces the deep mutual depen- dent relations that underpin the alliances. The alliances look increasingly like hierarchical political formations. The United States provides security and its partners accommodate themselves to American goals and policies. The asymmetry in the alliance relations have always existed from the beginning. It has always been manifest even in the European role within NATO. But rising military asymmetries will only increase political disparities and make the United States less inclined to listen to and accommodate its partners.

These developments are built into the changing structure of the international order. They would have an impact on American foreign policy even if the Bush administration were not in office. But this unipolar order backed by a near monopoly of military power tends to amplify the ideas of the individuals who run American foreign policy. In a unipolar world, the ideas of a few individuals at the center of that power can have a huge impact

on the wider world order. Indeed, it is not surprising that while the United States focuses on the fight against terrorists, the rest of the world is focused on America attempting to detect its strategy and vision. Governments around the world are eager to engage the United States and they search for ways to encourage a consultative-based, multilateral American foreign policy.

America's Postwar Bargain with the Outside World

The core of today's international order what might be called the post-World War II American system -- is built on two grand bargains that the United States has made with other countries around the world. One is a "realist" bargain that grew out of the Cold War. The United States provides its European and Asian partners with security protection and access to American markets, technology, and supplies within an open world economy. In return, these countries agree to be stable partners who provide diplomatic, economic, and logistical support for the United States as it leads the wider American-centered postwar order. This is the impulse leading a campaign against Soviet communism that shaped the character of American commitments on a global scale.

The other is a "liberal" bargain that addresses the uncertainties of American power. East Asian and European states agree to accept American leadership and operate within an agreed upon political-economic system. In return, the United States opens itself up and binds itself to its partners. In effect, the United States

builds an institutionalized coalition of partners and reinforces the stability of these long-term mutually beneficial relations by making itself more "user friendly" that is, by playing by the rules and creating ongoing political processes with these other states that facilitate consultation and joint decision making. The United States makes its power safe for the world and in return the world agrees to live within the American system. These bargains date from the 1940s but continue to undergird the post-Cold War order.

The American system is a product of two order building exercises after World War II. One is familiar and commonly seen as the defining feature of the postwar era. This was the containment order, organized around superpower rivalry, deterrence and ideological struggle between Communism and the free world. Truman, Acheson, Kennan, and other American foreign policy officials were responding to the specter of Soviet power, organizing a global anti-communist alliance and fashioning an American grand strategy under the banner of containment. America's strategy was to "prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won . . . to reshape the postwar international order."[2] This is the grand strategy and international order that was swept away in 1991.

But there was another order created after World War II. Here American officials were working with Britain and other countries

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2) John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 4.

to build a new set of relationships among the Western industrial democracies. The political settlement among these countries was aimed at solving the problems of the 1930s. This was a political order whose vision was articulated in such statements as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, and the Marshall Plan speech in 1947. Unlike containment, there was not a singular statement of strategy and purpose. It was an assemblage of ideas about open markets, social stability, political integration, international institutional cooperation, and collective security. Even the Atlantic Pact agreement of 1949 was as much aimed at reconstruction and integrating Europe and binding the democratic world together as it was an alliance created to balance Soviet power.

The American system is based on a vision of open economic relations, intergovernmental cooperation, and liberal democratic society. But the most consequential aspect of the order is its security structure. Although the United States remained deeply ambivalent about extending security guarantees or forward deploying troops in Europe and Asia, it ultimately bound itself to the other advanced democracies through alliance partnership.[3] This strategy of security binding has provided a structure of

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3) On the complex, ambivalent, and evolving American thinking on its postwar security commitment to Europe and Asia, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvin Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

commitments, restraints, and mechanisms of reassurance between the democratic alliance partners.

The American-centered alliances have always been doing more "work" than is usually appreciated.[4] The traditional understanding of alliances is that they are created to balance against external power and threats. But America's postwar alliances with Europe and Japan were created to achieve more. The alliances have had much to do with stabilizing and managing relations between alliance partners than in countering hostile states. This was true even during the Cold War but it is even more fundamentally the case today. The alliances serve to bind Japan, the United States, and Western Europe together and thereby reduce conflict and the potential for strategic rivalry between these traditional great powers. The alliances provide institutional mechanisms that allow each state to gain access to the policy making processes in the others. Europe and Japan have institutionalized mechanisms for influencing the exercise of American military power. The alliances allow the United States to both project power around the world and to limit and channel how that power is exercised. These functions of the alliances fit together and they constitute a long-term institutional bargain between the United States and its European and Asian partners.

It is these bargains and order building settlements that are up for rethinking in the current American debate about grand

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4) This argument is developed in G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

strategy. It is a debate about whether the existing relations and bargains still operate and serve the security interests of the major states or whether a new set of roles and understandings must be created.

America's Competing Grand Strategies

The Bush administration has still not completely come to terms with -- or accepted the logic of -- the American system. The events of September 11 expose philosophical divides that exist within the Bush administration over the exercise of American power and visions of international order. In fact, two distinct grand strategies are competing for primacy in Washington foreign policy. As we have seen, the strategy of liberal multilateralism generally characterized the approach of the previous Bush and Clinton administrations as well as American policy during the post-World War II era within the West. This is the strategy that gave rise to and reinforces the American system.

This liberal grand strategy is based on the view that American security and national interests can be best advanced by promoting international order organized around democracy, open markets, multilateral institutions, and binding security ties. The spread of democracy reduces security threats and creates a more congenial environment in which to pursue its interests. The expansion of trade and investment helps open up closed societies, strengthens civil society, and creates "vested interests" that favor stable and

continuous relations with the outside world. Properly constructed regional and international institutions can foster rules and norms of cooperation and create mechanisms for conflict resolution. Finally, by establishing binding security ties between potential adversaries, surprises are reduced and expectations of stable future relations dampen the security dilemmas that trigger arms races, strategic rivalry and power balancing. The American-led alliance system creates reassurances and binding commitments among the alliance partners that provides a structure for stable order.

But some Bush administration officials embrace a more unilateral -- even imperial -- grand strategy that is based on a stark realist vision of American interests and global power realities. It can be called realist unilateralism or a neo-imperial grand strategy. In this view, American preponderance allows it to operate offshore selectively to engage Europe and Asia, dominating world politics with military forces that are both unchallenged and less bound to United Nations or alliance controls. Cooperative security, arms control, and multilateral cooperation across the boards play a reduced role in this global strategy.

The new Bush administration still speaks with a somewhat mixed voice on grand strategy.[5] To be sure, it has reaffirmed basic aspects of the multilateral economic and security order and

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5) The U.S. State Department's Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, has coined the term "a la carte" multilateralism is refer to the administration's approach, but important differences in thinking exist across the administration. See Thom Shanker, "White House Says the U.S. is Not a Loner, Just Choosy," *The New York Times*, 31 July 2001.

America's leadership position within it. It has moved forward aggressively with freer trade and investment in the Western Hemisphere and called for a new round of global multilateral trade negotiations. But lurking in some quarters of the government is a deep skepticism about operating within a multilateral rule-based international order. Glimpses are offered of an alternative grand strategy of unilateralism and selective engagement. "It is not isolationist but unilateralist, unashamed of using military power," one reporter notes.[6] It is a unilateral grand strategy that resists involvements in regional and multilateral entanglements that are deemed marginal to America's own security needs. It envisions American power acting on the world but not being entangled by the world.

The most visible sign of this skepticism about liberal multilateralism and institutional commitments in the Bush administration was the dramatic sequence of rejections of pending international agreements including the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Germ Weapons Ban, and the Trade in Light Arms treaty. In pushing national missile defense, the administration has also signaled its willingness to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense treaty, which many regard as the cornerstone of modern arms control agreements. In each case, there is serious debate about the merits of various aspects of these agreements. But together the chorus of rejections underscore the misgivings the Bush administration has

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6) Stephen Fidler, "Between Two Camps," *Financial Times*, 14 February 2001.

about the entire enterprise of multilateral and rule-based co-operation.[7]

The Bush administration is also retooling defense strategy that will inevitably loosen alliance partnerships. The new high-tech revolution in military capabilities will increasingly allow the United States to project force from the United States rather than from platforms in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These include more long-distance bombers, precision missiles, and space-based weapons. Missile defense depending on which options are pursued can also loosen alliance ties by making the United States more secure without a forward based presence. Missile defense has been defended by some as a technology that will strengthen America's defense commitment to its European and Asian allies. If the United States feels secure from counter-attack from North Korea, they say, it is more likely to come to the defense of Japan and Korea. But the longer-term political effects of a comprehensive national missile defense capacity will ultimately have the opposite effect. It will make American political leaders less certain why the United States needs to be spending money protecting people in far away places.

The vision that lies behind this grand strategy and military posture is deeply rooted in old ideas about the country's place in the world -- ideas that over the last fifty years have been pushed to the sidelines.[8] It is a vision of a country that is big enough,

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7) See Gerard Baker, "Bush Heralds Era of U.S. Self-Interest," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 April 2001.
8) See Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Urged to Embrace an 'Imperial' Role,"

powerful enough, and remote enough that it can go it alone and disentangle itself from the dangerous and corrupting conflicts festering in all the other regions of the world. It is a vision that is deeply suspicious of international rules and institutions. "It is the difference between those who would rely on lawyers to defend America and those who rely on engineers and scientists," observers Newt Gingrich in explaining why his Contract with America included a commitment to National Missile Defense.[9] The dream that propels many missile defense proponents is not a limited missile shield that might stop an errant missile launched by a rogue state, but a national shield that will once and for all do away with the postwar system of nuclear deterrence based as it is on the ugly logic of mutual assured destruction.

The tension between the liberal multilateral and unilateral grand strategies has been sharpened in the aftermath of September 11 but it has also been altered by these events. Richard Perle, the Bush administration's head of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon suggested that there were real limits on a coalition-based approach to fighting terrorism: "It's wonderful to have the support of our friends and allies, but our foremost consideration has to be to protect this country and not take a vote among others as to how we should do it." When brought to Secretary of State Colin Powell's attention, he responded: "I have not scheduled a vote for any members of this coalition to participate in. . . . But the

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International Herald Tribune, 22 August 2001.

9) Stephen Fidler, "Conservatives Determined to Carry Torch for U.S. Missile Defense," *Financial Times*, 11 July 2001.

President has made it very clear that the kinds of things that will probably be most successful in the campaign against terrorism are intelligence-sharing, controlling people going across borders, financial transactions and how to get at their financial systems. You can't do this, America alone. You need coalitions."[10] Some officials in the administration -- embracing unilateralist ideas -- have bridled at the constraints that an alliance and coalition-based approach implies, particularly the limitations that it imposes on the countries and targets that the United States can go after. But the logic of the situation has strengthened the hand of those seeking to pursue American interests through multilateral and alliance-based tools.

The Bush Doctrine and the Imperial Impulse

The cutting edge of American foreign policy today concerns its strategy of dealing with rogue states and terrorist networks. In his speech before a joint session of Congress on September 20th, President Bush articulated what might be called the Bush doctrine: governments would be held to account for the activities of the organizations and groups within their territory. Governments that fail to exercise authority in supervising their own people or do not act to eliminate terrorist groups risk military intervention by the United States and the wider international community. In the

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10) Secretary of State Powell, National Public Radio Interview, 27 October 2001.

months since September 11th, as the Bush administration has debated the so-called "phase two" of the war on terrorism, Iraq and the "axis of evil" states have come into focus. It is now not just a campaign to crushing terrorist networks but also to confront rogue states that threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction.

When a prominent State Department official was recently asked if a Bush doctrine was emerging, he said: "I think there is. What you're seeing from this Administration is the emergence of a new principle or body of ideas I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine about what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked."[11]

In one sense, this set of ideas are consistent with the past. They affirm the primacy of states as the necessary guarantor of security. In the age of terror, the world must redouble its efforts to build order around fully functioning nation-states. Failed states such as

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11) Nicholas Lemann, "The New World Order," *The New Yorker*, 1 April 2002, p. 46.

Afghanistan are the breeding ground for terrorism. A world of stable, capable, and accountable nation-states is a world that is secure from terrorism. But the Bush administration takes this idea and takes it two steps further. First, it suggests that where countries fail to provide stable governments the outside world has a right to intervene and act directly against threatening groups. The rights of sovereignty are forfeited. The only way the outside world can protect itself is by directly occupying and rebuilding those states. The United States has indicated, for example, that it will keep its forces in Afghanistan until all the terrorist elements are eliminated. Likewise, foreign troops are likely to stay in Afghanistan for years so as to provide stability and protection for the new government. This approach to failed states harks back to an earlier era when the great powers supervised troubled territories through international mandates. Second, the Bush administration goes a step further by adding the threat of weapons to mass destruction to the campaign against terrorism. Iraq is the immediate target. Hawks within the administration argue that the war on terrorism cannot be won until Iraq's government is toppled and, indeed, the administration has made it a policy of the United States to effect regime change in Bagdad.

This is a foreign policy doctrine with almost no limits. The United States reserved to itself the right to intervene around the world to protect itself and to topple governments that it deems as threats. It is a marriage of American power and the transformation of the threat environment. In a deep sense, this is an emerging grand strategy that is more imperial than realist. It

is a vision of world order that is organized around American unipolar dominance possessed of the power and right to intervene without the constraints of allies or international law. It is not a vision of order built around the balance of power or a concert of major states. It is built on American might and national interest.

It is still unclear how radical a break the Bush doctrine is with the post-World War II American system of bargains and commitments. At the extreme in its neo-imperial version it is certainly a sharp break. But there is still an ongoing debate within the administration and across the foreign policy establishment about whether this assertive campaign against terrorism and rogue states is best pursued through unilateral or multilateral means. Secretary of State Powell and his aides tend to favor a multilateral approach. They recognize the virtues of concerted action it is more effective because it combines the power assets of multiple states and it ultimately is seen as more legitimate by the world community. The Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, Richard Haass, notes: "Great as our advantages are, there are still limits. We have to have allies. We can't impose our ideas on everyone. We don't want to be fighting wars alone, so we need others to join us. American leadership, yes; but not American unilateralism. It has to be multilateral. We can't win the war against terror alone. We can't send forces everywhere. It really does have to be a collaborative endeavor."[12]

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12) Lemann, "The New World Order," *The New Yorker*, 46

Other administration officials think otherwise. Allies are fine when they are supportive but we should not get caught up in complicated, collaborative ventures. How this debate is resolved will determine whether the war on terror reinforces or undermines the prevailing international order. The view of American allies is this: the United States has the power to act alone in many circumstances but it will pay a price. East Asian and European partners will probably not actively oppose an American intervention in Iraq, even if they do in fact privately oppose it. They will do what is minimally necessary to prevent a crisis in the alliance. If the United States acts deliberately and follows a path that begins with diplomatic and consultative steps the opposition will be deduced. But over the long-term, the journalist Yoichi Funabashi speaks for the many governments: "America's allies will not follow a United States that takes the law into its own hands as the guardian of virtue in controlling evil."[13]

Conclusion

The Bush administration has brought into office an array of neo-conservative hawks who have quite radical ideas about American power and international order. They are not status quo stewards of the American national interest. The terrorist events of September 11th have galvanized these officials and they are now

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13) Yoichi Funabashi, "Can 'Bad Cop Confront the 'Axis of Evil' Along?" *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 February 2002.

embarking on a far-reaching rethinking of American foreign policy. The quick victory in Afghanistan has strengthened the position of hawks in the administration who want to use the window of opportunity provided by the terrorist crisis to reshape the international order. The hardliners have seemed to won the debate: the United States does in fact intend to overturn the regime in Iraq. But behind this debate and the more general debate about unilateralism and multilateralism is how to exercise American power. Do you operate primarily though established alliances or partnerships or bravely embark on running a more imperial unipolar order? This great debate has not been settled.

What is missing today in America's rethinking of its grand strategy is a clear vision of how the United States wants to use its power. We lack a new picture in our heads of the 21st century world order. In past great wars, the United States has moved quickly to articulate postwar aims to indicate to the world what the long-term purpose of the war really is. Wars provide an opportunity to use victory to leverage agreements with other states so as to strengthen the underlying fabric of the international system. Woodrow Wilson did this in 1918 with his famous fourteen points and Franklin Roosevelt did it together with Winston Churchill in 1941 with the Atlantic Charter. These leaders indicated to their own people and to governments around the world that shouldering the burdens of war would be difficult but ultimately rewarding because it would pave the way to a better international order. The world since September 11th has been jolted by the new threats that make the civilized world less

secure. But there has been very little grand thinking about how the struggle against terrorism can actually be conducted so as to yield a more stable and agreeable world order.

The War against Terrorism, Islam, and the World Order

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I. Introduction

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001 is remembered not simply because of its intolerable atrocity against humanity by killing more than five thousand innocent civilians, but also because it changed the basic contour of world order. The September terrorist attack was an event that has reshaped the history of the 21st century. It was also a shocking wake-up call to the United States, which became complacent with its triumph in the Cold War and believed in the unpenetrable sanctuary of home land security.

The 9·11 tragedy was not anticipated at all.[1] It is particularly

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1) For a review of failures of early warning on the 9.11 terrorist attack, see Robert Baer, *See No Evil* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002); Seymour M. Hersh, "What Went Wrong: The CIA and the Failure of American

so when viewed in light of the advent of the Bush administration. The Bush administration that commenced on January 21, 2001, bringing to a close an eight year long Democratic administration, began to make major realignments in American foreign policy. The primacy of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation under the Clinton administration was abruptly replaced by Bush's emphasis on power politics and bilateral alliance. The Bush administration proposed a new strategy of selective engagement by criticizing the Clinton's "emergency call (911)" diplomacy of over-committment and over-extension. More importantly, George W. Bush had a vision of *Pax Americana* through a preponderance of its power. Offensive realism became the foundation of American foreign policy.

Such a shift was apparent in several key foreign policy areas. First, casting serious doubts about Clinton's soft-landing policy, the Bush administration quickly shifted to a hard-line policy. Second, on the Israel-Palestine dispute, it extended unilateral support to Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's hard-line policy, aggravating the situation. Third, China was no longer considered a strategic partner. In a sharp contrast to the previous administration, Bush and his neo-conservative advisors began to formulate its offensive East Asian policy by presupposing major threats from China. Finally, the Bush administration has taken a unilateral path to international cooperation by abrogating a series of international

Intelligence," *New Yorker* (October 8, 2001).

treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is paradoxical to witness the 9·11 terrorist attack occur at a time when the United States declared a new foreign policy initiative based on unilateralism and offensive realism.

Some Americans regards the September 11 incident as an event that is more serious and damaging than the attack on Pearl Harbor, which triggered the Pacific War. Several factors explain its seriousness. First, it was the first attack ever on targets in the heart of the United States. Second, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon symbolized world capitalism and American hegemonic power. Third, the "CNN effects" mattered. Americans watched the infernal scene of ruthless terrorism in real time. Finally, the attack by a small size terrorist group not only humiliated American power, but also portended a new type of war and insecurity in the 21st century.

The American response to the 9.11 terrorist attack was decisive and resolute. President Bush declared that war against terrorism should be the first war in the 21st century, and pledged to chase after Al Quaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden to the ends of the earth. As part of such efforts, the U.S. toppled the Taliban regime by waging a war and established a pro-American government in Afghanistan. However, the triumph in Afghanistan did not mean the end of the story. The United States has declared that it will continue to fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction. In his state of the union speech in January 2002, Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as new targets by calling them the "axis of evil."

Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at tracing impacts of globalism terrorism on world order. The first section locates and re-interprets the meanings of terrorism and counter-terrorism within the framework of the "clash of civilizations." The second traces the origins of Islamic terrorism by examining the many faces of Islamic fundamentalism. The third section attempts to uncover the motives of Islamic terrorist groups' attack on the United States. Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of American responses and subsequent impacts on the formation of world order.

II. Clash of Civilizations and Counter-terrorism

Since the September 11 incident, the United States has set the war against terrorism as a matter of highest priority in its national security. What then are its features? The war against terrorism, or counter-terrorism, can be defined as a series of actions and policies to detect terrorist plans and movements and to prevent them, as well as to drastically ferret out the terrorist groups and to crush them through preemptive attacks, in the case that preventive measures fail.[2] Although there has been an increasing concern over terrorism, counter-terrorism has gained the prominent position

in the hierarchy of national interests, compared with weapons of mass destruction. And strategies and tactics of counter-terrorism have varied by different types of terrorism.

The United States has focused on Islam in formulating the comprehensive strategy of counter-terrorism. Of course, President Bush has tried to avoid the impression that counter-terrorism reflects the clash of civilizations between the West and Islam. He defined it as a war against "the terrorists with global reach and the states that harbor them." Despite such rhetorical efforts, his war against terrorism has been gradually taking the shape of a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam. His state of the union speech that included Iran and Iraq in the axis of evil underscores it. Given the fact that radical Islamic terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden, consider the attack on the United States as a the beginning of a new religious war between the Islamic Community, the Jews and the Crusaders, that is Christianity,[3] it seems quite natural that the response from the West is quite similar with that of Islamic terrorists. And such perception is widely shared by the American public, and as a result, the September 11 incident has been approached from the angle of the clash of civilizations.[4]

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[2] Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 12-40.

[3] James Kurth, "The War and the West," *Watch on the West* Vol. 3, No. 2 (Feb. 2002), an electronic journal by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

[4] See John P. Holms, *Terrorism* (New York: Kensington Publishing House, 2001); Steven Emerson, *American Jihad* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

What does the clash of civilizations mean?[5] This concept was publicized for the first time by Samuel Huntington through his controversial book, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order."[6] His theory consists of five major propositions. The first proposition is based on the new understanding of the situation, concerning a view of war in the Cold War and the Post Cold War era. According to him, during the Cold War, ideological confrontation between the East and the West bloc, namely that between capitalism versus communism, drove to the possible outbreak of global war. In the 21st century of the post Cold War era, he argues, cultural identity and a clash of civilizations have replaced ideology as a primary cause of global war. He contends that the shift from confrontation of ideology into that of civilization and identity is the most noteworthy change in the international politics of the 21st century.

The second proposition is that modernization cannot be equated with westernization. The most dominant paradigm of comparative politics in the west through the late 50s and 60s was the modernization paradigm, which was based on the assumption that third world developing countries could become like western industrialized countries if they attained economic development,

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5) For a review of Islam and Civilization Clashes, see Chung-in Moon, "Islam, Clash of Civilization, and the World Order," *Truth and Freedom* (Mar. 2002).

6) Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

structural differentiation of society, and development of a stable. Thus, the process of modernization involves the process of convergence into the western world, in which modernization was equated with westernization. Huntington, however, squarely denies the validity of the modernization theory. He contends that no matter how modernized third world developing countries are, they cannot become westernized because the intrinsic values of the West such as individualism, democracy, transparency, rationality and the respect to the rule of law cannot be easily accepted by non-Western countries.

The third proposition is that there has been a gradual power transition among civilizations. Huntington asserts himself that there exist seven civilizations other than the Western one. They are Confucianism centering on China, Japanese civilization distinguished from Confucianism, Latin American civilization, Russian Orthodox Church civilization, Islamic civilization, Hinduism, and African civilization.

One of the most threatening aspects, according to Huntington, is that non-Western civilizations could pose new challenges to the Western one by fostering the pace of power transition. The Confucian civilization around China. Islamic civilization led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Hindu civilization led by India are classified as those challenging civilizations. China, not only with its possession of nuclear weapons but also with a huge population and rapidly developing economy and science technology, is estimated to rise as a civilization with stupendous power in the

21st century. The Islamic civilization might also become a new power player, challenging the western civilization with its high possibility of possessing nuclear weapons (Pakistan), petroleum-driven economic wealth, and an ever-expanding population. Lastly, he points out the Hindu civilization as another challenging power because of its nuclear weapons and a large population. What is more problematic is that each of these new challenging civilizations has its own hegemonic power around which other member states are unified. China in the Confucian sphere, Saudi Arabia for Sunnis, Iran for Shias in the Islam civilization, and India for the Hindu civilization.

The fourth proposition is that, given the trends of power transition and the presence of an unifying force within each civilization, western countries including the United States should refrain from imprudent intervention. He asserts that reckless and unilateral interventions by their own standards of value by western countries including the United States could precipitate the clash of civilizations, enhancing the probability of another world war. Huntington's message is clear-cut: The western civilization is superior to any other civilization, but it cannot and should not unilaterally force that upon the non-western parts. He underscores the importance of the wisdom of accepting cultural pluralism.

Finally, Huntington makes out three prescriptions. First, we need to accept pluralistic civilizations. Some insist that the

standard of western civilization is genuine and universal and that everyone needs to follow it. Huntington rejects such a claim and argues that admitting various civilizations is the only way to prevent the clash of civilizations. Second, he urges that western powers, especially the United States, should not interfere with other civilizations in the name of such western values as democracy, human rights, and the free market. For presumptuous and imprudent interventions by the western power could cause a clash of civilizations. Lastly, he draws our attention to the possibility of dialogue among different civilizations. For him, peaceful co-existence among different civilizations is more than plausible because of universal values and norms commonly shared by them. He warns that intellectuals and politicians of different civilizations should work together to broaden the scope of mutual understanding through constructive dialogue rather than politicizing the clash of civilizations.

III. Islam, Fundamentalism, and Terrorism

Drawing on Huntington's concept of a clash of civilizations, we can raise one simple, but powerful question: Can the September 11 terrorist attack and the American war on Islamic terrorism be interpreted as a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam? Strictly speaking, the September 11 attack should be understood not as a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam, but as a clash between civilization and barbarism. Civilization is a

system of order that abides by a set of norms, standards, principles and rules that are universally recognized. When these are violated, a civilization ceases to exist, and only savagery prevails. According to Islamic norms and values, the terrorist behavior shown through the September 11 attack falls exactly under the category of darkness (Jaihiliya) and barbarism.

In essence, Islam bans terrorism.[7] Most of all, Islam prohibits offensive war. The Quran chapter 2 verse 190 says: "Fight in the cause of God Those who fight you, But do not transgress limits; For God loveth not transgressors."[8] Islam denies offensive war, and favors defensive war fundamentally. Also, the Quran chapter 5 verse 35 says: "We ordained For the Children of Israel That any one slew A Person unless it be For murder or for spreading Mischief in the land It would be as if He slew the whole people; And if anyone saved a life, It would be as if he saved The life of the whole people."[9] Likewise, Islam *per se* is based on universal norms and values. The problem is that Islamic terrorists committed a fault by interpreting the norms and rules of Islam in

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7) Islamic view on terrorism is not clear yet. At the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Kuala Lumpur on April. 2, 2002, leaders from 57 Islamic countries had a heated discussion on the topic, but failed to reach an agreement. "Muslim Summit Defends Islam," *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (April 4, 2002), A3. For a more detailed discussion, refer to Chung-in Moon, "Philosophy of Peace in Islam," in Young-sun Ha (ed.) *Peace Thought in the 21st Century* (Seoul: Kkachi, 2003), in Korean.
8) The Holy Quran (translated by Yusuf Ali), p. 75.
9) The Holy Quran, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

their own ways. Their behavior is not congruent with Islamic values and norms, and it should be classified as an should be prescribed as a clash between civilization and barbarism, not as a clash between civilizations.

Islam originates from Christianity. According to the Quran, Christians and Jews are The Peoples of the Book. Islam is founded on six principles of faith. First is monotheism, believing that there is no God but Allah (Jehova in Hebrew and God in English). Monotheism is the most important creed of Islam. Secondly, Islam believes in prophets, which means all the prophets spanning from Adam, Abraham, Moses to Jesus. In Islam, Jesus is respected as equally as Muhammad. The only difference is that Muhammad is believed to be the last prophet God sent. Third, Islam believes in holy scriptures such as the Old and New Testaments as well as the Quran. But the Quran is the final completion of God's words. Fourth, a common feature is also found in the belief in angels. Fifth, Islam believes in the Final Day of Judgement. And finally, Muslims believe in Pre-determination. Viewed in this light, Islam and Christianity share a good deal of common points.

There are fundamental differences between Islam and Christianity. Islam does not accept the principle of the trinity because Jesus is merely a prophet of God, not a son of God. Another difference is found in the attitude towards original sin. According to Islamic doctrine, even though Adam committed the original sin by picking and eating the forbidden fruit, God forgave him and

condoned the sin, because Allah is the most merciful and most compassionate. Accordingly, as long as one absolutely obeys God and reminds himself of the past mistake by remembering God in every action, he or she can be free of the burden of the original sin. The relationship between church and state reveals another major difference. Separation of church and state is one of the basic premises in Christianity, whereas Islam advocates theocracy, which is founded on the unity of religion and the state. Other these differences, Christianity and Islam maintain a high level of similarity.[10] As with Christianity, Islam establishes itself as a solid universal religion and civilization.

Thus, it becomes necessary to distinguish Islam from Islamic terrorists. Islam as a civilization is a partner, with whom one can form a common front, and have mutual understanding through dialogue, while terrorism as a form of savagery is something that should be entirely contained, punished, and eradicated. What then is the nature of Islamic terrorism? It can be seen as an extreme aspect of Islamic fundamentalism, which is a subset of Islamic revivalist movements.[11]

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10) See "Feature on the Bible and the Quran," *Newsweek*, February 11, 2002, pp. 51-57

11) For a review of Islamic resurgence, see Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Islamic Revivalist Movements: Patterns, Causes, and Prospect," *Journal of East-West Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1983), 79-110; John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* 3rd. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999).

Islamic revivalist movements aim at reviving the glorious past of Islamic Empire. Muhammad, a caravan merchant, received a divine revelation and engaged himself in missionary work. He fled from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, which became the first year of Hijra, the Islamic calendar. Since then until 680, during which the four caliphs ruled after the death of Muhammad, the Islamic Empire grew into the most powerful empire in the world. Within 100 years of its founding, the Islamic Empire conquered and unified the area from Cordoba in Spain to Delhi in India. It was a history of glory and victory. Besides, the Islamic community back then was very democratic. A caliph who ruled the Islamic world since the death of Muhammad was elected through the democratic process of Ijma (consensus) among elders. It was a reign of peace and economic abundance without extortion.[12]

However, the decline of the Islamic Empire became apparent since the 12th century. The Islamic Empire split into the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Dynasty, and the Sanusi Dynasty in North Africa after the 16th century. At the height of European colonial expansion in the 19th century, most of the Islamic world was under colonial rule with, the exception of a few regions. Islamic revivalist movements came to the fore in search of past glory by overcoming historical defeatism prevalent in the Islamic world.

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12) On the brief history of Islam, see Jonathan Bloom and Sheila Blair, *Islam: A Thousand Years of Faith and Power* (New York: TV Books, 2000).

Islamic revivalist movements can be grouped in three categories. The first is the traditional orthodox school. Its proponents believe that they can revive the lost glory of Islam by adhering to Islamic tradition. The second is the reformist school. It contends that some Quranic messages do not fit in the modern world, and, thus, they should be reinterpreted into a modern context, and that Islam should be able to challenge the West through the positive inducement of science and technology. The last variety is the fundamentalist school. Its followers argue that going back to the fundamentals of Islam (i.e., the Quran and Hadith, tradition of Prophet Muhammad) is the right and sure way to recover the past glory of Islam.

The most controversial variety is the fundamentalist school. But fundamentalists are not homogeneous. They also can be divided into three groups. The first is conservative fundamentalists or orthodox conservatives, to which Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain belong. These countries adopt the Quran, the Hadith, and the Islamic law as the foundation of governance. Their ultimate goal is to revive the past glory of Islam by preserving the tradition, while rejecting the challenges of secularism.

The second group is composed of reformist fundamentalists. Those secular countries that transformed themselves into Islamic ones, such as Iran and Pakistan, fall into this category. These countries refuse secularism and make radical reforms by introducing

the laws and systems of Islam. Iran under Palevi was a secular state standing for Persian nationalism and modernization. However, after the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran declared itself as the Islamic Republic and has been pursuing a theocracy under which religion and politics are united. Pakistan has followed the same path. President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq transformed Pakistan into an Islamic country by demolishing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's socialism and secularist politics, while adopting Nazimi Islami (Islamic system). In contrast to Iran, Pakistan adopted the separation of religion and politics as ruling principles, but it has distinctive characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism as detected through the far-reaching application of the Islamic legal system.

The third is radical fundamentalists.[13] They believe that the genuine renaissance of Islam is not possible unless all the existing Islamic regimes are overthrown and overhauled. They regard all those who are ruling in the Islamic world as either secular or corrupt leaders. Since they overtly attempt to overthrow the existing regimes, they engage in underground activities. Afghanistan's Taliban is a prototype of radical fundamentalism. There are radical fundamentalists working underground against their governments in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

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13) Concerning the radical Islamic fundamentalists, see Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 60-118; Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing Co., 1997); John L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1997).

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the like.

Of these fundamentalists, what is most worrisome is radical fundamentalists, such as Al Qaeda, that undertook the September 11 terrorist attack. They are more than willing to sacrifice themselves as evidenced by suicide bombing. Those who commit suicide bombings are usually called martyrs of Islam, Shahid in Arabic. They commit suicide bombings with the belief that their martyrdom will guarantee them an eternal life in Paradise.

IV. Islamic terrorism and the United States

Having discussed varieties of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism, a major question arises: why has the United States become the target of Islamic terrorism? Four major reasons can be identified. The first is their discontent with the U.S. role and position concerning the Arab-Israel dispute. They believe that the United States is responsible for the aggravating tragedy of Palestinians by leaning towards Israel. American support of Ariel Sharon and his hard-line policy has provoked strong protest from the Islamic world. Those who are in the Arab and Islamic world still remember Sharon's provocative acts in 1982. Sharon, then defense minister undertook Operation Galilee, through which Israel invaded Lebanon to chase out the PLO in southern Lebanon and Beirut. During this operation, Israel launched indiscriminate attacks on Shabra and Shatilla, Palestine refugee camps, which gave rise to international criticism by shedding the blood of

innocent Palestinians.

Sharon, who took office as prime minister in February 2001, has developed an ultra-hard line policy; he unilaterally denounced the existing Oslo Peace Process, and continued to allow settlements in the West Bank. In contrast to the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has given tacit support to Sharon's hard line policies. The U.S. partisan attitude could have deepened anti-American sentiments in the Islamic world, driving al-Qaeda to undertake the terrorist attack. In fact, most Arabs and Muslims think that Israel cannot exist without American support and protection. In this perspective, the terrorist attack on the United States can be seen as part of tactical efforts to block the partisan and lop-sided U.S. support toward Israel and to attract American attention to their predicament.

Second, the Islamic terrorist attack could be a fall-out of the Gulf War. Some of the American forces that participated in the Gulf War still remain in Saudi Arabia. Radical fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia have been opposing it by arguing that infidel's troops cannot stay in the holy land of Islam. Given the fact that Osama bin Laden and most of the terrorists implicated in the 9.11 attack are from the Asir province of Saudi Arabia, the most fundamentalist region, terrorist attacks could be understood as an overt form of protest against the presence of American forces in Saudi territory.

Third, there is such perception that the United States is responsible

for the disruption of Islam. With the Gulf war, Islam was reorganized as pro-U.S., anti-U.S. and neutral power. Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Afghanistan and Libya were against the U.S., while most Islam states were pro-U.S., with exception of a small number of countries that adopted a neutral line, such as Algeria. Radical fundamentalists have been insisting that the United States should bear the responsibility for dividing the Islamic world and causing disruptions. At the same time, they have been arguing that American endorsement and protection have been sustaining corrupt and dictatorial regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere, which has in turn deepened human suffering in those countries. The terrorist attack on the United States could be a possible retaliation for this predicament in the Arab Islamic world.

Finally, the ultimate cause should have come from radical fundamentalists' blaming all the hardship and distress in the Islamic world upon the United States. Most Islamic states today are characterized by a vicious circle of tyrannies, dictatorship, extortion, and underdevelopment and poverty. Not a single country out of 57 member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference enjoys a democratic system in a strict sense. Most Middle East Islamic countries, with the exception of Turkey, assume an aspect of conservative royal regime or authoritarianism.[14] Some Asian Islamic countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are passing the stage of transition into democracy, but the future

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14) James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

prospect is very unclear. Iran, experimenting with Islamic democracy, is also far from satisfying the general requisites of democracy as a universal value. Radical fundamentalists attribute prevailing dictatorship and authoritarianism to American protection of, and support to, vested interests in the Islamic world.

From the economic point of view, most Islamic countries are trapped in perpetual poverty and underdevelopment. The quality of life index of Islamic countries, in particular, is far below the average level of developing countries.[15] Some oil producing Islamic countries have accumulated huge national wealth through petroleum export, but the wealth is not distributed equally. Most oil producing Islamic countries in the Middle East are characterized by a very high income and wealth inequality.[16] Here again radical Islamic fundamentalists blame the United States for its inequality, exploitation, and poverty.

The United States could have been a target of Islamic terrorist groups for cultural reasons too. Radical fundamentalists believe that the greatest anguish for the Islamic world today is the introduction of western popular culture. They say infatuation with Occidental culture (Westoxification), represented by Coca Cola, CNN and Hollywood, will jeopardize the future of Islam by

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15) World Bank, *World Development Report 2000* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).
16) Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), chapter 10.

leading the younger generation in Islam astray and bringing about an identity crisis. Accordingly, it is indispensable to restrain and throw out American influence for the continued existence of Islam.

In short, radical Islamic fundamentalists believe that the root causes of deformed politics, economic hardship and inequality, and socio-cultural degradation lie in the vested powers that are worldly and corrupt. And the United States has been protecting them. Therefore, they deem anti-U.S. terror essential, in order to overthrow corrupt political powers and to establish an Islamic regime. In this sense, radical Islamic fundamentalists have been waging war on two fronts; one against corrupt and worldly regimes at home, and the other against the United States.

Can these causes justify acts of terrorism? They cannot. As quoted earlier from the Quran, Islam bans terrorism. Some Islamic terrorists try to justify terrorism in the name of Jihad (Holy War). However, this is also problematic. Jihad in Islam can be divided into three kinds of meanings.[17] The first is personal Jihad. It is a religious Jihad (Jihadun-Nafs), which refers to purifying one's soul by dedicating oneself to God through missionary works and so on. This personal Jihad is considered the most important virtue in Islam.

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17) What the Quran Really Says About Jihad and Violence, from beliefnet.com.

The second is the verbal Jihad, that originates from Muhammad's teaching that one should not concede to injustice and should be able to tell the truth even in front of a tyrant, if it is for justice. Thus, resistance against dictatorship and immorality is the ultimate form of verbal Jihad.

The last one is physical Jihad, which means fighting a defensive war when the Islamic community is invaded by the enemy. This is an artificial concept that was devised by administrators of the Ottoman Empire in order to unify split groups and mobilize them against the invasion by western imperialism. It was misused by those administrators, who insisted Islam should be united and fight against the western empires, as they invaded the Islamic community. In this sense, one can infer that Islamic terrorists were not faithful to the fundamental teachings of Islam.[18]

Judged by the above discussion, the September 11 terrorist act cannot be justified in the name of Holy War (Jihad). Even though they try to justify it through the physical Jihad, it is unpardonable to slaughter innocent civilians in the U.S. Moreover, the act is not a defensive war but an offensive war that Islam bans. Special attention should also be given to the fact that the victims include

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18) For a discussion of the Holy War and peace in Islam, see Hasan Al-Banna, *Peace in Islam* (originally appeared in a monthly magazine, Shihaab, Cairo, 1948) http://www. youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/ peace_in_Islam/; Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996).

a large number of Muslims. In fact, it is hard to deem the United States as a target of the Holy War, because the United States is home to more than 6 million Muslims.

Above and beyond these causes, it is an undeniable fact that the U.S. has adopted a pro-Israeli policy. However, the U.S. has rendered various efforts for peace-building in the Middle East. The Camp David Peace Accord is a classical example. And were it not for the U.S. intervention at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq under Sadam Hussein, could have occupied the hegemonic position in the Persian Gulf, which could hamper the strategic stability of the Middle East area. It is thus not only misleading, but also wrong to blame the political, economic, social and cultural hardships of the Islamic world on the U.S. and to regard the U.S. as a terrorist target.

V. American Response and New World Order

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's and the breakdown of the Cold War system signaled the advent of a new and optimistic world order. However, the ultimate victory of the West, clothed with capitalism and liberal democracy, which was predicted by Francis Fukuyama in his book "The End of History," did not come true.[19] Rather, the end of the Cold War was

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19) Fransis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

tantamount to opening a Pandora's box. As the Balkan tragedies illustrate, the post-Cold War era has encountered the proliferation of conflicts and instability. The September 11 terrorist attack represented another shocking dimension of this change.

The American response toward Islamic terrorists was immediate, forceful, and sweeping. The United States made a retaliatory attack on Afghanistan to arrest Osama bin Laden, to liquidate al-Qaeda, and to topple the Taliban regime. American performance in Afghanistan has been mixed. The U.S. toppled the Taliban regime and established a new interim government with pro-U.S. inclinations. But Osama bin Laden is still missing, and al-Qaeda has not yet been annihilated. Despite its claim of victory, American war efforts in Afghanistan are still unfinished.

Will the capture or elimination of Osama bin Laden satisfy the U.S.? The answer is 'no.' The United States has been expanding its horizon of war against terrorism by designating Iran and Iraq as rogue states that should be primarily knocked down. The U.S. plans to punish Iran and Iraq not only because of the anxiety over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but as they harbor and support Islamic terrorists. Furthermore, the U.S. has shown its strong intention to engage in special operations to track down and break up underground Islamic terrorist organizations scattered all around Islamic countries. In short, the U.S. is not content with Afghanistan, but intends to spread the war against the entire Islamic world in the medium and long term.

Given the possibility of conflict escalation, what would the likely contour of new world order be? Three possible scenarios can be deliberated on.

The first scenario is the case of American triumph. It will not be easy for the U.S. to ensure a total victory by chastising rogue states such as Iraq and breaking down Islamic terrorist groups with a transnational reach in a short period of time. But suppose that the United States prevails. It will consolidate Amercian hegemonic power and unilateralism all the more, and the unipolar world order centering on U.S. hegemony will emerge. Nevertheless, as John Mearsheimer warns, the U.S. victory in the war against terrorism does not necessarily secure U.S. hegemony. With the rise of powerful countries such as China, American hegemony will be ceaselessly challenged, which as a result can lead world politics to a more unstable stage.[20] For all these probabilities, the U.S. victory in the war against terrorism will strengthen the U.S. position in international politics and make it easier for the U.S. to restructure the world order as it sees fit.

Still, the possibility of losing the war cannot be excluded. A lost battle in the context of counter-terrorism means a situation where an all-out war against Islamic countries becomes protracted, and at the same time there are increasing numbers of frequent and simultaneous terrorist attacks on the U.S., while antiwar movements

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20) John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

deepen at home. This being the case, one cannot rule out the possibility that it could become another Vietnam War. Given the size of Islamic terrorist groups, such a gloomy projection might be more plausible. It is impossible to estimate the exact size of these terrorist groups, but we can come up with rough estimates. Suppose fundamentalists account for ten percent of the Islamic population! Then their size would be roughly 130 million. Then again, let's give a very conservative estimate that radical fundamentalists account for ten percent of the fundamentalist population. Their size would reach 13 million. If we assume ten percent of this 13 million are suicide bombers (Shahid), there will be about 1.3 million people who would do suicide bombings any time and any place. In view of this, terrorist attacks could continue, making the war on terrorism protracted.

In this case, there is the high potential that the U.S. would turn its foreign policy to that of neo-isolationism. This becomes quite plausible when particularly viewed in light of the present situation that the mainstream of American society is composed of the Vietnam War generation. Should the U.S. choose to be an isolationist normal state, it is highly likely that a multipolar world order will take place.

Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility of the U.S. opting for international cooperation. If domestic public opinion fades, and support from allies is not available any more while the confrontation with Islam is protracted and becomes chronic, there

is no other way for the U.S. but to rely upon the United Nations. Cooperation with the U.N. can shift the hegemonic world order centering upon the U.S. to that of an international order based on multilateral cooperation. In this regard, Joseph Nye's recent book, "Paradox of American Power" seems well worth citing. Nye argues that no country in the world can challenge the United States, but it is impossible for the U.S. alone to deal with problems such as weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. No matter how powerful the U.S. would be, Nye urges the U.S. to rely on multilateral cooperation.[21]

It is hard to predict the future course of the world order. Nevertheless, some tentative outlooks seem possible. Among the three scenarios discussed above, turning to neo-isolationism after losing the war against terrorism is the least probable. No matter how extensive and invisible the Islamic terrorist groups might be, the U.S. will be able to break down and wipe out terrorist groups as well as preventing terrorism. However, a complete victory is hard to secure. Islamic terrorists' intermittent and repeated attacks will continue, which will cast a damp over U.S. efforts to build a hegemony based upon offensive realism. Ultimately, the United States has no other way but to work out a dual strategy with chastisement and retaliation through American hegemony on the one hand, and cooperative prevention of terrorism through international cooperation on the other hand.

21) Joseph Nye, *Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is hard to consider the September 11 terrorist attack as a pattern of the clash of civilizations. It is not a clash between civilizations, but rather a clash between civilization and barbarism. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility of its escalation into a clash of civilizations, one between the West and Islam. As professor Huntington warns, reckless, unilateral foreign policy disregarding the identity and contextuality of other cultures and civilizations, is bound to entail a clash of civilizations. Bearing this in mind, the United States should develop a prudent foreign policy and implement it with close international cooperation more than ever before.

Terrorism and East Asian Security After September 11

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I. After September 11: A Strategic Overview

Six months into the war against terrorism unleashed by the September 11 attacks, East Asia and the broader international community continues to grapple with the broader strategic ramifications of the "21st century's first war." For security and defense planners in the United States, or elsewhere, the tragic events of September 11 seems to have brought to a close the decade-old Post-Cold War era pronounced by strategic ambiguity, declining defense budgets, and fuzzy security benchmarks. While more traditional security issues have not lost their salience in the post-September 11 era, managing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and detecting, preventing, and defeating terrorism of mass destruction (TMD) have already redefined the Bush administration's defense priorities. If the Pentagon's "defense

transformation" slogan prior to September 11 sounded like a defense budget in search of a mission, the attacks have provided decisively more clear-cut roles and missions not only for the U.S. armed forces but also for key allied forces.

The longer-term consequences of the war against terrorism is impossible to forecast, including such factors as the longer-term political viability of a more permanent government in Kabul, the degree to which future terrorist attacks can be effectively deterred, and the overall cohesiveness of the international coalition that was formed in the aftermath of September 11. The key question is whether the events following September 11 are so fundamental in nature that they will result in a drastic reorientation of defense planning. For the time being, the threat from terrorism of mass destruction is going to cohabitate with more traditional sources of threats and potential conflicts. One may feed on the other and cross pollination of conflicts cannot be excluded. Whether September 11 was a horrible event data or the beginning of a terrorist Tsunami should become more visible over time although all agree that the war on terrorism is going to be a prolonged one. As President Bush remarked recently to commemorate the six-month mark:

Now that the Taliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base for terrorism, *we have entered the second stage of the war on terror a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world...* I have set a clear policy in the second stage of the war on terror: America

encourages and expects governments everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and peace of the world.[1] (Emphasis added).

Not surprisingly, changes have been most apparent in two key areas: reconfiguring of U.S. domestic and foreign policy priorities such as the creation of the Office of Homeland Security and a renewed focus on military transformation. It is ironic that two days before the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chastised the Pentagon bureaucracy for inertia, inter-service rivalry, and turf wars. Since then, defense transformation has assumed new weight and urgency and in the process, has forced defense planners to embrace both the old and the new. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said in a recent interview, "we took a 50-year old bomber and combined it with horse cavalry and turned it into a 21st century" fighting force.[2]

Accelerated change is going to permeate defense planning, force modernization priorities, adoption of new doctrines, and coalition warfare strategies. Indeed, traditional concepts of theaters, power projection, target acquisition, and battle management that were

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1) "President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts," March 11, 2002, http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/200203-11-1

2) Esther Schrader, "Military Fuses Old, New to Create a Lethal Force," *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 2002, ttp://www.latimes.com/templat/-printhistory.jsp?slug=la%2D021002natde. Schrader writes that "Since Sep. 11, the United States has harnessed the most outlandishly modern of its capabilities to the seemingly obsolete, creating a new kind of fighting force capable of finding and demolishing a new kind of enemy."

being reevaluated in the aftermath of the Gulf War are going through wholesale transformations on the basis of recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Terrorists by definition defy linearity and thus, applying nonlinear, if not fuzzy logic to defense planning dynamics is likely to consume significant attention in the years and decades ahead. Total situation awareness may have sounded like a buzz word, but the role of unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV) in Afghanistan illustrates that command and control dynamics cannot but change.

II. Recasting the Proliferation Threat and East Asian Dilemmas

Although the United States' nuclear strategy was under review prior to the terrorist attack, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which was submitted to the Congress on December 31, 2001 is a significant departure from the previous NPR that was conducted in 1994. In brief, the Pentagon plans to reduce its current inventory of some 6,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700-2,200 by 2013. Key elements of the NPR includes the following. First, a shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning that will enable the United States to maintain "a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security." And second, a reconfigured or New Triad with an emphasis on offensive deterrent capabilities that includes nuclear and non-nuclear

strategic capabilities, the development and deployment of both active and passive defenses, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The NPR contains defense goals as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to assure allies and friends, deterring aggressors, dissuading competitors, and defeating enemies.[3] The NPR also differentiated between immediate, potential, and unexpected contingencies using rogue states, China, and Russia as reference points.

1. Rogue States:

North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. *All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD missile programs.*

2. China:

Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.

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3) *Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]*, Submitted to the U.S. Congress on 31 December, 2001. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

3. Russia:

Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and hostility. *As a result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected.*[4] (Emphases added).

The specific characterization of China and North Korea as potential targets for U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear retaliation was immediately attacked by China as "nuclear blackmail." Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told U.S. Ambassador to China Clark T. Randt, Jr., in part, that "China wants to make it very clear that China will never yield to foreign threats, including nuclear blackmail."[5] Official Chinese media also accused the United States of using the NPR as a pretext to develop new nuclear weapons and to renew nuclear tests. Notwithstanding Chinese or other foreign criticisms, the NPR also shifts a potential change in the United States' negative security assurance, or an assurance that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that have signed the Nuclear

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4) Ibid.
5) China Bluntly Rebukes U.S. Over Nuclear Policy Review, *The New York Times*, March 17, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2/17CHIN.htm

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) unless those countries attack the United States or its allies in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. In early March, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher repeated the policy but added that "if a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of response."[6]

One of the central strategic questions that have arisen after September 11 is whether current military operations can be successfully duplicated in other theaters or countries. Initial post-operational surveys suggests a qualified yes to the extent that precision targeting, smart bombs, real-time battle management, and minimized collateral damage are here to stay. But in situations that involve opposition forces that have highly trained general purpose and special forces, fortified counterforce centers, and robust weapons of mass destruction, allied and coalition casualty rates during the Gulf War or the Afghan campaign are unlikely to be duplicated.

Whether in the Middle East, Central Europe, South Asia, or Northeast Asia, the fact remains that entrenched and protracted conflicts continue to persist. Subregional dynamics may be affected by the war on terrorism to the degree that rogue states like North Korea, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Sudan are going to think twice before harboring known terrorists or terrorist groups. Nevertheless, while terrorism is one facet of the complex security threat spectrum confronting a number of third world states, the

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6) Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets," *The New York Times*, March 10, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/-2002/03/10/in

root causes of terrorism are inextricably linked with imbedded ethnic rivalries, religious conflicts, and historical animosities. In South Asia, despite Indian and Pakistani assistance to the Afghan campaign (particularly in the case of Pakistan as one of the central frontline states), the protracted conflict between India and Pakistan have not been in abeyance. As the more recent clashes between fundamentalist Hindus and Muslims illustrated, prospects for a fundamental reconciliation between India and Pakistan remains slim and however unlikely at the present time, nuclear brink-manship between India and Pakistan in an acute and complex crisis cannot be discounted.

In the case of Northeast Asia, the cumulative ramifications of a more powerful China, prospects for reconciliation or protracted crises on the Korean Peninsula, tensions in the Taiwan Straits, and potential longer-term strategic rivalry between China and Japan are also unlikely to be significantly altered on the basis of the loose coalition that has been in place since September 11. To be sure, this is not to deflate the importance of the broader war against terrorism or the more specific campaign in Afghanistan. Key U.S. allies such as Great Britain and selective NATO member states, Japan, Australia, and South Korea provided unprecedented political and military support. For the first time in its history, NATO operationalized Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter wherein "the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."[7] Britain immediately joined the United States without any precondition and committed its forces to the war

effort in Afghanistan.

For its part, South Korea initially invoked Article 4 of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the Japanese Diet passed an unprecedented Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in October 2001 that enabled Japan to dispatch troops overseas.[8] Australia also announced immediately after the terrorist attacks that it would send, if necessary, combat forces to support the United States.[9] Indeed, Australia was the only treaty ally of the United

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7) The full text of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on April 4, 1949 stipulates that "[T]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by <u>Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations</u>, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." *NATO Basic Documents*, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictext/treaty. htm.

8) Article 3 of the ROK-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Defense that was signed on October 1, 1953 stipulates that "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, 2001 by the Japanese Diet opened the way for Japan's Self-Defense Forces to dispatch supply ships and to provide other logistical support to the Afghan campaign.

9) Prime Minister John Howard's government chose to invoke Articles III and IV of the September 1, 1951 ANZUS Treaty.

States in the Asia-Pacific region to commit combat forces to support coalition forces. Four FA-18A fighters, two P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, two B707 tankers, Special Air Service forces, and various naval vessels have been deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom and a total of some 1,500 Australian forces are currently involved in the Afghan campaign.

Beyond these core allies, others joined the international coalition including Pakistan, India, Russia, China, and Indonesia. The main point here is that if the war on terrorism is indeed linked more tightly with counter proliferation efforts, success is likely to hinge on the degree to which such a strategy can be transformed into viable regional, sub-regional, and local policies. Moreover, despite initial support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, it remains highly doubtful whether China or Russia will fully support the United States over WMD proliferation and missile defense. Even key allies of the United States confront dilemmas in transferring support for the war against terrorism to other issues. In Japan's case, two key issues have continued to hinder Japan's normalization talks with North Korea. First, the kidnapping of Japanese nationals to North Korea since the 1970s and second, the harboring of Japanese Red Army (JRA) fugitives in North Korea. Pyongyang continues to insist that it has never kidnapped Japanese nationals and so far has refused to hand over JRA fugitives to Japan. At least in the near to mid-term, Tokyo's support for the war on terrorism may further delay normalization talks with North Korea, although it is Pyongyang, rather than Tokyo that has to make the first move.[10]

In South Korea's case, the Kim Dae Jung government's sunshine policy has generated intense debate, particularly going into the December 2002 presidential election. That said, the key dilemma for the Kim Dae Jung government is that even while it continues to support the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, it also does not want to derail prospects for reconciliation or even a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. Kim Dae Jung's margin of maneuverability cannot but narrow as it seeks to convince North Korea of the need for South-North dialogue and restarting U.S.-North Korea talks while simultaneously catering to U.S. policy priorities such as the war on terrorism. For its part, North Korea also confronts significant hurdles in the aftermath of September 11 in that brinkmanship akin to the 1993-1994 timeframe when it threatened to withdraw from the NPT is unlikely to work with the Bush administration. Finally, China's conundrum in supporting the broader war against terrorism may be more acute than any of the other Northeast Asian countries given its multiple security cleavages as well as overlapping interests vis--vis the United States.

III. Northeast Asian Responses to September 11

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Chinese President

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10) U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/s/-ct/rln/2000/2423pf.htm

Jiang Zemin offered to join the international counterterrorism effort. The Xinhua Press Agency reported that "China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the United States and the international community in combating all manner of terrorist violence."[11] Washington and Beijing also decided to reactivate military talks after such discussions were postponed after the April 1, 2001 U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane incident in Hainan. From the very onset of China's public pledge to support the U.S. effort, however, Beijing has linked its stance with countervailing U.S. efforts on behalf of China's own "separatist" problem and the status of Taiwan. In a Beijing press briefing in late September, foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzhao said that "the United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against terrorism. China, by the same token has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists. *We should not have double standards.*"[12]

Beneath the public rhetoric during the Bush-Jiang summit in Shanghai in October 2001 such as Jiang's statement on October 19 that "we have a common understanding of the magnitude of the threat posed by international terrorism," it should be borne in mind that defining common security interests and cooperative security policies continue to be hindered by wide gaps in Chinese and American perceptions of security. Chinese concerns about

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11) Jeremy Page, "China Offers to Join Global War on Terrorism," *Reuters*, September 13, 2001.
12) Charles Snyder, "Powell Assures Taipei There's No Deal with China," *Taipei Times*, September 23, 2001.

renewed U.S. support for Taiwanese defense, potential U.S. military intervention, prospects for fielding a U.S.-Japan theater missile defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia, and contrasting approaches to North Korea's WMD problem have been "matched by American worries about whether a rising China will eventually challenge the United States."13) Initially, the Bush administration focused its attention on more traditional security threats in East Asia rather than on transnational security issues but the emphasis shifted dramatically in the aftermath of September 11.

As for terrorism, while China shares concerns with the United States, there is less urgency compared to the United States. Whereas China faces Uighur separatists and sporadic bombing attacks in Xinjiang and other major Chinese cities, "China's approach to dealing with terrorism has combined efforts to co-opt ethnic minorities, repression of groups that advocate separatism, and maintaining good relations with some states (such as Iran and Pakistan) where terrorists operate so that China will not become a target."14) Although China has given carefully crafted

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13) Phillip C. Saunders, "Can 9-11 Provide a Fresh Start for Sino-U.S. Relations?" *CNS Reports*, http://cns.mils.edu/pubs/reports/sino911.htm. China's ambivalence towards the United States regarding MD was visible in December 2001 when Beijing's foreign ministry stated that "our position on missile defense is very clear and consistent: we are opposed to the United States building a missile defense system." The foreign ministry also noted that "we believe that relevant sides should, through sincere and serious dialogues, seek a solution that does not compromise any side's security interests, nor harm international efforts at arms control and disarmament." See "China Fumes Over U.S. Missile Test," *Reuters*, December 4, 2001.

support for the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, Beijing is equally concerned that long-term U.S. military presence in Pakistan and Central Asia could serve to hinder Chinese security interests.

　　Among the many transnational security issues confronting China, nonproliferation remains as one of the most contentious issues with the United States. As noted above, the recent NPR was met with immediate rebuke from China although for its part, China's longer-term strategic concerns focus significantly on potentially divisive strategic discord with the United States. During the Bush-Jiang summit in October 2001, it was reported that Bush repeated U.S. concerns about China's compliance with an agreement not to sell missile technology to other countries and that he also tried to assure the Chinese president that U.S. plans to build a missile defense shield was directed at "rogue states" and not China. Despite the public display of solidarity in the war against terrorism, prospects for any significant strategic accord between China and the United States remains slim. While China is believed to have provided intelligence on terrorist groups to the United States, Jiang also faces key constraints such as the PLA(People's Liberation Army)'s concern about any long-term U.S. military presence on China's western border.[15]

　　In sharp contrast to China's very mixed responses to September

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14) *Ibid.*

15) Phillip P. Pan and Mike Allen, "U.S., China Agree on Little But Need to Fight Terrorism," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2001. For Chinese views, see Jiao Xiaoyang, "Summit Improves Sino-US Relations," *China Daily*, October 21, 2001.

11 given a wide-range of security issues that conflicts with U.S. policies, Japan's responses have been rapid, significant, and well-coordinated. On September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi released a statement outlining seven steps to be taken immediately by the Japanese government including the dispatching of SDF(Self Defense Force) troops for support, strengthening the protection of USFJ(U.S. Force in Japan) facilities and bases, dispatching of SDF vessels to gather intelligence, extension of humanitarian and economic assistance to surrounding and affected countries, etc.[16] Public support for Japan's swift actions were generally favorable although opinion remains divided on dispatching the SDF. In an opinion poll released on October 1, 2001 and conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun,* 62% of respondents supported Japan's cooperation with the United States while only 25% opposed Japan's role. 46% of the respondents disagreed with the government's plans to enact legislation allowing SDF dispatches while 42% supported it. 55% of the respondents gave favorable responses to Prime Minister Koizumi for responding well to the September 11 attacks while 28% did not give high marks to the prime minister.

In February 2002, the Japanese foreign ministry outlined a six-point counterterrorism plan including diplomatic efforts to strengthen international solidarity, passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (passed in the Diet on October 29, 2001), refugee assistance, assistance to countries surrounding Afghanistan,

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16) Office of the Prime Minister, "Statement by the Prime Minister on Japan's Measures in Response to the Simultaneous Terrorist Attacks in the United States," September 19, 2001.

international efforts in combating terrorism, and peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. On the basis of a Cabinet decision that was taken on November 16, 2001, Japan outlined a detailed SDF support plan including the supply of fuel ships, transportation of non-combat personnel, repairs and maintenance, medical activities, and sea port services. Elements of the MSDF (Maritime Self-Defense Force) and ASDF (Air Self-Defense Force) are participating in the Afghan campaign including one minesweeper and escort ships.[17] In October and December 2001, Japan established the International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division in the foreign ministry and signed the "International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism."

South Korea's overall responses to September 11 should be seen in the context of at least four different angles: (1) alliance management imperatives with the United States; (2) potential impact on North Korean responses and prospects for South-North dialogue; (3) domestic political repercussions in a crucial election year; and (4) regional diplomacy. President Kim Dae Jung announced in a statement on September 12, 2001 emphasizing his full solidarity with President Bush which noted, in part, that "the government has already worked out necessary measures to cope with this tragedy that hit the United States. I have already put our armed forces and police on a state of alert..."[18] During the

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17) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law*, Cabinet Decision of November 16, 2001.

18) Office of the President, "Statement from President Kim Dae-jung to the

33rd ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that was held in Washington, D.C., Defense Minister Kim Dong Shin and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reaffirmed Korea's role in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Beyond these and other measures, however, South Korea's overall responses to September 11 have been complicated by the need to address two seemingly bifurcated tasks: minimizing the potential fallout in South-North and U.S.-North Korea relations and convincing Pyongyang to take heed of the growing hardline posture of the Bush Administration. When North Korea initially announced that it also opposed international terrorism, Seoul tried to prod Pyongyang into announcing a joint statement against terrorism during South-North Ministerial Talks that were held in Seoul in mid-September. While the statement was not made, the foreign ministry and the ministry of unification emphasized that North Korea's statement condemning terrorism soon after September 11 illustrated a change in tone. Such positive rhetoric was overturned, at least temporarily by Bush's "axis of evil" remarks in the January State of the Union and this statement generated tremendous rancor in South Korea. In summary, South Korea's position on the war against terrorism continues to balance the requirements stemming from alliance management while fostering an opening in the South-North dialogue. On November 30, 2001, North Korea castigated the United States for fostering a war atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula by calling on North

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People," September 12, 2001.

Korea to comply with IAEA inspections and that "despite the fact that we have absolutely no ties with terrorism and our repeated stance against terrorism, the United States continues to refer to us as a terror-sponsoring state that only intensifies the United States anti-North Korean policy."[19]

19) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Press Release, November 11, 2001.

Assessing Inter-Korean Relations: Achievements, Setbacks and Prospects
-- In Relation to the Contribution of Jeju --

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Ⅰ. Introduction

It is not saying too much that the 20th century is an age of conflict. There were two World Wars, which brought unprecedented, grievous victims to world history. After World War II, the world was divided into two parts, owing to the outbreak of the Cold War. Therefore, the 20th century is said to have been a gloomy era of dispute and conflict.

Though the Cold War was an ideological confrontation spanning the entire world, the sharpening tension of conflicts and confrontations between land and sea powers lay exposed in the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the Korean Peninsula would become a front line of the Cold War in East Asia. This tension became a hot war, and eventually the Korean War broke out in 1950. A bloody civil war, the Korean War continued for three

years. It deepened the antagonism between the North and the South, and strengthened national division. More than 4 million people were killed during the Korean War.

Since the end of Korean War, the Korean Peninsula has long been shadowed by conflicts and tensions between the two Koreas. However, owing to the sunshine policy of President Kim Dae-jung and the engagement policy of President Clinton, North Korea moved toward detente with South Korea. The historical summit in June 2000 between the North and South was achieved by those policies and moves toward detente. Though one summit meeting alone cannot reduce the antagonism the two countries have endured for more than 50 years, the continued meetings such as ministerial talks, defense minister meetings and family reunions steadily seem to be building the confidence between the North and South. Building confidence is the most important factor in the development of an ideal economic and political relationship between the two Koreas. A trustworthy and cooperative relationship in which the two countries supplement each other could lead to an eventual integration of the two into a single community.

In this respect, this paper examines the overall assessment of inter-Korean relations after the Korean summit and explores prospects for the future relationship of North and South Korea in relation to the Bush administration's North Korean policy. In addition, this essay suggests how Jeju could contribute to improving the relationship between the two Koreas.

II. The Outcome of Inter-Korean Relations
after the Korean Summit and Responses

In February 1998, President Kim Dae-jung, leading the "government of the people," was inaugurated. In his inaugural address, President Kim made it clear that he would develop inter-Korean relations by promoting reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas and establishing peace between them. The President's speech reflected the basic direction of his administration's North Korea policy: at this point, rather than hastening to achieve national unification immediately, the government would first concentrate its energy into transforming the political structure on the Korean Peninsula from Cold War confrontation into reconciliation and cooperation.

The goal of President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy was to build mutual confidence and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula through expanding economic cooperation and cultural exchange with North Korea. Furthermore, it led North Korea to open its society and to build the basic structure of national unification in the future. Theoretically, the sunshine policy depended largely on "functionalism," namely that the increase of economic and cultural exchange would bring about political cooperation.[1]

The sunshine policy was well described in the "Berlin Declaration" on March 9, 2000 which suggested four points: (1) support for North Korea's economic recovery; (2) ending the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and realizing the peaceful coexistence between

the two Koreas; (3) a call for the resolution of the issue of separated families; (4) a proposal to hold talks between the two Korean authorities. Eventually, the Berlin Declaration resulted in the historical Korean summit.

Why did North Korea accept President Kim's proposal of holding a summit? It seems two reasons had the greatest impact.[2] One was the extremely severe economic crisis in North Korea. North Korea recorded negative economic growth every year from 1990 through 1998. It was known that over two million North Korean people had died since 1995, because of economic and agricultural crises. Furthermore, former allies, Russia and China as well as the U.S. and Japan didn't want to give unconditional aid to North Korea. Thus, North Korea had only South Korea to rely upon. The other was that if the inter-Korean summit succeeded, it would yield additional diplomatic and political benefits, such as normalization with the U.S. and Japan.

In this context, President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy resulted in the historic Korean summit. The Korean summit, which was held in Pyongyang during June 13-15 2000, brought about a decisive momentum toward building a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula. The June Korean summit and subsequent developments signified revolutionary changes in inter-Korean relations.

The most important document, the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration, was adopted during the summit. The content of the declaration is as follows:[3]

(1) The South and North agreed to resolve the question of

reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.

(2) Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a federation of a lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.

(3) The South and North agreed to resolve promptly humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of former long-term prisoners who had refused to renounce Communism.

(4) The South and North agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other fields.

(5) The South and North agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.

In addition, by including in the declaration Chairman Kim Jong-il's return visit to Seoul in due course, it enhanced the possibility of routinizing inter-Korean summits. And President Kim Dae-jung stated that he discussed U.S. troops with Chairman Kim Jong-il at the summit and that the North Korean leader agreed that U.S. troops should remain in South Korea. Reportedly, however, the two Korean leaders also discussed changing the role

of U.S. troops from a military combat force to that of peacekeepers.[4]

Owing to the summit talk, the official channel of communication between the two Koreas was revived. Six consecutive inter-Korean ministerial talks and one defense ministerial talk were held. Furthermore, the reunion of separated families took place three times. In addition, both Koreas significantly expanded the scope of inter-Korean social, cultural, and economic exchanges. While both Koreas agreed on measures to enhance inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation by signing an agreement of prevention of double taxation, investment guarantee, and a mechanism of payment clearance, they also embarked on reconnecting the Seoul-Shinuiju railway.[5]

Nothing is more urgent and critical than resolving the greatest tragedy of the national division, the issue of separated families. During the last inter-Korean summit, President Kim Dae-jung pointed out the urgent need for family reunions and urged Chairman Kim's response to his concrete proposal on the issue. The President proposed that the two Koreas first exchange family reunion visits on August 15, National Liberation Day, while taking step-by-step measures to check the addresses of separated families, promote the establishment of a meeting center and allow the families to be reunited according to their own will.

Chairman Kim sympathized with President Kim's proposal and suggested that, along with the cross-visits by separated families, unconverted long-term prisoners in the South will be returned to the North. To facilitate family reunions, President Kim agreed to include the unconverted long-term prisoners in a broader definition

of separated families and accepted the North Korean demand for their repatriation.

This marked the resumption of the exchange of visits by separated families for the first time in fifteen years since 1985, when the two Koreas exchanged a homecoming party and performing art troupes. The cross-visits had a significant meaning in that it was an important step toward building trust between the two Koreas.

Following the inter-Korean summit, the two Koreas exchanged two rounds of visits by separated families. During the first exchange, which took place from August 15 to 18, 2000, 100 people from each side visited Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively, and a total of 1,170 members of separated families were able to meet their relatives. During the second round of exchanges from November 30-December 2, 2000, a total of 1,020 people from both Koreas were able to meet with their relatives.

In this context, the exchange of separated families has largely increased since the launch of Kim Dae-jung's government. From the launch of Kim's government to December 2001, the numbers of separated family exchanges were as follows: 3,025 address checks, 3,246 letter exchanges, 608 reunions in third countries and 621 exchange visit reunions.[6]

At the same time, the South Korean government has returned eighty-three unrepentant communists to the North. Nevertheless, North Korea has been lagging behind in making reciprocal measures. No progress has been made in the return of kidnapped South Korean fishermen and prisoners of the Korean War. The

North also unilaterally canceled the fourth reunion of separated families that was scheduled on October 16-18, 2001. In addition, North Korea did not keep an earlier agreement to establish a permanent place for the reunion of separated families near the demilitarized zone(DMZ). Judging by this, both Koreas have made some progress in the reunion of separated families, but they are far short of satisfying the original agreement embodied in the Joint Declaration.[7]

Substantial progress was also made in exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea. The two Koreas finally agreed on an institutional mechanism to facilitate economic cooperation. They signed economic agreements in four areas: investment protection, prevention of double taxation, clearing of accounts and commercial dispute settlement. From such an institutional foundation, they were expected to promote more actively such major joint economic projects as Mt. Geumgang tourism and development, the Imjin River Valley flood prevention and the Gaesong industrial complex. Among them, connecting the Seoul-Shinuiju railway and Munsan-Gaesong highway was of great importance. These were long-cherished national projects that would generate huge economic benefits, including a reduction in transportation costs in inter-Korean trade and providing a physical foundation for inter-Korean economic cooperation. Furthermore, these land routes would open the door to a peaceful use of the DMZ and transform the Korean Peninsula into the main bridge between the Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean. The groundbreaking ceremony for this historic project was held in

September 2000 in the presence of President Kim Dae-jung.

Economic exchange between the two Koreas also expanded considerably. Inter-Korean trade reached a record high $333 million in 1999, $425 million in 2000, and $403 million in 2001.[8] In addition, the Hyundai Corporation made payments to North Korea, which may bring total secret payments closer to $800 million, for the right to operate a tourist project at Mount Geumgang. The Kim Dae-jung administration touted the Mount Geumgang project as the highlight of its sunshine policy. It decided to finance the project, which has been a big money loser for the financially troubled Hyundai Corporation.[9] The South Korean government also made a decision to provide subsidies of 250,000 won (about $200) for primary school students, 340,000 won for middle and high school students, and 300,000 won for college students, teachers, separated family members over the age of 65, unification instructors, people of national merit and the handicapped.[10]

At the same time, the exchange of people expanded as well. Excluding Mount Geumgang tourists, almost 8,000 South Koreans traveled across the inter-Korean border during the year 2000 and 8,551 South Koreans visited North Korea in 2001. A total of 24,747 South Korean people visited North Korea from 1998 to December 2001, ten times the number of 2,405 people who visited North Korea from 1989-1997. These figures showed the remarkable increase of South Korean people visiting North Korea, since the launch of President Kim Dae-jung's government. Furthermore, a total of 429,516 people visited Mt. Geumgang from 1998-2001,

including 57,879 people in 2001.[11)]

South Korea's humanitarian aid to North Korea also increased. The total amount of South Korea's aid to North Korea in 2000 was $113,760,000, which amounted to 38.5% of the total assistance to North Korea including the assistance of the international community to the North. The total amount in 2001 was $131,390,000.[12)]

The historic summit could build a firm relationship between the two Koreas based on mutual understanding, following 55 years of hostility. As showed in opinion polls, most South Koreans welcomed the Joint Declaration and expected that the new spirit of reconciliation and cooperaton could spread all over the Korean Peninsula. As to the results of the South-North summit, 76% said it achieved more than they expected, 13% replied as expected. About 90% supported the results of the summit.[13)]

However, there were also voices of concern that the declaration would go too far. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) declared that the second item of the Joint Declaration or "the suggestion of the South Korean side's confederation" was not a policy of the South Korean government, but only a personal one that President Kim Dae-jung made during his days as an opposition leader.[14)] They also insisted that the "confederation" suggested by President Kim was a concept that was never consented to by the South Korean people, or accepted as a national policy.[15)] The conservative South Korean people were also suspicious of the intention of the North's formula for a low stage of federation because they did not have any ideas of what it

entailed.

The hasty consent of the unification formula without the institutionalization of a peace system on the Korean Peninsula made Korean people feel uncertain, because the Joint Declaration did not mention anything about the national ideology of a unified Korea, and the unification process.

Furthermore, the first item emphasizing the principle of self-initiative (or independence) in resolving the question of Korean unification was to declare the "Koreanization of the Korean question." Such a point was already agreed between the two Koreas as one of the three basic principles stated in the July 7 South-North Joint Communique and reaffirmed in the Basic Agreement of 1992.

Though it was thought that it would be a natural step for South Koreans, it caused a great deal of concern among people, because North Korea had insisted on the rejection of foreign forces and the withdrawal of American troops. Furthermore, if the close relationship of the two Koreas was to be built, it could not only undermine the monopoly status of the United States, but also bring a revolutionary change to the U.S.-Korea security system, which regarded North Korea as the main enemy. And also the insistence of the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea would increase as the threat from North Korea decreased.

This hypothetical situation could also strengthen the Chinese position, a party concerned in the Korean question, which regards the American army as a thorn in its side. Without a strong effort, China could get an opportunity to lose the American initiative on

the Korean Peninsula. The United States has worried about this point. This could be one reason that the U.S. so hurriedly approached North Korea during the last era of the Clinton Administration while they welcomed the Korean summit.

As a result of this, the effect of symbolic manipulation did not last long. The surveys done in September 2000 show a somewhat worsened image of North Korea (than in June). According to a *Joongang Ilbo* survey taken on September 20, 72.4% said that economic assistance to the North should be done within the limit of Korea's economic capability. Considering that a majority of the people said Korea needed to assist the North as much as possible previously, this result was quite a change. In addition, a majority of the people still thought that North Korea was hostile and threatening. To make things even worse for the leaders of the two Koreas, the perception of North Korea deteriorated further one year after the summit. A Chosun Ilbo survey from June 11, 2001 showed that 50.1% viewed North Korea as not having changed much, and 43.9% evaluated the Kim Dae-jung government as not dealing well with North Korea, while 33.9% thought that the Korean government was doing a good job.

Along with this, the conservative media's critical portrayal of the Kim Dae-jung engagement policy seriously undercut political dividends from the summit. Although a triumphant mood following the summit pacified domestic opposition for a time, newly emerging domestic fragmentation began to cloud prospects of inter-Korean relations. Kim's own success not only precipitated domestic polarization, but was also an instrument for intensifying

domestic opposition, ultimately fracturing the foundation of national consensus and critically undermining his policy capacity.[16]

Furthermore, owing to the participation in the ceremonies to be held at the Monument of Three Charters for National Unification in the Grand Festival for National Unification in Pyongyang for 2001, the coalition government collapsed due to the passing of the vote of no confidence for Unification Minister Lim Dong-won. The New Millennium Democratic Party(NMDP) became a minority in the National Assembly and would face serious opposition from the two opposition parties, the Grand National Party(GNP) and the United Liberal Democrats(ULD). The conservatives, such as the GNP and *Chosun Ilbo* continuously criticized the Kim Dae-jung Government's sunshine policy as a reason for being deceived by North Korea. They argued that the North Korean regime would not want to change its traditional policy of communizing South Korea and also asserted that Pyongyang would only show a friendly gesture to get aid from the South in terms of a tactical maneuver. Without transparency, unconditional assistance to North Korea would not help ordinary North Korean people, but make the Kim Jong-il regime stronger.[17] In contrast with this view, progressives, such as NMDP, civic activist groups like "Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation", and *Hankyoreh Shinmum* strongly supported President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy. They also argued that the North would want to change substantially in order to get out of economic crisis and only the sunshine policy could make Pyongyang open and reform its political system. The progressives blamed the conservatives as

being trapped in Cold War-era concepts. They also argued that one of major causes of the North's economic crisis was the United States' economic sanctions and military aggressiveness toward the North.[18] Eventually, it seems these differences in views relied on whether they trust the North Korean posture or not. And also it was basically due to the lack of North Korea's sincerity.

For instance, North Korea agreed upon the fourth family reunion at the fifth ministerial meeting on September 2001 in Seoul. But Pyongyang postponed the family reunions scheduled for October 16-18, 2001 unilaterally, claiming that conditions would not be right for such family meetings until South Korea took its forces off of their September 11 alert --- the fact that the alert was already in place when North Korean delegates visited Seoul on September 15 and agreed to resumption of dialogue and family exchanges made this argument highly disingenuous. Tens of thousands of elderly South Korean residents have been lining up for a chance to visit long lost kin and for many, time is rapidly running out --- of the 200 chosen by lottery for the long delayed fourth exchange visit, more than a dozen have already died as the North continues to renege on its promise.[19] Thus, North Korea deserved to be blamed because Pyongyang made use of the family reunion issue for the sake of its political interests.

Anyway, this lack of national consensus resulting from "South-South conflicts" and the lack of sincerity of North Korea made President Kim Dae-jung so weak politically that he had virtually no flexibility in dealing with the North. There seemed to be little opportunity for further South Korean concessions. Furthermore,

as the political season of presidential election is getting near, it might be very difficult for President Kim's sunshine policy to move ahead fast. Therefore, the South Korean government should make an effort to get a national consensus by way of trying to cooperate with minority parties and should slow down a little in pursuing its North Korean policy.

At the same time, inter-Korean relations have deteriorated since the launch of the Bush administration. This deterioration will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Ⅲ. The Bush administration's policy toward North Korea and the "Axis of Evil"

The launch of the Bush administration and its hawkish posture toward North Korea brought about a negative impact on the continuous improvement of North-South relations.[20] In October 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-il. In the course of their talks, Kim agreed to end exports of all missile technology, and to freeze testing, production, and deployment of all missiles with a range of 500 kilometers. In return, the United States agreed to arrange for the launch of two or three satellites and agreed to accept compensation in kind, not cash.[21] This agreement mainly resulted from "the Perry Process" that envisioned a conditional and gradual improvement of the U.S.-North Korean relations based on the principle of mutual threat reduction.[22]

The Bush administration did not approach North Korea where the Clinton administration left off. The Bush administration undertook a lengthy review of North Korean policy. Before the review was completed, it became clear that the new administration was generally skeptical about North Korea, and it was apparent that it would prefer relying on coercive and punitive means to using diplomacy to try to head off missile threats. The Bush security team's North Korean policy mood was outlined by the so-called "Armitage report"[23].

Richard Armitage asserted that North Korea had been buying time to consolidate the regime, continue its nuclear weapons program, and build and sell two new generations of missiles, while disregarding the well being of its 22 million people since the Agreed Framework in October 1994. He also proposed a new comprehensive approach combining the elements of deterrence and diplomacy. He suggested that the strengthening of deterrence and even preemption should be considered for this package to be effective, if diplomacy failed. Of course, if Pyongyang meets U.S. concerns, the U.S. and its allies are prepared to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor including full normalization of relations. The objective of his comprehensive package should be to offer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, economic benefits, security assurance, political legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced military deterrence

After completing its policy review, President Bush's policy statement on North Korea was declared on June 6, 2001.

According to the statement of President Bush, reciprocity and strict verification were suggested as the principles guiding U.S. negotiations with North Korea. The Bush administration declared an objective of "improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities."[24] The U.S. emphasized that before delivery of key nuclear components of LWR (Light Water Reactor), North Korea should come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA.

President Bush's June 6 statement set a goal of "verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile program and a ban on its missile exports." He has emphasized the necessity of a strong verification mechanism in any missile accord.

President Bush also included a less threatening conventional military posture as well as the issue of proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) as the agenda to be discussed at the negotiating table. The U.S. would only consider normalizing ties with North Korea if Pyongyang reduced its conventional weapons deployed in the DMZ.

But conventional weapons are not as important for the U.S. as the issue of proliferation of WMD. Of course, the North Korean conventional threat needs to be emphasized to facilitate weapons sales (especially of F-15s) to South Korea, which plans to purchase high-tech conventional weapons that could amount to $3 billion. Bush needs to keep nurturing his domestic political allies such as Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and General Dynamics. Meanwhile, the

North Korea-U.S. negotiations on the conventional threat would also be in conflict with the South Korean position of North-South conventional arms reduction. South Korea wants to resolve the issue by implementing the 1992 North-South Basic Agreement, which is considered as a holy charter for national peace and unification, in which "the two sides shall discuss problems in the North-South Joint Military Commission and carry out steps for the phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof."[25]

North Korea also criticized very harshly the Bush administration's hawkish posture. In response to President Bush's statement of June 6, 2001, Pyongyang's Foreign Ministry issued a statement of its own on June 18, calling on Washington to implement "the provision of the North Korea-U.S. Agreed Framework and the North Korea-U.S. joint communique on October 12, 2000 as agreed upon." The statement on June 28, 2001 linked the U.S. demand for inspections with its own demand for electricity as compensation for the delay in completing the first replacement reactor promised under the Agreed Framework. It also issued a warning: "If no measure is taken for the compensation for the loss of electricity, North Korea can no longer keep its nuclear activities in a frozen state and implement the Agreed Framework."[26] North Korea also stated the clear position that "the American imperialists are attackers and peace destroyers" and they strongly responded to America's hawkish posture through the Pyongyang Broadcasting System and the *Rodong Shinmun*

(Labor Newspaper).[27]

North Korea hastily approached China and Russia as the U.S. threatened Pyongyang. Chairman Kim Jong-il visited Moscow and Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Pyongyang. Furthermore, North Korea made a decision to import Russian weapons amounting to millions of U.S. dollars[28].

Even though the North Korea-U.S relationship is getting worse, it seems that Pyongyang wants to maintain friendly relations with Seoul. The North resumed high-level dialogue with the South. It seems to recognize that the way to Washington lies through Seoul. If it is true, that marks an important shift for Pyongyang, which for the past decade has engaged seriously with Seoul only when it was sure that Washington was cooperating as well. Of course, the North Korean policy of maintaining a good relationship with the South can be interpreted as Pyongyang trying to create a rift between Washington and Seoul.

Since the Bush administration took a hawkish posture on North Korea, the relationship between the Kim Dae-jung and the Bush government deteriorated a lot. The Bush administration wanted to go about the issue with reciprocity based on strength, while President Kim placed more emphasis on appeasement through the giving of assistance. Those in the Kim government said that talking in terms of strength would hurt stability and create an atmosphere of war. Bush and his people said that the sunshine policy wasn't working, and the pouring of benevolence on North Korea only taught it bad habits.

In this situation, President Bush's remarks about an "axis of

evil" comprising Iraq, Iran, and North Korea surprised South Koreans and also greatly undermined the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. There is great concern in South Korea that his statement marked the end of any efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean relations. Bush's warning that the United States could take preemptive action to protect itself has heightened South Korean anxieties about combat on the Korean Peninsula, a frightening prospect because of North Korean missiles.[29] And it also has caused strong anti-American sentiment, especially in the younger generation.

President Bush, an anti-communist conservative, regards Kim Jong-il as a Stalinist dictator who starves his people and earns millions from selling weapons to countries like Iran. He would need North Korea not only to legitimate his MD (missile defense) policy, but also to calm down the Islamic countries in pursuing a war on terrorism. It seems if the U.S. sees the North Korean regime as an evil, there would be no room for dialogue, even though Washington is willing to talk with the North "any time, any place" without preconditions. Bush's stark portrayal of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" cast a shadow over President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy and damaged North-South ties.

President Bush said that he had no intention of invading or attacking North Korea and that his goal was peace when he visited Seoul on February 20, 2002. He also stated that he fully supported the so-called sunshine policy of negotiations with the North, embraced by the South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung. But he asserted that he would not change his opinion on Kim

Jong-il until he freed his people and accepted genuine proposals from countries like South Korea and the United States for dialogue, until he proved to the world that he has a good heart. President Kim and Bush agreed to work together to stop the North from developing weapons of mass destruction and to push for removal of missiles on its border that were within easy striking distance of Seoul.[30]

Even though the two leaders said there was no difference of opinion between Korea and the United States, no one could deny that they had different views on North Korea. It seems the Bush administration emphasized "hawk engagement"[31] as the leading alternative to President Kim's sunshine policy. Such a policy, focusing on strict reciprocity and verification, would continue energy assistance, food shipment and other aid to a population that has suffered catastrophic famines, while insisting that Pyongyang abide by arms control agreements and allow inspections. Meanwhile President Kim's sunshine policy emphasized a "comprehensive reciprocity" which wants to buy peace by unconditional aid to North Korea, and underscored "first aid, second verification. "These differences are largely due to the fact that the United States sees the North from the perspective of a worldwide strategy, while the South regards the North as a regional issue on the Korean Peninsula. Namely, President Bush has been proceeding with the hawkish North Korean policy emphasizing conditions that are hard for Kim Jong-il to accept, because the development of long-range missiles in North Korea would give the Bush administration good justification for building MD necessary for

maintaining world hegemonic power. While President Kim Dae-jung pursued an appeasement policy, because he believed that he could build the basic structure of unification by way of mitigating the toughness of North Korea and continuing the North- South dialogue. Therefore it seems these different views between Washington and Seoul will not be solved in the near future.

VI. The Island of Peace, Jeju's Contributions to Reconciliation and Cooperation between the South and North

It has been more than 10 years since the Jeju people (Jejuians, hereafter) have made efforts to turn Jeju into a so-called "Island of Peace." It is believed that those efforts toward this purpose play a pivotal role in opening a new ear toward cooperation and harmony between South Korea and North Korea. This might be explained in the consideration of sending tangerines as a form of humanitarian aid to the poverty-stricken communist state since 1998. In addition, Jeju is a politically favorable place for South-North talks. Especially, it is emphasized that Jejuians' aid to North Korea still continues since the summit talk between South and North. 2002 marked the fourth time they sent tangerines and the second time they sent carrots to the North.

1. Jeju as a Venue for South-North Talks

Along with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of

the former Soviet Union, the world has witnessed the dramatic change, coming out of the Cold War era. Since the early 1990's, this peaceful trend has lead Jejuians to believe that Jeju is the best place for a South-North summit which might be expected to bring peace and harmony to the Korean Peninsula. This is more clear and persuasive, considering the fact that the former places for South-North talks-i.e. Panmunjom, Seoul or Pyongyang, might at best be viewed as symbols of the Cold War structure. Jeju, however, has geographically symbolic meanings on one hand and politically on the other. From a geographical perspective, it provides us Koreans with a starting point in the following motto: from Halla to Baekdu Mountain. From a political perspective, it might be that it is located in a neutral zone in terms of the political interests of both. The situations taken altogether above lead Jujuians to claim to be peaceful messengers, bridging inter-Korean relations along with an effort to make Jeju an island of peace.

As a result, Jeju was chosen as the place for North-South ministerial talks after the Korean summit, and could contribute to opening an era of reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North. Following the summit was a series of inter-Korean talks in Jeju, such as South-North Special Envoy Meeting (Sept. 12, 2000), the first meeting of South-North National Defense Ministers, (Sept. 25-26, 2000), and the third Ministerial Talks (Sept. 27-30, 2000). Among other things, it was more than a special case that the first meeting of South-North National Defense Ministers took place in Jeju, the island of peace.

Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, also made clear to the press

representative from the South that he wanted to experience and appreciate the sunrise at Mt. Halla. Kim Yong-sun's visit, the North's special envoy, might be understood from this perspective. That is, he made a Sept. 11 trip to Jeju in 2000 in advance, to explore the potential visit of Kim Jong-il to Jeju. Following his visit, there was a cabinet-level meeting between Lim Dong-won, the South's envoy, and Kim Yong-sun. In this meeting, the two sides shared a close understanding of several pending issues: the visit of Kim Jong-il and Kim Young-nam to Seoul, the issue of separated families (especially, a matter of life and death, a matter of corresponding), the working-level talks of economy and finance, and the meeting of defense ministers.

Even though it is not the first time to bring an agenda of the defense ministers' meeting to the table, the agreement on the meeting of defense ministers in this special envoy meeting made it possible for the first meeting of defense ministers to be held on the island of Jeju. It is to a considerable degree significant that participants at the two days' meeting in Sept. 25-26 came to a mutual agreement on many issues: the mitigation of military tension, the removal of possible military actions, and the seeking of peace in the Korean Peninsula. It is understandable that all of these efforts have been accepted as a first great stride toward the dismissal of the Cold War structure and permanent peace on the peninsula.

As scheduled, the third ministerial talks were held in Jeju (Sept. 27-30, 2000). In this meeting, both sides made sure that they were firmly executing the "South-North joint declaration" on the one

hand and checking and evaluating the detailed processes of several agendas agreed upon by both, on the other. Furthermore, it was agreed upon that all these processes were put into practice: checking over deaths, correspondence, the establishment of a meeting place, the encouragement of investigation and prevention of double taxes, a goodwill soccer game, and mutual exchange of professors, students, and persons involved in cultural activities.

As briefly mentioned above in the series of talks held in Jeju, through the remarks made by the representative from the North, it is clear that Jeju, as an optimal venue for South-North talks, is the hope and desire of Jejuians as well as North Korea. For example, Kim Il-cheol, a member of the special envoy for the national defense minister talk, stated that when talking about unification, they (the North) cited "from Baekdu to Halla." And he added, "I am in Halla right now." All these things make Jeju attractive enough to be the best place for South and North meetings.

2. Humanitarian Aid to the North

It was 1998 when Jejuians first helped North Korea with a form of humanitarian aid to the poverty-stricken communist state. Tangerines indigenous to Jeju were the first products sent to the North. In addition to this, carrots came second, sent to the North along with tangerines since 2000. Jeju sent 100 tons of tangerines in 1998, 4,336 tons in 1999, 3,031 in 2000, and 6,000 tons in 2001, amounting to 3.87 billion won in cash. It also provided 2,000 tons

of carrots in 2001 and 4,000 tons in 2002 to the North, 6,000 tons altogether valued at 2.21 billion won. The total costs were 5.08 billion won, which represents the highest expense among local government and civic groups across the country.

The representative from the "Jeju Headquarters of South and North Cooperation Movement," which is in charge of sending tangerines to the North, was sent to North Korea two times to see how the tangerines were distributed through the North (the first visit was from Jan. 7-13, 2001 and the second, Feb. 5-10, 2001). It was noticed that tangerines were distributed to preschools, kindergartens, and maternity wards, etc. in Pyongyang. A group of people who delivered Jeju carrots to the North Dec. 2001 and Jan. 2002 witnessed passers-bys carrying around packs of tangerines in Pyongyang. It is admitted that unlike corn or rice, the short period of preserving tangerines limited its wide circulation over a long time.

At the reception held by Jun Kum-jin for the representative from Jeju in January 2001, he expressed his heartfelt thanks to Jujuians. He said: "We're really thankful to Jejuians for their warm-welcoming to the representative from the North through a series of talks. There is no doubt that Jeju and the Jeju people play a pivotal role in bringing harmony and peace into 21st century inter-Korean relations." He added that "he expects a wide range of exchanges and cooperation between North Korea and Jeju." These remarks are significant in the sense that high ranking officials of the North have very positive attitudes toward the island of peace, Jeju.

Jeju's support toward the North has features that have not found in other non-governmental organizations.

First, this movement is organized and run by civic groups consisting of people in various fields. From the very beginning, non-governmental organizations such as tangerine farmers and religious groups constituted the corporation, "Jeju Headquarters of South and North Cooperation Movement". This organization evokes Jeju people's voluntary participation on the one hand and tries to make direct contact with North Korea on the other hand. Also, this organization is in charge of the whole process of collecting and shipping tangerines to the North.

Second, the financial resources for this movement came from the Jeju people's patriotic love of peace, not the support of the central or local government. That is, most of them consist of Jejuians' contribution of money or products. For example, during the years of 2000 and 2001, 39,000 farmers made a contribution of 3,000 tons of tangerines to this movement. Even individual participants amounted to 3,000. Speaking of gifts of money, 371 groups (2,900 individuals), including local communities and even kindergartens sent money. In addition, shipping companies gladly volunteered to participate in such a humanitarian movement.

Third, as this movement continues, the trustful relation between the North and Jeju has built up. This relation is indirectly supported by the invitation of Jeju people as an indication of gratitude. As a pure civic activity, we sent our product -tangerines- to the North. As a response to our humanitarian activity, the North took very favorable steps toward allowing the South to

report the history of dolmens found in the North.

As seen above, recognizing that the humanitarian aid of Jejuians to the North has made a great contribution to peaceful inter-Korean relations, our government also provides us with financial support of these efforts made by Jejuians in 2001. More support is expected than in 2000.

V. Conclusion

As mentioned above, inter-Korean relations have stalled mainly because of the lack of North Korea's sincerity and tension between North Korea and the United States under President Bush, who has labeled the North as part of an "axis of evil." Policy coordination between the Bush and Kim Dae-jung governments would be difficult, due to their different views of North Korean change. Without North Korea's considerable concession to the demands of the U.S., such as the verification of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of conventional weapons, the resumption of talks between the U.S. and the North may not be easy. However, it is likely that North Korea will resume talks with South Korea because of its economic difficulties. Owing to North Korea's inclusion on the U.S. terrorism list, the Kim Jong-il regime has no other alternative but to rely on the South. North Korea might also want to resume dialogue with the South because the North can approach the U.S. by way of the South. Despite the resumption of talks between the two Koreas, it will not be easy

to move ahead as long as North Korea does not comply with U.S. demands.

President Kim Dae jung's government should try hard to improve relations between the U.S. and the North in order for his sunshine policy to succeed. It looks like a hunter having to catch two rabbits carefully. There may be room for North Korea to resume dialogue with the United States. On the one hand, the Kim Dae-jung government should persuade the North to accept the Bush government's demands such as verification of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, which is needed to build a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. Then, it might be easier for the North to get aid from the South and the international community. North Korea should know that any future South Korean government will not be as benevolent to the North as the Kim Dae-jung government. This opportunity might be the best chance to improve relations with Seoul and Washington.

On the other hand, the South Korean government should persuade the Bush government to understand North Korean anxiety resulting from an economic crisis and uncertain security. The topmost preoccupation of Pyongyang's regime seems to be securing its survival. Even its missiles and weapons of mass destruction are mainly intended for its survival as well as being a bargaining chip with the United States. If the U.S. guarantees its security and lifts economic sanctions long imposed on it, many of the problems existing between the two countries will be solved easily and their relations will improve.

Of course, the Kim Dae-jung government should remember that the inspection and verification of North Korea's underground nuclear waste site and a ban on its missile development are essential to building a stable peace and a fundamental structure of unification on the Korean Peninsula. On this point, the "soft reciprocity" focusing on inspection and the resumption of family reunion meetings in reward for aid to North Korea ought to be considered if the Kim Dae-jung government wants to pursue its North Korean policy based on a national consensus, because the strategy of "tit for tat" might be more effective in dealing with North Korea.

Furthermore, permanent peace could be realized by the institutionalization of a peace system on the Korean Peninsula. It seems that a peace treaty alone would not be sufficient for building a peace system on the Korean Peninsula. Arms reduction and a mutual inspection system, such as notification of major troop movements and observation of each other's military exercises are indispensable for it, and forward armies should be stepped back as well. Thus, the declaration of peace and a peace treaty between the two Koreas should be made only after the establishing of mutual reduction and inspection. Namely, the inductive approach toward peace building is essential to attaining a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula. It should be remembered that the hasty national unification movements would rather be a serious impediment to improving relationships between the two parts.

Even before the institutionalization of a peace system on the

Korean Peninsula, the building of a peace regime like a peace cooperation council would be requested for fostering a peaceful atmosphere in the international security environment around the Korean Peninsula. These days, owing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of environmental issues, it is essential that world peace and security be solved by the cooperative efforts of all states and not by one state alone. Therefore, the idea of "cooperative security," which emphasizes the attainment of cooperative security by way of building mutual confidence through dialogue and cooperation of states is very important.

It is necessary to propose ideas about the principles, norms, rules and decision- making processes of regimes in order to build a "Peace Cooperation Regime" in Northeast Asia. Namely, the intellectual leadership that could suggest such ideas is required to form the regime, and it could be exerted by local governments, universities and NGOs as well as the state. As NGOs suggest flexible strategies and fresh ideas, NGOs can play a great role in the formation of a peace regime. Therefore, the "Peace Cooperation Regime" could be attained more easily due to their ideas.

In this context, the "Jeju Island of Peace" plan raised by the Jeju provincial government is very important to attaining peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. The "Jeju Island of Peace" plan is a movement that can participate in and contribute to important trends of change in civilization at this transitional moment in the century. The Asia-Pacific Ocean region could be viewed as the center of political and economic activity

in the whole world. Thanks to this change, Northeast Asia will become the heart of world civilization and trade. It will also be clear that the ocean can play a more important role in the future. On this point, the geopolitical location of Jeju is the most important of all, which gives us much responsibility. The fact that Jeju is located in the core of Northeast Asia gives us the opportunity of rising splendidly as the leading actor of world civilization according to our efforts.

In this regard, the "Jeju Peace Forum" which will become an annual meeting, can also play a greater role in suggesting ideas such as "the Northeast Asian Summit Meeting" in Jeju and invite personnel from the North to exchange different views. The civic groups such as "Jeju Headquarters of South and North Cooper- ation Movement" also can play an important role in improving the exchange between the North and the South. Though North Koreans seem to take its time controlling the speed of inter-Korean relations with respect to personal and socio-cultural exchanges, they are seeking continuous and harmonious relations in the area of support from civic groups from the South and the Mt. Geumgang tourism business. So far, Jeju's support by sending tangerines and carrots itself is more than other helpful efforts made by non-governmental groups and the response from the North Koreans was enormous.

Encouraged by the successful aid of tangerines and carrots to the North, we need to extend supplies out of only a few agricultural products. What should be considered here is that our support is supposed to end up with some productive results, not

oriented toward consumer goods or items. For this we might need the cooperative business of both. A simple example can be found in the area of raising hogs. Recently it has been well noted that pigs native to Jeju are highly rated. Then, it is naturally expected that we can develop a cooperative business of stock farming with the North on the basis of our accumulated knowledge in such an area. For this, we can establish a sisterhood with some specific regions for joint-stock farm products, providing the North Koreans with skills related to the livestock industry.

Which Way Forward?
Scenarios for the Korean Peninsula

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Few countries in the world have more perplexed policy makers or confounded prognosticators than North Korea. The past decade is littered with failed predictions: the DPRK's famines and economic contraction in the mid-1990s would cause its collapse; the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-il, would never consolidate his leadership after the death of his father, the "Great Leader" ; the historic June 2000 summit would usher in a new phase of greater economic and diplomatic ties between the two Koreas. Reviewing this dismal record, it appears the inability to predict what Pyongyang will do next is the distinguishing characteristic of self-styled North Korea experts.

Obviously, no one can predict the future. But it is possible to systematically map out different "scenarios" to help us think about the various ways in which the world might change and identify

certain "warning signals" that can help us detect clear notes among the cacophony of everyday static. Ideally, scenarios provide a method to anticipate how the situation in Northeast Asia might change, to recognize it when it is changing, and as it changes to know how to respond quickly and appropriately to new developments.

Three proliferation scenarios for the next twelve months, each dependent on different policies by the key regional actors, can be developed. Under a "Let the Sun Shine In" scenario, named after South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine" policy of engagement with the North, the next year is marked by a resurgence of diplomatic, economic and humanitarian interaction between the two Koreas. The North also re-engages with Japan on the issue of missing persons and Tokyo decides to resume food aid. Washington and Pyongyang return to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear issues and ballistic missiles.

Under the "…And the Horse You Rode In On" scenario, the United States and North Korea avoid substantive interaction and only engage rhetorically to exchange heated barbs. In this deteriorating environment, President Kim Dae-jung's efforts at reconciliation are marginalized. Japan watches from the sidelines. The KEDO project limps along. The Agreed Framework and the North's ballistic missile testing moratorium survive, but barely.

Finally, under an "Axis of *Really* Evil" scenario, the security

situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes much more ominous. The North Koreans announce that their ballistic missile moratorium has ended and are seen preparing a launch site. They also deny entry to a new rotation of IAEA inspectors, leaving the Yongbyon nuclear site without an international presence on the ground for the first time since 1994. A delegation from the DPRK Ministry of Atomic Energy pays a high-level visit to Iran. Citing North Korea's aggressive behavior, the newly elected president of South Korea refuses to provide financial support for the KEDO project, thereby jeopardizing the Agreed Framework nuclear deal.

"Let the Sunshine In" Scenario

Months of behind-the-scenes negotiations between senior officials from the two Koreas result in renewed momentum towards reconciliation. By mid-summer, North Korea not only agrees to allow regularized family reunions, but also to support a permanent Reconciliation Center where divided families can meet; as a concession from Seoul, this Center is located in Kaesong and built using South Korean funds. The North starts clearing mines along the DMZ. ROK and DPRK defense ministers resume their discussions and agree to create a joint working group to examine confidence-building measures along the demilitarized zone. Following this warming trend in the relationship, tourism at Mt. Kumgang increases. Domestic support for the sunshine policy

revives, and with it, Kim Dae-jung's personal popularity.

Although it took far longer than expected, in the fall of 2002, Kim Jong-il finally makes the return visit to Seoul he had promised in the June 2000 summit. In a surprise move, he travels to the South via the newly reconstructed rail line across the DMZ. Before disembarking from his rail carriage, he announces his hope that one day this rail line will run all the way from Paris to Pusan. Boisterous crowds eager to catch a glimpse of the North Korean leader greet Kim Jong-il at every stop on his visit. Nightclubs and bars throughout the South sponsor Dear Leader "look-a-like" contests.

In private meetings, the two Kims make progress in creating a special economic zone in Kaesong. Seoul promises to provide free electricity on the condition that South Korean firms are not subject to North Korean labor laws or local taxes for a ten-year period. Over two-dozen ROK companies immediately express interest in locating factories there. In addition, President Kim Dae-jung personally promises he will lobby for the DPRK's admission to the Asian Development Bank and other international financial institutions. In an emotionally charged farewell ceremony, Kim Jong-il presents his South Korean counterpart with an unusual piece of ginseng; the symbolism is lost on no one, as the ginseng has two roots that merge into a single stalk.

Relations between the North and Japan also improve. Pyongyang

agrees to remove to a third country the Japanese Red Army terrorists it had harbored since the 1970s; they are then extradited to Tokyo, where, under a prearranged bargain, the terrorists receive lenient jail sentences. More contentious are the matters of the missing Japanese citizens suspected of being abducted by DPRK agents and reparations for Japan's occupation of Korea before and during World War II. As discussions on these issues move forward, Japan agrees to resume humanitarian aid to alleviate the food shortage in the North.

But the most surprising developments occur with the United States. At the Asean Regional Forum in July, the North Korean Foreign Minister effusively greets Secretary of State Colin Powell; the two men then spend three hours in private conversation behind closed doors. At a press conference afterwards, Powell states that both parties made clear they had no "hostile intent" towards each other. The following week, North Korea accepts the longstanding U.S. offer to "meet anywhere, anytime, with no preconditions." The two sides hold preliminary meetings in New York and agree on an agenda that includes "nuclear and related" issues. A State Department press spokesman clarifies that Washington interprets these words to mean that the North's ballistic missile, chemical and biological weapons are on the table. That same day, a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement declares that humanitarian aid issues would be discussed. The Bush administration requests, and Congress approves, $90 million of KEDO funding for heavy fuel oil (HFO) deliveries for 2003.

"And the Horse You Rode In On" Scenario

Perhaps it was President Bush's State of the Union Address that referred to North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" or perhaps it was the leaked Nuclear Posture Review that had North Korea on the nuclear target list, but most observers pointed to the Bush administration's determination not to certify North Korea as being in compliance with the Agreed Framework that was the final straw convincing Pyongyang that Washington was not interested in constructive dialogue. A *KCNA* report complains that the "warmongers in the White House are seriously getting on our nerves." In what is widely interpreted by Washington as nuclear saber rattling, *KCNA* also states that "the DPRK is a peace loving nation, but it will defend itself to the last man and bring ruin to the nuclear aggressors." The *Washington Post* quotes a State Department expert on North Korea as saying he "might as well go on vacation for the next year; there is nothing here for me to do." While public opinion polls show strong support for President Bush's tough stance, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, thought to be seeking the Democratic nomination for President, maintains that the President should "go to North Korea" to meet personally with Kim Jong-il to head off a second Korean War.

In an attempt to reverse the downward trend in intra-Korean relations, President Kim Dae-jung renews his invitation to Kim Jong-il on national television. In a severe loss of face, Pyongyang rebuffs his offer. The country's largest labor union criticizes Kim's

sunshine policy, calling on him to instead focus on rooting out corporate corruption and creating more jobs. In yet another sign of the President's eroding political fortunes, his government's secret negotiations with North Korea, including financial payoffs, to ensure its good behavior during the 2002 World Cup are leaked to the press. Still, ethnic Koreans living in Japan unfurl a DPRK flag and portrait of the Dear Leader during the World Cup quarterfinal match between Germany and England in Osaka; an estimated television audience of 800 million witnesses the spectacle before the Koreans are hustled out of the stadium by Japanese security guards.

At KEDO's light-water reactor site at Sinpo, three North Korean workers barricade themselves in a KEDO housing unit, declare themselves political prisoners and request asylum in the South. The incident becomes international news when a MOFAT official leaks details to the *Joong Ang Ilbo*. KEDO falls months behind in shipping HFO to North Korea, prompting Pyongyang to declare that the United States is not in compliance with the Agreed Framework. Although the DPRK repeatedly threatens to withdraw from the October 1994 nuclear deal, reiterates demands for financial compensation for the loss of energy, and cancels meetings with KEDO on a delivery schedule protocol and nuclear liability issues, it takes no specific action to violate the terms of the Agreed Framework.

North Korea works hard to improve ties with Japan, Russia and

the European Union, motivated in part by a persistent food crisis and related tuberculosis epidemic. But Tokyo insists on a full accounting of the Japanese citizens believed to be in the North. Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declares: "We resolutely demand that North Korea resolve this matter before we discuss any other topic because this involves the lives of Japanese nationals." Russia has little to offer the North except some antiquated military equipment and European Union representatives visit the North only to lecture DPRK foreign ministry officials about human rights violations. (In what may or may not have been an act of petty retaliation, the EU officials were without heat and hot water in their hotel rooms for the remainder of their stay in Pyongyang.) With no explanation, the North abruptly cancels the Pyongyang International Trade Fair and refuses to return the deposits of the thirty European companies that had registered to attend.

More importantly, Pyongyang's appeal for humanitarian assistance falls on deaf ears, as the international community instead channels its compassion towards rebuilding Afghanistan. The widespread hardship drives many desperate North Koreans to flee over the border into China. But unlike before when it turned a blind eye to these refugees, Pyongyang now sends its agents into China to forcibly return them to prisons in the North. Beijing cooperates by tightening border controls and prohibiting Western relief organizations from operating in the region. A spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry claims: "No refugee

problem exists between China and North Korea. China views such people as illegal immigrants."

"The Axis of *Really* Evil" Scenario

Just when North Korea watchers thought the situation in Northeast Asia could not get any worse, it did. With U.S. warships circling the waters, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces raise the suspected North Korean spy ship that sunk in the East China Sea in December 2001. Examination of the vessel reveals it to be of DPRK origin, but the truly alarming news is that it contains chemical weapons canisters. An outraged Tokyo demands an explanation from Pyongyang, which denies involvement and blames "militarists" in Japan for fabricating the entire incident. In response, Tokyo refuses to provide any humanitarian assistance to the North and announces stepped-up naval patrols in the Sea of Japan.

The December presidential election in South Korea brings to power a candidate far less accommodating to the North. His campaign promise to review the KEDO project, dismissed as mere election rhetoric, takes shape; as a first step, he suspends all operations at Seoul's light-water reactor office until the review is completed. His honeymoon is short-lived, however, as a confidential Blue House document calling for the establishment "of a Government for a Free Northern Korea" comprised of North

Korean defectors living in northeastern China, is leaked to the press. The ROK Foreign Ministry explains that this was an internal draft used only for discussion purposes, but China recalls its Ambassador to Seoul.

In what is widely perceived as retaliation for the hard-line adopted by the new South Korean President, the North withdraws all of its workers from Sinpo and places additional military units around the nuclear work site. The North also increases its military patrols along the DMZ and the border with China; it implements a shoot-to-kill policy against anyone caught trying to escape from the North. U.S. and ROK forces increase their states of alert and readiness; all leaves are canceled indefinitely.

Two additional moves garner widespread international attention. First, North Korea announces that its ballistic missile moratorium is ended. Overhead satellites capture field tests of an advanced engine system thought to be under development for the Taepo-dong II, which has a range of 6,000 kilometers. At this time, a Moscow newspaper reports the disappearance of the country's top inertial guidance expert, along with the rumor that he is now in North Korea working to improve the accuracy of the North's missile systems.

Second, after the IAEA inspectors at Yongbyon return to Vienna as part of their normal rotation, the North refuses to allow new inspectors into the country. For the first time since 1994, there are

no on-site inspections at the North's nuclear complex. Pyongyang declares the Agreed Framework no longer binding. A *KCNA* spokesman says that if the DPRK is on the U.S. target list, then the United States and U.S. interests will be on the North Korea target list. "Now that nuclear lunatics are in the White House, we are compelled to take substantial countermeasures to protect the Korean nation and freedom-loving peoples everywhere."

The United States grows increasingly concerned about the North's WMD activities. Intelligence reports suggest that Pyongyang will test a three-stage intercontinental-range ballistic missile by the end of 2003. A separate intelligence estimate indicates increased North Korean investment on asymmetric warfare capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons. The *Washington Post* reports that the Bush administration's decision that the DPRK was not in compliance with the Agreed Framework was because of a secret North Korean program to enrich uranium with the help of some disaffected Pakistani nuclear scientists. Washington publicly warns Iran not to seek nuclear or ballistic missile cooperation with the DPRK after a high-ranking North Korean delegation turns up in Tehran for unspecified meetings. On Capitol Hill, North Korean dissidents testify about the hardship and misery inside the North; they also assert that foreign aid is being siphoned off to feed the leadership and the military. Asked to comment on this testimony, President Bush states that Kim Jong-il has a "heart of stone" for his brutality. In congressional budget discussions, the KEDO appropriation is zeroed out. The Agreed

Framework is dead.

Conclusion

History, a wit once remarked, is just one damned thing after another. Developments on the Korean Peninsula can be characterized in much the same way. Although there is a fanciful element to each of the above three scenarios, what is both unsettling and sobering is that all three outcomes "Let the Sun Shine In," "···And the Horse You Rode In On," and the "Axis of *Really* Evil" -- are plausible. They serve to remind us that the decisions taken by countries in the region, especially South Korea, the United States, Japan and North Korea, today and in the weeks and months ahead, will shape the region's future.

The particular scenario that develops will be influenced by the quality of leadership, commitment, and wisdom these states bring to the complex of problems presented by North Korea. Amidst much uncertainty, though, there is one stubborn truth: There is little excuse for our not doing more to bring security and stability to the Korean Peninsula and great risks if we do less.

Between Normalization and Kidnapping: Re-establishing Japan's North Korea Policy

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Even after the conclusion of the Cold War, relations between Japan and North Korea (The Democratic People's Republic of Korea) remained frozen, due to Pyongyang's continuous development of weapons of mass destruction, and the emergence of the Japanese kidnapping issue. Although the progress made in the North-South Korean dialogues and the U.S.-North Korean negotiations at the end of the Clinton administration had compelled the Japanese and North Koreans to resume talks, the kidnapping issue was still the greatest obstacle to the normalization of relations. This was because the issue triggered a highly emotional public response, as the Yokota Megumi case has typically demonstrated. In addition, following the court testimony of the ex-wife of a member of the Japanese Red Army who hijacked the Yodo plane to North Korea in 1970, the kidnapping of Arimoto Keiko recently also received wide attention, further hardening public opinion. On March 19, 2002 the Japanese government set up a "project team

to deal with the issue of the kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea" under the vice-ministers conference.

According to the April 2, 2002 issue of the Mainichi Newspaper, support for the moderate view that the kidnapping issue had to be resolved parallel with humanitarian assistance and the normalization of relations talks had decreased to 33%, while the hard-liner opinion that called for the deferring of humanitarian assistance and the normalization talks until the kidnapping issue was resolved, reached 40% approval. Furthermore, 19% of people as of April 2002 supported the use of hard-line measures, including military cooperation with the U.S., to settle the kidnapping issue. Prime Minister Koizumi, who met with the victims families on March 19, 2002 also said, "This is not only a matter of the families. We accept this issue as a problem for Japan as a whole... Without resolving the kidnapping issue, the idea of reaching an agreement in the Japanese-North Korean talks is unthinkable." This was a clear suggestion that the settlement of the kidnapping issue is to be a precondition for the normalization of relations.

Suspected Cases of Kidnapping of Japanese Citizens

The first Japanese-North Korean normalization talks, which began with the visit of the Kanemaru-Tanabe delegation to North Korea in 1990, ended in failure two years later in November, 1992. At that time, the issue of the "suspected kidnapping" had not yet

surfaced, so the reason the negotiations were stalled was due to North Korea's continuous refusal to allow IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections, despite the growing suspicion that it was developing nuclear weapons. The then U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost, drew attention to Japan's apparent lack of understanding of the problem by showing satellite photos as evidence. In addition, ROK's President, Roh Tae-woo, was worried about the impact that the Japanese-North Korean normalization would have on his Northern politik. In other words, the Kanamaru-Tanabe initiatives were being carried out autonomously, outside the policy parameters of the U.S. and ROK.

Although the US-North Korea Framework Agreement was signed in Geneva in October, 1994, talks between Japan and North Korea were not resumed, mainly because of the situation in North Korea following the death of President Kim Il-sung. In fact, it was not until after the completion of the three-year mourning period for Kim Il-sung that diplomatic contacts were made in the summer of 1997 for the resumption of negotiations. Shortly after, these contacts were elevated to preparatory talks at the Asia Bureau deputy-director-general level, with both sides eventually agreeing, not only on the early resumption of normalization talks, the realization of home visits of Japanese spouses living in North Korea, and the establishment of the Japanese-North Korean Red Cross Meetings, but also on the investigation in North Korea of missing Japanese nationals.

The "investigation of the whereabouts of missing Japanese" was designed to confirm the presence of ten Japanese who were the

alleged victims in seven cases of kidnapping by North Korean agents in the late 1970s. The North Korean side treated these alleged kidnapping as "general, missing person" cases. However, Japan began to demand a serious investigation following the surfacing case of Yokota Megumi, who was 13 years old when she went missing. This case was revealed in February by the testimony of a North Korean agent who had defected to the ROK the same year. Since that time, the so-called "suspected kidnapping" have emerged as a diplomatic issue that neither Japan nor North Korea can avoid. Although the kidnapping issue was not on the original agenda, like the suspected development of nuclear weapons issue, it nevertheless has become fundamental to the prospect of the Japanese-North Korean talks ever reopening.

Consequently, Japan was gravely concerned when no progress was made in the investigation into the whereabouts of the "missing persons," despite its decision to contribute $27 million for food assistance to North Korea, and even after the realization of the first home visits of Japanese spouses, and the visit to North Korea of the delegation from the three ruling parties headed by Mori Yoshiro, Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's General Council. The North Korean government may have thought that the realization of home visits of Japanese spouses, and the mere promise of an investigation into the alleged kidnaps would be sufficient to reopen the talks and to induce Japan to provide further food assistance. This was a form of deceptive diplomacy. As a matter of fact, had North Korea confirmed the whereabouts of the "missing persons" at that stage, it would have been nothing

more than a self-confession that it had indeed committed an international crime, even before the resumption of the talks.

As a result, Japanese-North Korean relations once again became stalled. Diplomatic channels between Japan and North Korea had already been severed when the second-stage rocket section of the Daepodong crossed Japanese skies in August, 1998, further exacerbating relations. On September 1, the Japanese government strenuously protested the launch of the North Korean ballistic missile and demanded that the development and export of such weapons cease immediately. At the same time, Japan took measures to suspend the normalization talks, it ceased providing food assistance, and withdrew its assistance to the KEDO (Korea Energy Development Organization) project. The next day, the Japanese government canceled charter flights to North Korea. On September 4, North Korea responded by declaring that it had successfully launched an "artificial satellite."

The launch of the Daepodong had a significant impact on Japan's national security policy. The emergence of a ballistic missile from a hostile neighbor crossing unchallenged over Japan's main island, coupled with the memory of the suspected kidnapping and an on-going fear of nuclear proliferation, hammered home to the Japanese government and the Japanese people the extent of the North Korean threat. Consequently at the Liberal Democratic Party's joint meeting of foreign and defense affairs on September 1, it was decided to actively pursue the TMD (Theater Missile Defense) plan, develop intelligence -gathering satellites and strengthen Japan's air defenses. In addition, the

Liberal Democratic Party demanded the revision of guideline-related bills and the bill for legislation on a state of emergency. The implementation of these national security-related measures was no doubt facilitated immensely by the Daepodong shock.

Setback to the "Parallel Settlement" method

As has been already mentioned, it was not until 1997 that the so-called "suspected kidnapping" emerged as an important diplomatic issue. While it can be criticized for being too late in doing anything about these cases, it was quite natural for Japan to link them to the Japan-North Korean talks so that they can be handled as a diplomatic issue. This is because the normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations was the only diplomatic card that Japan held, along with the massive economic cooperation that would come with normalization. In fact, had there been no "suspected kidnapping" issue, or if the issue could have been settled after normalization, the normalization talks would have progressed far more smoothly than they have to date.

In addition, essential to the problem was the fact that as long as the Kim Jong-il regime continues, it is impossible to imagine how the victims of the "suspected kidnapping" could be retrieved if Japan were to pursue hard-line or confrontational policies. In cases like these, the toughest measure that one country can normally take is to sever diplomatic relations with its opposite member. However, no diplomatic relations exist between Japan

and North Korea. Moreover, even if the Japanese government were to violate the Japanese Constitution, and in an act of gun barrel diplomacy, deploy their Self-Defense Forces off the Pyongyang coast, the North Korean government would not acquiesce to Japanese demands, because what we are dealing with here is an ex-colonial regime that is burning with hatred against Japan. Indeed, North Korea has not yet resolved its history of colonial subjugation. Furthermore, given the experience of the Korean War, it would be naïve to think that the victims' security would be guaranteed if or when Kim Jong-Il's regime collapsed.

To make matters more complicated, Japans deterrence policies, which it embarked on following the launch of the Daepodong, have been difficult to maintain internationally. For example, shortly after the Daepodong incident, ROK President, Kim Dae-jung, visited Japan in October 1998 and asked for Japanese-ROK cooperation in dealing with North Korea. In November of the same year, following former United States Secretary of Defense William Perry's visits to Japan and the ROK, the three countries agreed to work together. Therefore, the Japanese government was unable to continue to freeze financial assistance to KEDO. As a result, during his key note speech in January the following year, Prime Minister Obuchi had to call on North Korea to make "a constructive response" ; and at the February 1999 meeting of Japanese-ROK foreign ministers, Foreign Minister Koumura had to redefine Japan's policy as "dialogue and deterrence."

As a result, following the settlement of US-North Korea negotiations on the Kumchangri underground facilities, and after

the North Korean Foreign Ministry's declaration that missile launches would be temporarily suspended, it was only natural that diplomats from Japan and North Korea met informally in October 1999 in Singapore to reconfirm the two countries' pre-Daepodong positions. In addition, in December the same year, a mission of Japanese parliamentarians headed by former Prime Minister Murayama visited North Korea. The mission consisted of members of seven parties including the Democratic Party and the Communist Party, together with several independent Diet members. The LDP's former Cabinet Secretary, Nonaka Hiromu, accompanied the delegation as its general secretary. The purpose of the Murayama mission was "to create an environment for smoothing inter-governmental negotiations for the normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations."

Regarding the issue of the "suspected kidnapping," Murayama proposed a "settlement through parallel dialogue" of the resumption of the normalization talks and the humanitarian issues, to which Secretary Kim Yong-Sun agreed. The reason the discussions progressed so smoothly between the two sides was partly due to the fact that issues such as the suspected kidnapping, home visits of Japanese spouses in North Korea, and food assistance were all bundled together under the heading "humanitarian issues" ; and partly due to the fact that the two parties had reached an agreement to resume normalization talks without any preconditions. Nevertheless, Kim Yong-Sun pointed out that the word of "kidnapping" was inappropriate, but he did promise to allow investigations to be made by the Red Cross into the

"missing persons." Having consolidated all these agreements, during a key note speech in January the following year, Prime Minister Obuchi summarized the three pending issues of the Japanese-North Korean talks as follows: the normalization of relations between the two countries, the settlement of humanitarian issues, and the protection of national security.

As a result, in April 2000, for the first time in seven years and five months, the ninth general meeting of the Japanese-North Korean normalization talks was held in Pyongyang. However, shortly after that meeting, on April 10, Seoul and Pyongyang announced an agreement to stage a North-South Summit meeting, thus placing the Japanese government in new situation altogether. The North-South dialogue, along with the trilateral cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, had begun to push Japan to make progress in the Japanese-North Korean normalization talks. In fact, Prime Minister Mori asked President Kim Dae-jung on his visit to Pyongyang to deliver Japan's "strong intent" to Secretary General Kim Jong-Il. However, the question remained whether North Korea would accept a "parallel settlement" or not.

At the 10th general meeting, there was no major change in North Korea's position, despite the fact that the Japanese government, fearing negotiations would be delayed, decided to assist with an additional 500,000 tons of rice, North Korea, on the other hand, repeated its assertion that reconciliation of the past, including a "deep apology and sufficient compensation," would enable the other issues to be resolved easily. The North then broke off the 11th general meeting held in Peking at the end of

October. Encouraged by the visit of Secretary General Kim Jong-Il's right-hand man, Cho Myong-rok to Washington, and Secretary of State Albright's visit of Pyongyang, North Korea attempted to obtain huge amounts of compensation from Japan by casting the suspected kidnapping issue to one side while trying to isolate Japan in diplomatic terms.

Bush's "axis of evil" diplomacy

When President Clinton brought about some improvement in US-North Korea relations by jumping on the bandwagon during the dramatic North-South Korean peace process, North Korea's external policy appeared to be working well. Had President Clinton himself visited North Korea after Secretary of State Albright's visit, Kim Jong-Il would have visited Seoul as part of a series of diplomatic events which included Kim Jong-Il's visit to Russia and Zhang Zemin's visit to North Korea. Had this occurred, pressured by the "double shock" of peace breaking out between the two Koreas, and between the U.S. and North Korea, the Japanese government would have had no choice other than to pursue the normalization of relations with North Korea, regardless of the size of the compensation bill that would result. It would then have been very doubtful that the parallel settlement of normalization and the suspected kidnapping issue could have been maintained.

However, assisted by antiquated vote-counting machines in

Florida, Republican candidate Bush was duly elected President of the United States. After having criticized the Clinton era as having "peace without verification," Bush promptly undertook an overall review of the United States' policy on North Korea and suddenly everything changed completely. Even when President Kim Dae-jung visited Washington in March, after gaining the glory of winning the Nobel peace prize, President Bush stated candidly, "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea." This came as a surprise to President Kim Dae-jung, who had hoped to persuade the new president to support his "Sunshine Policy" of engagement.

Furthermore, the June 6th policy announcement of President Bush was much tougher than expected. Although Bush expressed his intention to reopen dialogue with North Korea, the move would take place in the context of a "comprehensive approach," and would require "improved implementation" of the Agreed Framework relating to the North's nuclear activities (i.e. the early implementation of IAEA inspections), "verifiable constraints" on its missile programs and exports, and a reduction in its conventional military posture (the withdrawal of advanced deployments of military capability and long-range fire arms)[1]. Bush also said that the United States would expand its efforts "to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps" only if the North "responds affirmatively and takes appropriate action."[2]

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1) Statement by President, Office of the Press Secretary, June 13, 2001. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html.
2) *Ibid.*

US policy towards North Korea was further hardened following the 9.11 terror attacks that occurred in the heart of the United States. Since then, the "war against terrorism" and halting the proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass-Destruction) have risen rapidly on the agenda to become the United States' most important external policies. North Korea responded swiftly to the 9.11 attacks-the very next day in fact- by issuing a foreign ministry statement describing the attacks as a very "regretful and tragic incident."3) The North also took pains to make its position clear by stating that Pyongyang was against terrorism. However, early October saw the launch of "Operation Enduring Freedom" against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda network, and Kim Jong-il's protestations were completely ignored. The United States had not excluded North Korea from the list of countries that support terrorism.

President Bush's State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002 created even more shock waves. Moving on from simply criticizing North Korean policy, the President accused the North of "arming (itself) with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens."4) He then went on to accuse North Korea of being part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. Having differentiated itself from the Clinton administration, the Bush administration was now attempting to establish an "anti-

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3) "Seoul eyes anti-terrorism declaration with Pyongyang," *The Korea Herald*, September 13, 2001.

4) President Delivers State of the Union Address, The Presidents State of the Union Address, Office of the Press Secretary, January 29, 2002. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

terrorist coalition" to fight against global terrorism. In fact, Bush's term, "axis of evil," was reminiscent of President Reagan, who in his desire to recover US prominence lost during the Carter administration, denounced the Soviet Union as "an evil empire" and tried to set up a "new cold-war coalition" to fight against it.

Also, like the Reagan administration, the Bush administration is leaving its options open and blurring the boundary between "dialogue and deterrence" as it prepares to confront these "rogue states." In fact, at the House Appropriation Committee on February 13, Secretary of State Powell warned, "If North Korea does not receive IAEA nuclear inspection based on the US-North Korea Framework Agreement, the Light Water Reactor program as a whole will be scrapped."[5] The U.S. is also actively pursuing MD (Missile Defense) plans, however one of the biggest differences between the Reagan era and today is that President Bush does not have a close friend in Korea like Reagan had with President Chun Doo-hwan.

It is difficult to speculate how the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea will be implemented. The basic characteristic of the new Korea policy is that it will, for the time being, continue to call for dialogue while setting the hurdle high. Either way, if the U.S.'s next target, Iraq, is taken care of, pressure on North Korea will immediately intensify. If North Korea is to respond by launching missiles, the Bush administration may attempt to destroy them at the boost or at the pre-boost stage. In addition, as a part of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs), the U.S. is

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5) *Chosun Ilbo* (Korean), February 14, 2002.

now considering developing a new type of bunker buster (a less powerful tactical nuclear weapon) that would enable it to destroy North Korea's underground military facilities.

North Korea's Military-First Leadership

North Korea strongly protested President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and his visits to Japan and the ROK. In fact, in response to the "axis of evil" speech, on February 1 the North Korean foreign ministry released a statement denouncing it as an "actual proclamation of war,"[6] and the KCNA (Korea Central News Agency) reported on Secretary General Kim Jong-il's inspection of advanced military bases one after another.[7] In addition, on February 22, 2002, immediately after Bush's visit to the ROK, the North Korean Foreign Ministry launched a personal attack on President Bush's character by saying that "Bush's outbursts against the DPRK system is... little short of declaring a denial of dialogue with the DPRK" and his proposal is designed "to find a pretext for invasion."[8] These reactions clearly indicate that the North Korean leadership has become extremely sensitive to U.S. criticism of their system and to Bush's denouncement of Kim Jong-il.

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6) *Gekkan Ronchou* (Japanese), (Chousen Tsuushin Sha: Tokyo, Japan), February 2002, p.13.
7) *Ibid*., pp. 1-2.
8) Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush's Recent Tour of Asian Countries, February 22, 2002. Http://www.Korea-np.co.jp/pk/

Coinciding with its condemnation of Bush, the North Korean media has also intensified its criticism of the ROK's influential conservative presidential candidate, Lee Hoe-chang, president of the opposition Grand National Party. On February 6, 2002, the KCNA and the Pyongyang Broadcasting Service described Lee Hoe-chang as "a kind of war lover and a first-degree traitor who worships the stronger country." They also strongly attacked remarks made by Lee during his visit to the U.S., regarding the suspension of North Korea's WMD development and its deployment of conventional weapons to bases away from the frontline. In terms of President Bush's visits to Japan and the ROK, North Korea is clearly taking precautions against Lee Hoe-chang's winning the election and the strengthening of Japan-US and US-ROK alliances. In other words, Pyongyang is worried that a strategic alliance between Bush, Koizumi and Lee Hoe-chang may eventuate.

Gaining more attention in the North, however, was Kim Jong-il's inspection of front-line military units on February 1-2, 2002, immediately after Bush's remarks about the "axis of evil," and remarks about the "brinkmanship of war" made by both Cho Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the National Defense Commission and director of the general political department of the Korean People's Army; and Kim Young-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, together with other key North Korean leaders. At the February 14,2002 meeting to vow loyalty in commemoration of Kim Jong-il's 60th birthday, held early in the morning at a secret camp in Paektu Mountain, Cho Myong-rok

pointed out that "at present, the mad war-lover American imperialists further revealed their invasion plan against us, and bring the military situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war." He went on to emphasize, "We have to respond to fire with fire and to an all-out war with all-out war."

Needless to say, each of these North Korean reactions is a frank reflection of the "military first politics" that Pyongyang has been emphasizing. This means primarily that North Korea intends to maintain its form of socialism by force of arms, and to guard its supreme leader through the single-hearted unity of the labor force, the army and the people. In other words, nothing matters but the protection of Kim Jong-il's "Military First Leadership." Furthermore, the North Korean media recently emphasized repeatedly the significance of the "Military First Politics," and called for the people's "single-hearted unity." It was also reported that recruitment meetings are being held at high schools nation-wide, so that students can "voluntarily join" the Korean People's Army. This is similar to the situation that occurred when North Korea withdrew from the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in March 1993.

The lessons learned from the Rumanian civil war and the destruction of the Soviet system have influenced the way in which the North Korean leadership has given greater priority to internal unity and the protection of its supreme leader and leadership system, than to preparing for a military confrontation with imperial forces. Accordingly, in comparison with Afghanistan and Iraq, Pyongyang keenly understands the essence of the

military crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Basically, North Korea believes that as long as no organized anti-regime forces exist in North Korea, any military campaign against Pyongyang will mean an all-out war that will surely involve sacrificing lives on a large-scale; something that could never be tolerated either by the U.S., who are loath to sustain casualties among their own troops, and the ROK, whose capital, Seoul, would be taken hostage.

Clearly, North Korea sees any incomplete compromise as being dangerous. In fact, North Korean literature on "Military First Politics" says that in a "fierce diplomatic war," a country's "last resort" or ultimate strength is its military power. Thus, the thinking is that it was only because North Korea maintained its stance and backed it up with its strong military power that it was possible for Pyongyang to avoid Japanese-US-ROK sanctions during the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 and to resolve the "underground nuclear facilities" crisis in 1998.[9] In addition, instead of emphasizing, as it once did, Kim Jong-ils "matchless courage," Pyongyang now emphasizes the "fearless spirit of attack of Mt. Paekdu." In sum, North Korea is once again attempting to deploy diplomacy that is backed by military power.

How to re-establish North Korean Diplomacy

Despite the exchange of belligerent rhetoric, relations between

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9) *Kim Jong Il eui Seon Gun Jeongchi* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2000), pp.255-261

the U.S. and North Korea have not deteriorated to the point of no return. However, if conservative candidate, Lee Hoe Chang, is elected in the December ROK presidential election, and if U.S.-North Korean dialogue remains stalled, relations between both the U.S. and North Korea will become seriously strained, as will relations between North and South Korea. On the other hand, following the court testimony of the ex-wife of a member of the Japanese Red Army Group who hijacked a plane to North Korea in 1970, the Arimoto Keiko case was highlighted, provoking public demand for a "firm stance' against North Korea. There has never before been a time when public anger towards North Korea was so high. While it is vitally important that this crisis does not escalate any further, the issue nevertheless has provided the best opportunity to date for a diplomatic solution to be found.

Looking back on Japan's past policies on North Korea, the Kanemaru-Tanabe initiative was taken independently in the main, given the fact that there was no prior consultation with either the U.S. or the ROK. At that time, chances of normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea were at their greatest. Compared to the Kanemaru-Tanabe initiative, however, Murayama's initiatives placed greater importance on the settlement of the kidnapping issue. Because the Murayama initiatives were complicated by other issues, such as peace efforts between North and South Korea and between the U.S. and North Korea, they became something of a diplomatic attempt at international coordination. In addition, taking the Bush administrations "war on terrorism" into account, North Korean policy in the foreseeable future also

has to be internationally coordinated. In fact, in support of Bush's policy, it is of the opinion that the suspected kidnapping cases have to be resolved first.

Logically speaking, if the prior settlement of the alleged kidnapping case meant to be a denial of the Japanese-North Korean talks, it is inevitable that we have to assume a confrontation with North Korea. If Japanese-North Korean relations become stalled, so does the settlement of the problem. Furthermore, judging by North Korea's attitude that has been discussed so far, it will not be possible to rescue the victims of the suspected kidnapping without risking a military confrontation, or even all-out war. If there is military action, it stands to reason that the safety of the victims certainly will be far from guaranteed. At present, we even have no idea of the whereabouts of the victims. This case is different from a domestic crime because reaching the truth does not necessarily mean a resolution of the case and the rescue of the victims. It should never be forgotten that North Korea is indeed "a counterpart hard to deal with."

Required in Japan's current policy towards North Korea are the following: first, we need to face the grim reality of the situation, whether it be through appeasement or confrontation, and not delude ourselves into believing that a solution exists. Although it is important to take a "firm stance,' it is hard to imagine that the suspected kidnapping case can be resolved through the suspension of food assistance, or the imposition of cheap sanction measures alone.

Secondly, as there is no "capital idea" to rescue the victims, we

need to return to basics and re-establish Japan's North Korean policy from a broader, long-term perspective. We need to ascertain our most effective policy by seriously reviewing the experiences we have accumulated so far. As has been pointed out in this paper, given the way diplomacy involving international coordination vacillates in reaction to changing circumstances, and leaving aside the question of normalization of relations, rescuing the victims is going to be extremely difficult, whether through peaceful diplomacy or confrontation.

Thirdly, we therefore need to employ a skillful, hybrid form of diplomacy that incorporates both international coordination and independent initiatives. Unless Japan shows some independence and initiative, while at the same time continuing to work in close coordination with the U.S. and ROK, the North Koreans will continue to prevaricate on the suspected kidnapping issue.

Fourthly, I believe it is time to establish a full-time "special diplomatic investigation team," which would use methods similar to the police when dealing with cases that are expected to be unresolved. This team would be comprised of highly knowledgeable persons who would not only be able to make a persistent effort, but also would have the ability to make high-level judgments. They would have the mobility to make the most of every available lead, and the protection of confidentiality, as well as direct access to high-level policy makers.

If these policies are to have the desired effect, it is possible to imagine that more than a parallel settlement of the normalization of relations and the alleged kidnapping cases, that is, a "simultaneous

settlement package," can be achieved. If such dynamic and independent diplomacy bears fruit, it will inevitably gain public support. Furthermore, as the Bush administration's hard-line policy effectively promotes North Korea's change of policy toward the South and Japan, it can also be seen as part of President Bush's diplomatic success. However, the chance for this to eventuate will not occur until North Korea recognizes to some extent that a "crisis" is looming, and that it needs to normalize its relations with Japan in order to avoid this crisis. In other words, it is highly likely that such a chance will come after the end of the "World Cup cease-fire," and when the Iraqi problem enters into a new phase.

Working Towards Peace on the Korean Peninsula after September 11

Frank Hesske
Ambassador
Head of Delegation
Delegation of the European Commission in the Republic of Korea

Campaign against Terrorism

The EU is one of the leading partners in the global campaign against terrorism. Within days of the hideous terrorist attacks on the United States, a series of policy measures were tabled, which led to a plan of action being adopted by a special European Council meeting of EU heads of government on September 21, 2001.

This action plan consisted of a full range of areas where the EU as a whole has been making an effective contribution, adding value to the efforts of individual member states. These include: police and judicial co-operation, diplomatic engagement with key countries, reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, humanitarian aid,

air transport security, economic and financial measures and emergency preparedness.

At a time of instability and uncertainty in the international arena, the EU remains more than ever committed to supporting peace-building efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

Political Engagement

Political engagement has continued after the visit of the high level EU delegation to Pyongyang in May 2001. Senior North Korean officials in both the political and economic fields have traveled to Brussels on two occasions in 2001 and dialogue between senior officials took place on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in Hanoi in July 2001. In October 2001 the fourth political dialogue at the senior official level between the EU and the DPRK was held in Pyongyang. An exchange of opinions took place on a wide range of matters including developments after September 11, the need for renewed South-North dialogue and other issues of concern to both sides. The EU reiterated its call for the DPRK to abide by its obligations towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The meeting was seen as particularly successful in that the DPRK announced on that occasion that it would sign two of the seven anti-terrorism conventions to which it was not a party. The EU, of course, continues to frequently consult and co-operate with major actors

in the region on the development of its relations with the DPRK.

Renewed EU support for Non-Proliferation on the peninsula

The European Council approved on December 7, 2001 the conclusion by the European Commission of a renewal agreement with KEDO. After community contributions of € 75 million ($ 88 million including bilateral contributions by Member States) between 1996 and 2000 the new terms will see the EU contribute 100 million between 2001 and 2005. The new agreement also sees the renewal of the EU's seat on the Executive Board of KEDO, improvements in EU representation in the staff of the KEDO secretariat and in bidding possibilities for industrial contracts.

Human Rights Dialogue

The protection of human rights is a central part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Union seeks to integrate human rights concerns into all foreign policy initiatives including development and humanitarian programmes. The human rights situation in the DPRK remains of the highest concern to the EU. At the high-level EU-DPRK meeting in May 2001, Pyongyang agreed to foresee the possibility of a dialogue on human rights issues. As a first step, a delegation of DPRK officials traveled to

Sweden in June 2001 to participate in a seminar on universal human rights organized by the Raoul Wallenburg Foundation. The group then traveled to Brussels for an introductory meeting with the EU on human rights. In the political dialogue session in October 2001, the EU handed the DPRK a questionnaire on human rights issues and is currently waiting for a response. The European Commission and the Member States are now deliberating on how this process could be further advanced.

Continuation of Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups of people in the DPRK, which began in 1995, has continued at a similar level to previous years reaching a total financial value of approximately€ € 242 million by the end of 2001. In addition to providing clothes and medicines, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) actions are progressing to more ambitious projects such a new programme in which € 5.5 million will be allocated to the building of water treatment and sewage facilities in the country. Recognising that the shortage of food in the DPRK is due more to structural and policy problems, there has been a gradual move away from food aid towards agricultural rehabilitation through the supply of fertilizers and technical assistance. Fertilizers worth € €18 million are due to be delivered to the DPRK in April and May of 2002. This year the Community will also make contributions of food aid worth €€ 4.5 million to the World Food

Program for use in the DPRK.

Technical Assistance projects

The EU recognizes that it is necessary for the DPRK to make the transition from emergency humanitarian assistance to long-term development if it is to improve its economic situation. As part of the EU response to positive developments on the Korean Peninsula in 2000, it was decided to examine the possibility of beginning, at a modest level in the initial stage, technical assistance and training projects in the DPRK. A preliminary fact-finding mission took place in February 2001, which was followed by a donor coordination meeting in Brussels in March of that year. The results emerging from both the fact-finding mission and the coordination meeting were that the DPRK's priority needs are: training, particularly in regard to institutional capacity building, basic technical advice on how to run their energy sector, rural development and improvements in the transport sector.

In March 2002 the European Commission's Country Strategy Paper for the DPRK, a document that is written for all countries receiving EC assistance, was approved. This sets out EU development priorities for the country during the period 2001-2004. As a first step, two pilot projects will be launched later this year in training DPRK officials in principles of the market economy and

training officials working in the energy sector on how to achieve greater efficiency.

High Level Economic Delegation visit to the EU

During the high-level EU-DPRK meeting in May 2001, Chairman Kim Jong-il expressed an interest in the working of market economies in European countries. As a direct consequence, between March 3 and 16, 2002 a group of senior DPRK economic officials led by the Foreign Trade Minister visited the EU. The European Commission coordinated the visit as a whole and hosted the group in Brussels for three days. Topics covered during the meetings included an introduction to EU institutions, EU economic policies and restructuring measures and EU assistance to transition economies in third countries. The DPRK delegation had bilateral meetings with the Belgian government and representatives of the Belgian industry before travelling to Rome, London and Stockholm for similar meetings with the respective governments and economic organizations in those countries.

The Future

Despite the lack of tangible results from interaction with the DPRK over the last few years, the EU believes that engagement

is the only way to bring the DPRK into the fold of the international community and to end its isolation. The central element in EU engagement on the Korean Peninsula will continue to be support for inter-Korean reconciliation, which will inevitably be a long and gradual process. EU engagement of the DPRK will continue at a steady pace and will aim at assisting the country to gain the capability of constructing a blueprint for its own economic revival and entry into the international community. Close cooperation between the EU and other interested parties in the region will be maintained, in order to maximise the impact of the engagement policy. At the same time the Union will remain ready to respond appropriately to any major occurrence or sudden change on the peninsula.

Working Toward World Peace on the Korean Peninsula after September 11

Terusuke Terada
Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of Korea

Ⅰ. Developments in the past year as factors and the motives behind them

1. September 11: before and after and its effects on the Korean Peninsula

Some analysts point out that "September 11" derailed North Korea's scenario for restarting dialogue with the United States, South Korea and Japan. Whether such a theory of "derailment" is correct is hard to tell, but one can at least say that September 11 has created a landscape that is very different from the one that existed before, and has had an effect on the Korean Peninsula, as on other parts of the world.

In spite of the initial progress and the successful outcome of the Fifth Ministerial Talks, South-North dialogue stalled, after North Korea criticized the emergency security measures taken by South Korea to prepare itself for possible terrorist attacks, instead of

North Korea. Thus, September 11 seemed, at least on the surface, partly responsible for the stalled dialogue.

September 11 has highlighted North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issues, although these had already been a priority for a long time. The necessity of solving outstanding issues visa vis the North, including its WMD, has become even greater.

2. President Bush's visit to Asia and Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to South Korea

President Bush's visit to Tokyo and Seoul in February 2002 was a good opportunity to send a clear message to North Korea. Namely, that Japan, South Korea and the United States are ready for dialogue and ready to solve outstanding issues through dialogue. It was also important that President Bush unequivocally stated that the United States had no intention of attacking North Korea.

Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to South Korea, which took place roughly a month after the U. S. president's visit, was successful not only in terms of improved bilateral relations between Japan and R.O.K., but also in demonstrating the solidarity and cooperation between the two countries on policies toward the North. Our Prime Minister reiterated his strong support for President Kim's sunshine policy and expressed that Japan would patiently work on the normalization of relations

with North Korea and solving such issues as abduction and security, while President Kim also emphasized the importance of dialogue and expressed his willingness to closely cooperate with Japan.

3. North Korea's recent moves and its motives

As we all know, North Korea made a move in the last week of March 2002, when it agreed to accept Mr. Lim Dong-won as a special envoy of President Kim Dae-jung.

The visit was a success in that agreements were reached on resuming dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. North Korea was also reported to express willingness to resume dialogue with Japan and the United States.

Turning our eyes to Japan-North Korea relations, the North Korean Red Cross announced on the evening of March 22, 2002, the second day of our Prime Minister's visit to Seoul, that it would resume the investigation of the so-called "missing persons" and also proposed Red Cross talks.

Futhermore, a plan was scheduled for Mr. Chikara Sakaguchi, Health, Welfare and Labour Minister, to go to Singapore to meet his North Korean counterpart to informally discuss issues related to people suffering from the aftereffects of atomic bombs, though the visit was postponed at the last minute under the pretext that the North was not able to make adequate preparations for the meeting.

We also recall that North Korea rather abruptly set free Mr.

Takashi Sugishima, a retired newspaper reporter, in February 2002 after having detained him for more than two years.

The motives behind these recently active moves by North Korea have yet to be ascertained. Some experts say that North Korea is genuinely willing to improve relations with Japan, South Korea and the United States through solving outstanding issues by way of dialogue, while others see these moves as merely tactical.

We very much hope that the former is the case. We regard the above-mentioned announcement by the North Korean Red Cross as a positive move by North Korea, and we look forward to further positive actions by North Korea.

II. Achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula: Japan's view

1. Prerequisite for peace

There are certain issues that must be solved in order to achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, including security and humanitarian issues. The first prerequisite for lasting peace is that the parties concerned are willing to solve such problems through dialogue.

Japan, as is the case with South Korea and the United States and as is often reiterated, is ready for such dialogue.

2. Japan's policies vis à vis North Korea as well as its major concerns

This is Japan's basic position: To make steady efforts toward normalizing relations with North Korea in a way conductive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and close cooperation and coordination with South Korea and the United States.

The current state of Japan-North Korea normalization talks: the talks have been suspended since October 2000. North Korea's priority is placed on such issues as apologies and financial compensation, while it is essential for Japan that outstanding issues such as security and humanitarian concerns, including abduction, are simultaneously solved.

We have kept urging the North to take a constructive attitude toward various issues of concern, including abduction and security issues. The question of abduction is, as our Prime Minister said, a very serious problem for Japan, as it involves the lives of Japanese nationals. Security issues, including missiles and nuclear weapons concerns, need to be solved for the enhancement of stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.

It is necessary for North Korea to make further positive moves. The Japanese people want to see tangible results.

Ⅲ. Concluding remarks on engagement with North Korea

As our Prime Minister stated in the joint press conference with President Kim in March 2002, we need to patiently make North

Korea understand that for its own sake, cooperation with the international community is of paramount importance and that outstanding questions must be solved through dialogue. It is in the same spirit that Japan fully supports President Kim's engagement policy.

It is also important that the concerned parties work together to induce North Korea to make positive moves. In this connection, Japan fully commits itself to trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea and the United States, and we are glad to see the fruitful outcomes achieved on the occasion of the April 2002 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Tokyo.

While the trilateral cooperation plays a leading role, cooperation with other parties, notably China, Russia, the EU and Australia, whose representatives are with us here, is also essential. We wish to see these countries continue to send messages to North Korea, that continuing dialogue and making positive moves are in the best interest of the North and the international community.

Russia's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Teymuraz O. Ramishvili
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Korea

The outcome of the Russia-South Korea summit that took place in Seoul, February 2001, and the agreements achieved during the Moscow talks between the leaders of Russia and the DPRK in August 2001, convincingly showed not only Moscow's resolution to ensure its active participation in matters of the Korean Peninsula, but also the recognition by leaders of the two Korean states of Russia's role in maintaining peace and stability in this region.

An important role in deepening mutual understanding on the issues of preserving peace and stability in the region has lately been played by regular meetings between leaders of parliaments and governments, ministries and agencies of Russia on one side, and the two Koreas on the other, through consultations and exchanges of opinions on bilateral and international matters.

I believe South Korea made certain of the sincerity of Moscow's intentions to render all the assistance to the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue, while realizing that all problems remaining in their

relations, including, of course, the problem of unification, are to be solved only by the Koreans themselves. Favorable international surroundings that can only be ensured by the effort of all nations participating in the Korean process should contribute to finding solutions on the Korean Peninsula.

Russia is ready to go its part of the way. We sincerely wish for a sooner unification of Korea. To eliminate the spot of constant tensions and create a unified, democratic, and independent Korean state with powerful economic potential fully corresponds with the interests of our country.

Russia is ready to use its potential in relations with South and North Korea to contribute to the inter-Korean settlement. The Basic positions of our approach have not changed.

First, the peace process and cooperation between the North and South should develop on the principles agreed upon by the Korean people themselves, and by the Korean leaders, without outside interference.

Second, all problems should be solved through peaceful, diplomatic ways only in the spirit of the Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 made between the South and North.

Third, we will welcome the process of the peaceful creation of a unified Korean state, which will be friendly toward Russia and other countries. And we are convinced that reliable security can be ensured through non-military means, by working out certain international legal guarantees.

Fourth, reduction of tensions is impossible under the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world in general, as well

as in the region and on the Korean Peninsula in particular. We will support the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula. Russia is ready to contribute its might into these processes, particularly in the context of promoting our global initiatives on the non-proliferate of missiles. We call on the Republic of Korea to actively participate in these undertakings.

Fifth, Russia is interested in implementing multilateral projects aimed at the economic development of the region, with participation from Northeast Asian countries, including the two Koreas. Such projects as opening transportation along the Trans-Korean railroad and the Trans-Siberian railway, joint modernization of energy complex on the Korean Peninsula and other projects are beneficial to everyone. There will be no losers in this work. It is such joint projects that lay a solid economic foundation for stability in the region.

Certain points in the internal and foreign policy of the DPRK give us reason to take a different look at this country today. First of all, I mean a more open, civilized behavior of Pyongyang in the international arena.

Kim Jong Il's probe into foreign country's experiences of economic reforms, even though still cautious and yet quite noticeable (particularly, during his visit to Russia) attracts attention. Today we can talk about a changing image of the DPRK leadership. It seeks to get rid of the "rogue state" label, which, as is well known, has never been approved by Russia. Pyongyang has generally shown its solidarity with the international fight against terrorism and took the decision to join international conventions on the

fight against financing terrorism, and counteracting hostage kidnapping.

The unequivocal condemnation of international terrorism by North Koreans, following the events of September 11 in New York, was of great use and significance. I must say that the statement was made by North Korea not without our influence. (Immediately following those terrorist attacks we had contacts with North Korean representatives, and recommended them to make a public statement. They followed our recommendations.)

The Russia-North Korea Summit in August, 2001 in Moscow reaffirmed our view of Kim Jong Il as an experienced and dynamic leader, disposed to active dialogue with the outside world, receptive to new proposals and initiatives.

We noted that the North Korean leader is interested in the experience of economic reforms. To him, this experience is limited to China and Russia, yet his visits to these countries became, in a certain sense, a useful lesson.

Our President gave special attention to the contacts with Kim Jong Il. Those talks provided the North Korean leader with a lot of open and straight information. It was important and useful.

I think he is the figure one may and should talk to on the problems of the Korean Peninsula, as well as on international issues. Attempts to isolate him or to use pressure on him, as can be seen from experience, turn out to be counter-productive. We believe that the line on cooperation between the North and South has no alternatives, although the tactics might vary.

During the talks in Moscow last year, Kim Jong Il pointed to

a close link between inter-Korean relations and the development of contacts between North Korea and the U.S. However, the course on tightening its policy towards the DPRK made it more difficult to seek compromise between Pyongyang and Washington.

In the new situation on the Korean Peninsula it is the inter-Korean dialogue that became a key element to ensuring security and stability. Promoting relations between North and South might have a positive impact on creating a favorable atmosphere around the Korean Peninsula in general, and for setting the concerns expressed by the U.S. as well.

Moscow was therefore satisfied with the outcome of the recent trip to Pyongyang of the South Korean president's special envoy, Lim Dong Won.

The talks showed that Pyongyang is generally interested in the development of inter-Korean cooperation, naturally with certain guarantees for the present regime and on the condition of external security.

We realize the difficulty of the inter-Korean negotiation process, preceded by decades of mutual distrust and suspicion. It requires mutual patience and consistency in policy. Under the circumstances, we consider it counter-productive to act by using threats and insults toward North Korean leaders.

While Russia is building its policy of friendly relations with Seoul and Pyongyang without directly linking it to the status of the inter-Korean dialogue, its successful progress fully corresponds with our interests. We see today's role of our country as Korea's neighbor not only in absolutely supporting the all-Korean reso-

luteness for reconciliation and unification, but also in helping to work out stable external conditions for the dialog, equally safe for all parties.

For this purpose, we are ready to further discuss possibilities of normalizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula with all countries, interested and involved in the Korean affairs, including the United States, China, Japan, as well as European countries, all of which have lately demonstrated great interest and active approach toward Korea.

Democracy, Human rights and Peace: Critical Reflections

Jean-Marc Coicaud
Professor, United Nations University

The topic assigned to me by the organizers of this conference is "Democracy, human rights and Peace: Critical Reflections" This is indeed a huge topic, and a rather intimidating one to say the least. I have therefore no intention to give you a full or comprehensive account of these three themes - democracy, human rights and peace - and their connection in the current era. Rather I will focus on one possible aspect of the topic and will use it to attempt to assess the extent and limits of extending a sense of international solidarity and responsibility since the end of the Cold War. This will be my way to reflect critically on the state of democracy, human rights and peace at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21th century.

From this perspective, the issue on which I will focus concerns the extent and the limits to which human rights have become part of the international agenda since the early 1990s. The 1990s indeed

provide at the global level a critical entry point on the relevance of the issues of democracy, human rights and peace and on how they are handled since the end of the Cold War. The question that I will try to pose, and answer, is the following: how do we account for the fact that in the 1990s, in the area of human rights, much and yet so little was done?

In order to pose and answer this question, I will touch upon four main points. First, I will examine how the normative dimension of international order encompasses principles upon which individual rights can be recognized and implemented as imperatives. Second, I will emphasize the limits of modern international solidarity and the consequences that it holds for the implementation and protection of human rights at the international level. Third, I will show that, as a result, the projection of international justice with regard to human rights, while made possible by legal obligations, relies more at this stage on moral imperatives. Fourth, I will try to see how we could improve the commitment of the international community to internationalist issues, and to issues of democracy and human rights as a way to bring about peace.

Towards international solidarity for the good and the recognition of individual sovereignty

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the redistribution of inter-

national power contributed to the demotion of traditional strategic interests and the exacerbation of local conflicts. Combined with the pressure exercised domestically and internationally in the West by progressive actors asking for the crises of the period to be addressed, this allowed the extension of a sense of international solidarity as a policy guide. As such, the West began to give an enhanced sense of importance to human rights at the international level, as a way to fulfill and abide by an ethics of international affairs.

There was no need to start from scratch in order to motivate and justify international involvement in the local wars of the 1990s. It only required a slight readjustment of the focus of the fundamental principles regulating international relations, including an approach that was more sensitive to human rights and humanitarian considerations. Understanding this requires exploring how the principles of international socialization were agreed upon in the post-World War II era, identifying them and examining their qualities. It also entails looking into the regulatory role they play by serving as the structural standards of international law and the international system. This calls for analyzing how the evolution of the distribution of international power can influence the interpretation and application of international principles, thus also influencing international ethics and the guidelines it provides.

The process of formulation of universal principles regulating international relations after World War II[1] was formally initiated in the United Nations in the late 1950s and reached its climax in

1962, when the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States was set up. Its work lasted several years. On October 24, 1970, a *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations* was adopted by consensus in the General Assembly[2]. Without pretending to be exhaustive, the Declaration listed the critical principles at the core of the rule of law at the international level, allowing a modicum of relatively smooth international relations. A wide range of factors were taken into account in the discussions and negotiations that determined which international pronouncements engendered principles of universal scope and binding force. Treaties, General Assembly resolutions, statements by government representatives in the United Nations and diplomatic practice were considered. Ultimately, the fundamental international principles that the Committee identified and agreed upon reflected the classical structure of the world system based on equality of states as well as the new trends emerging after World War I and particularly after World War II. The following major principles were endorsed: sovereign equality of states; non-intervention in the internal or external

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1) For a historical overview of the international principles at work before World War II, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, reed.), pp. 23-38.

2) Resolution 2625, XXV Session of the General Assembly, in *General Assembly. Official Records: Twenty-Fifth Session, Supplement No 28*, A/8028 (New York: United Nations, 1971), pp. 121-124.

affairs of other states; good faith; self-determination of peoples; prohibition of the threat or use of force; peaceful settlement of disputes; respect for human rights; and international cooperation. The principles of sovereign equality of states, non-intervention - at least in its role as a precept designed to protect states from interference of the traditional type in their domestic affairs- and good faith are those principles strongly embedded in the classical pattern of international relations. Self-determination of peoples, the prohibition of force (except in self-defense), peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and cooperation among states tend to be indicative of the post-Westphalian model, that is of the changes brought about in the international community by the new values that have emerged in the 20th century[3]).

These universal principles play a socialization role in international relations. Their socializing function can be broken down into three principal aspects. Their first role is one of inclusion. International principles bring a variety of value-ideals into the international system. Recognizing and incorporating them is of crucial importance for the inclusiveness of the international system. This is a key element of the inter-subjective dialogue among the actors of the international system. Recognition and incorporation are made mandatory by the fact that these value-ideals are viewed as

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3) For a slightly different perspective on fundamental principles, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (op. cit.), pp. 65-68.

valid by a significant number of strategic actors. These actors identify with the ideal-values and consider the endorsement of international principles as a condition of their own integration and participation in the international system. They consider them as an indispensable feature of the quest for and establishment of a workable and just international system. As such, fundamental principles appear to be components without which the international order could not exist, nor hope to fulfil its claims to represent a sense of justice and have legitimacy. For example, the principle of the sovereign equality of states is central to the legitimacy of the current international system[4]. The fact that respect for human rights is an important element of the democratic legitimacy dimension of the current international order provides another example.

The second socializing role played by universal principles is to serve the rule of law at the international level as they help to define it. Universal principles fulfill this function in two ways. To start with, they help to shape the normative framework of the international system. It is largely in connection with international principles that the normative and legal architecture of international order is envisioned and established, from its most general to its

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4) One of the attributes of sovereignty is to minimise the effects of the unequal distribution of international power. It fits the democratic conception of law, including international law, as the art of attempting to make unequal powers equal. Incidentally, law in a hierarchical culture is designed to ensure that what is viewed as unequal in essence remains unequal by law.

most specific characteristics. Norms, rules, regulations and standards of socialized international relations are associated with these principles, directly or indirectly. In addition, fundamental principles, through the value-ideals that they represent, inscribe their recommendations into a forward looking movement. Playing the roles of axiological foundations, guidelines and ends, they encourage a predictability of interactions within the dynamics of reciprocity of rights and duties. These are geared towards regulating the present and even more so the future of relations among international actors. By playing this role, they are at the core of the deliberations, decisions and actions of those eager to take the rules of the game seriously.

The third aspect of the socialization function of universal principles is to enhance a sense of community on the international plane. In delineating the overall setting of appropriate international interactions, international principles define the parameters and expectations of behavior that members have as part of the international community. In doing so, they outline the ethics of international affairs within the realm and the bonds of international community.

Having these socializing roles entails giving a strong normative determinacy to international relations. Normative determinacy is reflected in the paths that fundamental principles recommend and those that they reject. It is at work in the prescriptions of the norms, rules, regulations and standards associated with universal

principles, as they participate in the process of universalizing, particularizing, applying and deepening the axiological and political significance and reach of universal principles. Normative determinacy can also be found in the consistency that international principles call for and help to produce in the conduct of international actors.

However, besides introducing normative determinacy, fundamental principles leave room for normative indeterminacy. On the one hand, this normative indeterminacy is necessary to the application of principles. The application of fundamental principles is not a mechanical procedure, nor should it be. Principles cannot foresee the details of each situation. This is all the more true considering that social reality is relatively open and indeterminate. Contingency constantly enters into its formation and development. Applying international principles therefore presupposes a process of interpretation to assess how unfolding events fit into the vision and ordering of the international system by fundamental principles[5]. Yet, the normative indeterminacy contained in international principles is a sign of an uncertainty as to how the international system should prioritize the values that they delineate. This kind of normative indeterminacy shows that fundamental principles contribute to establish a normative order that, while designed and destined to be coherent, is only problematically coherent. It is not entirely convergent. The relative plurality of value-ideals represented

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5) On the question of interpretation in international law, see for instance Michel Virally, *Le droit international en devenir. Essais crits au fil des ans* (Geneva: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 120-121.

by international principles and their relations accounts for this situation. This is best illustrated by the relationships of compatibility and competition existing between fundamental principles.

The sense of compatibility among fundamental principles is critical for the existence and functioning of the international system as a whole. If compatibility was totally absent, the international system would be at stake. Compatibility among the principles ensures that the international system is moving in a clear direction. Compatibility also makes fundamental principles mutually reinforcing. Examples of compatibility can be found in the fact that prohibition of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and international cooperation express, defend and promote a similar philosophy of international relations and work together in the service of the regulation of the international system. Respect for human rights and self-determination of peoples are also technically quite compatible, although this is not automatic, as the hijacking of the principle of self-determination of peoples by the nationalist agenda in the Balkans in the 1990s indicates.

The problem is that not all principles are compatible. This lack of compatibility fuels a sense of competition among the fundamental international principles. Take for instance the issue of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and that of respect for human rights. These are both values about which actors feel strongly. Yet they are apt to be at odds with one

another, and thus in competition. Their application may entail the choice of one over the other, which is prone to generate difficulties and dilemmas, if not deadlocks. Tensions are all the more possible considering that it is not only among principles that there is competition but also between interpretations of a principle. The conflicting interpretations of sovereignty that affected the sovereign equality of states in the 1990s is a case in point[6].

The juxtaposition of relationships of compatibility and tension among fundamental principles echoes the various demands that are recognised and served by an international system geared

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6) In the debates of the period concerning humanitarian interventions, two conceptual interpretations of sovereignty found themselves in rivalry. Some advocated a territorial understanding of sovereignty, basically associated with the view that nations are independent realms within which national political institutions are entitled to exercise almost unlimited and unchallenged power. Here, the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the international plane was conceived of as largely non-negotiable, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states coming as a reinforcement of this interpretation of sovereignty. Others put forward an interpretation of sovereignty that emphasised its democratic dimension, insisting on the significance of the individual and human rights. The principle of respect for human rights was called upon to support this reading. The former view tended to be favoured by the non-Western world, and in particular by developing countries already deeply penetrated by dominant powers or fearing such penetration. The latter was the preference of the Western democratic nations. However, these nations, especially the most powerful among them, tended to rein in their advocacy for democratic sovereignty whenever its effects infringed upon their own autonomy of decision-making, as was for instance shown by the United States' reservations regarding the International Criminal Court.

towards socialization. In giving resonance to the major strategic value-ideals that shape international political culture, it reflects and feeds into the three regulating roles of international principles that we mentioned earlier regarding inclusiveness, rule of law and international community. In this context, the dangers of conflicts among principles which are not fully convergent tend to be tamed by the normative priorities that emerge as a condition of socialization and that the distribution of international power helps to identify and push forward. Indeed, while all are of critical importance, universal principles are not entirely of equal status. There is a more or less explicit and entrenched hierarchy established among fundamental principles that gives preference to certain interpretations and applications of principles over others. This normative hierarchy indicates the value-ideals to which the international system attaches a prevailing significance. For instance, up to the 1990s the territorial reading of the principle of sovereignty was the predominant paradigm, making it difficult to launch and justify international interventions in the name of human rights and humanitarian considerations. This tone corresponded with the distribution of international power existing at the time, namely made of East-West confrontation and North-South tensions.

The fact that priorities among principles are established in connection with the distribution of international power has consequences for the evolution of the international normative hierarchy. Not surprisingly, it implies that the priorities manifested

by the interpretation and application of principles and their relationships may vary with changes in the distribution of power. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of the Cold War[7].

As it evolves with the transformations affecting the structuring parameters and the identity of the international system, the ethics of international affairs is not set in stone. This means that the deliberations and decisions of international actors are dealing with a moving target. This was especially the case for the United

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7) Incidentally, this should not lead one to think that international trans-formation is a one-way process, only triggered by alterations in the material dimension of the distribution of power which are then factored in at the international normative level. Value-ideals can themselves contribute to changes occurring in the distribution of international power. For example, if the craving for respect for human rights was not the sole element that brought about the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it certainly had an impact. Ultimately, when a transformation in the distribution of power is important enough, it can account not only for the emergence of a new approach to the hierarchical relationships of principles, but also can encourage the changes of fundamental principles themselves. This entails then a systemic alteration of the values and modalities through which international socialisation takes place. Indeed, the ability of international principles and international law to be relevant and handle change depends upon the balance between determinacy and indeterminacy, of which relations of compatibility and competition among principles are parts. Lack of balance on issues that are not central to the functioning of the international community can exist without major consequences. However, if there is no balance on critical matters, the outcomes are likely to be devastating. International principles, inter-national law and the institutions associated with them run the risk of losing their regulating power with the undermining of their social validity.

Nations Security Council in the 1990s. In the "arc of interpretation" that its members leaned on to deliberate and decide -connecting principles, unfolding events and the various characteristics of the distribution of power during these years- they had to take into account the pressure generated by the changed international landscape. This made it imperative to embark on a reading of international principles keen on addressing human rights and humanitarian concerns.

The Security Council could not avoid human rights and humanitarian issues. The numerous resolutions dealing with them in the 1990s illustrate this point[8]. Most peacekeeping operations of the period had a strong human rights component, as the peace processes in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti show. In addition, attention to human rights and humanitarian matters also led the Security Council and peacekeeping operations to challenge the principle of sovereignty and its traditional territorial understanding. This resulted in a mixture of humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement, although under different conditions in each case, seen in Somalia, Bosnia and even Kosovo. Carrying perhaps even further the human rights and humanitarian shift was the establishment of the international tribunals. The International Tribunal

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8) See for example the list of selected resolutions dealing with human rights and humanitarian issues between 1990 and 1994 in *The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995), pp. 139-141. For the resolutions themselves and related documents, see pp. 402-495.

for the former Yugoslavia was given the broadest mandate of any international investigative body since the Nuremberg trial. The Tribunal carries out the authority to prosecute individuals responsible for four groups of offences: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; violations of the laws or customs of war; genocide; and crimes against humanity. It was also given primacy over national jurisdictions and the ability to issue international arrest warrants if national authorities were unwilling to cooperate or failed to serve the initial indictment of the accused individuals. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was given the task of prosecuting Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

These developments were so novel that it led some to raise the question of the discretionary powers of the Security Council to engineer them[9]. Further, their likelihood in terms of influencing the future, as the progress made on the establishment of the International Criminal Court indicates, certainly attests to the

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9) The Security Council's extension of its domain of responsibilities to new areas in the 1990s caused Mohamed Bedjaoui, the president of the International Court of Justice between 1994 and 1997, to examine the legitimacy of these self-appropriated responsibilities. He wondered whether it would be judicious to establish legal control over acts of the Security Council. See Mohamed Bedjaoui, *The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 47-53 and 127-130. For more on the issue, see also Jose E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council," in *The American Journal of International Law* (Washington DC: The American Society of International Law, volume 90, no 1, January 1996), pp. 1-4 and 10-14.

extent of the mutation that took place in the 1990s when it comes to a sense of international solidarity triggered by human rights and humanitarian crises.

- *The limits of modern international solidarity and the protection of human rights at the international level*

The context of the Post-Cold War era extended a sense of international solidarity to individuals in ways stronger than before. But it remained constrained by the configuration of international affairs. Two main factors account for this state of affairs. First, there is the structure of modern democratic solidarity itself. Second, in spite of the progress of multilateralism and internationalism before and during the 1990s, the international system remains largely nationally rooted, with state actors in competition.

In comparison to traditional solidarity, modern democratic solidarity is wider. Rather than being locked in narrow and exclusive social forms of memberships, modern democratic solidarity is wider because it is based on values which feed on and seek wide belonging and inclusion. The values of universality, equality and freedom at the core of modern democratic culture introduce a sense of sameness and connectedness that opens wide the gate of identification with others. It opens wide the gate of a sense of community that goes far beyond the boundaries of the immediate community in which each individual is born.

The inclusive democratic values of universality, equality and freedom, while generating a sense of connectedness among individuals, produce as well, through the individual autonomy that they also encourage, a distance between individuals. The tension between connectedness and distance contributes to make what is modern democratic law: the bringing together of people and the recognition of a normative basis for mounting a legal challenge if necessary. Indeed, in order to relate in legal terms with someone, an acknowledgement of the sameness of this person is first necessary. Without this sense of sameness and connection, the other has no grounds for any claim. Calling for a claim to be heard requires the recognition of the sameness, of the fact that there is a world and a humanity that is common and shared. The values of university, equality and freedom allow for this requirement. But they also accommodate a second characteristic required for making a claim. Litigation and challenge call upon a sense of otherness, of distancing from the same. While the other has to be understood within the realm of the same, this has to take place without having the sense of the same overwhelming and annihilating the dimension of the other. Otherwise the idea of challenge itself is not even thinkable. The existence of the other within the realm of the same, triggered by universality, equality and freedom helping to generate individuation, makes the challenge possible, opening venues for legal claims. Ultimately, it does so not only at the individual level, but also at the national level, and increasingly at the international level.

This combination of the same and the other, the understanding of the other within the realm of the same which is critical to the dynamics and development of modern democratic law, gives democratic values a double power of inclusiveness. They encourage inclusiveness through their embracing character as well as through the normative foundations they offer to the possibility of mounting challenges and claims. In other words, the fate of the other becomes part of the definition of the same - including the self and its qualification as a "decent self." In addition, the understanding of the other within the realm of the same also provides normative grounds to the challenge of privileges and injustice in the name of democratic values.

It therefore is not surprising that over the years, the widening of the circle of inclusion and deepening of the benefits of solidarity associated with it, namely understood as the recognition and respect of rights, have been objects of struggles. Indeed, in spite of the declarations of principles, the beneficiaries of democratic universalism and equality initially formed quite an exclusive club. It is therefore around the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that the battles for political, economic and social justice focused throughout the evolution of modern democratic culture. The objective was not necessarily to get rid of all forms of exclusion entirely, since functioning as competent members of society requires embodying positions shaped along lines of inclusion and exclusion[10]. At stake was mainly where and how to draw the line between inclusion and exclusion in the key areas

and roles of society, in connection with the expectations viewed as legitimate by excluded peoples[11]. The movement towards an ever wider and greater realization of a sense of justice, fuelled by the very content of democratic values, became one of the defining vectors of modernity, at the national level as well as at the international level.

In terms of the international plane and international law, the drive towards the universalization of rights has certainly encountered even more adversity than the diffusion of democratic rights and the constitutionalization of society has encountered at the national level.

The beginnings of modern international law were very much a self-serving exercise for the major European powers. Modern international law was used to endorse and justify the distribution and workings of evolving international power structures. Commercial and political interests were critical elements in the monitoring of

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10) On this question, see for instance Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 117-118. The socialist utopias that made the elimination of all forms of exclusion their goals ended up paving the way for communist totalitarianism.

11) Although the agreement of both parties is essential for the negotiation on and implementation of the rules and substance of justice, the evaluation of the just or unjust character of a situation accords more weight to the excluded peoples' point of view than to the privileged ones. Being on the wrong side of the fence gives greater credence and validity to the justice claims they may have.

the international system at "home" in Europe, on the seas, and in the relations of the European powers with the overseas lands and people being newly discovered[12]). The economic and political interests of the most powerful countries have remained integral parts of the making of international law. Countries at the receiving end of international power must continuously address and accept this. At the same time, however, the unveiling of new worlds and their ruthless subjugation by European powers also led some to reflect on international relations in a more inclusive and respectful manner concerning the treatment of the other.

In the domineering West, voices emerged that criticized the subjugation of non-Western people. They sought to protect them by insisting that they should be recognized as members of the human community. What was humanly, ethically, and legally owed to them, in terms of rights, came to occupy, in various ways, a number of scholars of international law, such as Bartolom de Las Casas and Pufendorf. The mechanism of recognition and inclusion could not be harmless. It was also a double-edged sword. The recognition of the human sameness in the other that brought protection, could as well require adjustments from the newcomers to the "human community", including religious conversion and abandonment of local cultural traditions. But it

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12) For a detailed account of the links between international legal arguments and justifications, commercial and political interests associated with the European expansion overseas and forms of colonization, including conquests and settlements, see Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 16-50, 78-108 and 166-196.

certainly put the West on the path of the universalization of human rights.

This aspect of international law remained timid and marginal for centuries, like small islands in the oceans of international law mainly dedicated to making state actors the primary bearers and beneficiaries of international law. It would take a lot of twists and turns in the history of national and international politics to redirect the modern discourse of rights - including Locke's possessive individualism - that had at times been used to conquer and colonize the non-Western world. A fundamental evolution of its values and priorities was necessary for the discourse of rights to be used as part of the foundation and guidelines for the spectacular development, after World War II, of an internationalization of individual rights geared towards ensuring respect for all human beings.

Yet, there is another side to the story of modern democratic solidarity and the universal inclusiveness that makes it possible. This other side of democratic culture greatly contributed to limit the extension of international solidarity in the post-Cold War era. It amounts to the fact that while wider than traditional solidarity and becoming increasingly so under the dynamic influence of democratic values, modern democratic solidarity tends to be thinner. The intensity of solidarity among individuals provided by democratic solidarity tends to be lower than in traditional solidarity. As modern democratic solidarity widens outward, it

thins inward. Indeed, the normative structure of universality, equality and freedom, while maximizing inclusion at the human community level, brings about a strong sense of individual autonomy which lessens the level of inward social solidarity, which increases inward social anomie. The independence given to the individual by democratic values put limitations on traditional social forms of bonding and belonging. What brings people together is also what pushes them apart. Furthermore, the values of universality and equality cannot impede a hierarchy of priorities from playing a selective and limiting role in the extension of solidarity. Just as universality and equality did not prevent social hierarchy from continuing to exist and have significance, universality and equality could not get rid of the idea of priority, of a hierarchy of priorities. How could it be otherwise considering, to start with, that making priorities and living by them is an essential requirement of human life, without which no direction can be given to and no sense can be made of the decisions and actions of individuals.

Moreover, although the circle of the human community ever widens under the influence of universality and equality, the ability to relate and share becomes more and more abstract and remote, the further away from the centre. As a result, the concrete experience of democratic community, from the wide circle of humanity, tends to transform itself into a world of concentric circles in which priority is given to more neighbouring worlds and people. In terms of modern solidarity and the impact that it

has on the recognition and implementation of individual rights, this takes a particular toll at the international level considering the continuing national bent of international politics.

In an international system which remains largely nationally rooted, the lower intensity of solidarity among actors, the high degree of individual autonomy that tends to keep them apart and the concentric character of the diffusion of solidarity, have a dramatic impact on the limitations of international solidarity. As the widest circle of humanity, the international realm does not benefit from the level of identification and participation existing at the national level, at least in integrated modern societies. In addition, the mechanisms called upon at the national level to keep the socially disruptive aspects of democratic values under check are difficult to transpose onto the international plane. As, for instance, the self-interest of international actors and the lack of an international culture or tradition continue to be defining parameters of the international landscape, institutionalizing a sense of inter-national public good and the delivery of the services associated with it remains elusive. As a result, in spite of the democratic rhetoric of universality and equality of access to rights, its inter-national pulling power remains weak. It is weakened further when contextual considerations enter into the calculus of inter-national solidarity - and they almost always do.

For example, a selective component tends to favor those beyond borders with whom the most internationally engaged nations feel closer, namely for reasons of geographical, cultural or psychological

proximity[13]), or of economic interdependence. By the same token, those who are on the edge or fall outside the contextual sense of shared identity at the international level, are certainly less likely to benefit from a sense of solidarity.

- *Justice in the international realm: on legal obligations and moral imperatives vis-à-vis human rights*

In integrated societies - economically, politically and socially integrated - it falls on the political institutions and power holders to perform services in a satisfactory manner, within their recognized realms of responsibility as defined by the core values of the society. It falls on them to recognize that their responsibilities and duties echo the imperative to abide by and implement as much as possible the rights of the members of society, and of society itself[14]), as shaped by the society's core, commanding values. These services may vary with the differences in the core values establishing the identity of any given society[15]).

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13) In this regard, there may be much geographical distance between the old European and Far Eastern nations, but for some of them, there is significant cultural and psychological closeness.

14) Political institutions and leaders' responsibilities and duties are not only owed to the members of the community, but also to the community itself as a whole, as its continuation and welfare is key to the welfare of each individual. This goes back to the social nature of the human condition.

15) The nature and modalities of services vary with the defining values of the society. See for example the differences in what is expected from the United States' political sphere compared to that of the welfare states of the Nordic countries. From these differences namely derives

It is based on their ability to perform their public duties that political institutions and leaders are evaluated, judged, and held accountable. They are accountable legally, through what their constitutions mandate them to do. They are also accountable politically, namely through the participation and election processes.

A strong sense of ethics inhabiting and guiding political deliberations, decisions, practices and outputs is likely to facilitate and encourage social virtues, and reciprocity, among interacting individuals within society. The more that political institutions and leaders take their responsibilities vis-à-vis society and its members seriously, the more members of society are themselves likely to keep close to their heart their social responsibilities vis-à-vis their fellow members, the political sphere and the society as a whole. As a result, in a highly socialized national community, for political institutions and leaders as well as for individuals, doing the right thing when it comes to social interactions is not simply a matter of acting morally. It is not only a matter of respecting the rights of others[16], of deliberating and making the right choice out of personal judgement and volition[17]. It goes beyond this. It

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the fluctuation of boundaries between what is a matter of public responsibility and oversight, and what is not, what is a matter of private choice and morality and what is a matter of social ethics and public policy.

16) There is obviously more to morality than this.

17) This is not contradictory with the fact that the power of individuals to deliberate and reach a decision on their own, and the willingness of political institutions to encourage such a tendency, is one of the

is about acting upon the constraining, yet consensual, effects of key values recognized as the basis of the ethics of the society. It is about identifying with regulatory social norms of society. For individuals, it is about acting out of a sense of social virtues and obligations. As for political institutions, they act out of a sense of public ethics and public policy obligations, a state of affairs which justifies in the best cases the fact that they have at their disposal a variety of implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Ultimately, this opens the way to a constitutional vision and functioning of society.

The situation differs significantly at the international level. The current level of socialization of international life, no matter how progressive it may appear today vis-à-vis what it was decades ago, still remains low compared to highly integrated societies. One of the reasons for - and illustrations of - this is that, at the international level, there is no direct connection between inter-national law and political institutions, on the one hand, and

defining criteria of democratic politics. Indeed, individual autonomy and freedom require a public stand and its enforcement if necessary. Similarly to a market economy which, when not understood as pure anarchy, is not a starting point, but an end-product based on regulations, individual autonomy and freedom require, to be socially sustainable, an adequate organization of the public space. As a result, rather than leading to the full removal of one at the expense of the other, the high level of social ethics and public policy regulated behaviors in democratic societies only fuels the debate on the appropriate character of the evolving boundaries between the spheres of private and public concerns.

individuals and their rights on the other. Hence the ambiguous attitude of international law vis-à-vis human rights.

Democratic values and principles today represent enough of a cultural pressure for the importance of individual and human rights to be duly acknowledged in the body of international law. However, it still largely depends on states to look after individual and human rights, to ensure that they are properly expressed and enhanced nationally. States acknowledge this responsibility by membership to the United Nations, as the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the importance of human rights, and by ratifying, if they do so, human rights international treaties and conventions[18]. But what happens when states do not respect their commitments? What are the legal remedies offered by international law to protect human rights in national jurisdiction? They are very few[19].

To this day the legal obligations of states vis-à-vis human rights remain largely internally exercised. Already at the regional level,

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18) Treaties and conventions dealing with individual and human rights create legal obligations, as ratification by member states makes them part of their national legislation and leads, in principle, political institutions to be committed to ensuring their respect. See Paul Reuter, *Introduction to the Law of Treaties* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), pp. 73-78, and Anthony Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 75-99.

19) The yearly assessment of national human rights situations by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is hardly a breathtaking breach of the wall of *domaine réservé* by which states historically sheltered atrocities from international scrutiny.

the legal remedies offered by international law are rather few. For it is mainly in Western Europe, with the European Court of Human Rights, that appeal possibilities exist[20]. At the global level, the situation is even more problematic. When human rights violations take an international dimension, when they hamper the development of friendly relations between states "based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of people," it is possible to take some action. The coupling of human rights issues with matters of international peace and security generates an incentive. But short of this, it continues to be difficult to take action in favour of human rights at the global level. There is no immediate legal recourse based on international human rights treaties and conventions to force states to live up to their commitments at home[21].

International law, when dealing with human rights issues, envisions and organizes neither an international right to intervene nor - even less so - an international duty to intervene to put an end to massive humanitarian crises and human rights violations.

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20) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights handles few cases compared with Europe and the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction. See David P. Forsythe, "Introduction," in David P. Forsythe (ed.) *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy* (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2000), p. 10.

21) Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. See also on this question, the comments by W. Michael Reisman, "Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law," in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds.), *Democratic Governance and International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 240.258.

The fact that international law makes it necessary to obtain the consent of the state concerned shows that the right to intervene, as superseding the state's sovereignty right, remains no right in itself. As for the obligation and duty to intervene, it is far from being a legal option, even in cases of genocide. There is indeed nothing in the Genocide Convention that clearly recognizes and creates a legal obligation for states to intervene[22].

If there is no legal obligation to intervene to prevent or stop humanitarian catastrophes or massive violations of human rights, where does this leave us? It leaves us to think that the public dimension of the international system is quite limited, that the

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22) On this issue, see William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): "Perhaps the greatest unresolved question in the Convention is the meaning of the enigmatic word "prevent". The title of the Convention indicates that its scope involves prevention of the crime and, in article I, State parties undertake to prevent genocide. Aside from article VIII, which entitles State parties to apply to the relevant organs of the United Nations for the prevention of genocide, the Convention has little specific to say on the question. The obligation to prevent genocide is a blank sheet awaiting the inscriptions of State practice and case law. A conservative interpretation of the provision requires States only to enact appropriate legislation and to take other measures to ensure that genocide does not occur. A more progressive view requires States to take action not just within their own borders but outside them, activity that may go as far as the use of force in order to prevent the crime being committed. The debate of this is unresolved, and is likely to remain so, at least until the next episode of genocide, if there is no insistence that the subject be clarified.", pp. 545-546.

international realm is far from being communal. It is still largely state-centric, with international competition among states and the preservation of an idea of self-contained national sovereignty still in tension with respect for human rights. As such, it also forces us to fall back on a sense of morality.

Indeed, when international interventions takes place, they are not, first and foremost, part of an international public policy endorsed and triggered by international law. Since acting as good international citizens in the fields of individual and human rights, as defined by current international law, does not make international solidarity legally mandatory, intervening to save strangers is largely a voluntary matter, based on a moral awareness or political considerations. As there is no clearly established legal hierarchy that puts the respect of human rights ahead of sovereignty, international humanitarian intervention tends for the intervening powers to be a matter of feeling compelled to do the right thing, of acting morally and exercising a sense of altruism. Moral awareness is all the more likely to serve as a motivation for action when intervention is coupled with political interests and gains.

Yet, justification for action and action itself only based on morality are weaker than when sanctioned by law. This is the case because of the lower degree of institutionalization and socialization of morality compared to law. Law is based upon the recognition and implementation of rights. Rights are themselves

values, moral values, that are viewed as so important in terms of each individual's life and relations among individuals that they have to be made into rights. Values as rights receive the legal codification and endorsement that make them the rules as well as the horizon of realization of the social game. They become part of the rule of law that calls upon them being at least minimally respected. If not, the rule of law guarantees access to claims and challenges based on the force of law, as well as enforcement mechanisms when necessary. In this context, doing the right thing morally and abiding by the law work together. They have convergent and cumulative effects. Law offers a set of procedures securing the regular implementation and, if needed, enforcement of moral values, of a certain vision of morality.

On the other hand, when doing the right thing is mainly a matter of moral judgement, and a judgement somewhat at odds with established law, the status and implementation of this moral judgement appear problematic. It loses the social and political qualities and attributes associated with law. It loses the predictability of a socially negotiated and endorsed course of action. As a result, choosing to do the right thing becomes unreliable and unpredictable. Whether it happens or not is largely a matter of choice. It is up to international actors, primarily state actors, to act morally. This may or may not happen. Taking a moral stand and acting morally is not automatic, especially when it goes against key features of the standard legal wisdom. It is precisely this largely voluntary character of acting morally, in favour of human rights in particular,

at the international level that has historically led and continues to lead to a low level of international morality and ethics, and therefore in turn a low level of international socialization. In spite of the normative foundation, and the encouragement and endorsement that it receives from a number of fundamental international principles - associated with issues of human rights in one way or another - such a moral course is still an uphill battle. Furthermore, any moral stand at odds with established law tends to be followed by shallow implementation, largely because in this situation it is difficult to mobilize and rally the wide support of actors and institutions that come with law.

This is all the more the case when a moral action goes against the status quo. For instance, an international military intervention claiming to be based on moral considerations, due to lack of legal obligation, is likely to generate debates and questioning. This should not come as a surprise since it is often because there is no agreement on intervention that the moral stand seeks to justify, as it is not part of law. It is precisely because it is caught in conflicts of moralities and legitimacies at the international level that it is not part of the options and obligations clearly envisioned and organised by international law. The plurality of points of view on humanitarian intervention and use of force in the 1990s, with some states favoring them and others opposing them, serves here as a case in point. The lack of obvious legal justification in favour of intervention made the choice to intervene a difficult moral, and political, one.

How to balance the fact that an intervention might be needed to help the victims on the ground, with the danger that intervening might also put on a slippery slope the respect of the principle of national sovereignty of member states?[23] How also to balance the fact that sovereignty was never meant to be a shield behind which civilian populations could be killed with total impunity, and the protection that it offers against self-interested external interventions? These are some of the considerations which have to be weighted.

Such thinking and the dilemmas it entails show that, contrary to conventional thinking, international relations is not foreign to ethics and morality. As a matter of fact, the contrary is true. First, there is the relatively low level of international legal protection for individual and human rights. Second, there is the recognition of the protection of individual and human rights as of critical importance, although not yet to the point that upholding them could justify fully removing the double-edged protection offered to individuals by sovereignty[24]. These two elements account for

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23) After all, there is no guarantee that the intervening powers will not take advantage of their presence on the ground to secure long term gains. The reluctance of developing countries to take such a risk makes them all the more attached to the value of sovereignty.

24) It fits to speak here of "double-edged protection." While the principle of sovereignty is designed to protect a nation and its citizens from external infringement, and constitutes as such a right embedded in a moral value, national sovereignty is also called upon at time to offer protection to crimes within borders, to assure non-accountability to their authors.

the fact that morality has become today an increasingly important aspect of the thinking on and practice of international affairs.

It is largely in this context, along with political considerations associated with it, that the Security Council came to deliberate and decide on what to do about the unfolding crises of the 1990s. The international changes taking place in the aftermath of the Cold War, including the multiplication of crises and the feeling in public opinion that helping was both possible and necessary, engendered a moral and political pressure that it could not ignore. Hence the fact that the Security Council stretched Article 39 of Chapter VII of the Charter and the definition of a threat to peace to justify United Nations intervention in internal conflicts and humanitarian crises. These crises previously had been considered matters of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2 (7) of the Charter[25].

Eventually, the deliberations, decisions and their implementations ended up being cast in dilemmas that reflected, inside the Security Council and on the ground in the areas of conflict as well as in the world at large, the extent and limits of international law and international ethics. They reflected and projected the difficulty

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25) See Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 127-160. Rather than welcome this development as a sign of normative progress, Simon Chesterman cautions against it (ibid., p. 161). See also the review of the book by Nicholas Wheeler in *International Affairs* (London: Blackwell Publishers, vol. 77, no 3 July 2001), p. 688.

of reconciling and making sense of the partly compatible, partly competitive demands of the international system, of the various constituencies, identities and legitimacies that now inhabit and shape it.

- Human rights, moral communities, and democratic culture: Where do we go from here?

As a whole, the story of the 1990s sends an ambiguous message when it comes to human rights and the emergence of a culture of affirmation and respect of "individual sovereignty." On the one hand, when confronted with extending a sense of international solidarity and responsibility for non-traditional strategic reasons, the key international decision-makers of the period, while advocating international engagement, favored the national realm and its ends over the international realm. This certainly presents a sobering view of the reality of moral obligations to people beyond borders. Those committed to a full cosmopolitan agenda would no doubt bemoan this state of affairs. On the other hand, there is also a more positive way to look at the story of the 1990s. The mere fact that the Security Council addressed the conflicts of the period in terms of dilemmas was in itself a form of progress. It was a recognition that states' rights are not all that matter. In responding to the conflicts in ways that differed from the status quo, the Security Council, beyond trying to address the immediate demands generated by wars, also helped to shape and alter the future of the international system in ways more sensitive to

individual rights. As such, it contributed to stress the idea that the moral community of the world as a whole does not allow the fate of the various communities and their members to be ignored. This brought a greater sense of reality to what had been so far a largely rhetorical exercise.

In the balancing act among the moral, political and legal obligations with which the Security Council struggled in the 1990s, it recognized the growing obligations that the international community has to individuals beyond borders, whoever they are and wherever they are. To be sure, such recognition is far from being perfect since it takes place within the realm of selective universalism, cultural relativism, reactive and reparatory justice, and has to portray concerns for human rights in terms of traditional national interest to create the minimum incentive for action[26]. Yet, addressing the conflicts, albeit as a dilemma, is recognizing more than ever the growing legitimacy of the moral community beyond borders. It represents the growing recognition that the community of duties towards others does not stop at the border. The centrality of dilemmas in the Security Council deliberations shows that the moral community beyond the national moral community is now strong enough to force decision-makers to think of international engagement for purposes of solidarity and responsibility in terms of trade-offs.

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26) This is especially true in the American context.

This does not mean, however, that the battle in favor of human rights has by now largely been won. It will continue to be an uphill battle, as there is still much progress to make. And it is here that international organizations have a critical role to play.

The tradition has largely been to examine questions of justice, authority, and rights in a national setting. However, the internationalization of societies and the socialization of the international dimension that are underway require an adaptation of this thinking to the emerging political landscape. They also make international organizations important tools for international justice. For the United Nations, as for any international organization, the challenges to think through and implement human rights and individual sovereignty imperatives are to this day quite daunting.

In this context, addressing the demands of international justice and the rights associated with them requires that at least three challenges are successfully met. Embracing and adjusting international diversity without smothering it is the first of these challenges. This entails facing the fact that on the international plane, plurality is much deeper - in terms of cultural differences, levels of development, and aspirations - than it is on the national plane. The question is how to implement a multilateral culture without having it become a tool of Western extension and colonization. The problem also encompasses how to bring about an international order that is not, in its regulation of openness, a veiled monopolization of power. It involves ensuring that democratic

values and mechanisms - including democratic rights - that are meant to be tools of empowerment at the service of justice do not become instruments of power. Solving this problem involves looking for ways to further democratize the cultural, political, and economic hegemony of which the multilateral project is a part. Upon this depends the fact that access to and circulation of power will not be moderated by multilateral arrangements themselves.

It will also be necessary for international organizations to address the weak sense of international community. In order to overcome this weakness, stronger mechanisms of global identification, participation, representation, responsibility, and solidarity than the present ones will have to be imagined and implemented. However, strengthening the sense of global community must not be envisioned as the construction of a war machine against the national or even regional realms. For if the development of a legitimate international community cannot be reduced to the imposition of one cultural model, neither can it be based on the exclusion or elimination of existing forms of political association. Forms of synergy and complementarity among the various layers of contemporary politics have to be encouraged. In this context, the democratic qualities of national, regional, and international political arrangements constitute an asset, one that can be capitalized upon in negotiating and facilitating the establishment of an international common sense.

The third and final challenge for international organizations is

handling the effects of the paradox of contemporary democratic culture. The increased sense of responsibility at the international level and the simultaneous proliferation of a democratic culture of individual entitlement at the national level that is apt to be allergic to solidarity is, indeed, a riddle for institutions committed to international socialization. What is to be made of these two trends, and can they continue to develop in parallel? Will the evolution of contemporary international democratic culture pursue the liberal quest of entitlement? Or will it follow a more republican path - in which modern democratic culture as a whole is historically and ideologically rooted - with greater sensibility to the global social and citizenship concerns that it could bring about? The future state of the discourse and practice of rights and international justice will largely rest upon the answers to these questions.

Democracy and Peace-Building in East Asia

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First of all, I am happy to be at this conference in beautiful Jeju. When I first visited Jeju Island in 1949, a year after the Jeju Rebellion, the island was not a peaceful setting as it is today, where it is possible to read a paper on "Democracy and Peace-Building in East Asia," with particular references to North Korea. That was my topic designated by a conference organizer. However, my emphasis today will be on democracy and crisis avoidance, rather than peace-building.

Under my given topic, I propose to discuss: (1) Some aspects of democracy today, (2) aspirations and realities of "democratic peace," (3) democracy and autocracy in East Asia today, (4) "democratic enlargement" and "liberal bellicosities" after September 11, (5) some frameworks for crisis avoidance and eventual peace-building in East Asia, with particular references to North Korea, and (6) "bellicose" American democracy torday.

Democracy. Many writers agree that democracy is an aspiration of many peoples, as it is a philosophy of political organization in

which major public policies are decided and executed by decision makers who are subjected to popular control through periodic elections conducted on the principle of individual autonomy and under conditions of political freedom.[1] Even this "procedural minimum"[2] definition of democracy makes it immediately clear that the term may be applicable in East Asia only to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and not to China and decidedly not to North Korea.

Further, it becomes clear that some differentiations should be considered as soon as the concepts of the degree of "authoritarian breakdown," meaning the process of weakening and the disappearance of nondemocratic systems, e.g., in North Korea, "democratic transition" or the movement toward democratic politics, and "democratic deepening," designating the phenomena of firmer rooting of democracy, and "democratic consolidation," the consolidation of democratic procedures and habitual democratic practices.

When these gradations and differentiations are introduced, myriads of historical, cultural, economic, and civil matters cry out for consideration, a task that requires volumes of theoretical and empirical studies. With our time limits, only two concepts may be touched on in considering democracies in East Asia, namely, those of "political rights" and "civil rights," as did "The 2000

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1) John Kie-chinang Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.4.
2) Kim Sunhyuk, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), p.10.

Freedom House Survey" of the world.[3] For the sake of convenience, I use the term political rights to mean, as the Freedom House did, that citizens have the rights to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choices and whose leaders can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its citizens' civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights, including gender and family rights, personal freedoms, and freedom of the press, belief, and association.

Democratic Peace. Immanuel Kant spoke of *Perpetual Peace* among states sharing "republican constitutions," and Woodrow Wilson expressed a similar vision for the twentieth century when he envisioned a "war to make the world safe for democracy." The Second World War was to defeat the tyrannical "axis" powers. Those who accept the "democratic peace" worldview subscribe to the idea that democratically organized political systems in general "operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with other democracies." [4] Implicit in the idea, however, has been that democratic states are not necessarily peaceful and that they would make war among themselves[5] and against

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3) Alibi Piano and Arch Puddington, "The 2000 Freedom House Survey," *Journal of Democracy*, 12, 1 (January 2001), pp. 87-92.

4) Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.11.

5) In fact, there were 79 wars "involving democratic states" between 1816 and 1980, according to Kurt Taylor Gaubath, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 167-70

anti-democratic nations and entities. It could be simply noted here that democratic elections have sometimes affected foreign policy choices and have become incentives for wars.

In any case, the "zones" of democratic peace in the world have been steadily expanding. In 1950, 22 democratic states accounted for 31 percent of the world's population. Today, 58 percent of the world's population lives under elected or "democratic" leadership, while another 5 percent reside in states with restricted democratic practices (such as Malaysia, where the ruling party enjoys over-whelming electoral advantage and systematically works to suppress political freedoms for opposition groups.) According to the Freedom House, electoral democracies constitute today 120 of the 192 internationally recognized independent entities.

Democracy and Autocracy in East Asia Today. It is evident that the trend toward democratically elected governments has been accompanied by a noticeable trend toward broader political freedom and enhanced civil liberties. The Freedom House's end-of-the-year survey of *Freedom in the World* finds that 85 of the world's 192 countries (44 percent) are "free," meaning that these countries maintain a high degree of political and economic freedom and respect basic civil liberties. Thus, according to democratic peace theory, the theoretically peaceful zone in the world has expanded significantly in the past half a century.

As to East Asia specifically, the survey rated East Asian countries as follows on a seven-point scale (1 representing the most free and 7 the least free, in terms of political rights (PR) and civil

liberties (CL) as well as overall ratings):

	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
China (PRC)	7	6	Not Free
Japan	1	2	Free
North Korea	7	7	Not Free
South Korea	2	2	Free
Taiwan	2	2	Free

North Korea was singled out as one of 13 worst rated countries, along with such other states as Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan.

Waging Democratic Enlargement and "Liberal Bellicosities."[6] A major cataclysmic destruction, that undeniably has had serious impact on democracy, occurred early in the 21st century. The September 11, 2001 events exploded shortly after the January 2001 inauguration of President George W. Bush. In his little-noticed inaugural address that was short on foreign policy issues, the new U.S. President declared - some eight months before September 11 -- that the United States "will confront...the enemies of peace...with weapons of mass destruction." Although President Bush in his brief address did not identify who the "enemies of peace" were, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Bush's alter ego in national security matters clearly singled out "the regime of Kim Jong-Il" as "the evil twin of a successful regime just across the border,"[7] in her discussion on "Coping with Rogue Regimes." Another "evil"

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6) David l. Blaney, "Realist Spaces/ Liberal Bellicosities," Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, eds., *Democracy, Liberalism and War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 25-44

7) Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/ February, 2000)

rogue state that Dr. Rice had identified briefly was Saddam Hussein's Iraq. It was obvious that Bush and Rice paid scant attention to President Kim Dae-jung's inaugural address in February 1998 that his government would "actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation" with Kim Jong-il's North Korea. Thus, on the day the Bush administration was born, Kim's "Sunshine Policy" was on a potential collision course with President Bush's policy predilection toward North Korea.

The attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a nerve center of the capitalist world, and the Pentagon, the epicenter of the military might of the United States, shocked, angered and aroused the American leadership and the people far more than any other single catastrophe. This cannot be overemphasized. Jolting events of the past that catapulted the Americans to action to punish the nondemocratic enemies were pale in comparison with the September 11 events. For instance, the sinking of the battleship "Maine" in February 1898 in the Havana Harbor led to sensational Hearst newspapers headlines reading "Remember the Maine" when 266 lives were lost at Havana. The outcome was the Spanish-American War. Even the Japanese attacks on the Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, devastating as they were, caused the loss of 2,403 American lives. Furthermore, it occurred in a far-away Hawaii, long before the advent of instantaneous communications. In fact, a Japanese pilot crash-landed on a smaller Hawaiian island after attacking Pearl Harbor, but the islanders were blissfully unaware of the devastations at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese pilot was allowed to roam

around the island for sometime.

The shocking images and sounds of September 11, on the other hand, were on every TV and radio almost in real time, and shown and heard *ad nauseam* for days and weeks. In the evening of September 11, some 95 per cent of American families were riveted to their TVs to watch the triple catastrophes unfolding on their screens. The searing impact on the American psyche went far beyond the loss of 3,062 lives on that day. There has been nothing comparable to the visual and auditory wounds on the American soul that is still gnawing and haunting it. Without September 11, the "axis of evil" reference in Bush's State of the Union message might not have had the vivid images on every American's mind. The Americans were angered as never before, and the anger led to tens of thousands of Americans spontaneously opening their wallets and giving an astounding and unprecedented amount of $1.6 billion, and the war in Afghanistan ensued in short order.

The tragedies of September 11 elicited the strongest popular support for a new policy stance that reflects a proactive waging of democratic peace against the enemies of peace. It marked a clear departure from the defensive mentality of the "Fortress America," that turned out to be so incredibly fragile. Having seen how vulnerable highly sophisticated capitalist, democratic super-structures are, the "Bush Doctrine" now stipulates that democratic "just wars" be actively waged against "holy wars" by Muslin fanatics or a Stalinist despot of North Korea, without waiting until sneak attacks devastate the bastion of world democracy.

Instead of a world divided by the Cold War between the "free

world" and the communist world led by a "godless" and "evil empire," the post-September 11 world and the "moral outrage" from it is divided into zones of liberal democracy on the one hand and despotic zones bent on destroying the capitalist, free world on the other. The zones of "evil" contain Muslim fanatics in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran and a Stalinist dictatorship in North Korea. Coupled with the two distinctive American traditions, namely, its Puritan religious roots and the belief that America is the world's last best hope for democracy, the Bush Doctrine logically dictates unabashed American unilateralism. Such a worldview calls for "war without mercy" and a Manichean vision of the world that demonizes the enemy. This has been a recurring pattern in American history, from the time of the "Remember the Maine," to Pearl Harbor, and September 11, and the Bush Doctrine has an additional dimension of Protestant fundamentalism and messianic zeal rooted in it.

As to East Asia, Bush declared that he "will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons." It is abundantly clear that North Korea has been singled out as one of the most dangerous regimes in the world. Even before the advent of the Bush administration, some hawks at the highest levels of American decision-making actually planned coordinated preemptive attacks on North Korean nuclear facilities in the summer of 1994. The top-secret war planning was switched to diplomatic negotiations only after former President Jimmy Carter urgently called the White House from Pyongyang on June 16, 1994 signaling that Kim Il-sung had agreed to defuse

the imminent nuclear crisis.[8]

Fragile Framework for Crisis Avoidance and Peace-Building in East Asia. Two major wars have been fought in East Asia since the end of the Second World War, namely, the Chinese "civil war" and the Korean War, definitely in the Cold War context. At present, there are two areas of potential crises in East Asia, Korea and the Taiwan Strait. In both of these potential conflict areas, the United States is directly involved politically and militarily, particularly in Korea through the U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. The most visible manifestation of this treaty relation today is the long-continued military presence of some 37,000 American troops in South Korea. The United States has also maintained a credible nuclear-capable military presence in and around Japan. Thus, South Korea and Japan are military alliance partners of the United States, which has been the preponderant presence in these countries. Some even call the United States the hegemonic regime that has made South Korea and Japan semisovereign and penetrated states.[9] From the perspective of South Korea and Japan, these may be the characteristic hyperbole of an often outspoken observer. But from an objective and realist vantage point in Washington, D.C., these remarks contain strong elements of validity.

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8) Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Reading, MA: Asddison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 326-30. Oh, "Another Korean War?" *The Korea Times* (Times Forum), June 14, 1994, pp. 6, 11. I am amused that my Forum piece was written sometime before the June 16 phone call from Pyongyang.

9) Bruce Cumings, "Warfare, Security, and Democracy in East Asia," Barkawi and Laffey, eds., *ibid., pp. 129-52.* 2.

Within these limitations, and on a symbolic level, some crisis avoidance measures have been attempted between the two Koreas particularly since the February 19, 1992 "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation Between South and North Korea." However, on a substantive level, the overall picture has not improved much. While some limited exchanges and cooperation has occurred between the North and the South in the past decade or so, "no progress has been made in the area of tension reduction, confidence-building measures, arms control and a inter-Korean peace treaty."[10] The overwhelming reality today is that combined forces of nearly 1.8 million soldiers are guarding the stilltense demarcation line.

Furthermore, the military and political realities have been also repeatedly colliding with resurgent nationalism in East Asia, from China to Japan to the Koreas since the end of the Cold War in most parts of the world. The *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology of the North and the populist cum nationalist ideas of President Kim Dae-jung and his ardent supporters had recently found a common ground in attempting to resolve "the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country," according to the first point in the "South - North Joint Declaration" of June 15, 2000. It is true that the declaration did not contain the old North Korean insistence on excluding foreign influence and interference as a

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10) Chung-In Moon and Tae-Hwan Kim, "Sustaining Inter-Korean Reconcili-
   ation: North-South Korea Coperation", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*,
   XV,2 (Fall/Winter 2001), p. 218.

precondition for improved inter-Korean relations. In and of itself, therefore, it was a timely - if fleeting -- meeting of the minds, intra-Korea.

However, the problem has been that the Korean issues were not amenable to self-reliant internal solutions between the two Korean leaders alone even if they agreed with equal fervor on the solutions to 50-year-old thorny problems. (Fundamentally, the sunshine policy, too, was proposing to "penetrate" the mantle of *Juche* ideology.) After the short-lived euphoria following the historic three-day summit in Pyongyang in June 2000, meaningful linkages between the North and the South failed to materialize due to the lack of reciprocal performance on North Korea's part. After largely symbolic exercises of selected family reunions and luxury-ship cruises to Kumgang Mountain, which brought pots of gold to the North, substantive progress has been singularly lacking to date.

Ironically, the hoped-for thaw between the North and the South started to refreeze perceptively after the untimely visit by President Kim to Washington in March 2001. Precisely when attention was focused on the Kim-Bush summit, Bush publicly expressed his "skepticism" about Chairman Kim Jong-il and his regime, pending extensive reviews of the Clinton administration's policies toward the North, including the "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of October 21, 1994. The Framework has been viewed with serious reservations by conservative elites that surround the Bush administration. That President Bush harbored deep suspicion of

Kim Jong-il was abundantly clear for anyone reading his inaugural address of January 2001.

In hindsight, it is almost unfathomable as to why President Kim decided to rush the first meeting with President Bush even before he and his foreign policy team had any time to get organized, orient themselves and chart the policy directions toward the two Koreas. Judging from public utterances of the Korean ambassadors in this transition period to the effect that Bush's Korea policies could not be very different from Clinton's approaches, it is not likely that input to President Kim Dae-jung from Korean sources in Washington were very helpful to him. He was becoming increasingly impatient with Kim Jong-il's lack of responsiveness while pushing for a peace treaty with the United States and with the stony silence of Bush's inner circle regarding his sunshine policy. It is not unlikely that President Kim, with considerable *hubris*, bolstered by the Nobel Peace Prize, believed that he could persuade the young President of the United States to embrace North Korea as a partner in peace-building in East Asia.

As Professors Moon and Kim correctly pointed out, in an apparent understatement, "The American position is critical in influencing North Korea's policy behavior," and thus it becomes essential to strengthen "the existing channels of communication" between the two Koreas and United States. It is quite evident that diplomatic linkage between South Korea and the United States is often tenuous. The institutional aspect is obvious. A Korean ambassador's counterpart in the U.S. State Department is Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs. Clearly this is not a very high

level in the foreign policy executive hierarchy--twice removed from the Secretary of State. Even the Secretary of State may or may not be in the highest-level decision-making loop, depending on the stature of the secretary and sometimes the issues involved. A clear example of such a case was the stance publicly taken by Secretary Colin Powell during the visit of President Kim Dae-jung to the Bush While House to the effect that the new administration would essentially continue the Clinton administration approaches to North Korea, only to be publicly rebuked by President Bush a day later.

When the Korean government states that it communicated with the American government on a given issue, it usually means that a Korean ambassador either conferred with the Assistant Secretary and/or transmitted a communication through him. This level of communication does not assure that it is brought to the attention of top aides in the White House or the President himself. The stature, diplomatic skills, and informal personal clout of the Korean ambassador in the Washington circles, become crucial. Indications are that few Korean ambassadors managed to established effective channels of communication to the very top level. Results are that both sides are often surprised, shocked, and in the end, resentful.

The recent diplomatic history between the two countries is full of surprises and frustrations for Korean presidents. In despair, a few Korean presidents resorted to direct diplomacy, often with disastrous outcomes. The most odious example was President Park Chung-hee's attempt at influencing the American government

directly, and an outcome was the "Koreagate" scandals, involving assorted characters, including Park Tong-son, Kim Han-jo and other unsavory figures and even a couple of Korean ambassadors barely below the surface.[11] Subsequent Korean presidents, also attempted so-called "summit" diplomacy through their frequent visits to the United States. For example, President Kim Young-sam met with the United States president four times during his tenure. Some observers comment that President Kim Dae-jung was attempting to engage the United States personally, when he accepted the resignation of Ambassador Lee Hong-koo after two and a half years in Washington, only to be stone-walled by President Bush during his ill-advised and ill-timed visit in March 2001.

The American channels with North Korea are even more frail and intermittent. The United States government has a designated envoy to deal with North Korea when occasions warrant, and he is seldom occupied. It has no official representation in Pyongyang. Though North Korea has its delegation to the United Nations in New York City, the North has no permanent diplomatic presence in Washington.

Bellicose American Democracy. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 America shows many signs of becoming a "bellicose" democracy. The stunned and infuriated president and the shocked and aroused

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11) For instance, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives: Ninety-Fifteh Congress, Second Session* (Part 5, June 1,6 and 7, 1978) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp.53-119.

American public are interacting and escalating the anti-terrorist rhetoric and making the United States a mobilized country to hunt down and destroy "terrorists" in Afghanistan and beyond. Bush, who was elected as a minority president, has been extremely popular with the American electorate in his war against terrorist groups and against states abetting terrorists anywhere. In the initial phase of the War in Afghanistan, Bush's popularity skyrocketed among the general public and voters. While the Afghan campaign is seemingly winding down and the attention span of the American general public is short, North Korea has suddenly come into sharp public focus as the first country that Bush named as one of the "axis of evil."

From the standpoint of listeners in Washington, it was no great surprise. After all, North Korea started the Korean War that claimed some 34,000 American lives in the living memories of many. North Korea has persistently maintained warlike behaviors and perpetrated terrorist deeds, some of them unforgettable. Worst of all, it is seriously believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery systems, and evidently exporting them to terrorist states. Despite decades of negative economic growth and famines, it refuses to collapse. Recently, the existence of dozens of gulags in North Korea, the death from starvation of a million North Koreans in the 1990s, and the flight of some 300,000 desperate North Koreans to China, Mongolia, and Russia are becoming increasingly more visible to the American public. When the American president called the country not only dangerous but

also "evil," some 55 percent of the American public agreed with such a characterization, while about 65 per cent thought likewise about Iraq. To a growing wing of conservative Americans, this dangerous and "evil" North Korea is not fit for survival.

To a growing number of American voters, a South Korean regime that single-mindedly insists on embracing this "evil" state that has shamelessly refused reciprocity and verification is beyond comprehension. Herein lies the fundamental perception gap and growing political distance between the Kim Dae-jung government and the Bush administration. Henry A. Kissinger recently wrote, in his "Answering the 'Axis' Critics," that "at some point, engagement must lead to reciprocity: it must not become an exercise in psychological self-fulfillment."[12] It was not difficult to surmise as to whom the remarks were directed. This explains why Lee Hoi-chang, president of the Grand National Party, who emphasized during his January visit to Washington that he would demand reciprocity and verification in his dealings with the North, was given such a warm reception by the official Washington.

The North Korean debate centering on the hard- or soft-landing of North Korea has not been heard recently. Both views presumed a "landing" and survival of the North. More recently, ominous news leaks and reports are appearing with disturbing regularity. The Pentagon's "Nuclear Posture Review" suggested that low-yield nuclear weapons that produce less nuclear fallout could be targeted on Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, or North Korea.[13] The

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12) *Washington Post.* March 5, 2002, p. A19.
13) *New York Times.* March 11, 2002, p. A1, A8.

Pentagon argued that "in a world full of unexpected threats and rogue states" the United States should not only have deterrence capability but also flexible "offensive strike systems," composed of both non-nuclear systems and tactical and precision-guided nuclear assets. In the post-September 11 world, the non-thinkable is becoming thinkable.

The Pentagon report further suggested the possibility of using quick strikes with low-yield nuclear weapons designed to burrow deep into the earth and wipe out underground sites where rogue states are believed to be producing and storing weapons of mass destruction. Such "bunker busters" have been battle-tested in Afghanistan, and one recalls the existence of huge underground complexes near Kumchangri, near Yongbyon, North Korea. When U.S. satellite photos raised concerns about the cavern in 1999, the North after long delays allowed U.S. inspection of a site in return for food, but questions remained in many minds.

The Bush administration decided on March 20, 2002 not to certify that North Korea is abiding by the 1994 Agreed Framework designed to freeze its nuclear weapons program, alleging that the North has almost certainly hid nuclear material from effective inspection, leaving North Korea out of compliance with the Framework. For instance, Joseph Bermudez, a military intelligence expert who writes for *Jane's* defense publications, and his colleague, Sharon Richardson, recently sketched a worst-case scenario in a new book, *Planning for a Peaceful Korea*[14]. They posited that the

14) Henry D. Sokolski, ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), Chapter 3, "North Korea's View of the

North had stockpiled enough material for up to 12 nuclear bombs and aimed to build 30 by 2015. Since the North is not observing provisions of the Framework, from Washington's perspective, $4.6 billions dollars should not be spent to erect light-water reactors in the North.[15] Under the circumstances, it is not exactly surprising that the North is threatening to walk away publicly from the Framework.[16]

Meanwhile, clocks continue to tick. South Korea will have a new government by February 2003 when President Kim Dae-jung will be replaced. It is not unlikely that the next South Korean President would be more of a pragmatist than a visionary. The light-water reactors were targeted to be completed by 2003, but the project is several years behind schedule. After test-firing the Taepodong missile in August 1998, Pyongyang agreed in 1999 to suspend tests of long-range missiles and extended the moratorium until 2003. The North Korean economy has no way of making a dramatic upswing, while the forward deployed North Korean military is restless and having massive maneuvers just north of the demarcation line. On his recent Asian trip, Bush stated that "It's impossible to have peace on the peninsula if there are loaded

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Development and Production of Strategic Weapons Systems."

15) *Washington Post*, March 20, 2002, p. A4 *and New York Times*, March 24, 2002, p. 14.

16) *The Korean Central News Agency*, "upon authorization," reported on May 16, 2001 that "If the U.S. side fails to meet its obligation to the provision of LWR project and tries to evade its responsibility to make compensation for our electricity loss, it will only compel us to go our own way." http://korea-np.co.jp/pk/161st_issue/2001052201.htm

guns pointed" at South Korea.

It may take a small spark to touch off a conflagration on the Korean Peninsula, and it has been already speculated that the U.S. navy may begin to challenge in international waters North Korean ships suspected of carrying war materials headed for any terrorist organizations or states. The Japanese have already sank what they claimed to be a North Korean spy ship. These are explosive situations waiting for an incident. On March 19, Lim Dong-won, Special Advisor to President Kim Dae-jung suggested at a public meeting that 2003 could be a year of crisis, unless North-U.S. relations improve markedly within a year.[17]

The pent up anger of the American President and the people is in search of a target to vent on before the next congressional election to seat the 108th Congress in January 2003. A consummate politician, President Bush who appears to be election-driven and sometimes called an "election maximizer," thus far had mixed results in the Afghan War that is viewed as inconclusive with al-Queda leaders repeatedly eluding the American and allied encirclements. American involvements in Indonesian and Philippine anti-terror campaigns have been also limited with intangible victories. The recent trips to the Middle East of Vice President Dick Cheney have produced a chorus of opposition from the Muslim world to a possible U.S. attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and Iran, a populous

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17) *Dong-A Ilbo,* march 20, 2002, p. 2. The paper also reported that the North Korean Central TV asserted that the American bellicosity had pushed the Korean situation to "the brink of another war... A second Korean War is matter of time."

and rich nation, could not be convincingly tied to anti-American terrors, though Iran reportedly provided weapons to the Palestinians fighting the Israelis.[18] That leaves only the failed and isolated state of North Korea among the "axis of evil" to which American anger and frustration could be targeted.

Conclusions. An aroused and mobilized democracy is not likely to be in search of a "democratic peace" with a failed, dangerous, and "evil" state of North Korea. It is abundantly clear that there is a major crisis building in East Asia, now targeted at North Korea. Unlike 1950, there are no counterbalancing powers that could checkmate the U.S. military in East Asia. The Chinese military is believed to be badly in need of modernization, and China is preoccupied with a political transition to a fourth generation leadership and with economic transformations as well the 2008 Olympiad in Beijing. Russia today, likewise, is in no position to intervene forcefully in Korea.

In case of an exploding crisis in the Korean Peninsula, South Korea, with its capital only 30-odd miles away from the demarcation line and much of its industrial/financial centers within the range of North Korean artilleries and missiles, will be the immediate targets of Northern attacks. This potential is the ultimate deterrence that the North has, barring near total preemptive strikes against the Northern batteries and divisions. Preemptive strikes, with tactical nuclear and conventional assets have been actively under

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18) The recent Arab summit in Beirut declared that an attack on Iraq would be considered an attack against all Arab state. *New York Times*, March 29, 2002, p.A1.

consideration under the Bush Doctrine.

Thus, it is urgent and critical for the governments of both Koreas to defuse the current crisis, which must not be belittled. It is imperative that the Northern regime change from its reclusive, self-deluding, capricious, and tyrannical ways to more open, realistic, dependable, humanitarian, and reformist modes -- to survive. The South should not spare any efforts to point these out effectively to the North's leader - to survive together. President Kim is sending a presidential envoy to the North. He might well consider sending equally persuasive special envoys to the United States, China, and Japan to bolster existing channels of communication. President Kim who, with all grandiose intentions, has painted himself into a corner from which only Kim Jong-il could extract him, has little time to lose.

Depending on the shape of the current crisis avoidance, there will be time enough to discuss various paths to peace-building in the Korean Peninsula and East Asia.[19]

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19) For instance, Kim Sung-han, Dimensions of Peace-Building on the Korean Peninsula, *KOREA FOCUS*, 9, 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 51-66. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

Enlarging Civilizational Identity

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Civilizations in Conflict?

When the terrorists attacked and felled the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in September 2001, many people asked whether the event would radically alter the course of history by giving substance to the currently fashionable notion of "clash of civilizations," particularly the clash between the Christian and Islamic "civilizations." Today, some seven months after the tragic event, talk of such a clash has become largely muted. Despite the lionization of Osama bin Laden in some quarters, he seems to have failed in galvanizing the Muslim world while suffering a clear-cut military defeat in Afghanistan and the decimation of al-Qaeda forces.

I am inclined to think that long-term effects of the events of September 11 should be found in the realization of two interrelated facts. One is to see that it no longer makes much sense to speak

of "civilizations" in the plural. Ever since the early decades of the 16th century, the world has been on what can only be called an inexorable path towards a single civilization - a scientific-technological civilization coupled with democracy. The post-September 11 events made clearer than ever before the extent to which the world has become one civilization. The other fact which September 11 made clear to us has been the extent to which the civilizational identity of the scientific-technological world has become deeply problematic, so much so that it is in need of a major transformation.

I would like to dwell on these two points. But first on how I understand the terms "civilization" and "culture." These two terms are notoriously difficult to define with any precision. But in practical as well as historical contexts, it is not difficult to identify a certain group of people as belonging to a certain "civilization." People live as members of different communities - as members of families, tribes, villages, nations, empires and civilizations. Members of a given community share a certain *Weltanschauung*, a world view, and the most inclusive of such *Weltanschauungen* is shared by the members of that civilization. Such a Weltanschauung is expressed in certain cultural elements, such as a certain form of agriculture, a certain pattern of production and consumption, religion, language, rituals, law and politics.

Arnold Toynbee identifies 21 civilizations in human history, many of which are petrified in museums. A viable civilization however, is a living organism in which these various cultural elements are arranged in such a way that they serve to overcome the constraints imposed by nature and the environment with a

view to ensuring the survival and prospering of its people. As a living organism, it must constantly change in order to adapt itself to changes in nature and our knowledge of that nature. Impetus for such a change may come from some natural catastrophes. It can also come from the realization that its own conceptual and practical resources may be inadequate to the challenge, as a result of an encounter with another civilization conceptually richer than itself. Some civilizations have experienced change as the result of imperialistic imposition. But some civilizations may lose a sense of direction at a certain point, and may, by its own will change allegiances, as the result of the recognition of its own inadequacies.

The world at the dawn of the 20th century was in a very fundamental sense, one. It was ruled by the West, consisting of a few western and central European states and the United States as their cultural extension. Along the periphery of this world were a few non-Western, so-called "honorary" members of the West, such as Japan and Russia, that had embarked on the road to Westernization earlier than others. They were mimicking the ways of their mentors, including their imperialist ways. There were a few exceptions, but by and large the rest of the world consisted of either colonies or protectorates. Despite their state of subjugation, these societies, almost without exception, were unanimous in seeing Westernization as the sole choice that would ensure them a viable future. Westernization was for them the yardstick against which the progress and regress of their societies could be measured.

Modernization, Westernization and Globalization

Just as in the case of modernization, globalization is for many nations of the non-Western world a process of, whether willingly or under compulsion, accepting and internalizing norms and institutions, which constitute the political, cultural and economic order erected by Western civilization. Beginning in the sixteenth century, a few Western European societies began extending their influences, eventually eclipsing rival civilizations such as the Chinese, Islamic and Indic civilizations. The Industrial Revolution, based on the fruits of science and technology, enabled Europe to achieve and expand its economic prosperity, democracy and social justice. The material and intellectual persuasiveness of the world thus created was such that many peoples and societies willingly turned their backs on their customary truths and ways of life in order to gain entry into this world, under the banner of development, modernization, or what seemed synonymous, Westernization.

The Western Model

The relative ease with which the political and economic norms of capitalism and democracy could make inroads into Korean society after 1945 must be seen in the context of the Koreans' experience in encountering the West during the receding years of the 19th century. Koreans blamed their own political and cultural tradition for the inability of their own culture to deal with

Western culture, with which they were suddenly confronted during the latter half of the 19th century. Confucian culture had been the basis of its high degree of social stability and cultural achievements during a period lasting 500 years. But the psychological basis for a Confucian restoration in 1945 was simply non-existent, since it was indelibly associated with the ignoble demise of the Choson Kingdom. In a virtual cultural *tabla rasa*, the ideas, norms and values of the Western economy and polity found ready acceptance.

During its early phase, the course of national development in both the political and economic spheres, was seen as essentially following the course set by Western democracy and capitalism. Within the severely circumscribed context of national division and ideological confrontation, the debate on the course of national development was centered on how best to follow the course set by this ready-made cultural model. In moments of doubt and uncertainty, one needed simply to turn to this model for instruction and inspiration. The debate revolved largely around the question of identifying and then eradicating the values, norms and attitudes implicit in the traditional world view, which tended to impede development along the course set by the Western cultural model.

Cultural Fragmentation

Today, instead of returning to its former condition of "oneness," as might have been expected, given the end of the Cold War and

the push for globalization, the world is showing clear signs of cultural fragmentation. What are the reasons for the preeminence of the notion of a clash of civilizations in the political discourse of the post-Cold War and globalization era? It may be only too natural that all the elements other than ideological, which had previously lain low, should now come to the forefront of international politics in the post-Cold War era. As the ideological identity of nations retreat into the background, the revival and sometimes construction of identity based on religion, language or ethnicity comes to the fore. Furthermore, homogenizing and leveling tendencies inherent to globalization are seen as threatening the integrity of its social and cultural characteristics, that is, its identity. Perception of such a threat expresses itself in efforts to protect and preserve its tradition against all that threatens it.

It is my view that a more fundamental reason must be found in the perception that the cultural synthesis of the West that had been the basis of economic development, democracy and human rights is losing today its once matter-of-fact validity and persuasiveness. This cultural synthesis has been the civilizational identity of Europe and later America - the West and those parts of the world which aim to develop and modernize according to the Western cultural model. This civilizational identity is coming under the increasing suspicion that the problems arising from management of resources and the environment and the increasing gap between the haves and have-nots may now be the consequence of the very ideas and values that provided the basis for the rise and development of industrial civilization. There is an increasing

realization of the fact that the expansionistic dynamics inherent to industrial civilization may be the source of the forces which may eventually undermine the foundation of that very civilization.

History seems to have apotheosized only one of the triumvirate of ideals marking the Western synthesis: liberty. Politicized forms of the other two members of the triumvirate - equality and fraternity - have gone down in the ashes of history with the demise of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the fall of the Third Reich 1945. In this context, history may indeed be said to have come to an end with the victory of liberty over equality and fraternity.

We know however, that the classical ideals of equality and fraternity are far from dead. The fierce anti-globalization movement, the so-called "Third Way" and the resistance to the "Middle Way" in Germany are but aspects of history that are still very much alive. As we ponder over the meaning of September 11, these aspects are bound to appear ever more and more at the forefront of our reflections. Far from coming to an end, history may be just taking a new turn. A debate is fully under way as to how to revise, revitalize and, if possible, enlarge the civilizational identity of the West that will be adequate to changed historical realities.

Notion of Identity

The question, "who am I?" is a question that lies outside the boundaries of everyday language use. It is a question that a

person who has just regained his or her memory after a bout with amnesia, or perhaps a person who is experiencing respite from his schizophrenia, could pose. In such a situation, the question is one about the meaning and reference of the person, and could be answered simply by giving the name, sex or address of the person in question. However, the context in which a question of this form is posed is more likely to be a situation of some personal crisis or existential despair, in which a person's past or his position within society is called into question. An identity question of this kind clearly cannot be answered simply by giving the reference and meaning of a name.

What is expected as an answer to the question "Who am I?" is not a description of the person involved. What is expected as an answer is rather a reply to the question "What should I be?," a question relating to a future and normative projection. It is rather a reflexive account of what I should be. It is a question that can only be answered adequately by reflecting on the interaction between a person's natural history and his normative future-oriented project. Samuel Huntington asserts that identity is something primordially given, beyond choice or revision. Such a conception of identity describes only one aspect of the question. It overlooks the future orientation and normativity that are essential in the construction of identity.

Such a view of identity can be transposed to a question concerning the identity of a group. Most of the so-called "identity-based" conflicts are conflicts which arise from identity constructions based on such factors as territory, population, religion, or ethnicity,

factors which are given in a primordial way by nature and history. But as in the case of individuals, the construction of a group's identity must also go beyond the description of the primordially given. Construction of identity can be achieved only when the factors given by nature and history undergo interaction with the normative project of the group.

Such a project would consist of certain ideas and values, beliefs and attitudes that are illuminated, revised and expanded in light of the conditions of the life world of the group, in such a way that they would eventually constitute a dynamic and coherent set of ideas, values and practices capable of providing guidance to the group's efforts for survival and flourishing. Such a process of interaction between the primordially given and the normative project is, in my view, identical with the process of constructing identity.

I have been calling such a process of identity construction the task of cultural synthesis. I see different cultures and peoples as engaged in the task of forging cultural synthesis in their own ways, some in isolation, others in cooperation but also in conflict with others. Viable civilizations have sought to survive and prosper within the constraints imposed by the natural environment, more significantly within the limits of their knowledge and under-standing of those constraints. In the process, they may succeed in forging a synthesis of ideas, values and practices that are optimally suited to dealing with the constraints. When such a synthesis is successful, it will set the goal and direction for the activities of both individuals and society as a whole. A society

based on such a synthesis would be able to command the loyalty and affection of its people. It would also be able to interact fruitfully with other societies by providing instruction and inspiration.

Enlargement of Civilizational Identity and Asian Values

One such resource in our common task of enlarging civilizational identity is of course "Asian values." Impressed by the rapid economic development in Japan and the so-called four tigers - Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore - some Western scholars began to notice a consistent pattern of work ethics fundamentally different from the Puritan work ethics in the sense of Max Weber. Roderick MacFarquahr spoke of "the post-Confucian challenge." Peter Berger for his part spoke of a "second-wave of modernity." In so doing, they were referring primarily to the emergence and importance of such values as education, consensus formation, government leadership, harmony, duty-consciousness, solidarity and other related values. These values were seen collectively as constituting a core of work-ethics that represented a distinct and viable alternative, or a complement, to the ethics of competitive individualism - the first-wave of capitalism.

So when we speak of Asian values, we are speaking of that area of Asia where Confucianism has left some indelible marks in its history. Perhaps the term is a misnomer. Furthermore when we speak of Asian values, we are speaking primarily of ideas and

values associated with Confucian thought. It is my view that there are essentially two tenets of Confucianism which are germane to the task of enlarging civilizational identity. One is the Confucian emphasis on moral education; the other a conception of what it means to be a human person.

The response of Kung-fu-tzu to the problems of his times, unlike the Taoist response of retreat into nature, was to emphasize the importance of moral education. Not power or any form of coercion, but moral persuasion was the essence of political leadership. The idealized sage-king of the Chou period was someone who has become an exemplary moral teacher. Only then does he earn the right and responsibility of a political leader. The ideal of self-cultivation sufficient enough to be an exemplary moral teacher was at the heart of Kung-fu-tzu's long-term response to what he conceived to be the ills of his times.

At the basis of this ideal of self-cultivation lies a conception of what it means to be a human person. According to this conception, a person becomes a human being only by virtue of participation in society. In the felicitous phrase of Prof. Tu Wei-ming, a person "learns to become a human being." Simply being born into a particular biological species is not enough to make him a human being. One becomes a human being as a consequence of personal cultivation and socialization. It is only through learning to participate in society and enter into harmonious relationships with others - the relationship of ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, brothers and friends - that he can overcome the instincts and desires of animal nature, and develop cognitive, aesthetic and

spiritual capacities which make him fully human. Being a human being is not something which is given to men by right of birth: it is something that must be achieved.

Tasks Ahead

A radical cultural transformation is clearly called for, but there is no dominant voice that can claim with certainty the form and direction of this transformation. But whatever form and direction this process of transformation may eventually come to take, one can clearly identify a number of issues that recur in these debates. There is, first and foremost, the task of an appropriate revision of the aggressive individualistic ethics that formed the backbone of Western civilization. Can it be tempered or even replaced by a greater concern for the common good? Can we make the ethos and institutions of the traditional communalist societies relevant for the societies of tomorrow? Can familism, which is often pointed out as an essential element of traditional Confucian culture, be sublimated into a normative standard for a more inclusive and cooperative human relationship?

The issue of individualism is intimately connected with the problem of social justice, both at the international and national level. Once deprived of prospects for improvement in an economy where the total aggregate wealth does not keep pace with the growing population and where expansionist dynamics must be kept in check because of environmental concerns, they become the

source of disruption in the social fabric of a society and of conflict between individuals, nations and societies. Are received conceptions of justice adequate to deal with these problems? Is there some way that a fundamentally different idea of justice can be incorporated into the received, widening its applicability without sacrificing the purpose for which the idea of justice stands?

Most controversial perhaps is the problem of the fundamental readjustment of man's relationship to nature. In place of the conception of man as a being separate from nature, obligated to conquer it, a less exploitative outlook must take root, which sees man as one species among others, embedded in the intricate web of natural processes which contain and sustain all forms of life. Such an outlook must be supported by the knowledge that there are limits to natural resources and that human intervention in the actual process is bound to have far-reaching consequences. It must be a relationship to nature that would enable us to manage our economy, including technology, to sustain the complexity and stability of nature. At the same time, it must be a relationship that is able to deal with the still unsolved problem of poverty and underdevelopment in much of the world. In short, it must enable us to manage the complexity and stability of nature to sustain our economy. The task ahead is not simply to control nature, but to control ourselves so that economy can fit appropriately within the natural ecology.

Finally, the issue of the meaning of life figures importantly in the debate. It is connected to the attitude that sees human flourishing primarily in terms of the accumulation of material

wealth. Such an attitude must be replaced by a more holistic sense of perspective, which knows how to balance and coordinate satisfactions along many different dimensions of human existence. It would be an outlook that places "inner" satisfaction of the mind on the same or even on a higher level than material satisfactions. Art, music, poetry and rituals would temper and enrich barren rationalism, regaining their commensurate places in the lives of men. It would be a perspective in which reason and emotion, quality and quantity, future and past have their own appropriate and respected places.

Prospects: Regulative Ideal

What are the prospects for a successful cultural synthesis, a successful conceptualization of human flourishing that could become the model for all societies, culture and civilizations? Will it be an enlargement and revision of European civilizational identity? Or will it be that of some other civilization, or an entirely new civilizational identity that will consist of the most appropriate cultural elements of all civilizations in dialogue?

I would propose to regard the possibility of an optimal cultural synthesis as a regulative idea, in the Kantian sense. It guides the efforts of different peoples and periods to forge a system of ideas, values and practices perfectly adequate to the requirements of men and the constraints of the environment. As our knowledge of the world increases and our horizons expand in the wake of

even greater contacts with other peoples and cultures, our notion of the optimal cultural synthesis is bound to undergo a similarly evolutionary process of revision and expansion.

We are encouraged in such a view by the fact that there are species-specific primitive facts in man's natural history that are common to all men, and that the basic constraints that the recalcitrant world places on the lives of men are essentially the same for all cultures and periods. So, too, is the increasing homogeneity of the physical living environment of different cultures. But these "universals" represent only a small part of the components needed to forge an optimal cultural synthesis. The task of forging a cultural synthesis would be somewhat akin to that of an archeologist who, on the basis of meager material, attempts to create an over-all picture of an ancient, little known civilization. As the picture offered must undergo changes, sometimes minor, sometimes radical, whenever some new material is discovered and thus moves closer to the "true" picture of the civilization, so too must our knowledge of the world and our conception of how best to flourish in it undergo a continual process of disruption, correction and expansion. And the finitude of man constrains us from believing that such an evolutionary process of forging cultural synthesis would be a linear one. A more appropriate image, I think, would be that of a spiral, and an irregular one at that.

The Characteristics and Significance
of 4·3 Investigations

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Jeju was for a long time a part of South Jeolla Province. However, in 1946 when the U.S. Military Government[1] promulgated the Military Government Law No. 94, it announced on July 2, 1946, that Jeju was to be separated from South Jeolla Province and named as a separate province. Although this was done according to the demands of Jeju islanders, it also showed how important the island was to the United States Military command. The strategic importance of Jeju in the Far East region was established and reflected in this decision.

Less than a year after Jeju's separation from South Jeolla Province, outside influences began to coerce and oppress the

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[1] After Japan surrendered to Allies in August 15, 1945, Korea was liberated from 35 years of Japanese rule. However, the United States and the Soviet Union decided to divide the Korean Peninsula. From September 8, 1945 to August 15, 1948 when South Korea established a separate government, it was under the jurisdiction of the United States Army.

island. As the island itself was remote and detached from the mainland, it provided an ideal location for arbitrarily exercising public power. Under the conditions of such a geopolitical environment, the inhumane massacre against innocent Jeju islanders took place. The alienation and discrimination that arose thirty years later in Gwangju shared a similar background with the situation and event that occurred in Jeju.

Under the authoritarian dictatorship and a state of national division, South Korea took the anticommunist line in the establishment of the country and did not allow any resistance to its national sovereignty. Those who resisted were coerced without differen- tiation and were shown the how great the country's "power" and force was. Furthermore, through the sanctity and absoluteness of the state, the anti-democratic authoritarian regime was allowed to rule for 45 years. For that reason it is not too much to say that Korea's despotic and authoritarian regime was preserved at the sacrifice of the people of Jeju.

The official histories of South and North Korea respectively described the 4·3 incident as a form of "communist riot" and "proletarian resistance." In the South, the unjust and criminal aspects of 4·3 were emphasized in order to justify brutal oppression and extended this reasoning to claim the legitimacy and legacy of the state, while the unjustified exercise of political power and civilian massacres went nearly unrecorded in official history. Thus, it could be seen that the events of 4·3 were distorted and manipulated in order to create solidarity in the midst of authoritarian rule and a divided nation.

North Korea's interpretation of 4·3 as a form of "proletarian resistance" used the incident as an instrument for justifying its political power. They maintained that the people of South Korea preferred socialism at the time and that American imperialism and the Rhee Syngman regime were illegally preventing people from supporting it. This view of the event would go on to serve Kim Il-Sung as a form of legitimacy, with the North using it to qualify unification under communism.

Both sides sidestepped the truth and instead manipulated and distorted the history of the event in order to fit it into their respective ideologies.

On the other hand, the majority of people in Jeju remembered this incident as a massacre inflicted upon their inhabitants by outside parties, especially the Northeast Youth Group[2] (Seo-buk Cheong Yeon Dahn), and non-Jeju police officers. In addition to the death toll, the victims were labeled "red" while the survivors were implicated through a guilt-by-association system. Under a repressive authority, the survivors had to live for half a century in a constant state of fear, never knowing what might happen next. The collective psychology of the island seemed to have turned into a kind of autism, as they tried to push the memories of the incident away through a kind of autohypnosis. Through this self-induced "lapse of memory," they would restrain themselves subconsciously in order to keep the issue settled, while hoping

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2) Northeast Youth Group was a rightist youth group from North Korea. They were formed in November 1946 in Seoul and took actions in to prevent leftist movements in the South.

that the story would not be brought up. No one could assert their feelings of how they were mistreated nor could they justify their actions. Moreover, they were brainwashed with the logic of the regime, believing in a manipulated history for five decades. They became cynical and nihilistic and were sick with a kind of "4·3 syndrome."

The "Gwangju uprising" in 1980 and the investigation and movement for reestablishing tarnished reputations gave the people of Jeju a sense of shame, but also courage and hope. From Gwangju, they learned that an investigation could be sought even in situations where a sacrifice was made in the name of the nation's power, and that inquiry was in fact part of the democratic process.

However, few were willing to initially participate in the investigation. The scars of the event were still too fresh in their minds for many to come forward. Even those who were at the fore could not easily access the subject. There were risks that they might become embroiled in another ideological controversy and that people might have seen the government's use of suppression as a form of justice. The approach and the viewpoints of the investigation had to be carried out carefully from the start.

At this point, a third topic, apart from dispute over whether the event was a form of resistance or a communist riot, arose: considering the event in terms of the keywords of human rights and peace. The event had to be understood in the paradigm of humanity and life, not just through organizations and movements, which corresponded to how the majority of the inhabitants felt

about the event. Because the massacre involved civilians, the inhabitants of Jeju could rally together behind a common cause, dissolving boundaries. The aim of the investigation was not limited to simply addressing the complaints and grievances associated with the incident, but was built upon reconciliation and cooperation, and intended as a future-oriented movement that would focus on issues of human rights and peace. 4·3 was not an issue limited to the Jeju region, but could also be seen as a problem of national history produced in the turmoil of Cold War and during the division of the nation, as well representing a problem confronted by all of human history. Therefore, through the understanding of citizens of the nation and of the world, we hoped to create a new movement to examine the truth. This was considered as a strategic aspect, particularly considering that it would be difficult to carry out a thorough examination based only upon the limited influence of Jeju inhabitants.

Although criticized as reformist and too compromising by the leftists and as a form of radicalism under the guise of conservatism by the conservatives, this approach convinced the public and created public sympathy over 4·3, especially since human rights and peace were universal values that no one can deny.

At this point, we cannot ignore the heightened awareness in the 1990s of peace and human rights. In other words, Korea's democratic system had advanced in the 1990s and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tensions felt during the Cold War came to end, showing that ideology was not an absolute value, but only certain ways and means to governing. The under- standing

that human life lived in the paradigm of peace took precedence over structures or systems and permeated the social atmosphere.

> 'Jeju 4·3' was the biggest civilian massacre in Korean history and also a world event tangled with American's Far East Asian strategy in the Cold War era.
>
> The '4·3' investigation is being carried out in order to correct the lies in a distorted history and is a human rights movement. Therefore, a future-oriented recognition and approach is necessary for addressing '4·3' issues. Such a movement should be elevated to a movement that awaits human rights and peace.
>
> (Kang, Chang Il. "Jeju's approaches to solving 4·3 problems." Sponsored by Jeju Province Report on Public Hearing of the 4·3 settlement October 18, 1999)

The investigation into the Gwangju people's uprising and massacre became the catalyst for democratization and furthermore, it set the precedent for further historical investigations on civilian massacres. It became a clear fact that democracy kept the nation in check, while placing human rights and life as the highest values.

The Gwangju uprising and civilian massacre and later the historical investigation movement and movements to regain the tarnished reputations developed into a democratization movement, converging to form the 6·10 democratic uprising[3]) which achieved

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3) Demonstrations demanding democracy were held against President Chun Doo-hwan's totalitarian regime. Beginning on June 10, 1987 people all around Korea participated in this demonstration for about 20 days for the democratization of the country.

democracy in Korea. From this point on, the civilian massacres that took place were actively and publicly investigated along with the creation of movements to restore the honor of victims.

Deciding the president by election and establishing local self-governments gave the opportunity for such movements to flourish. No one could cover up the truth anymore, and the nominees in the election race pointed out the inhumanity of the civil massacre, simply in order to get votes, while some pledged to investigate the issue and restore reputations. Previous presidents such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung all pledged this more than ten times since 1988.

Yet, in the Kim Young-sam administration no other changes in measures took place except emergency measures on the "Geo-Chang" civilian massacre. Demands for investigations on the massacre overwhelmed the Kim Dae-jung administration, leaving him with no escape plan. The "4·3 Special Law" was drafted on December 16, 1999 as a reform legislation after many complications. The Special Law was not a gift given by the legislature but was won by the Jeju inhabitants and the democratic forces who had fought to clarify the truth of history. Nevertheless, while power still lies with Korean conservatives, we cannot overlook the fact that there still lie many obstacles ahead for the investigation and restoring reputations.

In the historical marking of 4·3 has two meanings. One is the significance of the defensive resistance movement to protect the people's rights to live with their wishes for independence, unification and democracy and the other is the significance of the

inhumane massacre against civilians by anti-democratic and anti-unification forces. Thus, the demand for the investigation started as a part of the democratization movements and developed into a movement for human rights and peace. Furthermore, it has become a moral foundation for the demand for unification of the divided nation.

By constantly working to find the truth behind a manipulated history, the 4·3 investigations have helped us recognize the universal fact that some day the historical truth will be revealed. Moreover, it helped us recognize that no matter in what kind of situation, human rights and life should be the most important values and peace should be maintained through reconciliation and interdependence. Because of this, the investigation has made a great contribution to the democratization of Korea and has raised the quality of the movement one step up.

The Present Significance of the 4·3 Incident

Young Hoon Kim
Member, Jeju Provincial Assembly

I. Why the 4·3 Incident Must Be Addressed

Jeju's 4·3 incident, which occurred 50 years ago on Jeju Island after national liberation, was indeed a significant and intense moment in the island's history. Why is it that even though the situation has long passed, the inhabitance of Jeju cling to the incident and hold conflicting views over what actually happened? Is it possible for them to simply regard it as a kind of madness that happened in an age of chaos? What is burdening them so much that they want it to be solved 50 years later?

The fact is that the incident still gives much grief even to those living today. Although it is not easy to list all of those affected on a case by case level, it is still important to examine the history, significance and impact of the event within Jeju society, as well as in a broader scope and on the national level.

In the meantime, although there has been much discussion over Jeju 4·3, not much progress has been made. The only fact that

is certain at this point is that many were killed during the incident. And yet in spite of everything, many misunderstandings surrounding the incident remain to this day.

Even the number of casualties and the actual course of events differ according to which time period the 4·3 incident is viewed from. While some view the event as an isolated instance that occurred on the sidelines of the Korean Peninsula. Despite being controlled and contained it happened to garner attention. The incident could also be seen as an event that could damage the legitimacy of successive governments.

As a result, all kinds of archives pertaining to the issue were classified as confidential, the witnesses were kept silent and discussion of the subject was avoided. It was in this social atmosphere that an ideological approach became the mainstream, which in the process neglected to tell the truth.

1. Healing the conflict and divisions

While the incident remained concealed, ancillary disagreements and factions over the incident developed. While some based their understanding of the issue on individual experiences and recollections, a surge of opinions ensued based on hearsay, rumors and presuppositions.

On top of undergoing the trauma of the 4·3 experience itself, the ideological technique of coloring the inhabitants of Jeju red, even without the need for physical violence, was enough to instill fear in them. Thus, all of the inhabitants became embroiled in the

situation, without a single person able to talk with ease about the issue.

Even after 1984, when only the remains of the previous era existed, the inhabitants had to endure the continuation of the guilt-by-association system and even if that was not the case, a weak and fearful mindset of "crawl forward where you must" was still prevalent among people. On top of weakening the spirit and minds of the people, this state of affairs hindered progressive developments in society at large.

Yet this kind of ideological approach to the situation is one, and a minor one, out of numerous possible ways of looking at the situation. A solution based on a comprehensive examination and understanding of the event must be sought. Elements such as the conditions of the surrounding Korean Peninsula, structural inconsistencies, the United States Army's policies, and Jeju's history and societal conditions at that time must all be examined together. In other words, unless 4·3 is examined and regarded as a structural problem, we will only graze the surface of the truth.

2. Repairing Jeju's broken community

Because of the 4·3 incident, mutual aid and interdependence, a readiness to oppose injustice, and all that defined Jeju's traditional community spirit deteriorated, turning into selfishness, and widespread distrust. Now, Jeju has the reputation of having the highest number of people filing lawsuits and complaints in the country.

The "divide and conquer" policies, initiated as a strategy under the colonialism of the Japanese and the United States military, were drawn into the maelstrom of 4·3. While the pushing, shoving and pointing fingers at people resulted in many deaths, the fact remains that the side effects of this kind of mentality remain to this day among inhabitants. This problem still lives on in current generations and in some villages in Jeju, people can still be heard saying "this is someone's fault" or "don't keep company with someone," and beyond being a conflict among the members of a village, it could also become a conflict between villages and social classes. This kind of state of anxiety is not simply a scar from the 4·3 incident, but has planted its roots deeply in people's mindsets. For the good of the Jeju community, this problem must no longer be overlooked.

3. From the perspective of restoring history

4·3 was not simply a regional problem limited to Jeju, but was, without a doubt, an event created by the conflicting structure in the Korean Peninsula after natural liberation from Japanese. Because it happened on the basis of Korea's unique history, such as the division of the nation, and was closely related to the nation's policies toward the United States, the incident was only accessible from the government's perspective. Also, the investigation of the unfortunate past could become the foundation for starting a new chapter in history. Furthermore, investigations are needed to clarify past events and restore the truth to Korea's

distorted modern history.

4. The continuing process of 4·3

The fact that the 4·3 incident, which has caused so much pain and suffering to those living in Jeju, has remained unsolved for 50 years, is a good enough reason as, to why it must be investigated. Inhabitants who saw the gruesome deaths of their loved ones have lived miserable lives full of guilt for 50 years, while their feelings of obligation towards the deceased still burdens them. Even though some survived 4·3, they did not receive compensation for medical care. They lost their land to the government and could not receive a family registry, and without a family registry, neither they nor their descendants could be protected under the law. In addition, the guilt-by-association system bound people to the participants, and branded them as communists. The pain that 4·3 brought did not end 50 years ago. It is still being passed on from generation to generation. 4·3 is still an on going process and that is why we can no longer put off solving the problems of 4·3.

II. Efforts and Approaches Concerning 4·3 - The Jeju Provincial Assembly 4·3 Select Committee

In 1991, after 30 years, the provincial assembly was reborn. The Jeju Provincial Assembly did its best to act as the representative

organization dealing with the problems of 4·3. Members of the assembly, through a shared understanding, got together to form the 4·3 Select Committee and began to gather public opinions and consensus on a full scale.

This was not an easy job, with external pressure trying to prevent this effort. However, the committee tried its best as a local assembly, researching the cases of other countries and submitting a petition to the National Assembly. The present writer was the chairperson of the 4·3 Select Committee at the time we investigated the victims of the incident. This was done due to the conclusion that the exact number of casualties would be very valuable as a primary reference when discussing 4·3. In addition, it was concluded that we should not cling to any of the different figures.

Along with this, we continuously demanded that the government and National Assembly solve the issues revolving around 4·3. As well as appealing to the 14th and 15th sessions of the National Assembly for help, we tried all possible ways to get the problem solved, including submitting recommendations and delivering urgent messages and letters to the National Assembly.

To widely inform the public about 4·3, we gave lectures at universities on invitation, had interviews with the press, attended various meetings and publicized the matter all around the country.

The investigation of the victims of 4·3 began in 1994, before the 4·3 Special Law was established by the government. With this investigation, we recorded the names of nearly 15,000 victims.

14,028 casualties were reported during the reporting period set by the 4·3 Special Law.

However, it is difficult to conclude that this is the total number of casualties. After the enactment of the special law, many more are trying to report additional grievances. The number of victims is tentatively estimated to be 30,000 persons, but there are still many cases that have not been reported.

Some have given up, thinking that nothing will change even if they report damages, and some still want to keep their involvement a secret, fearing that revealing it may cost them. Moreover, there are cases where entire families were killed in 4·3, in addition to the soldiers sent from outside Jeju and young children not registered in the family registry, making it impossible to total the exact number of victims. Thus it is our sorrow that even into the 21st century, we can only make an approximation of the total number of victims.

III. Establishment of 4·3 Special Law

President Kim Dae-jung promulgated the 4·3 Special Law on January 12, 2002 to "extend human rights, expand democracy and harmonize the nation by closely examining the matters of 4·3 and restoring the honor of the victims and their families." Along with the Remuneration Special Law concerning democratization and a special law for unsolved deaths, the 4·3 Special Law was one of three reform legislations that the Kim Dae-Jung administration

endorsed.

With the enactment of the 4·3 Special Law, systematic provisions to authorize and restore the honor of the victims and their families through a report system were established. Moreover, it had great significance because victims would no longer have to fear testifying on the event and would no long be disadvantaged due to their involvement in 4·3. Additionally, people whose family registries had been destroyed found ways to register through the special law.

However, some insufficient aspects remain. There still are limits to setting a memorial day, punishing those responsible, distributing compensation and collecting data. Furthermore, some believe that the medical and welfare support given to the injured is just to give a good impression to people.

Especially, there have been concerns about the basis for selecting victims, which has been creating some conflict recently. A particular concern has been the recent criteria set for selecting victims, which has been creating disagreements. Without the completion of closer investigations into the matter, it is not possible to determine by which clear standards the victims are being discussed and determined.

What is more, there have been many complaints that the government is deliberately delaying the process and not giving enough support for a budget to build the 4·3 Peace Park.

IV. Preconditions for Building an Island of Peace

It is a fact that 4·3 was a tragic event in Korea's modern history, that took place in the mid-20th century on Jeju Island. Even though the issue has every reason to be settled, the event still remains controversial. Universal values such as respect for human rights and prosperity and peace should be at the heart of settling the issue. To achieve this, many talk about the need for compassion and cooperation, or forgiveness and harmony.

How wonderful it would be if only things would turn out that way. Everyone will agree that in order to prevent terrible events like 4·3 from happening again, we must try to truly understand the incident as one of history's lessons and gain wisdom from it, in order to begin a brighter future filled with hope.

However, we still find ourselves disputing over who the real victims are and in conflict over ideological standards, especially when trying to decide who to show compassion towards, who to cooperate with and who to forgive. Moreover, we still have not found anyone responsible with whom we can be reconciled.

In this sense, it is still valid to remind ourselves of the original purpose and aim behind the creation of the 4·3 Special Law.

Jeju 4·3: Reconstructing History and the Art of Peace

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The Jeju 4·3 Incident was an unforgettable imbroglio that happened during the formative period of the separation of the two Korean states. Not only in Jeju, but also on a national and a global scale, the incident was an embodiment of the developing Cold War conflict and the culmination of domestic struggles for and against the two divided entities.

The Jejuians have gone through many hardships in modern history, including experiences of colonialism, World War II, national division, Korean War, and the Cold War. To them, the most cataclysmic milestone of all this was the Jeju 4·3 Incident. Although the Cold War is over, for the Jejuians this incident has not yet ended. The incident remains deep in the collective memory and life of Jejuians. However, it has almost been forgotten in the rest of Korea and the world.

Due to the efforts of Jejuians, from 1999-2000, South Korea's

government and National Assembly made an unprecedented decision to establish a special commission for unveiling the truth and solving Jeju's past tragedy. It was the offspring of a historical compromise.

It may certainly become an invaluable precedent for coming to terms with problems from the past in both South and North Korea. Although Jeju witnessed massacre and tragedy during the initial Cold War period, it has recently become the symbolic locus of peace, reconciliation, and human rights in East Asia. Now, by learning the Jejuian way of reconciliation and mutual forgiveness, we can then apply their spirit, model and way of peace to the Korean Peninsula, East Asia, and the world.

1. The Jeju 4·3 Incident: Roots, Causes, and Contours

　A. International level: Cold War

　B. National level; Division and the Rise of Separate Regimes

　C. Local level (Village Community) (Chung-in Moon)

　D. Remote Location and Isolation

2. "A Crime against Humanity" rather than "A Crime against Peace"
　　- "de facto war crimes" in peace time.

　A. State Suppression for Internal Pacification (Anthony Giddens)

　B. Terrorism

　C. Leftist-Rightist Struggle

　D. Endogenous Conflict

3. Responsibility

A. Whose? : Partial Blaming, Partial Responsibility

ⅰ. American, or Soviet?

ⅱ. State, or North Korean Infiltration?

ⅲ. Local Communist Leadership

ⅳ. Local Groups?

ⅴ. Mutual Violence?

B. Categories (Jovan Babic)

ⅰ. Legal Responsibility; A final solution?

ⅱ. Political Responsibility

ⅲ. Moral Responsibility

- We need to set up a compromising design among and beyond these three categories.

4. Issue of Ideology

A. Anti-communism vs. Pro-communism

B. "Little Tradition"

C. Radicalism or Moderates

D. Leadership and Ordinary Islanders

5. Consequences and Historical Impact

A. Casualties

B. Winners and Victims

C. The Involvement System

D. Stigmatizing

6. Revealing the Past: The Long Journey to Truth

A. Divided Memory and Divided History (Jeffrey Herf, Seong-Nae Kim)

B. Relationship between Politics and History: Antithesis
 - Logics of Power and Logics of Truth (Hannah Arendt)

C. Democratization and Re-(Re-)writing the Past (Kim Jong Min)

　ⅰ. Writing the History of Jeju 4·3

　ⅱ. Re-writing the History of Jeju 4·3

　ⅲ. Synthesizing the two contradictory parallels; enactment of "The Special Law on Jeju 4·3 Incident" and formation of "The National Commission on Jeju 4·3 Incident." These will be the examples of re-writing the tragic incidents in the two separate regimes from the post-Cold War and reconciliatory perspective.

7. Four Options before Us (Archbishop Desmond Tutu)

A. Revenge

B. The Nuremberg option

C. Do Nothing: "Let bygones be bygones, lets forget the past"

D. The South African Way
 - What is the Jejuian Way or the Korean Way?

8. Jeju in the 21st Century; Beyond the Past
 - Locus of the Art of Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia

A. Back to the Future; An Exemplar Case of Re-writing the

Past

B. Truth and Reconciliation, Justice and Tolerance
   - A Very Difficult Combination

C. The Art of Peace; Minimizing Punishment, Maximizing Forgiveness

D. Returning Jejuians to the Tasks

9. Concluding Remarks

A. Constructing the Jeju Peace Beltway

B. Spirit for the Future: Peace, Human Rights, and Reconciliation

Our Tasks for Constructing Jeju Free International City
- Focusing on Methods of Raising Competitive Power -

Jin-boo Ko
Member, the National Assembly

Good morning (afternoon or evening), ladies and gentlemen. I am a member of the National Assembly, from Seogwipo, South Jeju.

First of all, I believe it is a very meaningful opportunity to attend this event, as one of those who helped form the final plan of the Special Act on Jeju Free International City and helped to promote its legislation. Moreover, I am very pleased to participate in the discussion, having the honor to invite Director Jwa Seung-hee as the chairman. I will make a presentation focused on the methods of raising competitive power to make Jeju Free International City a success.

I. The Meaning of Constructing Jeju Free International City

As noted, the current global economy has created one global

village where trade barriers are being relieved and let down, and each country is actively developing investment points in order to draw world capital and enterprises and to prevail over the competition.

Especially, while the East Asian economic bloc, including Korea, is gaining more importance in the global economy, Hong Kong, Singapore, Podong, China and Okinawa, Japan are vigorously promoting their plans for international free cities in order to dominate the bloc. Given the current trend of globalization, Korea has also selected Jeju Island as an international investment point for promoting its plan to utilize the area as one of the strategic points of the opening and liberalization of the Korean economy, manifested in the plan for the Jeju Free International City.

After having gone through many complications, the government and Jeju Island legislated the Special Act on Jeju Free International City on December 27,2001. The remaining task is to implement it, based on the legal grounds for Jeju Free International City.

As you are all aware, since "The Basic Blueprint of the Realization of Northeastern Business-Centered Country" was confirmed at the Economic Policy Coordination Committee held on January 4, 2002 concentrated efforts on the development of Jeju Free International City threaten to be decentralized.

Therefore, the current situation behooves us to consider better strategies and prepare alternatives to them so as to differentiate Jeju Island from other international free cities and to acquire global competitiveness.

II. Methods to Raise the Competitiveness of Jeju Free International City

The successful propulsion of Jeju Free International City demands changes in the perception of Jeju by the central government, a reform of the administrative system of the Jeju region, and especially reorganization of class structure. And also, the globalization of the consciousness of Jeju people is urgently needed.

1. Positive Understanding and Support from the Central Government

Understanding and support from the central government is an essential factor to maximizing the unique potential that Jeju Island has, so that regional and national interests can be achieved at the same time.

If the government recognizes the Jeju region only through the perspective that is applied to other self-governing bodies, it will cause a national loss, besides putting Jeju at a disadvantage. Therefore, Korea should have a win-win strategy in mind, in order to pursue both regional and national interests by perceiving Jeju from a value-centered point of view and recognizing that Jeju is an invaluable resource.

A. Necessity for the Cooperative Division of Roles with the Central Government

One of the important factors required in the administration

today is an entrepreneurial spirit. Especially Jeju, which is promoting the plan for Free International City, needs to have a flexible administrative system that can flexibly react to changes. The rights of the personnel management and organization under the control of the central government are too limited to encourage and foster professional administrators who can exert an entrepreneurial spirit.

Though the central government's hesitation at entrusting authority is understandable, especially due to the concern over the abuse and misuse of discretionary authority by heads of local self-governing bodies, authority should be devolved because the legislation of the Special Act on Jeju Free International City itself premises the confidence between the central and local government. That's why the cooperative division of roles refers to the decisive transfer of authority (including the police and educational self-governing bodies). By placing the responsibility of outcomes with the head of the self-governing body, it can then play a managerial role, while emerging from an administrative one.

B. Necessity for Forming the Systemic Environment including Amendments to Relevant Statutes

To construct an economic system that is autonomous at a certain level, which is the prerequisite to a free international city, various laws relevant to the Special Act on Free International City should be amended in addition its legislation.

a. Reasons for delaying the amendment process of relevant laws

and the enforcement ordinance

Initially, the enforcement of the ordinance of the Special Act as well as that of the Tax Limit Law, the Agricultural Land Act, the Forestry Law, the Grassland Law were amended, as well as the Enforcement Ordinance on the Limitation on Taxation Exceptions, and the Enforcement Ordinance for Agricultural Special Tax. These were to be completed by the end of March so that the nominal and de facto implementation of the laws would begin. However, since the schedule was created according to the assumption that the National Assembly would be resumed in February and March 2002, and the schedule of the National Assembly did not correspond accordingly, the implementation was inevitably postponed.

b. Further plans to be promoted

As the 299th Extra Session of the National Assembly is being opened on April 8, 2002, we are hurrying to amend the relevant laws and ordinances.

First, the legislative bill for the amendment of the Tax Limit Law, the most sensitive and key item at the 1st Plenary Session on January 8, 2002, was passed, and the amendment process for the ordinance of the law's enforcement is under negotiation among the relevant organizations. And we will strive to start the amendment process for other relevant laws and ordinances within this session.

c. Tasks and outlook

As the Agricultural Land Act, the Forestry Law and the Grassland Law have not yet been submitted to the Plenary Session, the related standing committees seem to need continuous monitoring and encouragement

But, because the amendments are not among the heated issues dealt with between the government party and the opposition party, they are expected to pass before long if the committee's schedule proceeds smoothly.

Regardless, as for the cases that need to be dealt with at the National Assembly, we will try to propel the process for them without delay, in cooperation with Assemblyman Hyun Kyung-dae.

C. Stable Acquisition of Investment funds is Required

Next, financial support should accompany administrative support. Jeju's infrastructure, including such facilities as airports, roads and harbors has been constructed to a certain degree because of consistent tourist development. Also, such factors as the alleviation of legal regulations on investments are expected to be conducive to private capital. In spite of all of these developments, a considerable amount of public investment into many aspects of the plan is required in order to transform Jeju Island into a free international city. Accordingly, the processes involving the institutionalization of financial support at the governmental level is required to accelerate the realization of the island's free international city status. We will do our best in cooperation with Assemblyman Hyun KyungDae, in order for this work to be actualized.

2. Designing Jeju as a Single Self-Governing District for the Construction of an Efficient Administrative System

The population of Jeju Island was 540,000 as of 2001, which makes it equal to 1/15 of Gyeonggi Province. Although it corresponds to the size of a self-governing district in Seoul, Jeju maintains two self-governing levels that refer to one province and four cities and districts.

Although more precise verification and research is needed, the two-level structure based on the current population seems excessive in regards to the local self-governing body. It becomes more so especially when considering the local uniqueness of the island, such as its single sphere of life and economy and the strong social homogeneity among the people. Although the system has positive aspects, such as helping local development through good-natured competition between the basic self-governing bodies and raising democratic processes in the administration through a system of checks and balances, we should not overlook the negative effects of the two-level structure either, which includes wasteful administrative spending due to overlapping operations between the two levels.

Additionally, the bi-level structure can also be seen as cumbersome by adding another level of deliberation and delaying political decisions. It also allows for each basic self-governing body to excessively pursue its own interests, rather than those of Jeju as a whole. Not only can it distort the structure of equal representation and the equal distribution of human and material

resources in the area, but can also result in unbalanced development among localities on the island.

Some stress that the current structure is proper in order to promote democracy and make the administration more accessible. However, those factors can also be achieved if opportunities are extended for people so they may directly participate in the administrative processes while administrative services become more extensive for the people.

Considering the aspects previously mentioned, we need to discuss the methods for building an efficient administrative system for promoting the construction process of Jeju Free International City in the future. This refers to a single self-governing district model formed by converting the existing cities and districts into administrative cities and districts without corporate rights, and allowing them to conduct only the businesses that have been entrusted to them by the province and country.

3. Fostering Global Understanding among the People

Promoting Jeju Free International City can be part of the open-door development strategy to secure regional competitiveness in the age of global exchange. The success and failure of such a strategy depends on the globalization of the provincials' views, which will also enable them to accept such a strategy. In other words, they should cultivate a more refined point of view and should develop a cultural awareness equal to that of others, in order to become global citizens. This will subsequently contribute

to the area's survival and development at the dawn of the 21st century, which is foremost represented by globalism.

The following represent several requirements for the Jeju people, who will be the main actors in promoting the Jeju Free International City.

First, they should have unbiased points of view, meaning the balanced acceptance of humankind's common values and the local community's spiritual heritage. Global citizens should internalize pluralism and tolerance, in order to accept variety without being limited to only one measuring stick for values.

Second, the recognition of world events across the boundaries of time and space should be heightened. Global citizens need to have both a systematic and deep understanding of common matters that face citizens of the world today, such as war and peace, the environment and resources, and human rights and welfare. Therefore, more interest in and a better understanding of the reality of international society is more than ever necessary.

The third is to foster competitiveness. Mutual coexistence is not only a rule but is the prerequisite for globalization. It rejects the compulsion of a one-sided logic, and instead recognizes and sanctions just competition. That is why we should place priority on fostering the ability to participate justly and fairly in the age of infinite competition.

Accordingly, the educational efforts to globalize their cultural awareness must be urgently developed in order to raise Jeju people to the status of global citizens. Such work should be furthered by a mutual organic cooperative relationship among the

country, the local self-governing bodies, educational institutions and civic groups.

III. Conclusion

The legislation of the Special Act on Free International City has become the springboard for Jeju's growth, on its way to becoming a global city like Singapore, Hong Kong and others. while leading the country to a more developed level in the international arena. However, strictly speaking, the comparative advantages of a free international city announcing the liberalization of human, goods and capital exchanges are not permanently maintained but continue merely for 20 or 30 years. In other words, the current comparative advantage of Jeju Free International City may soon be extinguished. Hereupon I stress that Korea should alleviate the regulations resolutely so that its comparative advantage may be fully utilized, bearing in mind that the comparative advantages of international free cities are only maintained for a limited time of 20 to 30 years.

In addition, Jeju and its people should concentrate all of its energies towards boosting the construction of a successful free international city, of course while keeping in mind and maintaining Jeju's independence of spirit and creativity.

'Jeju Free International City' is not simply for the sake of development itself but is a strategy for promoting national development and the survival of the Jeju area. Thus, not only

should it be developed according to the bureaucracy or a limited number of elites, but should be relevant to ordinary people's lives. In other words, an atmosphere should be fostered that enables all Jeju residents to join in the process of constructing the free international city, while responding to changes in today's world and priding themselves on being global citizens and having an open mind for their future free international city.

The promotion of Jeju Free International City will lead to success only when it gains the local public's sympathy, and when the plan can be adapted to fit naturally into people's lives. Thank you.

Jeju Free International City against a Backdrop of Enhanced Regional Economic Cooperation

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With the advent of the era of globalization we are witnessing a trend of burgeoning regional economic cooperation. The end of the Cold War has contributed to this trend. The tremendous reduction in global tensions following the breakdown of the Cold War structure served to heighten cooperation and inter-dependence among nations. Moreover, the downfall of the Soviet system has facilitated the integration of the socialist planned economies into the capitalist market economy in Europe. This in turn has reinforced the spread of liberal democracy and the market economy as universal values. The world has therefore been undergoing a fundamental change: a move away from confrontation towards political reconciliation and economic cooperation. The advances in information and communication technology have further accelerated these trends. As global and regional interactions

have intensified, such advances have had a further synergistic effect with globalization. This has led to the enhancement of transnational economic and political cooperation, thereby further strengthening linkages between countries and regions in a variety of ways.

The Rise of East Asia

East Asia, with its record-breaking rates of growth and economic dynamism, has emerged as one of the three major economic zones in the global economic order. The emergence of an integrated Europe has acted as a spur for this. Moreover, a shift in US attitudes towards accommodation of regional cooperation around the end of the Cold War has further stimulated its rise. This tripolar economic configuration is likely to continue well into the 21st century.

Since the middle of the 20th century, Japan has further strengthened its position as the second largest economy in the world. The newly industrializing economies (NIEs) have followed suit on an impressive scale since the 1970s. ASEAN has also continued to show remarkable growth rates, averaging more than 8 percent since the 1980s and has even reemerged after the brief setback of the financial crisis in the late 1990s. China, which belatedly adopted a capitalist development model in the 1980s, has already become the third largest economy. The region's economic rise has consistently propelled political and institutional

changes in East Asia. Trade and investment among the countries in the region now account for an increasingly large share of their economic activities. At the same time, trading blocs elsewhere have become visibly more consolidated. Against this backdrop, there has naturally been a growing awareness of the need for a framework to generate a sense of regional identity. East Asia has therefore begun to deepen economic cooperation within the region through institutionalized mechanisms and to coordinate its economic relations with the rest of the world.

Moving Beyond the Barriers: Initiatives for Regional Cooperation in East Asia

Unlike Europe with its Christian heritage, and North America with the strong leadership of Washington, there are numerous barriers impeding East Asia's regional cooperation. Political rivalries, historical animosities, and ideological confrontations have tended to generate tensions within the region. Disparities in levels of development, differences in economic and social systems and cultural diversity have also conspired to preclude meaningful progress. The countries of the region have traditionally taken neighboring nations for economic competitors rather than potential collaborators. However, considerable experience of regional cooperation has been built up in East Asia within the frameworks of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Based on

experience accumulated over two and a half decades, the inauguration of ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting) in 1996 as well as the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis constituted the most dramatic triggers for regionalization on the groundwork of economic cooperation among regional countries. While the initiation of ASEM provoked challenges to the concept of a regional identity by powers in and outside the region, the Asian financial crisis provided strong impetus for the institutionalization of regional cooperation. It awakened East Asia to the need to strengthen cooperation to preempt and solve its problems collectively. Thereafter, a series of proposals have been put forward in order to bring the countries closer together.

ASEAN Plus Three

At the ASEAN initiative, ASEAN Plus Three (participated by Korea, China and Japan) was established in December 1997. This was a more far-reaching East Asian Summit that precipitated the consolidation of East Asia on a general level and more specifically, the acceleration of sub-regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. The summit was originally formed with a view to hammering out a unified East Asian position vis-à-vis the EU within the framework of ASEM. The concept of regional integration in East Asia, especially one that includes Korea, has yet to be clearly fixed. However, there have been continuous discussions and initiatives for the institutionalization of regional and sub-regional

cooperation, and the motivation for such developments remains strong.

At the initiative of President Kim Dae-jung, two bodies were established: the EAVG (East Asian Vision Group) to discuss ideas for long-term cooperation and the EASG (East Asian Study Group) to prepare action plans. The ambitious report of the EAVG was submitted to the leaders' meeting in 2001. In this report, they proposed such measures as the establishment of a free trade and investment area, a regional monetary fund and an East Asia Forum for broad-based social exchanges. They further proposed developing the ASEAN Plus Three forum into an East Asian Summit. The next summit in Cambodia in November 2002 is due to discuss this report together with the views and recommendations of the EASG. As a result, efforts to institutionalize regional cooperation in East Asia will be stepped up even further.

In parallel with the strengthening of the ASEAN Plus Three framework, there has been growing awareness in Northeast Asia of the need to rectify the increasing asymmetry between the two sub-regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. There is greater recognition of the need to promote good-neighbourliness, bolster cooperative relations and overcome the distinction of sub-regional integration. The recognition of and need for sub-regional economic cooperation gave rise to the inauguration of the trilateral breakfast meeting between the leaders of Korea, China and Japan in November 1999. Putting historical feuds and ideological differences aside, the informal summit fostered a

political atmosphere that was conducive to the further promotion of cooperation and interactions among the three countries in Northeast Asia. In an effort to step up economic cooperation, they established a three-way forum of economic ministers at the last summit held in Brunei in November 2001. In addition to these trilateral talks, usually held on the side of ASEAN Plus Three Meetings, bilateral summit diplomacy has also contributed to the intensification of cooperation between the three countries. The new agreement on a Bilateral Investment Treaty signed on March 22, 2002 at the end of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Seoul constituted a great stride toward the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries. In this respect, Kim and Koizumi further agreed to launch a joint research group to pursue a Free Trade Agreement. Although no time frame was set for this move, the agreement itself could certainly generate great impetus to facilitate discussions on the issue at various levels between the two countries.

The trend of proliferating FTAs is irreversible. Yet in addition to this, a global pursuit of economic integration is in its progressive stages. It may, for example, take shape through a process of development such as the stages of a primary consultation forum, comprehensive caucus, free trade area, customs union, common market, currency union and economic union and even eventually a united country with a political alliance. In Northeast Asia also, a wide range of discussions and research on the concept of setting up at least a comprehensive Korea-China-Japan caucus, with a view to developing it into a Free Trade Area has been

actively pursued. Despite their economic sizes, the three countries have been the exception by staying out of the network of FTAs around the world. It is, however, inevitable that these countries will join an FTA sooner or later. AFTA (the ASEAN Free Trade Area) in Southeast Asia will be completed by the year 2005 and the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) comprising thirty-four nations in North and South America will be launched in the same year. Accordingly, a study of how to cope with the situation, including the possibility of a three-country caucus, is imperative. Furthermore, it would be wise to study the development of a comprehensive caucus into an FTA within a decade, as this is the year for the launch of an FTA between ASEAN and China. This is also the target year, tacitly agreed upon between certain sectors of Korean and Japanese society, for the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on an FTA.

The Special Act on Jeju Free International City

In the midst of this global flood of regional integration, the National Assembly railroaded the "Special Act on Jeju Free International City" around the end of December 2001. It was highly noteworthy that both the ruling and opposition parties agreed upon it. The government-proposed act on the island development project also sets out a plan to turn Jeju into a free international city by 2010. The special act aims, first of all, to revive the volcanic island as a major tourism and recreation

attraction with a total investment of 4.7 trillion won ($3.6 billion). It aims to expand the social infrastructure for tourism, build tourism facilities including theme parks, construct convention centers, including a "South-North Peace Center," and establish more shopping outlets. In particular, it sets out to build about 20 more golf courses and allow domestic tourists duty-free shopping, worth up to $1,200 a year. Furthermore, foreigners from 30 countries will be allowed to enter the island without visas for up to 30 days.

The second ambitious plan of the act is to promote the island as a complex for commerce, finance, logistics and knowledge-based industries. For this purpose, free trade zones around ports and airports will be set up and comprehensive tax breaks of seven years for foreign investors and three years for local investors will be provided. Foreigners will also be able to establish international schools and branch colleges, which will be able to accept foreign and local students. In this connection, documents will also be available in English at public offices to facilitate smooth business transactions. The third goal is to draw up comprehensive plans to increase the local islanders' income. The act, all in all, aims to turn the island into a duty free and free trade zone where people, goods and capital flow freely.

Jeju : the Advantages of its Location

In this respect, the specifics of the plan seem to reflect the

current trends of regional cooperation, especially those taking place in East Asia. If the East Asian community, in particular Northeast Asian economic cooperation, intensifies, the geopolitical location of Jeju will be a great advantage. The idyllic isle is located in the heart of the Northeast Asian region, just two hours by plane from anywhere in Korea, and from 18 select cities in China and Japan, with a population of five million or more able to reach the island in this flying time. The advantages it has as an island and its landmass are more conducive to various institutional and legal experiments than any other part of the mainland. It is also a gateway not only to ASEAN countries but also to the Pacific Ocean.

In this sense, competition with Hong Kong and Singapore must be considered. It is clear that when it comes to the necessary features of a free international city, the two rivals are already far advanced in every respect. Their status as trading and financial centers seems to be unchallenged. However, Hong Kong lost its edge to some extent with its incorporation into China in 1997, and Singapore's disadvantageous location on the outskirts of East Asia may mean that it will be less competitive in the long run. In this regard, Northeast Asia shared 92 percent of the regional economy in terms of GDP at the end of 1999, with ASEAN only accounting for 8 percent. The long-term purchasing power of Northeast Asia, therefore, could hardly be compared with that of Southeast Asia.

Since 1971, even Japan has embarked on plans to make Okinawa a trading and financial center in the region. Moreover,

since 1990, China has followed suit in developing Shanghai for the same purpose. In this respect, it would be advisable to explore complementary projects to foster an identity for Jeju island that is quite distinct from other cities, rather than compete head on with them. Strategic alliances could also be pursued. Jeju surpasses its competitors in terms of natural environment, and the scenic beauty of the land and its well-preserved nature give Jeju the edge. In this regard, the tourism and convention industries could be key industries to develop. However, the question of time frames will also be very important. AFTA will be completed by 2005, China is to enter into an FTA with ASEAN in 2010 and there have already been Korean and Japanese moves in the pursuit of an FTA. In light of all this, it may be a little late for Jeju to set about becoming a free international city by 2010. Moreover, Japan concluded an FTA with Singapore in January 2002 and wishes to expand its network of FTAs. Therefore, ways of launching and accelerating projects that do not require large levels of investment should be pursued in earnest.

In this regard, it is understandable that residents may have concerns with respect to future plans for development. Efforts to harmonize conventional industries with the further exploration of strategic industries will be key. So far, the GNP per capita of the island totals less than 90 percent of the national average as its two industrial pillars, namely the primary industries (mandarin farming and fisheries) and tourism, have shrunk due to high prices and the opening of the market. More than 26 percent of

the population has been engaged in the primary industries up to now, three times more than on the mainland, and 3 to 4 percent in the manufacturing industry. The rest of the inhabitants, around 70 percent, are employed in service industries. This represents an imbalance in the impoverished main industries. Furthermore, a large proportion of tourists, or 93 percent of visitors in 2000, came from mainland Korea. In fact, there is no trained workforce available in the strategic industries. This trend of economic distress will continue, in the absence of revolutionary changes in its economic plan. However, the successful precedents of Hong Kong and Singapore serve to encourage reform. They have built their trade and finance empires without primary industries and despite a lack of natural resources. In this respect, fundamental solutions could be found in an unbalanced development model focused on spearheading industries.

While trying to interlink conventional and strategic industries as much as possible, extensive sales activities to entice investments on a large scale will be imperative. History has shown that petty investments tend to bring about disorderly and pell-mell development, which could ruin the environment and rural charms. From this point of view, efforts to induce multinational companies to build theme parks here would be highly recommendable. Projects like "Legoland" and "Disney World" may serve as good examples to follow in this sense. Since the development plan of the strategic industries in the first stage has been mapped out, its implementation should be rather flexible in order to secure international competitiveness.

Considering the geopolitical location of the island and the current trend of regional cooperation, the Chinese and Japanese should be the primary target of efforts to attract people to Jeju. In this regard, Secretary General Francesco Frangialli of the WTO predicted last year that East Asia and the Pacific will become the world's second most visited region by 2020. He revealed WTO statistics showing that the Northeast Asia sub-region received 64 million international visitors in 2000. It has also been a widely held view among specialists that more than 10 percent of the entire Chinese population of 1.26 billion and most Japanese has international standard purchasing power. Taking into account this trend, ways to sustain low prices, easy access and fluent linguistic knowledge of Chinese and Japanese should be actively explored. But a main focus on English should be maintained in order to follow the precedents of Hong Kong and Singapore, especially in this era of globalization. In regards to ambitious plans for the convention industry, it should be well heeded that Hainan in southern China, since February 2001, has already kicked off the Boao Forum for Asia. This has been seen as an Asian version of the Davos Forum in Europe. In this respect, there should be great emphasis on measures to distinguish activities in Jeju, including the South-North Peace Center, from the Boao Forum.

Furthermore, in parallel with the implementation of farming reforms, ways to raise the income of the residents and to absorb a surplus labor force at the same time should be pursued. In the case of agricultural products, specialized farming methods should

be a solution. In connection with schemes for the promotion of financial, logistics and knowledge-based industries, there are two possible avenues in pursuing a solution to the lack of labor. One way would be education, and the other attracting a necessary workforce from outside the island. In view of the lack of educational institutions, including vocational schools and research institutes, programs for the education of professional human resources should be pursued on an urgent basis. This will be a comprehensive way to raise standards of living on the island.

Above all, if Jeju really wishes to transform itself into a free international city, a strong public desire for this and consistency in implementing such a policy will be vital. The island needs to overcome the traditional confrontations of a divided public opinion. This is a great chance for Jeju to embrace the future and secure a strong position in the formidable tide of globalization, liberalization and market opening. Jeju should embrace new ways of thinking and adopt a posture geared towards a positive and outward-looking future. Now is the time to rise to the challenge.

Assigned tasks for achieving successful promotion of Jeju Free International City

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I. Introduction

The Special Act on Jeju Free International City (hereinafter, referred to as the "Special Act") was enacted on April 1, 2002, along with the consolidation of the enforcement ordinance of the Special Act and the amendments of related laws such as the Enforcement Ordinance on the Limitation on Taxation Exemptions. Thus, the legal basis for developing the Jeju Free International City has been prepared. However, having seen the delay of the establishment of the Jeju Free International City Development Center (hereinafter, referred to as the "Development Center"), which would act as a center for developing the free international city, with seven major representative tasks, and having seen governmental spending, including the budget for the operation of the Development Center dramatically reduced, it is becoming

apparent that the Jeju Free International City is facing difficulties even from its inception.

Yet the situation is even more of a predicament. Relevant laws that were amended in order to create various kinds of investment incentives and supporting systems, originally planned only for Jeju Free International City, were to be applied to the other domestic areas. The combined Economic Advisory Meeting and Economic Policy Coordination Meeting held on January 4, 2002 decided, through the blueprint to materialize a Northeastern business-centered country, that Yeongjong Island, Song Island and Kimpo reclaimed land would be developed into special economic districts that would concentrate on international logistics, business and finance. Incheon International Airport and Busan and Gwan-gyang Harbors would be focused on the logistics of Northeast Asia. Jeju is confronted with strong contrary wind even before commencing. In other words, Jeju must survive competition not only with other domestic free areas but also with existing oversea free international areas like Hong Kong, Singapore, Okinawa, and Podong in Shanghai. Although the original plan had in mind the development of a northeast Asian trade, logistics, and finance-centered city, the situation calls for changing the direction and strategies of the development of Jeju's free international city plan.

If the only merits that Jeju Free International City exist only in name or disappear, I am afraid that it might discourage Jeju residents who, despite the inferior economic foundation and infrastructure of the area, have been striving to prepare innovative strategies for local development, have given strong support to the

central government. However, since the other areas do not have legal and systematic bases for developing their cities into special economic districts or logistical points yet, Jeju Free International City should strive for a differentiated strategy, based on its comparative advantages, in order to survive the competition, together with efforts to maximize the effects of its current position. At the same time, plans to mobilize Jeju provincials' cooperation and capabilities should be discovered and taken advantage of alongside cooperation from the government.

II. Tasks to Promote Plans for the Free International City Successfully

1. Striving for differentiated strategies for the Free International City: integration with the strategy, the "Island of World Peace"

Article XII of the Special Act provides the grounds for designating and developing Jeju Island as an island of world peace. Both the "Island of World Peace" and "Free International City" strategy suggests a very important vision and direction in regards to Jeju's future and development. Accordingly, the development of Jeju Free International City can be differentiated from those of the other areas by associating and integrating the two strategies mentioned above. First of all, as a peace and development strategy to be practically implemented, the first step is to

fully review the meaning of the island of world peace strategy, in regards to a Jeju development strategy.

First, the island of world peace plan aims to suggest an ideological direction that the life and development of Jeju can take in the long term. "Peace," originally meaning a state without opposition or conflict can be defined in another way, as a state where harmony among actors is realized. So, "Jeju Island of World Peace" means allowing Jeju to achieve sustainable development, to pursue harmony between nature and human beings, to enable Jeju to be a point of exchange through harmony among the localities and the world, and to create a welfare community where opposition and conflict among the provincials are overcome, and where basic human living rights are guaranteed. This is the development idea that Jeju is mainly following and communicates with that of the free international city as well.

Second, the island of world peace has great significance as an action plan that enables the status of Jeju to be recognized by the world. While contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world, Jeju can become a stronghold of international exchanges and cooperation, based on its geopolitical location and peaceful image. Through this plan, Jeju, taking advantage of its status of being a point of international exchanges and cooperation, will contribute to local peace and development and consequently, harmonize and maximize its own and international common interests.

In order to turn Jeju Island into an island of peace and activate peaceful cooperation, we should establish a Jeju world peace

foundation or a South-North peace center that would take charge of executive functions such as policy development, planning, regulation and support, which is necessary for promoting related businesses as well as researching theories on peace thoughts and peace movements. It is known that Jeju is currently promoting the establishment of the South-North Peace Center as a peace foundation.

Jeju Island also needs to establish and hold international conferences on peace and actively draw other related international conferences to the island so that it can be recognized as an island of peace by the whole world. Especially, attracting the Northeast Asia Peace Conference and conferences on regional security will activate the tourist industry and further contribute to exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea and a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula. The Jeju Peace Forum is currently being held for this expressed purpose.

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is one of the representative consultative bodies at the non-governmental level relating to multilateral security dialogues, while the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED), suggested by Korea, is a governmental organization. In order for the Jeju Peace Forum, which is now driven by private experts, to become a forum covering non-governmental security dialogue at the same level as NEACD, contribute to the initiation of NEASED, and moreover, play a role in NEASED itself, legal and systematic basis must be extended. To do so, the Jeju Peace Forum should begin concentrating on the fields in which cooperation can be drawn and discuss them practically, by narrowing its range down to the

level of dialogues between civilians or governmental representatives from Northeast Asian countries.

Given the United Nations (U.N) Convention on the Law of the Sea, entered into force in November 1994, and a new order of the Law of the Sea based upon this, countries bordering the sea in Northeast Asia, such as Korea, China and Japan have been trying to set up their sea waters under its jurisdiction, looking after their own interests. Also, in relation to the establishment of exterior limits and boundary delimitations among surrounding countries, disputes over island domains, which had lain dormant, have started again. In particular, Northeast Asian sea area countries have proclaimed their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and concluded bilateral fishing agreements. An important political and diplomatic task must be undertaken to develop a common legal order and reasonable countermeasures to resolve opposition and conflict over the reorganization of the order of the Law of the Sea. Northeast Asian countries bordering the water should renew their recognition of the necessity for mutual trust and the construction of a cooperative system so as to lead the 21st century into an age of the sea or of the Asia Pacific. They should make efforts to construct a peaceful order of the sea by making the most of the process of reorganizing the order of the Law of the Sea, which follows the effectuation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. And, based on the new order, they have discover a system of peace and cooperation for the Northeast Asian sea area.

Considering the existing political and ideological differences among Northeast Asian sea area countries, there is not much

possibility for it, despite the great importance of the construction of a system of Northeast Asian security cooperation. However, now that the peace and security in the Northeast Asian sea area would easily collapse through disputes over island dominium and marine resources jurisdiction, the most contentious parties in marine disputes are required to build mutual confidence in advance and reduce armaments, in order to decrease the possibility of disputes occurring and escalating to military collisions.

Accordingly, the countries surrounding the Northeast Asian sea area must begin consultations for building a cooperation system under which they could jointly conduct the management and preservation of fishing resources, discuss issues regarding the preservation of the marine environment, conduct marine science research, and resolve and prevent disputes peacefully. Because Korea, China and Japan are all preparing individual fishing agreement systems amongst each other, now it is time to positively examine the establishment of a Northeast Asian marine community from a long-term perspective, by extending and reorganizing the systems into multilateral fishing agreements and by trying to establish a comprehensive marine cooperation organization, which would perform functions of dispute settlement and environmental cooperation. As an action strategy, Jeju's Island of Peace plan and the Jeju Peace Forum could play leading roles in constructing this Northeast Asian system of cooperation and moreover, in the Northeast Asian community.

2. Strengthening incentives for domestic and foreign investments, and measures for investment disputes

The key strategy for promoting Jeju Free International City is to attract domestic and foreign investments. The Special Act provides various types of methods to induce investments in relation to this. However, it is true that the taxation and financial incentives as provided in the Special Act are less sufficient than expected. Especially, the tax benefits for foreign investments in Jeju Free International City have been reduced. Compared to the incentives provided by the central government in accordance with the existing law, this contradicts the original purpose of developing the free international city through innovative attraction of investments. It is noteworthy that China, a major competitor, has a more inclusive tax benefits system for its free international areas. The current tax benefits system for Jeju Free International City could work against the positive inducement of foreign capital.

Given that economic purchasing power or back markets have not been sufficiently composed, tax benefits policies and financial support policies for the free international city are key factors for the investment inducement policy. Accordingly, an innovative taxation incentive allowing a tax rate at the level of a tax break should be given in relation to foreign investments into free trade zones or investment promotion districts, such so that Jeju can compete with existing free areas, including Hong Kong and Singapore.

In addition, in connection with the "Special Zone System of

Vessel Registration," the corporation tax to be imposed on international vessels registering in the open ports within the Jeju area needs to be reduced in order to attract more international vessels that register and establishment of offices of ocean traveling ship companies in Jeju. And, if the main reason that domestic shipping companies are performing a "flag of convenience" is not only because of tax incentives but also because of financial benefits and with a view to avoiding strict standards of operation and safety, only the incentives specified in the current Special Act put limitations on the effects expected from the Jeju Special Zone of Vessel Registration. So, various types of inducement measures, including innovative financial support for ocean-going ship companies, should be prepared.

Meanwhile, as one of the financial support measures stipulated in the Special Act, in relation to the formation of a science technology complex or the designation of an investment promotion district, the Development Center shall finance the purchasing cost of a site to be rented by corporations moving in, or reduce the land rent. But, more legal ground authorizing the Development Center to do individual negotiations in relation to financial support for investors should be prepared for the more positive inducement of investments. As an objective evaluation criterion considering the practicability of an investment, the necessity for an investment in an underdeveloped area and the expected effects on local economies, the Development Center should make a checklist regarding incentive allowance so that it can independently decide on the necessity to give incentives. The allowance of

incentives through individual negotiations will enable us to deal with investment inducement flexibly, to collect related information on certain industries by closely examining investment plans, and to double the effects of the investment inducement for balanced development of areas. However, an ex post facto evaluation system for financial support through individual negotiations should be introduced, and the managerial systems of local self-governing organizations should be strengthened.

In connection with the inducement of foreign investments, an important matter to be considered is whether investment contracts between the Development Center or Jeju Island and a foreign investor can also be understood as a contract relation between the country (government) and the foreign investor. It is directly connected to the matter of whether a local self-governing organization or a juridical corporation having characteristics of a public enterprise can be a party of an international contract. Regarding this matter, a view has been posited that a local self-governing organization can be free to conclude non-binding agreements in commercial businesses with a foreign local self-governing organization or a foreign company. However, since it is not feasible for a foreign investor to invest in a free international city based on a non-binding agreement, Jeju Island and the Development Center need to be authorized to conclude binding contracts or agreements in relation to the inducement of foreign capital through the Special Act.

There are many cases where foreign investments are protected by "investment protection agreements between countries. Problems

related to investment agreements" between countries to protect foreign investors are also likely to rise in the case of Jeju Free International City. Disputes over the application and interpretation of these agreements can occur. This kind of dispute is generally solved by favorable discussion or diplomatic negotiation. If it is impossible, various types of international arbitration procedures are undertaken.

In connection with an investment dispute between a foreign investor and a country, the dispute is regarded as one between the two countries, even if the country of the investor attempts to give diplomatic protection. Generally, home countries' diplomatic protection measures for investment corporations are exercised in relation to such measures as acceptance or confiscation by the governments. However, it is not often exercised in general international commercial transactions and simple investment-related disputes. Additionally, considering the complicated composition of the ownership of a multinational corporation or an international corporation (MNEs or TNCs) which lead oversea investments today, cases which are subject to the exercise of diplomatic protection are difficult to identify, due to the difficulty in determining the investment corporation's nationality. Therefore, investment disputes between a foreign investor and a country or a local self-governing organization will likely be the central problem.

In principle, disputes between a foreign investor and a country shall be solved primarily through such amicable ways as negotiation or discussion. However, in case a dispute cannot be settled by those means, it takes administrative relief steps or goes

through the judicial procedures of the country receiving an investment at the investor's choice, to the arbitration committee organized in accordance with the provisions of "the investment security agreement" between the countries. In the case where both the receiving country and the home country of the investor are parties to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States they are subject to the arbitration procedures of the ICSID (International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes) at the investor's or the receiving country's request,

A foreign investor may well prefer international dispute settlement procedures to the domestic ones of the receiving country. Even if an investment security agreement between the countries has not been concluded, the investor normally attempts to internationalize dispute settlement procedures to be used through an investment contract with the receiving country. In the case of international arbitration between an investor and a country, the arbitration can generally utilize arbitration procedures of the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) of the International Chamber of Commerce, those of ICSID, or the arbitration rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

As explained previously, international investment disputes proceed in complicated and various ways, and their solutions are the key matters regarding the protection of investors. Consequently, the Special Act needs additional provisions concerning the settlement of investment disputes, for the purpose of protecting investments by foreign investors in Jeju Free International City. As a rule,

investments by foreign investors need to be practically protected by guaranteeing the utilization of the international dispute settlement procedures, such as international arbitration to settle disputes between foreign investors and states and ensuring that those procedures are applied to disputes occurring at the execution stage of investments. Also, for the purposes of actively inducing foreign capital, provisions should be made for dealing with full compensation, in equal measure to those applied to natives, in the case of reception for public purposes and for losses by war and need.

3. Tasks assigned to the provincials for successful promotion of Jeju Free International City

1) Understanding strategies for free international cities

The Jeju Free International City strategy is intended for Jeju to actively strive for development tactics of internationalization, globalization, and localization. If internationalization, or globalization means opening up, the plan to make Jeju a free international city means to make Jeju open to international society and to let foreign people, goods and capital move freely in and out. However, if the real goal of Jeju Free International City plan is to create a creative, matured community that is integrated economically, socially and culturally by Jeju people's own hands, Jeju should autonomously establish and actively implement goals and policies for its development. To do so, Jeju people should understand the background and goals of the strategies and raise the capacity

required to actively participate in the process of implementing them. In particular, to meet the age of localization and the decentralization of power, government employees in the fields of local matters and policies must play a more active role and become more capable at handling policies.

The most preferred goal in promoting Jeju Free International City should be to achieve harmony of foreign cultures and Jeju's unique culture, and to promote the quality of Jeju people's lives through environmentally sustainable development, and to openly develop Jeju's identity. Jeju should try to make a society where all materialism is rejected and human values are respected. Also, Jeju people's simple and honest humanity and frugal lifestyle should be continuously maintained, and what's more, Jeju should be developed into a "welfare community" where spiritual and artistic values and human achievements are enshrined.

2) Acquiring positive support from the central government

The development of the free international city is promoted based on the Special Act and its enforcement ordinance. The central government should make efforts to efficiently develop Jeju Free International City by expanding and strengthening necessary administrative and financial support as well as these laws and ordinances. Especially, as it was decided to establish a development center to take full charge of free international city development, as an affiliated organization of the central government. It is not saying too much that the success and failure of the development depends upon the central government's willing support, considering

that the development of Jeju Free International City is a strategy for local and national development that raises national competitiveness at the same time. Therefore, Jeju Island needs to persistently and by all means focus on acquiring the attention of and support from the government. Moreover, it must try to expand the province's authority over the development of the free international city by enlarging its autonomy. This autonomy will thus serve as the base upon which a mutually complementary and cooperative relationship between the central government and Jeju local government should be built.

3) Raising the capacity for local management and acquiring legitimacy of policies through participation by the people

The most important thing in promoting the development of Jeju Free International City is to raise local management capacity and the leadership of the heads of the self-governing bodies in Jeju, including the provincial governor. At the same time, building democratic leadership by guaranteeing participatory democracy should be one of the necessary tasks for a local development strategy of the 21st century. Especially, based on the past experiences, we must realize that reducing confrontation and conflict between the province and people or among people, through residents' participation is crucial. The administration must now embrace grass-roots localization, which must be based upon legitimacy acquired by residents' agreement. Thus, collecting and coordinating residents' opinions and public consensus through local councils, together with policy-making based on people's opinions and a

democratic administration headed by self-governing bodies form a significant aspect of this. While various claims and opinions from the residents should be sufficiently reflected in local councils, conflicts of interest or public complaints should be settled by this political process.

Various actors in civil society are requested to play an important role in the process of localization. Civic and social groups, together with residents, should always pay attention to local issues and actively consider those problems. This becomes possible only when they accustom themselves to democratic processes, which involves acquiring the necessary knowledge for recognizing and solving local issues and problems together with the local government and public servants, and discussing and negotiating through sound dialogue to reach acceptable agreements. Through this process, they can efficiently and legitimately achieve policy promotion for the free international city.

4) Heightening international awareness in government employees and Jeju people

The plans for Jeju Free International City inevitably involve opening, pluralism, and growing interdependence. Internationalization strategies demand increased competitiveness of the area and its people and increasing the capacity for receptiveness. The age of globalization and the reality of the current international society require localities to autonomously take on the roles of main actors in international relations and international cooperation. To efficiently promote the Jeju Free International City strategy,

government employees in charge of the administration need to maintain an open and active awareness that will foster their own participation in international exchanges and lead to internationalization and globalization. They should seek a worldly wise attitude and an ability to utilize information. They should develop their language skills, which promote the mutual understanding needed while keeping company and conducting exchanges with foreigners, and when guiding and providing information for them when they visit Jeju Island for sightseeing, investment and economic activities.

Jeju residents must also develop and internalize a cultural awareness and must become capable of understanding and accepting foreign practices and cultures with a generosity of spirit. Because international exchanges and trade in the age of internationalization will be led by private groups and corporations and residents, all of them are urged to increase their abilities in order to more actively play their required roles, as citizens of a free international city.

5) Globalizing and generalizing the local culture

The gravest concern in promoting strategies for Jeju Free International City is the weakening of Jeju's identity and the possibility of the quality of its culture changing. However, it seems that the strategies could allow various cultures of the world to coexist, as Jeju Island will have become the vanguard for globalization and the spreading of its local culture. Interactions among those cultures would life the quality of Jeju's culture. Accordingly, one of the island's tasks by all means is the

globalization and generalization of the culture by conserving and cultivating its own local culture.

The globalization and generalization of consciousness and culture in the age of internationalization and globalization does not mean unabashedly accepting other areas or foreign cultures without keeping one's own consciousness and culture or denying a sense of self-respect and identity. Rather, it means keeping in check narrow-minded and exclusive thoughts and behaviors. It requires the people to have pride, maintain their tradition and culture, and to take it to a higher level.

6) Strengthening international exchanges and cooperation among local self-governing organizations

The current trends of internationalization, globalization and localization require raising the roles of the local and private sectors, which has also the reason behind promoting localities to be information-oriented. Localization means that cities or localities become the main actors in creating initiatives for localities and international exchanges, while the central governments are no longer monopolistic actors. International exchanges carried out together by localities and private sectors correspond to the trend of globalization, in the sense that citizens all over the world voluntarily conduct exchanges with each other as members of the human community. This goes beyond the classification or discrimination of countries, and they can ultimately contribute to human beings' development and the realization of universal values.

It is true that in Korea's case, international cooperation and exchanges have mainly been handled by government employees in charge of foreign affairs, or experts in relevant administrative departments and offices. However, the private sector, consisting of private corporations and civic groups, including cities and local self-governing organizations, has come to actively take part in international exchanges and cooperation, as society becomes more pluralistic and the aspects of civil society increases. The activation of international exchanges and cooperation performed by local self-governing organizations could be complimentary to diplomatic activities held at the governmental level and strengthen national competitiveness. In the end, it will bring a more strengthened global civil society that transcends national differences.

Jeju's island of world peace and free international city strategies can be regarded as the desire that provincials and the authorities of Jeju Island have for creating a community of peace and welfare. They need to actively respond to the tasks that the age of internationalization and localization have assigned us. Therefore, for local development and initiatives, these strategies require Jeju Island to develop itself as a point of international exchange and cooperation.

Issues Concerning the Success
of the Jeju Free International City
- Based on its Status as a Spearhead
of Korea's Open Door Economy

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The Special Act on the Free International City was enacted on April 1, 2002 which was just 10 days ago. Jeju Island is now officially ready to launch the establishment of the Free International City, while the fourth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting, another new multilateral trade agreement after the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement declared the Doha Development Agenda in November 2001. In other words, the world has entered the phase of infinite competition in the 21st century, with Jeju Island entering into this world competition as a spearhead of Korea's open door economy. Therefore, the success or failure of the Jeju Free International City is not only a regional problem, confined to Jeju Island. It will put the national economy to the test and will also be a key to defining the destiny of Korea's national economy, a country leaping to the task of

becoming an economically developed country after overcoming the financial crisis.

The reasons why there are still many worries and expectations even at this moment when the Jeju Free International City Special Law has been already enacted reflect how important the Jeju Free International City is and how many issues it has to deal with. Now when the "ship" of the Jeju Free International City has been launched from a harbor to the sea of the world, the key to a successful journey is that we have to muster all of the nation's and Jeju's strength together. In this perspective, here I would like to propose some recommendations for achieving the successful building of the Jeju Free International City.

First, we need to establish a systematic alliance between the central government and Jeju Island. As I stated before, the Jeju Free International City is a national issue which will test whether or not the Korean economy can achieve a developed country status and is also a regional issue concerning the economic development of Jeju Island. Therefore, the central government should promise to give active and continuous support. On the other hand, Jeju Island should make concessions and be patient when necessary for the efficient establishment of the Jeju Free International City. Considering this as a test measuring and evaluating whether Korea can secure its own competitive edge as an open international country in this age of infinite competition, the state should not hesitate to support the Jeju Free International

City. At the same time, Jeju Island should focus on mutual interests rather than regional egoism and a focus only on short-term interests.

Second, the continuous benchmarking of similar cases and models is needed. Regions with similar environments to Jeju Island such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Okinawa have started to build their Free International City models earlier and have now developed to some extent. Therefore, in order to make the success of the Jeju Free international City more viable, we need to analyze not only factors for success but also for failures through the continuous benchmarking of those regions. In other words, the Jeju Free international City can be successful only if Jeju Island finds a way of developing characteristics that can be differentiated from other competitors, through accurate benchmarking. In order to do this, a good approach would be having exchanges and cooperation through joint studies, seminars, and workshops with the other model cities in the region.

Third, we need to implement active public relations (PR). The purpose of establishing the Free International City is to provide a place where mutual exchanges can take place with an international view beyond a regional scope. Therefore, it is necessary to implement aggressive overseas PR and advertisement strategies to draw investment and participation from multinational corporations. At the same time, we also need to implement efficient public relations strategies. For, in order to build the Free Inter-

national City successfully, it is mandatory to have the participation and understanding of the citizens on Jeju Island. Without these kinds of aggressive public relations strategies, it is very likely that the Jeju Free International City will become a big feast with few guests.

Fourth, the anticipated benefits of establishing the Free International City should be shared with all the citizens on Jeju Island and we need to prepare institutional systems. As a matter of fact, because the design of the Free International City is focused on the tourism and service industries, there is a possibility that the primary industries, including mandarin farming will be isolated. Therefore, it is necessary to some extent to prepare support plans for people in the primary industry. Of course, according to the existing special law, some portion of the profits from the development centers can be used to assist regional farming and fishing funds. However, more support plans have to be designed in the near future, with some of the profits going towards the alienated classes, such as the low-income and handicapped sectors of Jeju society.

These four preconditions are the basic concerns for the success of the Jeju Free International City. However, more issues will continuously arise while its establishment is in progress. For instance, some government officials suggested the idea that the investment area in Incheon share similar incentives with the Jeju Free International City. Meantime, some people argue that the

entrance requirement for foreign schools, which is defined in Jeju Island as three years of living experience in other countries, has to be equally applied to other regions in order to pursue the principle of fairness. However, these can be real threats to the success of Jeju Free International City.

Jeju Island does not have outstanding advantages in terms of logistics costs, geographical proximity, and social infrastructure, such as an international airport and harbors. It is obvious that under this situation, if other regions can also possess similar advantages as Jeju, it will be difficult finding the significant value of Jeju Free International City. Therefore, the central government should remember that the Jeju Free International City is taking on an important role as a spearhead not only of regional concerns but also of the entire nation, as an open international country in the near future. If the central government would like to provide benefits to other regions in pursuit of a balanced development strategy, it should consider different kinds of benefits to other regions. That way, both Jeju Island and other regions will not fail but be prosperous together.

Suggestions for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment and Extending Tax Free Liberalization Standards on Jeju Island

Gil-Hyun Lee
Chairman, the Jeju Tourism Association

I. General Outline of the Jeju Free International City Development

1. Background of Promoting the Free International City

Jeju, an island located in a geographically strategic location, is blessed with a good environment and natural tourist resources, essential qualifications for becoming the hub of Northeast Asia. There had been six comprehensive construction plans in total, including the "Comprehensive Construction Plans of Jeju Island" in 1964, for building basic infrastructure including an airport, roads, and tourist sites. However, in the process of emerging as an international tourist destination, Jeju Island faced many problems, such as varying types of development stagnation in the tourism industry, language barriers, and insufficient price competitiveness.

Although there were four trial attempts to promote Jeju Island as a Free International City, none were successful. However, under the Kim Dae-jung government, a comprehensive development plan was established in order to develop Jeju Island as a "Free International City," taking advantage of the auspicious nature of Jeju and the infrastructure constructed in the past years.

2. Process of the Free International City

- Although, beginning in 1964, there had been several attempts by the island to promote itself as a Free International City, none of these were successful. However, taking President Kim Dae-Jung's announcement of plans for the development of the Jeju Free International City in 1998 as its momentum, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation implemented several research projects in September 1999, which focused on examining development feasibility and established a master plan for Free International City development in June 2000.
- In September 2001, the "Jeju Free International City Committee" was organized under the office of the prime minister and formed the "Jeju Free International City Planning Team" with staff members from 10 different departments.
- In December 2001, the Jeju Free International City Special Law was enacted.
- In March 2002, the Implementation Acts and Treaties were enacted according to the Special Law.
- Since April 1, 2002, plans for the Jeju Free International City

began implementation.

3. Chief Plans for Free International City Development

1) Institutional improvement and better investment environment for internationalization
- Providing investors with various incentives in order to attract more investments in the tourism industry of the Free International City by improving the management system of immigration for foreigners and introducing the system of the Jeju investment promotion area
- Introducing the "free trade and special treatment zone" in order to provide better infrastructure for the manufacturing industry and logistics industry in Jeju
- Building the "Jeju high-technology science complex" in order to promote the telecommunications industry and the bio-engineering industry with the efficient use of natural resources in Jeju Island
- Paying more attention to English services and education, creating educational environments for internationalization, and building infrastructure for becoming a center of finance and logistics

2) Improving policies to attract domestic and foreign tourists
- Introducing the system of "Duty Free shopping for domestic tourists" which exempts domestic tourists from taxation on specific purchased products
- Expanding the construction of golf courses and cutting down

the prices
- Activating leisure business through expanding accommodation facilities
- Making all efforts to lower the cost of tourism through management rationalization and controlling excessive competition in the tourism business

4. Seven Guiding Projects

The seven guiding projects are based on the principal outline that development should be financed by domestic and foreign private investors with a concentration on the tourism and leisure industries. Considering the characteristics of a free international city, the scale of projects, timing, and methods should be embodied through detailed feasibility research.

1) Developing leisure activity residential areas
Leisure residential areas, targeting domestic and foreign persons in the aged group with high incomes, that can provide integrated services including residence, leisure, and medical care areas should be established. In Yeraedong of Seogwipo, designs are being made for a leisure residential area to be built on a 226,800m² (68,000 pyong) site at a cost of 550 to 600 billion won. It would provide two main facilities such as a residential area including condominiums and country houses and leisure facilities including golf courses, medical facilities, commercial facilities, and sports centers.

2) Enlarging the Chungmun Tourism Area

For the purpose of building a multi-leisure complex representing Jeju Island, a Chungmun Tourism Area site has been chosen in Chungmun, Seogwipo, on 101,180m² (30,000 pyong) of land, with the cost expected to be around 200 to 300 billion won. It would include main facilities such as retail shops, restaurants, commercial resort centers, a world-class aquarium, and a sea exhibition hall.

3) Developing a beautiful harbor for tourism in Seogwipo

With the aim of developing Seogwipo harbor while making it harmonious with its surrounding environment, we can develop this harbor into a tourism site that provides leisure areas.

4) Building a high-technology science complex

Jeju aims to build a high-technology science complex, providing accommodation for multiple areas such as education, studies, and backup support for starting enterprises, For instance, bioengineering research can be conducted with the best use of rare, living, natural resources and clean environments in Jeju. The complex plans to be built on 446,833m² (135,000 pyong) of land, with an expected cost of around 400 to 500 billion won. Major amenities such as bio-engineering facilities, agriculture research institutes, foreign schools, international schools of hotel management, training centers for business start-ups, commercial centers, call centers, and residential facilities would be built.

5) Building a free trade area around the Jeju International Airport

For the purpose of fostering the processing and exportation of primary and high technology products and creating a platform for air logistics industry development, we should build a free trade area around the Jeju International Airport. This area would be constructed on a 436,400m² (132,000 pyong) site and is expected to cost around 200 to 250 billion won. Major facilities such as manufacturing/processing facilities, cargo storage centers, refrigerated storage facilities, office buildings, and duty free shopping facilities will be built.

6) Developing shopping outlets

For the purpose of promoting the shopping-based tourism of domestic and foreign visitors, especially Chinese tourists, we should develop shopping outlets. We have plans to build an outlet on 200,000m² (60,000 pyong) of land, with an expected cost of around 30 billion won. Major facilities that will be built in this area are shopping centers, principal products shops, fast food and other restaurants and a parking lot.

7) Creating Ecology, Myth, History Parks

By making theme parks representing the ecological and cultural values of Jeju Island, we can promote tourist products unique to Jeju. These theme parks would be built on a site covering 4,900,000m² (1,480,000 pyong), costing roughly 100 to 150 billion won.

II. Attracting More Foreign Direct Investment

In order to develop the Jeju Free International City, it is essential to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) and extend the standards of duty free liberalization.

1. The Concept of Foreign Direct Investment

- "An activity of expressing continuous interests in a corporation located in another country by a corporation or an individual investor who would like to keep long-term relations with investment recipient corporations and play an important role in the process of management." (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1999)
- Foreign investors participation in management activities by possessing more than 10% of the total stocks or equities in order to be involved in decision making processes and establish sustainable economic relations. Or long-term loans of over 5 years from an overseas parent company of foreigner-investing corporations or another corporation which shares equity with the parent company. (Foreign investment promotion law 2.4)
- This FDI must be differentiated with FPI (Foreign Portfolio Investment) in buying foreign stocks, bonds, and other securities in order to increase profit rates or diversify risks.
- For Jeju Island, FDI plays an important role not only as a part of investment resources for new industry development but also

as a motivator for developing the free international city in a long-term perspective.

2. Expected Effect of Foreign Direct Investment

1) Contribution on Economic Growth

- One of the most important motives for attract foreign direct investment is that FDI will have a positive effect by helping to increase the national income level.
- From the empirical analysis of 68 countries around the world in 1998, Eduardo Borensztein explained that FDI is more influential than investment from domestic investors and did not discourage domestic investments.
- In fact, a dollar increase in FDI brings the positive effect of more than a dollars worth in investment. Therefore, an increase in FDI will have a positive effect on establishing the total fixed assets in the recipient country and increase the labor productivity as well.
- In 1997, a related finding by Balasubramaniam demonstrated that FDI has a positive influence, especially in the case of countries with export-driven economic structures and high quality labor forces.

2) Employment Opportunity Effect

- FDI brings both direct and indirect employment opportunity effects to recipient countries.
- We should help foreign investment corporations establish legal

enterprises such as factories and recruit local employees for manufacturing and management so as to increase employment opportunity as a direct effect. At the same time, as an indirect effect, it would also provide more job opportunities for companies providing secondary materials or raw materials and logistics companies, regarding the distribution of the corporations final products.

- Encouraging foreign investing companies to hire more local employees by giving them certain tax incentives, if they hire a certain number of local employees according to the foreign investment promotion law.

 3) Inflow of advanced technologies and management resources
   from overseas

- FDI has horizontal and vertical expansion effects, meaning the transference of industrial and managerial technologies to recipient companies.
- In 1998, Findlay introduced the expansion effect, including advanced technologies, management skills, and marketing that foreign companies have already developed.
- Foreign investing companies can transfer advanced management and marketing skills. On the other hand, foreign investing companies can also encourage entrepreneurs and government officials to follow market economy principles and supplement any necessary systems for the efficiency of market functions.
- Domestic companies should maximize endeavors to improve their sales performance. FDI promotes economic growth through

marginal productivity increase in capital, confronting the pressures of increasing investments in order to develop technologies from the perspective of recipient countries,
- It may have a possible reverse effect on the development of domestic technology as a result of the influx of advanced technology and management skills from foreign countries.
- In the case that foreign investing companies rely on the parent company for their raw materials, it is difficult to build ties with domestic industries and minimizes the technology transfer effect.

3. Current situation of FDI in Jeju Area

1) Current situation of FDI in Jeju Area

At the end of 1996, there were only 19 cases of FDI, amounting to $230 million. However, at the end of 2000, the number increased to 47 cases, amounting to $1.146 billion, a six-fold increase from the previous figures.

<Table 1-1> Trend of FDI in Jeju Area

(Unit: million dollars)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Reported Amount	0	2,009	20	19	306
Realized Investment	232	2,165	1,176	1,153	1,458

Source: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Dec. 31, 2000)

<Table 1-2> Current FDI of Each Industry in Jeju Area

(Unit: million dollars)

	Number	Amount
Agriculture and Fishing	2	0
Mining and Manufacturing	4	1
Wholesale and Retail	0	0
Restaurant	5	2
Accommodation	21	1,340
Other Services	10	114
Total	42	1,458

Source: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Dec. 31, 2000)

<Table 1-3> Current FDI of Countries in Jeju

(Unit: million dollars)

	North America	Japan	China and Hong Kong	Taiwan	Others	Total
Amount	1,482.2	171.2	67.8	68.6	1.2	1,458.3
Number	9	20	8	2	3	42

Source: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Dec. 31, 2000)

2) Weaknesses of Jeju in attracting FDI

- Poor performance in attracting FDI and subsequent insufficient management
- Insecure investment rate of return
- Unrealistic incentive systems
- Insufficient incentives from local government

- Imbalanced industrial structure and insufficient horizontal relations among industries

4. Suggestions for attracting more FDI to Jeju Island

Beginning with the launch of the Jeju Free International City on April 1, 2002, many changes will occur, including the islands economic structure. FDI is essential to building a social infra-structure and environment that matches the size of the Free International City,

  1) Realization of strategies aiming at attracting investment
- Due to the development project covering three regional units and 20 tourism areas, the investment attraction strategy looks well implemented in terms of amount. However, it has not been realistic because a practical realization strategy for attracting external capital including FDI does not exist.
- Selecting the main projects according to the characteristics of each development area and implementing those projects with companies possessing the particular comparative advantages would be efficient. In order to do this, it is necessary to recruit professional investment experts and channels through which we can acquire information on relevant countries.

  2) Revision of Law and Institutions
- Due to the enactment of the foreign investment promotion law, it is true that the investment environment improved. However,

we still need to revise and improve the institutional management of foreign investment areas.

- Concerning foreign investment in Jeju's tourism industry, in order to reduce risks, it is necessary to implement foreign investment area rules only for those areas that are designated as investment areas in advance.

- According to the foreign investment promotion law, no area can be appointed as a foreign investment area unless a foreign investing company establishes a new legal entity. Therefore, it is difficult to provide any incentives for foreign investment by mergers and acquisitions. Though it might be temporary, we need to a certain extent consider providing tax incentives and minimizing reverse discrimination to domestic companies in favor of currently implemented tourism development projects or investments through mergers or acquiring existing companies.

3) Creating and Providing Differentiated Incentives

- In order to attract more FDI to Jeju Island, developing investment incentives that are differentiated from other regions or countries is required.

- Incentive rules on the tourism industry according to the Foreign Investment Promotion Law will expire by the end of 2001. Therefore, we need to develop various, systematic investment incentives.

- RSA (Regional Selective Assistance) and incentive packages in England, the frontier status of Malaysia, and ITA (Investment Income Tax Assistance) and a wide-range of tax advantages in

Singapore are good examples of other countries differentiated incentives. All these clearly show the close relationship between FDI attraction strategies and investment incentives.

- Recently, one of the biggest reasons why the amount of the real FDI inflow is much lower than the previously reported amount of FDI is that Jeju failed to provide the expected investment incentives, such as the delay of construction of casinos that would also admit domestic residents. Considering this fact, creating and providing new incentives is the most important factor of attracting FDI.

4) Improving the Business Environment
- In order to attract FDI, improving the business environment is as just as important as providing various incentives for foreign investors.
- It is essential to abolish corruption and eliminate the inefficient culture and practice of the public administration. Providing living facilities and managing investments afterwards are also important.
- Concerning the implementation of projects, it is more important than anything else to have better social infrastructure, such as an airport and harbor and make regional citizens, who lead the regional economy, to change their perceptions of foreign capital.

5) Searching for Better Funding Methods to Host Investment
The development project of the Free International City demands huge amounts of investment. In the meantime, the realization of

profits from investments will take a longer period of time. Therefore, we need to consider project-financing methods that can raise funds for the sake of future cash flow. Due to the fact that it is hard to finance the project with funds only from the public sectors, it is necessary to find ways of attracting private funds.

6) Reinforcing Public Relations to attract more FDI

In order to promote FDI, it is recommendable to create websites providing detailed information on Jeju's investment environment as well as inviting more people to conferences or meetings on development projects.

III. Suggestions for Expanding the Liberalization Standards of Tax Exemption

- Shopping facilities in Jeju Island are limited. There are only 13 registered souvenir shops and four duty free shops. The worldwide business of duty free shopping is being led by multinational corporations.
- The duty free shopping industry in Singapore is composed mainly of specialized duty free shops selling duty free products in the form of retailing businesses. Normally, the specialized shops are located in international airports, centers in the city, and some tourist sites.
- In order to attract the attention of both domestic and foreign tourists, it is necessary to develop strategies for expanding

shopping opportunities. In addition, for the maximization of the expansion effect, shopping facilities have to be located in places close to Chungmun, the airport, and tourist sites.

- In order to encourage domestic and foreign tourists to spend more for shopping in Jeju, it is necessary to build large shopping outlets and duty free shops that can provide a variety of products with good quality and expand the liberalization standards of duty free shopping.

1. Limit of Total Amount of Duty Free Shopping

- The total amount of duty free shopping is limited to $300 at one time per tourist (the tax law for exceptional limitation). Only under the condition of a maximum of four times a year and less than $300 each time, the government allows tourists to be exempted from taxes such as value added tax, special expense tax, and customs when they bring products out of Jeju. However, only one bottle of alcohol under $100 and less than 10 packs of cigarettes are eligible for tax exemption. In addition, when the total amount of a couples expense is over $ 600, they cannot be exempted. The way of purchasing duty free products is somewhat different from general shopping. Tourists receive exchange tickets instead of products at duty free shops. When they leave Jeju Island, they can exchange them for the purchased products at the airport or harbors.

2. Limitation of Shopping Products and Facilities

- The number of Chinese tourists visiting Jeju last year reached around 71,000. However, 60% of them stayed only one night or less and 20% of them were transit tourists. They left Jeju for Seoul or Busan because there are not many places for shopping on the island. Since these results bring negative effects to the local economy of Jeju, we need to build large shopping facilities such as a shopping outlet.

3. Shopping Outlets and Duty Free Shops for Domestic Residents

- According to the ideas currently discussed, shopping outlets and duty free shops for domestic residents can be classified into "afterward duty free shops" and discount shops. Tourists can receive refunds at the airport after purchasing products in the "afterward duty free shops". In discount shops, tourists can buy brand-name products at a discounted price. However, we do not have detailed plans about how much of the amount of shopping products will increase and how we will manage these shopping facilities. We have just decided to locate the shopping facilities far from the existing shopping area but do not have other detailed plans in terms of the location and sales items. We are negotiating between two ideas: formulating one independent company based in Jeju Island and inviting foreign companies that have strong logistic channels on the shopping

outlet construction.

- Though we are implementing research on similar companies in the U.S. and Japan, we still need to make detailed plans in terms of the location, size, and management of shopping outlets. There is a plan to differentiate it from the existing shopping areas in terms of items and location. However, there are still many worries.

<Table 1-4> Price Table of Foreigners Duty Free Shops

Brand	Product	Price (unit: $)		Brand	Product	Price (unit: $)	
		Minimum	Maximum			Minimum	Maximum
CHOPARD	Watch	1,900	8,200	LANCOME	Skin lotion	29	-
	Tie	84	100		Softener	36	44
	Perfume	50	-		Cream	37	109
	Scarf	180	224				
FERRAGAMO	Bag	300	500	BURBERRY	Belt	20	40
	Coat	500	1,000		Tie	82	-
	Belt	95	180		Scarf	160	190
	Scarf	130	190		Wallet	70	200
	Wallet	120	350		Clothes	60	1,100
	Shoes	250	680		Bag	250	350
	Clothes	135	1,000		Coat	600	700
CHRISTIAN DIOR	Tie	70	90	DUNHILL	Bag	120	1,300
	Scarf	100	200		Wallet	140	280
	Watch	500	1,500		Tie	90	-
	Bag	320	1,100		Scarf	180	220
	Wallet	70	250		Clothes	130	200

Source: Hanjin Duty Free shop (March, 2002)

- Since there is strict limitation on the maximum amount and items of duty free shops for domestic residents, some people argue that this system will not be very attractive to tourists. Besides, domestic brands might lose their market shares

because shopping outlets will sell domestic products together with famous brand foreign products.

4. Expansion of the Liberalization Standard of Duty Free Shopping

As I stated above, the maximum limit of $ 300 per tourist according to the tax special law seems unreasonable from the perspective of both companies and customers. From the perspective of companies, due to the maximum limit of sales volume and items, it is not favorable. On the other hand, this system will not be effective because it will discourage customers purchasing desire or drive them to use illegal means to buy more than the limit using the tax advantage, such as indirect purchasing. The <table 1-4> shows the price of major products from different brands. As this shows, tourists can only buy low priced products such as light clothes, belts, or ties. Marriage gifts or souvenirs from expensive brands cannot be made available within the duty free limit. For example, Christian Dior bags ranging from $320 to $1,100 and Burberry coats ranging from $600 to $700 are not available for the duty advantage that is currently applied to domestic residents. Therefore, it is desirable to extend the price limit up to $600 per tourist so that they can purchase at least two or three products in the middle or low price range. This can at the same time satisfy consumers desire and provide companies with more investment opportunities. In conclusion, the extension of duty free liberalization standard will satisfy consumers desire

to purchase a variety of products, produce an expansion effect to the local economy with more active purchasing activity, and encourage more investments by providing a better opportunity for investing companies.

What is Necessary for Successfully Building the Jeju Free International City
- Focusing on the Necessity of Revision and Enhancement

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The Jeju Free International City was implemented officially and because of this, Jeju has become a stronghold of Korea's economic open door policy. With the special law for the Jeju Free International City enacted and the master plan announced, the model outline of the Jeju Free International City was publicly released.

Building a development engine based upon international trade is necessary, due to the fact that Jeju Island is incapable of maintaining a self-sufficient economy. Therefore, promoting the Jeju Free International City as an actively open strategy is the right decision. However, there have been severe conflicts between the supporting group and the opposing group in Jeju, concerning the suggested Free International City model.

The Jeju provincial government and business sectors are showing strong support for the idea of the Free International City. They believe that building the Free International City is a development strategy through which the difficulties of the local economy can be solved in one sweep, leading the area to prosperity.

Meanwhile, agricultural sectors, labor sectors, the Jeju branch of the Korean Teachers' and Educational Workers' Union and some civic organizations are aggressively opposing this idea. They argue that the recommended model of the Jeju Free International City is simply an "illusion" through which neo-liberalist theories can be applied and tested on the island. The survival of Jeju citizens becomes totally dependent on the result of the implementation of the model. In other words, the model risks the very survival and rights of the island's citizens.

Under these circumstances, all the strength and support from the area are demanded in order to accomplish and proceed with the bilateral integration of both groups. In order to make sure that these strengths are effectively combined, the current model of the Jeju Free International City must be modified and supplemented according to the following points.

First, on the conceptual level, the concept of the Free International City for Jeju needs to be revised and improved, according to international standards. Unless this is done, the island will face limitations that will make the city be perceived as simply an

ordinary Free International City. The situation and model would also be enhanced if the development guidelines pursued the goal of helping Jeju become an international tourist destination.

The next step would be building more infrastructure and capacities required for development in areas such as financial investments, business, and so forth, so that Jeju Island can develop its unique Free International City model catered specifically to the island, or a so called "Jeju-typed" plan. In other words, a "Jeju-typed Free Tourism City" with total tourism and business capabilities would be the best option. It also means that, at the same time, we have to seriously consider the competitiveness of Jeju as a Free International City, that is, the effect of market predominance through differentiation. North East Asian free cities present severe competition in the race to become the base of an open economy. For instance, Hong Kong has already settled itself as a Free International City, Pudong in Shanghai is rising at an incredible speed that can be described as remarkably historic; Yeongjong Island in Incheon is being developed as an economic center for North East Asia and Tokyo is preparing its second leap into becoming an international financial base. Competing with these Free International Cities, it is not very likely that Jeju will achieve a good position in the fields of international logistics, international finance, and export of processed goods.

Therefore, the Jeju Free International City must be "Jeju-typed," as mentioned above. The Jeju Free International City is only

possible if Jeju builds complementary relations with other major international cities in North East Asia. In other words, Jeju must be developed as a resort city on par with the major international cities in North East Asia, such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei. This is the only way that the draft and outline of the Jeju Free International City could become concrete and establish appropriate development strategies. Otherwise, the Jeju Free International City model will become an ambiguous and imprecise plan. It is neither a Free International area nor a tourism leisure area. If that happens, Jeju will not be able to catch up with other competing international cities.

Second, on the ideological level, whereas the open door policy of the Jeju Free International City emphasizes the efficiency of the market economy, necessary cooperation among social factors is also critical in getting rid of the side effects of the market economy. As an alternative to this, we have to benchmark a "third way" plan that has been widely accepted internationally. We need to particularly draft benefit distribution policies and integration policies for the alienated classes of Jeju society which may be excluded during the process of developing the Jeju Free International City.

Development of the Jeju Free International City has to be designed to dialectically integrate its centrifugal force towards an open door policy and a centralizing force toward regional development. It must be based on innovative concepts and strategies

including a knowledge-based economy along with all the island's resources. At the same time, the model must be based on concepts and strategies through which mutual communication and convertibility between macro-scale discussions on the state, citizen, and market level and micro-scale discussions on the neighborhood, regional, and cultural levels are enabled. If so, an embracement policy establishing a winners' circle will become possible and the exclusion of isolated classes, such as primary industry employees will be avoided. For this, as a prerequisite condition, localization has to be positioned at the same level with globalism. "Production methods using the resources of Jeju within its natural environmental capacity and reflecting the local culture and tradition under the guidance and control of the local community" must be the starting point of the Jeju Free International City.

Third, on the procedural level, the development of the Jeju Free International City must place importance on acquiring the consensus and support of the local people, from the perspective of social settings, as well as policy achievements from the perspective of social engineering. Based on this idea, the Jeju Free International City has to include the opinions of opposing classes and reflect their ideas in the policy process. Furthermore, the system of procedure of the Jeju Free International City should not follow the current method led by the central government, but should be reorganized based on local divisions and cooperative leadership among the state, enterprises, and citizens. It has to be designed so as to place the central power concerning the development

of the Jeju Free International City in the island itself. However, in order to improve the efficiency of the procedure, we need to eliminate and restructure the local administration's system of hierarchy and create an innovative, local network that enables cooperative management with the market and civil society. Especially, local citizens can play a very important role in establishing this local network. In order to establish the Jeju Free International City successfully, local citizens need to build up the mindset and capacity of global citizens and actively participate and study local developments as key actors. In order to adjust to a more global society, the open door policy is indubitably an unavoidable choice. And if we have to open our doors, an active response is more desirable. In this perspective, the Jeju Free International City model is appropriate. However, an open door policy demands prudent selections and considerations. For, the open door policy may sometimes bring destruction to the region rather than prosperity, due to unwise selections and a lack of caution. Though the region may become prosperous, opening the floodgates may result in a policy that leads people to become poor, "rich slaves." In this perspective, I would like to argue that, most of all, the local open door policy aimed at joining the world's exchanges and economy should be based on an inside-out approach, where the benefits are localized.

Building the Jeju North-South Peace Center In Search of Peace and Common Prosperity

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I. Introduction

Jeju Island is undergoing major transformations at the beginning of the 21st century. It has taken bold steps towards globalization and new prosperity by enacting the Special Law on Jeju Free International City, which will be vital to the promotion of such strategic industries as tourism, trade, banking and finance, and education on the Jeju Island. Along with this, the Jeju Provincial government has been working hard to transform Jeju Island into an "Island of Peace." Peace and prosperity go together; prosperity cannot be achieved without first materializing the foundation of peace. It is against this backdrop that the Korean central government and the Jeju provincial government initiated the establishment of the Jeju North-South Peace Center with the suggestion of academic professionals.

Upon the legal basis laid by the Jeju Special Law, the Jeju North-

South Peace Center will be established as a world-class research institute with its pointed focus on peace studies. The Center will put no less effort on developing a world-wide network of scholars, policy-makers, and peace professionals. This work already got started by successfully holding an international conference in Jeju last spring, celebrating the first anniversary of the historic North-South Korean summit.

A joint team of Yonsei University and Cheju National University has been drawing up a project of establishing the Jeju North-South Peace Center in the framework of a cooperation agreement between the Jeju Provincial government and Yonsei University signed October 2001, and the final draft of the project is now ready. This paper is a summary version of the final draft, and reflects efforts thus far to build the center. The first section of the paper deals with the question of why a peace research institute should be established on the Jeju Island. The following section is devoted to suggesting organizational and managerial infrastructures of the center. The suggested main direction of research at the center is the subject of the next section. We turn in the last section to a ten-year master plan for the center's overall activity.

II. Historical and Theoretical Foundations of the Jeju North-South Peace Center

1. Why Peace Studies Now?

Since the collapse of the Socialist bloc, and with the end of the

Cold War on the global level, new security concepts have emerged. Conventional security based on symmetrical power and military confrontation became hardly tenable under the newly emerging global order. Conventional national security yields to people's security: besides the protection of national interests and global security, the focus is now being expanded to those threats to ordinary people caused by a variety of sources like disease, famine, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political oppression and environmental destruction. Major security concerns are directed away from military buildup toward the sustenance of life and dignity of mankind. People's security in particular calls for a renewed attention to the interconnectedness of security threats across the globe, earlier prevention of those threats, and human development through participation and solidarity. Domestic aspects of people's security include economic security such as guaranteeing a basic income, job, and rescue from poverty; food and health security; environmental security; personal and communal security; and political security. Internationally, threats to human security include the widening economic gap between rich and poor nations, the refugee problem, environmental contamination, cross-border crimes including drug trafficking, and, of course, international terrorism.

With the sharpened interest in human security, conventional military issues are being taken over by an array of issue areas such as the preservation of national identity, governing ideology, sociocultural values, protection of economic production and exchange, and ecological protection. With regard to the question of how to

gain security, attention is also being diverted from confrontational deterrence toward cooperative security. No less important than strength and power is bilateral or multilateral cooperation as a means of ensuring security. The concept of common security now encompasses not simply those with whom to ally, but also who to confront. If and when locked in the conventional conception of military security, we will hardly deal with, let alone solve, the newly emerging security issues and problems.

This is more so, as new forms of no less intense conflict and confrontation are taking over the old ones. They are on the horizon now, emanating from ethnic, religious, cultural, and even civilizational heterogeneity. Economic inequity on the global level is no less a concern to us, with the unprecedented rate of globalization. Famine and poverty, and relative deprivation due directly to unequal development deepen conflicts at local, national and international levels, often bursting into violent wars and clashes. In this context, nation states are no longer the sole major subject of violent conflicts. Ethnic and religious groups, as well as multiple nation states sharing a common religious or cultural heritage, are emerging as the new subjects of conflict with their intensity no less severe than those between nation states. The spread of chemical and weapons of mass destruction heightens the intensity of conflict. We already witnessed in the 9.11 terrorism, Kosovo, and other cases how intense and extreme the human tolls could be by these new types of conflict.

This alone urges more active and multi-faceted approaches to security and peace than ever before. Peace studies now ought to

stride into a new direction, accommodating the new forms of conflict and confrontation. These new developments call for diverting our attention from negative toward positive peace. While the former is defined by the absence of direct violence, the latter refers to actively building up the conditions for the liberation of mankind from political and socioeconomic alienation and oppression, as well as to the resolution of the direct use of violence. Positive peace in this sense implies peace-making and peace-building by preemptively eliminating potential sources of conflict and violence.

2. Why a Peace Research Institute on Jeju Island?

Jeju Island had long been a place of exile throughout Korean history. This historical tradition engraved the value of freedom and peace on the collective memory of the Jeju people and become the basis of a collective aspiration to freedom and peace. Jeju Island is traditionally known for the absence of beggars, thieves and gates to the individual's house, which symbol- ically demonstrates Jeju people's collective spirit and attitude toward peace and security.

After the liberation of the Korean Peninsula from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, however, Jeju Island had fallen a victim to the newly emerging global conflict. The ideological conflict and confrontation on the global level penetrated deeply into the Korean Peninsula down to Jeju Island, culminating in the tragedy of the 4·3 "revolt", even before the outbreak of the Korean War. The 4.3 tragedy was indeed a reflection and an embodiment of

the multi-layered structure of conflict, all the way up to the international level and down to the local level. By living this tragic history, the Jeju people have learned by heart the preciousness of peace, which becomes a strong backbone of support for the establishment of a peace institute on the island. Given this historical backdrop, it is far more than symbolic to establish a research institute devoted to peace studies on the historical site of alienation and conflict of the Korean Peninsula, which is the last place on earth where the old ideological and military confrontation is still kept alive between North and South Korea.

Reflecting this historical fact and reality, Jeju has been a site of a series of summit meetings since the Gorbachev and Roh Tae-Woo summit in 1991, each of which turned out to be a critical juncture in international peace-building. Among those who visited Jeju include Bill Clinton and George Bush of the United States, Jiang Zemin of China, Hashimoto, Obuchi and Nakasone of Japan. Between April 1991 and September 2001, the number of visits to Jeju Island by former and current top national leadership amounts to thirteen. In the summit between Bill Clinton and Kim Young-Sam in 1996, four-way talks were proposed as a way of reducing tension and settling peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Geo-economically, Jeju Island is strategically located at the heart of Northeast Asia, whose economy has been at the forefront of global economic growth for the past fifty years. Jeju lies at the geographic center of an emerging Northeast Asian economic trading bloc comprising Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. It also takes advantage of a huge population base within

close proximity, including five cities with more than ten million people within two-hour's flying time and eight cities with more than three million people. There are over fifty cities with more than one million residents within three-hour's flying distance. This geo-economic position testifies to Jeju's potential as a new regional center in communication, trade and transportation. Jeju Island, as a world-class tourism site, boasts of advanced infrastructure well fitted for a regional economic center, which includes an international airport, thirteen sea ports, 2,800km-long paved roads, advanced electricity supply and communications system, six universities and colleges, and an international convention center under construction with advanced equipments and facilities.

Strong support from the Korean central government is an immediate medium that brings this huge potential to the surface. Based on the promise made in the 1997 presidential campaign, President Kim Dae-jung has been implementing his promise to turn Jeju into an international peace island. In January 2000, the government promulgated a special law on Jeju development, in which the central government's administrative and financial support in this direction is clearly enunciated. Article 52 of the law stipulates the establishment of a research institute dedicated to international cooperation, as well as the attraction of international organizations and conferences for peace and cooperation to the Island. The special law was revised as the Special Law on Jeju Free International City in December 2001. In February 2001, the New Millennium Democratic Party established the Policy Planning Group for Jeju Free International City, which is engaged in

developing concrete policy measures. In September, under the cabinet the Steering Committee for Jeju Free International City was established, headed by the Prime Minister and Planning Board for Jeju Free International City, which is composed of related govern- mental agents from over ten departments and offices. All this testifies to the serious commitment by the Korean government, culminating in the formulation of the Basic Plan for Jeju Free International City. The Korean government says it will spend $3.6 billion over nine years to transform Jeju into a free international city that it hopes will surpass Hong Kong or Singapore. Jeju Island is indeed seen as an experiment and bridgehead for the wider opening and liberalization of the Korean economy, and the establishment of the Jeju North-South Peace Center is acknowledged as an important part of this grand project.

3. Mission of the Jeju North-South Peace Center

Under the ultimate purpose of building an Asia-Pacific peace community, the Jeju North-South Peace Center is committed to systematic research on conflict and peace at the global, regional and local levels. The Center aims at becoming an intellectual engine of peace, prosperity and integration by utilizing its research outcomes for state policies and peace education.

The "North-South" in the center's name has a dual meaning: first, it refers to the relationship between the rich and the poor as opposed to the old ideological confrontation between the East and the West. The widening economic gap between the rich and the

poor is emerging as a major source of international, regional and local conflict, the peaceful resolution and prevention of which should be our central concern now. Research activity of the Jeju North-South Peace Center is thus focused on closing the socioeconomic gap in search of common prosperity. Second, it also denotes the Korean question, namely, North-South Korean confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. The center will devote no less effort to peaceful resolution of the old confrontational structure and, based on the researches at the peninsula level, will further contribute to peace building on the regional and global levels.

The main activity of the Jeju North-South Peace Center is divided into four categories of research, education, publication and dissemination, and international networking. Peace research to which the Jeju North-South Peace Center will be committed is in the direction of:

Universal and comprehensive security - The center's research attention is extended from nation states to regional and international communities.

Positive, as well as negative, peace - The center's research focus on negative peace at the peninsula level develops into positive peace at the regional and global level.

Multiple tracks of peace studies and practice cooperative networks of peace-building are forged not only with governmental organizations, but also with civilian organizations and practitioners.

Peace-making and peace-building - A combination of theoretical, policy-oriented, and practice-oriented studies points towards peace-making and peace-building over and beyond peace-keeping.

Education is a no less important realm of the center's activity. Its educational activity will be targeted in the first place at policy-markers and governmental officials while the function of public education is taken up by the Summit House and the 4·3 Peace Park. Over a longer time span, however, its education function will be expanded to include international and regional students under a close cooperative relationship with local and national educational institutions. As for dissemination of the Center's works, electronic mediums, such as e-mail and website downloads, should be maximally utilized for efficiency purposes.

III. The Jeju North-South Peace Center: Organization and Infrastructure

1. Hardware

The center will be established in the Chungmoon Tourist Complex located in the city of Seoguipo. A 71,000 ft^2 building is planned on an eight acre plot of land, which will house both the center's main facilities and the Summit House. The Jeju North-South Peace Center's main research facilities are composed of research rooms for research staff, conference rooms, a library, a

computing center, and administrative offices, approximate space allotments of which are shown in <Table 1>.

<Table 1> Space composition of the Jeju North-South Peace Center

		Number of rooms	Unit size (ft^2)	Total size (ft^2)
Research rooms	Individual	30	300	9,000
	Common	5	300	1,500
Management	President	1	500	500
	Reception room	1	800	800
	Vice President	1	500	500
	Meeting room	1	1,000	1,000
	Rooms for the executive board members	5	500	2,500
Administration	General administration	1	1,000	1000
	International cooperation	1	1,000	1000
Library		1	1,000	1000
Library stacks		1	2,000	2000
Computing center		1	1,000	1000
Seminar rooms	Medium size	1	800	800
	Small size	5	300	300
Total		55		22900

2. Governance and Organization

The Jeju North-South Peace Center is organized as in <Figure 1>.

<Figure 1> Organization of the Jeju North-South Peace Center

An advisory Council will be composed of such prominent international figures who made a visit to Jeju for summit talks or contributed to international peace. The highest decision making body of the center is the Board of Governance that will consist of leading international scholars, policy-markers, diplomats and professionals in the field of peace research. While the Board of Governance makes strategic decisions regarding the center's direction of research and management, the Executive Board comprised of a President, Vice President and heads of each

division of the Center is in charge of operational management of the Jeju North-South Peace Center.

<Table 2> Composition of the Summit House

Space	Display items
Peace Hall	History of peace-building and peace studies Introduction of peace-related figures and organizations including Nobel Peace laureates
War Hall	History of war (local and international wars) Development of human conflict and confrontation The rise and demise of the Cold War Military buildup and its effects nuclear, chemical, and other mass destruction weapons
Summit Hall	Introduction of the summits who visited Jeju Agenda and achievements of the summit talks held in Jeju
Event Hall	Special events related to war, conflict and peace
Simulation Hall	Edutaining facilities and equipments
Other facilities	Warehouse Souvenir shop, book store, restaurant, etc.

The Center is divided into three bodies: research division, division of external cooperation, and administrative division. The Division of External Cooperation organizes conferences and seminars, operates educational programs and performs other public relations activities while the Division of Administration provides general administrative and supporting services, running the computing center and the library. The main function of the Summit House is public education, utilizing Jeju Island both as a renowned tourist resort and as a historic site for a series of summit talks and visits. By demonstrating the achievements of the summit talks, as

well as displaying thematic items related to war and peace, the Summit House will provide vivid education on peace for tourists from various parts of the world.

3. Budget Plan and Fundraising

<Table 3> Annual expenditure projection

	Ratio (%)	Amount (US $1,000)
Personnel	45	2,700
Research staff	20	1,200
Administration	25	1,500
Maintenance	25	1,500
Conference and project costs	30	1,800
Sum	100	6,000

The Center's potential financing sources are manifold: the Korean central government, the Jeju provincial government, interest revenues from its own Foundation (when established), project revenues, civilian support including grants and donations, and other revenues. For its initial founding period, heavy reliance on governmental financing will be inevitable. In order to enhance the center's independence of research and stability of operation, however, it is important to gradually reduce its reliance on governmental financing by diversifying financing sources. A long-term alternative to governmental financing is to establish the center's own foundation on the basis of grants and donations from various sources, including business, foreign governments and

international foundations. <Table 3> presents a very rough projection of annual expenditure of the Jeju North-South Peace Center when it begins to work normally. Project and conference financing should be sought from external sources from the beginning.

IV. Direction and Organization of Research

1. Research Inventory

For systematic research over time, we have devised a research inventory composed of three issue areas divided into four different levels of analysis as shown in <Table 4>. The columns of the table represent three programs of research on which the Jeju North-South Peace Center will concentrate its research efforts while the rows show a set of four analytical levels corresponding to each research program.

<Table 4> Research inventory matrix

Subject area / Levels Of analysis	Peace	Prosperity	Integration
Global	A	B	C
Regional	D	E	F
Korean Peninsula	G	H	I
Local Jeju	J	K	L

The Center's research programs are organized along the issue

areas of peace, prosperity, and integration. Each program is divided into multiple levels of analysis, and each cell **A** to **L** is filled with specific research projects, around which research teams are organized. The three-by-four matrix will serve as a long-term research pool of the Jeju North-South Peace Center, from which an annual research agenda will be selected. Utilizing this research inventory, the Center will be able to deal with a variety of research topics without losing its pointed focus on peace and common prosperity. <Figure 2> illustrates practical operations of the research inventory.

<Figure 2> Operation of the research inventory

Program (columns)+Level of analysis (rows)=Specific research projects

e.g.) Cell **G**: Peace + Korean peninsula = CBMs between North and South Korea
                                            Disarmament
                                            Peace treaty
                                            ...
e.g.) Cell **E**: Prosperity + region =   AMF
                                        Free trade zone
                                        ASEAN+three

2. Organization of Research

Research teams are flexibly organized along the detailed research projects selected from the research inventory. No permanent organizational borders divide research teams with a of Director of Research in charge of managing all three program areas. This will

not only ensure flexibility and integrity of research, but also facilitate interdisciplinary studies. In order to support this flexible mode of organization, it is important to maximally utilize the visiting and adjunct fellows system, while keeping the number of full-time research staff at minimum. We suggest that the full-time research staff should be around ten while no less a number of research positions be filled with visiting or adjunct fellows. <Table 5> shows the suggested composition of research and other staff of the Jeju North-South Peace Center.

<Table 5> Composition of research and other staff

Division	Number
Governance	President and Vice President
	Director of Research
	Director of Administration
	Director of External Cooperation
Full-time research staff	10-15
Visiting fellows	5-10
Adjunct fellows	5-10
Conference	5
Administration	10
Others	15 assistants
Total	55-70

3. Identity and Brand

By utilizing the research inventory suggested above, the Jeju North-South Peace Center should find a way to establish its own institutional identity, which will be characterized as a center of new peace studies at multi-levels of analysis. Specific projects will

facilitate this process of identity establishment. Current candidates for the center's research brands include:

Peace Index - statistical regional peace analysis currently under development by a team of Yonsei staff

Annual Peace Report - a qualitative version of the statistical Peace Index based on comprehensive regional peace analysis

Biennial Jeju Peace Forum - an international conference series by scholars, policy-makers and professionals already begun in 2000

Besides these brand projects, the Center will embark on a wide variety of publication and dissemination targeted at various audiences, which will include:

Newsletter - information newsletter about the Center's activity

Policy Briefs - policy-oriented analysis of current issues targeted at policy-makers

Working papers and monographs - project outcomes targeted at scholars and professionals

Quarterly journal - academic journal aimed to be listed in SSCI

Major publications of the center should be published in English and made available electronically at its web-site. Introduction of a subscription system on the basis of individual and institutional membership will facilitate wider dissemination of the center's publications.

V. Master Plan for the Jeju North-South Peace Center

In this section, we propose a five-stage ten-year development plan for the Jeju North-South Peace Center. Our point of discussion is on the major tasks to be accomplished in the given stage of development.

Stage 1: Preparation (Present - June 2003, the Second Jeju Peace Forum)

A steering committee should be set in motion to organize and manage the launching process, which will include organization of governing and executive bodies. The main tasks of these bodies include selection and recruitment of key personnel, preparation of the Second Jeju Peace Form scheduled for June 2003, budget planning, and selection of research projects for the initial period. The basic design of the Summit House is completed in this preparation period. Public relations works should also get started by launching the center's website and information newsletter.

Stage 2: Launching (June 2003 - Completion of construction)

Up to the point of the completion of the Center's construction, minimum research and administrative staff should be recruited to embark on research projects. Educational programs for the Summit House are developed by the center's research staff. A Library, computing center and other research supporting facilities are set

in place to back up normal research works.

<Table 6> Ten-year development plan

	Stage 1 (Present Jun. 2003)	Stage 2 (Jun. 2003 Construction)	Stage 3 (Construction Jun. 2005)	Stage 4 (Jun. 2005 Dec. 2008)	Stage 5 (Jan. 2009 Dec. 2011)
Research	- Selection of research staff	- Recruitment of research staff - Preparation of research projects	- Research projects - External financing of research projects - Peace Index, Annual Peace Report	- Outcomes of research projects - Peace Index, Annual Peace Report	- Mid- and long-term research projects - Project outsourcing - Peace Index, Annual Peace Report
Education	- Preparation of the Summit House	- Opening of the Summit House	- Public education through the Summit House - Professional education	- Public education through the Summit House - Professional education - Academic education	- Public education through the Summit House - Professional education - Academic education - Introduction of certificates and internship programs
Publication	- Newsletter	- Newsletter - Conference & seminar series	- Newsletter - Conference & seminar series - Policy briefs - Working papers - Monographs	- Newsletter - Conference & seminar series - Policy briefs - Working papers and monographs - Brand projects	- Newsletter - Conference & seminar series, Policy briefs - Working papers and monographs - Brand projects - Academic journal
Networking	- 2nd Jeju Peace Forum - Website launching	- Introduction of the membership system	- 3rd Jeju Peace Forum - International and domestic networking	- 4th Jeju Peace Forum - Expansion of international networking	- 5th Jeju Peace Forum - Alumni organization
Financing	- Governmental sources	- Governmental sources	- Establishment of own Foundation	- Diversification of financing sources	- Limited financial independence

Stage 3: Maturing (Completion of construction - June 2005, the Third Jeju Peace Forum)

Research tasks should be intensified in this stage. All organizational infrastructures are set in place while the initial outcomes of research emerge in the form of working papers and monographs. Professional education targeted at policy- makers and professionals commences in this period. With the Jeju Peace Forum being institutionalized with its third conference, other brand projects, particularly the Peace Index and Annual Peace Report, launch their initial publication. Financial diversification should begin by preparing the establishment of the center's own Foundation.

Stage 4: Expansion (June 2005 - December 2008)

Academic education commences targeted at international and regional students in close cooperation with local and national educational institutions. While the publication of the Peace Index and Annual Peace Report is activated, preparation of journal publication should be launched by organizing an editorial committee.

Stage 5: Take-off (January 2009 - December 2011)

The final stage should see the completion of the Center's identity and brand establishment. Activities of the Center in every

area are consolidated as the educational function takes root with the introduction of professional certificate programs and post-doctoral programs, as well as short and mid-term internship programs. The Academic journal, *Journal of Jeju Peace Studies*, also comes to its first publication in this period. By the end of this stage, reliance on governmental financing should be reduced to the level of 10-20% with its project and foundation revenues account for one half of total revenues.

VI. Conclusions

With new forms of conflict and confrontation rising over the horizon, a grandiose project has been launched at the right time, in the right place and with the right cause. The main task of the Jeju North-South Peace Center is to search for peace and common prosperity across the multi-layers of human society. Although it was initiated by the Korean national and local governments with the suggestion of academic professionals, the project indeed deserves much wider attention and participation from the inter-national community simply because of the common cause it pursues. Attracting attention is one thing, and turning such attention into sustained participation is another. The only way to ensure sustained attention and participation from the international community is to secure a high quality of research that the Jeju North-South Peace Center will produce. For this reason, we cannot overemphasize the importance of establishing its own

distinguished identity and brand of research, on which limited resources should be concentrated for a strategic time period.

Besides the quality of research, many other factors delimit the establishment and development of the Jeju North-South Peace Center. Financing is only, although very important, one of those. Heavy reliance on governmental financing brings about short-term stability only at the expense of longer-term research independence. It will also expose the Jeju North-South Peace Center to unpredictable political fluctuations. Securing diversified financial sources, thus, is a key to its longer-term stability and survival.

No less crucial in its embryonic period than money is care and attention at the national level. The center should not be considered an offspring of a particular government or a political party. Nor should it be regarded as a parochial project. Only if we are able to go over and beyond this factional and parochial context, should the grand project of establishing the Jeju North-South Peace Center attract the greater external results that it deserves.

The Jeju North-South Peace Center: Learning from Others' Experiences

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A team at Yonsei University has been drawing up a preparation report on establishing the Jeju North-South Peace Center under the framework of a cooperation agreement between Jeju Provincial government and Yonsei University signed in October 2001, and the final draft of the project has just come out. In preparation of the report, and in order to learn lessons and draw a benchmark for the Jeju North-South Peace Center from top rank international institutions, the team made visits to Hawaii and Oslo while another team of Cheju National University made a visit to Japan. All in all, we explored six institutes: East West Center, Pacific Forum CSIS and Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, PRIO in Oslo, and UN University and Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan. My presentation is focused on what we have learned from their experiences.

Organizational flexibility

The center's organization should be maintained as simply and as flexibly as possible. In the research division, by keeping the full- time staff at a required minimum and by utilizing a visiting and adjunct fellows system, we could enhance the elasticity of research upon different issues and needs. This will not only help keep maintenance costs down, but also facilitate interdisciplinary studies. It would improve organizational flexibility to have a single director of research coordinate different research program without erecting organizational barriers between program, while the smaller units of research team are assigned specific research projects. No less important is to prevent administrative and supporting departments from overgrowth.

Internationalized governance system

The highest governing, albeit nominal, body composed of prominent international figures would help attract wider participation from the international community not only in center's research activity, but also in its fundraising.

Sharp and focused mission statement

The mission of the center should be as clear and as focused as

to be an operational guideline for the center's overall research activity. Too broad and too general missions would only dissipate limited resources, scatter attention, and ultimately cost the center's research competence. As a late comer, the center needs to distinguish itself from the world rank institutes of a similar kind. Developing its own institutional identity and research brands will facilitate this task greatly. Limited resources should be concentrated on the pointed target area.

Setting priority in different operations

Given the limited resources, there should be a clear priority order among different activities of the Center. For this, a long-term master plan will be of great help, in which different realms of the center's activity are ordered with differentiated emphases.

Balancing academic and policy studies, theory and practice:

Although we cannot overemphasize the importance of building up longer-term academic and theoretical competence, it is no less important for the Center to address the problems and issues that are high on current political agendas. What's needed in the field of peace studies is a balanced approach combining academic research, policy analysis and proposals, and practice.

Broad international networks of cooperation and partnership

The center should establish a broad network of cooperation and partnership with both domestic and international research and educational institutes, as well as with NGOs. In its staff composition, as well as governance, it is important to build and maintain a high international profile. Network assets thus established will provide valuable inputs for developing the center's own research and educational programs that will have wide repercussions in regional and international communities. Major publications of the center should be published in principle in English while its website should be managed multilinguially.

Local linkages

No less important than international networking is intimate ties with local communities, from which emanates strong support. Local educational and other research institutes should become important partners of the center's activity and sources of its recruitment. By maximally utilizing local facilities and resources related to its operation, the center will not only avoid overlapping investment, but also could be immersed in local communities.

Diversifying financial sources

Although it is inevitable to rely heavily on governmental financial support in the initial period, it is critical to gradually reduce the center's reliance by diversifying financing sources. The short-term stability comes only at the expense of longer-term stability and the independence of the center's research and other operations.

Designation of the Island of World Peace and Establishment of South-North Peace Center, and Our Task

- With projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea as the central issue -

Myung-Bong Chang
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1. The Background of the Designation of "Island of World Peace" and (tentatively named) establishment of "South-North Peace Center"

☐ Relevant Legal Background

○ Special Act on Jeju Free International City (amended on January 26, 2002 and substitution of the Special Act on Jeju Island Development)

· The state may designate Jeju as an "Island of World Peace" (Article 12, Chapter 4) (Paragraph 1), and provide major projects that the state and local self-governing bodies can operate such

as:
- Activities to invite organizations relating to international peace and cooperation to maintain offices and hold activities in Jeju
- Establishment of a research institute for the study of international cooperation
- Activities to invite international conferences on world peace and cooperation to be held in Jeju
- Projects to promote mutual exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea
- Projects to promote other international cooperation

· Among these, it provides "Projects to promote mutual exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea" (Paragraph 2, Item 4).

· The state shall provide such administrative and financial assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the projects and activities (Paragraph 3).

· Necessary matters concerning the designation of the Island of World Peace and the execution of projects and related activities as well as administrative and financial assistance shall be determined by the Presidential Decree (Paragraph 4).

○ Special Act on Jeju Free International City Enforcement Decree (in effect after April 1, 2002)

· The governor of Jeju presents a plan of operation concerning designation of Island of World Peace to the Minister of Construction and Transportation (Article13, Paragraph 1).

· The Minister of Construction and Transportation should consult

with the Minister of Unification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and other heads of relevant administrative agencies (Paragraph 2).

· Thereafter the Minister of Construction and Transportation should submit the plan for the deliberation of the Jeju Free International City Promotion Committee, before he finally decides on them with the approval of the president (Paragraph 3).

· The heads of relevant central administrative agencies should secure financial resources and professionals to operate the projects of local self-governing bodies and give support to establish and operate related promotion organs (Paragraph 4).

2. The Central Point of Discussion and Background

□ Discuss the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation as a Part of Role-playing and the function of the Island of World Peace

□ The Value and Background of Jeju Island as a place for North-South Mutual Exchange and Cooperation

○ Raises Image of Jeju as a Place for North-South Mutual Exchange and Cooperation
· Jeju has image of peace
· Many national leaders around world visit Jeju Island and have summit meetings.

    - Leading national leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Jiang Zemin, Bill Clinton, Morihiro Hosokawa, Junichiro Koizumi visited Jeju Island and had summit meeting

○ Examples of the North-South Talks secretary of the North Korean Workers' Party and official in charge of South Korean affairs

· The visit of Kim Yong-soon, secretary of the North Korean Workers' Party and official in charge of South Korean affairs

· The talks between the Ministers of National Defense of North and South Korea

○ Discussion of Cross-Promotion for the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation with Paekdu Mt. and Halla Mt. as the Central Figure

· Makes the best use of the values of Halla Mt., the symbol of Jeju and spiritual mountain of South Korea

○ Supporting North Korea with Special Products of Jeju Island

· Aid through tangerine and carrot shipments of Jeju to North Korea

· Appreciation by North Korea for the aid
    - North Korea's invitation to Jeju residents

○ Raising the Possibility of Expanding the Foundation for the Promotion of Jeju Free International City and North-South Mutual Exchange and Cooperation

☐ Favorable Condition of Jeju for the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea

· Uses internal and external images of peaceful Jeju
· The advantage of promoting mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea in non-political sectors
  - Equipped with various conditions to promote economical, social and cultural projects, etc.
  - Plans for the economic development of North and South Korea through Jeju free-trade harbor, as a free international city
· Best place to open talks for cooperation between North and South Korea
  - Guarantees free come-and-go
  - Promotes free discussion and cooperation mood
· Uses blessed environment and various tourist attractions such as Halla Mt. and sea resources
  - Positive recognition of Halla Mt. and its symbolic nature which corresponds to Paekdu Mt. in North Korea
  - The geographic image of the northern end (Paekdu Mt.) and the southern end (Halla Mt.) of Korean Peninsula represents the metaphor of reunification
  - Jeju can give new impression of South Korea to North Korean people with its foreign atmosphere
· Recently, North Korea is planning economic improvements through the development of the tourist sector. Therefore, it is possible to plan tourist exchanges and development project

between North and South Korea centering around Jeju Island.

☐ Preparation for the (tentatively named) 'South-North Peace Center'

· Establish as a foundation
· Research ways to raise funds and manage the center
· Plans to use the center on internal and external dimension for a peaceful Korea and mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea
· Permanent operation system for mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea of Jeju

3. The Direction of the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea and Matters to be Considered

☐ Strengthening Assistance System for Mutual Exchange And Cooperation Project with Civic Organizations

· Contributes to form national community through strengthening social and cultural exchange and cooperation
· Promotes non-political sector rather than political, and stresses projects at civic level together with governmental level.
○ Promotion Process of the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation at Civic Level and Its Sector

● Advantages of Expanding Civic Exchange

· It gives an opportunity to promote talks between the two authorities

· Contacts with North Korean society at the civic level, based on autonomy, contribute to the change of consciousness of North Korean people and their society

  - Civic exchange on many levels can play mediating role in inducing gradual exchange with North Korea

· Guarantees the popularity of reunification by presenting the direction of the civic reunification movement

● Development Process

· July 7, 1997 - 「Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem and Reunification」: strive for mutual exchange and cooperation of civic organizations toward North Korea

· June 12, 1989 - 「Basic Guide for Mutual Exchange and Co-operation between South and North Korea」

· August 1, 1990 - Enactment and Promulgation of 「South-North Mutual Exchange and Cooperation Law」

· February 18, 1992 - Effectuation of 「Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea」

· September 17, 1992 - Chapter 3, 「Affiliated Agreement on Performance and Operation for the Mutual Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea」 of 'Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea'

· April 30, 1998 - 「Management for the Activation of Economic Cooperation between South and North Korea」

● Sectors (Centering around Non-political, Non-military Sectors)
· Jeju is evaluated as having great conditions and manpower to hold talks for the mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea in non-political sectors such as the education-learning sector, the culture and arts sector, the religion, sports, tourism, journalism-broadcasting, and communications sectors etc.
· The central government and Jeju provincial office need to share roles in order to meet the conditions for the projects that promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea in the above sectors.
· It is important to create an atmosphere of expanding foundation for the projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea based on autonomy of local self-governing body, breaking away from inflexibility on the governmental level.

※ Review of Considerations to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation Project at Governmental Level
· We have to consider the fact that governmental assistance to the Kumgang Mt. tourism business, for instance, can relatively affect the Jeju tourist industry
  - Clarify the scope of the assistance for Kumgang Mt. tourist business and its time limit.

- Prepare the assistance measures suitable to Jeju in the projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea

□ Concept of Establishment and Operation of (Tentatively Named) North-South Peace Center

○ Grounds for Establishment : Regulations

○ Characters
  - Corporate structure (incorporated foundation)
  - Civic organization (research and education capacity)
  - International cooperation organization
  - Plays the role of bridgehead for council between North and South Korea

○ Capacities
· Research and cooperation capacity to build peaceful environment on Korean Peninsula.
    - Assists mutual exchange and cooperation projects in scholarship
    - Promotes mutual exchange and cooperation projects of scholars and students between two Koreas
    - Operates short, mid, long-term personnel exchange in scholarship sector and social-cultural sector
· Researches international cooperation methods for peace, cooperation and reunification in Korea
· Promotes the mutual exchange and cooperation projects between

　　South and North Korea and reunification
· Fund raising and its application
　　- Government subsidies and public donations
　　- Assistance of the mutual exchange and cooperation fund
· Offers information related to the mutual exchange and cooperation
　　and reunification
· Provides information about reunification of Korea to visitors of
　　Jeju (especially foreigners)
· Education capacity to residents and students
· Provides the opportunity of cooperation between North and
　　South Korea using the environment of Jeju Free International
　　City.
· Plans projects for peaceful Korea and promotes mutual exchange
　　and cooperation projects based on the characteristics of Jeju
　　Island with civic organizations as central figures

○ Constitution and Management
· Independent management
· Follows the incorporated foundation based on civilian affairs.
· Arrangement for fund
　　(Strives for plan to get operating profit by articles of association)
　　(Plans to contribute a part of profits related to Jeju tourism to
　　the Peace Center)
· Institutionalization of operation and insuring substantiality
　　- Promotes projects based on the characteristics of the incor-
　　porated foundation
　　- Strives for plans to operate permanently

- Assists and promotes the research about projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea

□ Establishing Basic System at National Level and Detailed Assistance System

· Mutual exchange and cooperation of local self-governing bodies should be promoted based on the projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea at governmental level
· Jeju should have detailed assistance system for this project
※ It is possible to have conflicts about consistency of the mutual exchange and cooperation project at the government level, promotion directives for administrative jurisdiction, and the expansion of autonomy of Jeju in this project.
    - Mutually harmonized business and institutionalization of operation are needed.
    - Problems of budget allotment and using personnel resources to establish organization on the Special Act and human· material assistance system

□ Considering Specialization of Mutual Exchange and Cooperation Project between Self-governing Bodies of South and North Korea.
· The projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation are supposed to be promoted separately according to the characteristics of self-governing bodies.

- For instance, Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do should group together for mutual exchange and cooperation projects through the development of border areas.
- Promotes building a place for pure breed of seed potatoes, common prevention of *thecodiplosis japonensis* in Kumgang and Seorak area, stocking salmon and fry project etc.

· In case of Jeju, plans and promotions for specialized projects, such as tourist program connected with Paekdu Mt. of North Korea, are needed.

4. Examination of Legislation Plan for the Projects to Promote Mutual Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea

☐ Plan for Institutionalization of Laws

○ Relation to the law
· Basically promotes according to the Special Act on Jeju Free International City
· The designation of the Island of World Peace and project promotion are led by the states based on the Special Act.

○ Supplementary Plan (Enforcement Decree etc.)

● In the case of the projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea, the range of

application and role and effect of the North Mutual Exchange and Cooperation Law should be established.

· According to the current enforcement decree, there are no concrete stipulations on the projects for promoting mutual exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea of Jeju. Therefore it is necessary to provide further details and regulations on the project.

  - Concrete content on administrative and financial assistance for the projects to promote mutual exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea, related to the capacity of Island of Peace.

● Provision for designation of Island of World Peace (Enforcement Decree, Article 13)

· The central operating body (Proposal to change it from Minister of Construction and Transportation to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade)

· Reason : Change of the central operating body is needed to execute the project systemically at provincial level.

· Matters concerning change of the establishment bases for Jeju peace project promotion committee (hereafter referred to as the promotion committee) from provincial ordinance to the presidential decree.

  - Establishes peace project promotion committee in Jeju
  - Committee is comprised of 15 civic experts and professors
  - Functions of the committee are:

· Matters concerning designation of Island of World Peace and

related projects
· Holding Jeju Peace Forum on regular basis and development measures on related forums
· Discusses and promotes various matters concerning South-North Peace Center
· It is possible to present alternative policy plans on many other things related to Jeju peace policies.

○ Enactment of Regulation
· Rules on Jeju project operations related to the projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea
　- It is possible for self-governing bodies to operate projects aimed at functioning as part of Island of Peace (Special Decree Article 12, Paragraph 2)
· Promotes projects that Jeju can operate according to the promotion of mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea.
　- Matters on the establishment and management of the South-North Peace Center
　- Civic assistance projects toward North Korea (assistance of Jeju special products, sisterhood relationship with local cities in North Korea, and mutual exchange of personnel and material resources etc.)
· Training and use of professionals at Jeju level for mutual exchange and cooperation with North Korea
· Securing lawfulness of Jeju participating in mutual exchange

and cooperation projects toward North Korea
· Supply institutional installation for substantial projects

※ Relevant Supplementary Matters
· Supplies the establishment foundation of (tentatively named) "Jeju Peace Projects Promotion Committee" to efficiently promote projects on Article 12, Paragraph 2
· Decides necessary matters concerning the constitution and management of Jeju Peace Projects Promotion Committee according to rules

● Matters To Be Included in Regulations
· Necessity and Goal of Regulations
· Matters concerning organization and management of relevant funds
  - Assists with mutual exchange and cooperation of civic organizations
  - Employs and trains professionals for mutual exchange and cooperation projects
  - Secures transparency of fund earnings and fairness of practical use
· Matters concerning the process and method of projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation
  - Materializes mutual exchange and cooperation projects at civic level
  - For instance, cooperation plans in the tourism sector of South and North Korea (cooperation organs and their management

etc.)

· Matters concerning the constitution and management of "Jeju Peace Projects Promotion Committee"

· Matters concerning the establishment of the South-North Peace Center

· Provides the relationship between projects at national or government level and projects at Jeju level

· Effectuation

※ The process of gathering opinion of residents, relevant experts and council etc.

□ Collaboration of Mutual Exchange and Cooperation Projects with the Government and Establishment of Assistance System

○ Securing Connection of Assistance System at Governmental Level

· The projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea need to be promoted with the government (Ministry of Unification) as the central figure.

· The projects to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea through Jeju basically cannot be promoted against the government's principles on mutual exchange and cooperation.

· It is important to maintain cooperation system with relevant agencies such as the Ministry of Unification in offering information on and contacts with North Korea.

○ It is desirable to promote the projects under the guidance and assistance of relative agencies such as Ministry of Unification, while taking into account Jeju's unique position.

○ Building cooperation system with other local self-governing bodies in promotion of relevant projects
· Prevention of overlapping project promotion
· Joint ownership of information about North Korea
· Provides suggestions through examples of projects toward North Korea

○ Development of mutual exchange and cooperation projects based on characteristics of Jeju
· Distinguishes itself from other local self-governing bodies
· Expands personnel exchange which uses natural environment and tourist resources of Jeju Island
  - Arranges plans to overcome geographically long distance and difficult access to Jeju
  - Considers the assistance for the North Korean people visiting Jeju and assistance method for personnel exchange project between South and North Korea as a project supporting mutual exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea (take into account working expenses according to certain scope and standard of Kumgang Mt. tourist project)
· Expands material exchange with North Korea by the openness and autonomy of the Free International City
  - Provides conveniences such as import and export of North

Korean products to third countries through the Free Inter-national City

- Recognizing special cases in Jeju's economic relations and trade of North Korean goods within fixed rules and regulations.

Centripetal Force of Jeju, "Island of Peace"; the South-North Peace Center

Jung-un Chang
Member, the National Assembly

I. The Creation of Jeju's "Island of Peace"

The designation of Jeju as an "Island of Peace" pursues to transform Jeju Island into an Free International City. And while it is a strategy that allows development, it also marks a turning point for the island, with the marked absence of war and violence. It actively enlarges the possibility of peace and the development model suggested is catered specifically to Jeju.

"Island of Peace" in Jeju is the foundation of Jeju's Free International City model under the pressures of the globalized world economy. Defining its future status, the model will enable Jeju to search for a constructive way to prosperity. Without peace, there is no freedom. In a place full of war, violence, suppression, and isolation, we cannot expect to achieve the anticipated results and build up an Free International City with stability. Therefore,

through the formation of an "Island of Peace," we can enlarge the scope of peace, which will improve the mutual respect, coexistence, and tolerance of other parties. Through efforts of exploring the necessity and possibility of peace, we can expect the development of the Jeju International Free City with the free flow of people, products, capital and information moving in and out.

The constitution of an "Island of Peace" in Jeju can be regarded as a basic philosophy of Jeju's development, which is stipulated in the Jeju Free International City special law. Jeju is pursuing various peace policies based on this basic philosophy. Some of the examples are the enactment of the special law for the 4·3 incident, the establishment of the 4·3 Peace Park as well as the successful organization of the Jeju Peace Forum last year. Especially, the Jeju Peace Forum, which was held from June 15 to 17, 2001 in commemoration of the one-year anniversary of the South-North Summit, impressed the world with an image of Jeju as an "Island of Peace." In addition, the Joint Declaration was adopted and the establishment of the South-North Peace Center was announced as an organization that will be in charge of the continuous administration of the Peace Forum.

II. Purpose of the Establishment of the South-North Peace Center

The South-North Peace Center is designed as one of the projects,

with the aim of developing and systematizing the "Island of Peace" in an academic orientation. With the goal of building an "Asia-Pacific Peace" community, the South-North Peace Center, located in Jeju, will systematically study the problems of conflicts and peace, poverty and prosperity, and separation and integration on the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and worldwide. The results of research will be recommended to state policies and peace education so that it will play an active role in creating peace, prosperity, and integration.

III. The Role and Management Direction of the South-North Peace Center

In order to achieve a true "Island of Peace," Jeju's South-North Peace Center will seek a philosophy based on the perception and behaviors of peace, and one that Jeju Island will be furnished with. And at the same time, it will search for the universal values of peace, testing them from an academic approach. As well as establishing various academic exchanges and connections inside and outside Korea, the center will actively carry out the internationalization of a Korean-typed peace concept. Maintaining a close relationship with education and behavior, the center will play a key role in putting the outcome of research and studies into practice efficiently. The basic management framework of this South-North Peace Center is as follows.

First, the operation and formulation of the research and admini-strative system must be flexible. Keeping only the necessary number of full-time employees, the center has to actively utilize a part-time employment system. This is desirable for not only will it bring an efficient budget management, but will also allow easily access to the appropriate employees under this system.

Second, while the Jeju South-North Peace Center's facilities have to be kept at a minimum in terms of their fixed costs, the use of neighboring facilities that can be shared must be maximized. It is not only for the purpose of overcoming the problems arising from duplicated investment or facilities, but sharing facilities will also reduce the number of potential conflicts with relevant organizations. This idea will help the South-North Peace Center achieve an efficient management organization. In addition, when it is possible, the maximization of outsourcing is desirable in management and outcome perspectives.

Thirdly, the financial resources of the institute must be diversified. In the first stage, financial assistance from the central government or local government may enable stable management of the institute in the short term. However, it will not be secure because the institute may rely heavily on political variables. Therefore, slight changes in the political arena can bring the institute serious financial problems. In the long-term perspective, considering the survival of the institute, it is not desirable to obtain financial assistance from governmental sectors. Furthermore, once the govern-

ments provide financial subsidies, they may try to restrict the purposes of expenditure of the financial resources. It may hurt the independence of the institute in the future. However, if the institute can raise a large amount of funds, it can operate with interests from banks. Although this is a good way to promote its independence, this can also be risky, due to the fluctuation of the interest rate. Therefore, heavy reliance on interest is not desirable either.

In short, the Jeju South-North Peace Center can be launched with financial assistance from the central or local government in the short term, but the level of reliance on government sectors must gradually decrease as the institute moves into a stable management period. Instead of financial assistance from government, it has to independently find different financial sources and try to explore various management systems. In order to do this, we need to launch a foundation as early as possible together with the Jeju South-North Peace Center.

Fourth, we have to take advantage of the fact that the South-North Peace Center is located in Jeju Island, not in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Jeju Island has to assure a better environment and facilities in terms of academic research, conferences, and education systems. This means that the Jeju South-North Peace Center has to differentiate itself from other competing domestic institutes, while promoting efforts towards international recognition.

Fifth, in terms of study and management, studies at both the international and local level must be implemented at the same time. In order to develop the institute at an international level, the focus of studies should not be limited to the small-scale boundaries of Jeju Island or the Korean Peninsula. Apart from the internationalization of researchers and scholars through exchanges, a major decision-making system must also be internationalized, while on the other hand, the local characteristics of Jeju Island are preserved in the process. This is one of the ways that we can promote the recognition of the Jeju South-North Peace Center.

Sixth, we have to combine "theory and practice," and should not focus our attention only on academically valued studies. Rather, we need to pursue studies that carry important implications for real policies. Through these practical issues, we must develop a network that includes politics, public administration, and business arenas, and impose a policy implementation on the justification of peace studies. In other words, we have to actively participate in and support practical activities as well as peace studies.

Seventh, the undertakings of the Jeju South-North Peace Center will be research, education, exhibitions, international exchange, and publications. We have to prioritize these and focus more attention and make more investments in different areas, according to their priority. In this way, the center will be able to reach international standards. In addition, we have to actively share our findings with existing institutes and facilities that also conduct

peace studies. Considering the fact that the Jeju South-North Peace Center cannot manage all these projects alone, the allocation and sharing of projects is definitely required.

IV. Conclusion

If the Jeju South-North Peace Center successfully implements the roles and basic guidelines stated above, it can work together and form horizontal networks with world-famous institutes such as PRIO in Oslo, SIPRI in Stockholm, EWC in Hawaii, and the Hiroshima Peace Center in Hiroshima. If so, the Jeju South-North Peace Center will be able to recommend international standards of peace studies by gaining recognition through study issues as well as promoting peace studies in Korea to the international level. Finally, I would like to summarize again the guidelines of peace studies that the Jeju South-North Peace Center should follow.

First, studies, education and activities pertaining to peace must be actively integrated together, while bearing in mind the importance of practical oriented approaches. In order to achieve this, it is absolutely necessary for scholars, teachers, and peace activists in the relevant fields to cooperate with each other while actively participating in exchanges, along with taking charge of responsibilities through the sharing of duties.

Second, it is necessary a variety of peace concepts approaches must be pursued. As concepts of peace are not static and have changed along with the times, the approaches also have become diversified. As a result, it has become more and more difficult to define a single concept of peace and therefore, a larger, concept of peace has been generally agreed upon. Therefore, peace studies at the Jeju South-North Peace Center must pursue active studies of peace that engage with appropriate changes, while implementing active concepts of peace beyond single definitions that are no longer viable.

Third, as for the realization of peace, we must take note of the voices of civil movements and leaders. Apart from official state policies, we also have to support the civil organizations that are working for peace around the world. At the same time, we have to absorb and make use of the suggestions and ideas of civil organizations regarding their experience in their respective fields.

Fourth, we need to have more understanding about various peace agents through more dialogue, while enforcing mutual networks. Diplomatic efforts on the inter-government level for building world peace and solving conflicts are important. However, it is also important to promote participation and mutual understanding among the individual actors who are struggling for peace in international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, international Non-Government Organizations, local organizations, and ordinary citizens.

In summary, the Jeju South-North Peace Center will promote the image of the island as an international city that studies peace with love and pursues its values as well. It will also help Jeju Island to upgrade its status as a tourist destination. The Jeju South-North Peace Center will lead the world in peace studies through the discussion and study of peace and prosperity. The integration of peace will not be confined to the Korean Peninsula, but will hold true for Northeast Asia and the entire world as well.

Building the Jeju South-North Peace Center: What Needs to be Done?

Scott Snyder,
Korea Representative, The Asia Foundation

One of the most interesting and paradoxical developments in today's world is the combination of globalization and localization which has both strengthened the impact of local affairs on global developments and heightened the aspirations of local leaders to play an expanded role in global affairs. The telecommunications revolution and the relative ease of travel in today's global village have increased local consciousness of global affairs and have given local actors the aspiration to play some role on the global stage. Global affairs are no longer the unique concern of the capital city, but rather carry implications and are within the realm of the locality. Although there is the famous saying that "all politics is local," global politics in today's world is included as part of local affairs to an unprecedented degree.

The effort to establish a Jeju South-North Peace Center seems to be a good example of the vision of combining the local and the

global that has developed in the context of globalization. And this conference has attracted a measure of attention to that effort. The conference has uniquely defined Jeju Island as a convening place where people from around the world may come to assess prospects for progress in inter-Korean relations. The challenge will be how to sustain such a meeting and how to differentiate it from the "competition" from other localities or institutions that also are attempting to look at the same issues.

Of course, one distinctive aspect of the Jeju South-North Peace Center that has allowed its rapid establishment as a convening organization is that it has had the budget to do so, a distinct advantage that has allowed the Jeju South-North Peace Center to achieve its objectives to some degree. Another aspect is that it has taken advantage of the opportunity to define a niche as a player in the context of the Korean conflict. Both of these aspects have begun to give the South-North Peace Center a "brand name" and niche in a relatively short period of time.

What of the future? How can the Jeju South-North Peace Center sustain the efforts it has begun in unique ways? I would like to make proposals for consideration in the following areas: the development of a unique research agenda, the effective use of telecommunications to spread the message of the center, and the importance of human networking and partnerships as a way to extend the work of the center.

The Jeju South-North Peace Center has already begun to develop its research agenda through the holding of two conferences that have focused on the process of inter-Korean reconciliation. A sub-theme of these conferences has been the importance of regional integration in Northeast Asia as a vehicle and as an effect of inter-Korean reconciliation. Other possible themes that might be developed would include the examination of regional maritime issues and disputes in Northeast Asia and the search for methods to resolve them and on the development of regional cross-boundary economic cooperation in Northeast Asia as it has developed at the local level. Another important research agenda will be to examine the international implications of inter-Korean reconciliation in all of its dimensions. Another piece of the agenda that might be of interest would be to explore the relationship of Korean domestic politics to international and regional relations, perhaps as a means by which to stimulate better local under-standing of the interaction between Korean local political concerns and Korea's position in the world. The establishment of cutting edge research capacity in these areas by acting as a convener and commissioner as well as research partner and chief research archive for such efforts would be an important and unique contribution that the Jeju South-North Peace Center might pursue. The means by which to pursue this research agenda would include traditional means, such as developing institutional capacity as a convener of regular meetings as a vehicle by which to make the Center known as a premier institution that is doing work in this area. Another method would be to provide research support

to scholars who are doing unique work in this field.

Another aspect of promotion of such a center that benefits from globalization and from Korea's unique position as an early-adapter of new telecommunications technologies is the role of information technology in today's world. Although the center would derive its "brand" from being associated with a place, Jeju, the internet revolution allows the marketing and dissemination of the center's program to transcend geographic boundaries. This suggests to me the increasing need to "locate" institutions such as the Jeju South-North Peace Center without being bound by geography. The means by which to do this would be through using the latest teleconferencing technology to make a "place" for the center not only on Jeju Island, but also on the internet by making it possible for people to participate in and derive benefit from the convening capacity of the center without necessarily always physically participating in every meeting or discussion that the Center might have. This means establishing broadband convening capacity globally while also promoting a strong local image through the active sponsorship and promotion of the Center. It also means using the internet to develop a world class site for information on the research agenda developed above, perhaps with a special focus on developing a "broadband archive" of oral documents and interviews with specialists and players on these issues that would illuminate the historical record and expand real-time understanding of the issues that are the central focus of the Center's work. Web casting and development of a

strong internet web site are two ways of locating the Center's work and drawing attention to Jeju while also transcending the limitations imposed by geography in unique ways.

This brings me to my third suggestion for the Center, and that is to develop an unparalleled human network of research ties with the best institutions and individuals in the chosen fields of endeavor. In practical terms, this may also mean initiating partnerships that highlight the telecommunications linkages that might serve to bind the various institutions together. It also would mean finding ways to both bring representatives of those institutions to Jeju and to bring the core human resources associated with the Jeju South-North Peace Center - and the attraction of top-notch human resources would clearly be one of the critical investments that the South-North Peace Center must make if it wants to succeed - to the world. Building a thick network of regional and global ties with leading scholars and institutions would be essential to the next phase of development of the Center if it is to truly make an impact on the research agenda as it develops.

If the suggestions provided above are useful, the next challenges to be faced by the Jeju South-North Peace Center are clear: how to be an intellectual leader on Korean and regional issues by developing a research agenda that effectively links local and global concerns, how to identify and locate the center through the effective use of cutting edge telecommunications in ways that

both take advantage of and transcend the boundaries of geography, and how to establish the center as the "center" of a network of institutional and individual ties that allows it to be effective regionally and known internationally. It is an ambitious agenda that will require much energy and effective use of resources to pursue effectively. On behalf of The Asia Foundation, I wish the Center the best in its endeavors.