

Peace and Prosperity
in Northeast Asia **Volume I**
Exploring the European Experience

Peace & Prosperity in Northeast Asia [Vol. I]

Exploring the European Experience

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Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia

Exploring the European Experience

The 4th Jeju Peace Forum Vol. I



Preface

Since its launch in 2001, the Jeju Peace Forum has established itself as one of Korea's most important international conferences drawing key political, business, media, and academic leaders from throughout Northeast Asia and around the world. With the full support of the Korean government and a tremendously successful history, we have been trying hard to institutionalize the Forum as a crucial regional venue for distinguished experts to discuss and carve out a new blueprint for Northeast Asian peace and prosperity.

This volume is a collection of papers and essays presented at the 4th Jeju Peace Forum, which was held from June 21 - June 23, 2007, in Jeju, South Korea as a continuation of the previous 2001, 2003 and 2005 Forums. In an effort to ascertain the future state of the Korean peninsula at a time of momentous change, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, together with the International Peace Foundation (with which the Jeju Peace Institute is affiliated) and the East Asia Foundation, planned the Forum based on the theme of "Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: Exploring the European Experience."

The 4th Jeju Peace Forum proceeded in the form of "forums within a forum" by holding two special sessions: Special Session I, titled "From Helsinki to Jeju: Designing the Jeju Process for a Multilateral Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia," and Special Session II, "IT Cooperation in East Asia." This reflects JPI's keen awareness that we need to closely examine the correlation between the formation of a Northeast Asian security/economic community and information tech-

nology that can bring about changes in international relations as well as changes in political, security, and economic processes at a domestic level.

The 4th Forum explored the European experience in political, security and economic fields and applied them to the problems of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. In other words, throughout this forum, keeping the key issue of forming a cooperative framework in Northeast Asia in mind, we addressed the European experience during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, including the CSCE/OSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), German reunification, and the economic and political integration of the EU. We explored applicable ideas and the framework for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, and examined whether they would be useful for accelerating the process of institutionalizing regional peace and common prosperity.

In publishing the proceedings of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum, we would like to extend our gratitude to all the participants. We also would like to thank the co-hosts, organizers and co-sponsors for their generous support: the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, the International Peace Foundation, the East Asia Foundation (co-hosts); the Jeju Peace Institute (organizer); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, the Presidential Committee on

Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiatives, Cheju National University, Jeju Free International City Development Center and the Jeju Development Institute (co-sponsors). We are also grateful for the last-minute efforts on the volume by Dr. Tae-Ryong Yoon, Dr. Bong-jun Ko, Dr. Seong-woo Yi, Prof. Douglas Hansen, Ms. Jeongseon Ko, and Mr. Ben Bong-Kyu Chun.

We hope that the Jeju Peace Forum will continue to serve as a venue for leaders from the public and private sectors to jointly promote common peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia.

May 10, 2008

The Organizing Committee of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum

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I

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Introductory Remarks

Youngmin Kwon

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, today I am very happy to extend my heartfelt welcome to a distinguished international audience from countries around the world. Moreover, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Frances Mautner Markhof, the Director of ACIS in Vienna, who has spared no energy to prepare for this special session as a co-host. My sincere respect and an open-arms welcome also go to Dr. Horst Teltschik, the long-time security advisor and assistant to the former German Chancellor, Dr. Helmut Kohl, and the architect of European Integration as well as German Reunification.

As you may be aware, traditionally we don't have front gates on this island. Instead, we have Jeong-nang. Two stone-pillars, each with three holes arranged vertically, are placed on each side of an entrance. If three wooden bars are put horizontally across the entrance into each pair of holes, it means the owner of the house went out for a long time. Two bars up means the owner will be back in the evening, and one bar up means the owner will be back soon. In preparing for this Peace Forum, we have long since removed the three bars from Jeong-nang. We have been anticipating your visit to the island of Jeju. Jeong-nang, the expression of the spirit of trusting each other with faith and honesty is a valuable cultural trait. Together with the historical heritage of the Sammu spirit, signifying the absence of three things: beggars, thieves and gates; this shamanism also encapsulates the very essence of peace on this island.

The Jeju Peace Forum, since its launching in 2001 as a biennial venue for discussions by world leaders from the public and private sectors, has now established itself as Korea's most important international conference. It has already drawn key political, business, media, and academic leaders from surrounding countries with the full support of the Korean government. Unlike past practice, the Fourth Forum has been organized by the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI). JPI has designed the forum for broader and more in-depth discussions by expanding the scope of the talks. Specifically, the Fourth Forum intends to explore the European experience in political, security and economic fields and will attempt to apply lessons of that experience to solving the problems of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. We will draw on the European experience to seek ideas for a framework for ultimately securing regional peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

If political and business leaders, government officials, scholars and experts have the chance to establish whether the European experience is of pragmatic value for the future of East Asia, and determine what limitations and prospects those differences and similarities suggest for the possibility of applying the European experience to the East Asian case, then it will offer theoretical and empirical bases for moving forward toward peace and prosperity while reducing trial and error in the days ahead. Furthermore, the peaceful solution of the Korean problem is one of the core preconditions for achieving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. As previous forums have done by enhancing a mutual understanding of regional leaders through discussions of major issues, including the Korean problem, the Fourth Jeju Peace Forum also intends to play an important role in facilitating the process of institutionalizing peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean peninsula.

Once again, I welcome our dear guests. I wish for you great success in finding the ways and means of applying the European experience to solving the problems of East Asia, and at the same time, please have a most pleasant sojourn on this beautiful island of Jeju. Thank you.

Introductory Remarks

Frances Mautner-Markhof

It is my pleasure to welcome you all to this Special Session of the Jeju Peace Forum co-organized by the Jeju Peace Institute and the Austrian Center for International Studies, and I want to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to my Korean colleagues for the excellent work they have done here in organizing the Jeju Peace Forum and this Special Session.

Special Session 1 is a follow-up of the ACIS meeting on “Multilateral Cooperation in East Asia: Relevance of the OSCE and EU Experiences,” which was held in Vienna in December 2006. The proceedings of this meeting have been distributed to all participants of Special Session I. The Vienna meeting was the first main activity of the ACIS project on Multilateral Cooperation in East Asia. The participants at the Vienna meeting, representing the OSCE, East Asia, Europe and the United States, provided an important combination of experience and expertise in practical diplomacy and policy analysis. I am pleased that quite a few of those participants are also taking part in this Special Session.

Special Session 1 addresses and develops many of the topics and recommendations of the ACIS meeting in Vienna, which covered a wide range of issues including: the relevance of the OSCE and the Helsinki process for East Asia; security challenges and structures in Northeast Asia and the prospects for multilateralism; implications of the North Korean nuclear issue for regional security, stability and cooperation; and the relevance for East Asia of European Union experi-

ence, especially its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The possibility of a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in the region is being increasingly explored as an important option for dealing with traditional and non-traditional threats and instabilities which concern the countries of the region, which no individual country, no matter how large or powerful, can deal with on its own, and on which it is in the interests of sovereign states to cooperate. There was general agreement in Vienna that to achieve a meaningful and effective start for an institutionalized multilateral security cooperation mechanism in the region, the initial focus would be on the three key countries of Northeast Asia, expanding in due course to other countries.

There is an increasing interest on the part of the Northeast Asian countries to understand relevant European experience and what could be gained from this experience, especially that of the CSCE and the Helsinki process, as well as of the OSCE and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The comprehensive security concept of the OSCE has had an important impact on other organizations such as the EU and the Council of Europe. Key aspects of successful multilateral cooperation are common interests, relevance, pragmatism and flexibility. The OSCE and EU could also profit from closer ties and a mutual learning process with the countries in the Northeast Asia region.

The Helsinki process involved, at the time, negotiations among states divided into opposing blocs, systems and values. This process was possible in large measure because of the political environment prevailing at the time and was successful primarily because of the political will and perceived benefits to all concerned on both sides. The political process leading to agreement on the Helsinki Final Act would, it was agreed, be of special relevance to analyze and understand the institutionalization of a cooperative security mechanism in the East Asian region. The success of regional cooperation depends on recognizing that an effective multilateral cooperation mechanism is not a zero sum game — what increases the security of one country must not and should not diminish the security of others, on the contrary.

How did the title of this Special Session come about? What is meant by the "Jeju Process?" The idea of the Jeju process arose from an

awareness of the importance of the Helsinki process to the creation of the CSCE and general agreement that the Helsinki process, which led up to the Helsinki Final Act, was perhaps the most relevant European experience for the Northeast Asian countries. It was hoped that a process could be started in Jeju which would become a catalyst for a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia, just as the Helsinki process led to the HFA, the CSCE and the OSCE.

The issues surrounding the concept of political will and sovereignty, in particular the equal sovereignty of nation states, run throughout all discussions and negotiations for institutionalizing multilateral cooperation especially in the security area. In exercising sovereignty and demonstrating political will in a timely and effective manner, states can create a mechanism which itself becomes an example of trust, transparency and confidence-building.

A multilateral institution cannot be created in times of crisis, and it is thus essential to have such a mechanism in place before crises become imminent and unmanageable. The broader the framework of such a mechanism, the wider the range of political and security issues it can encompass and deal with.

In Vienna, a number of issue areas were identified which could profitably be addressed both at this Special Session in Jeju and by a new Jeju process. It would make an important and unique contribution to confidence, security and stability in the region if the Jeju process were to start as a result of this Special Session and of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum.

Introductory Remarks

Hoick Suk

Good afternoon, Your Excellency Minister Roh Jun-Hyong, Professor Kim Cae-One the Chair of the International Peace Foundation and honorable guests from all over the world, I would like to welcome all of you who have taken valuable time to attend this Special Session on “IT Cooperation in East Asia” as part of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. The Jeju Peace Forum originally began as a biennial gathering in 2001 to talk the peace and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region. As part of the Forum, the Special Session on the “IT Cooperation in East Asia” will be addressing issues in regards to the cooperation of East Asian and European neighbors in terms of IT as well as challenges that the IT industry is facing.

With such an intention, one of the topics to be presented would be the importance of comprehending the IT situation in Asia and understanding various options for regional cooperation, especially with the European community. As the world is becoming closer together, we are now experiencing what the term ‘Global Society’ means in our daily lives. I am certain IT is one of the foundations that made this dramatic change possible. Studying the analysis from the European community as well as by sharing our experience and expertise, today’s gathering could help the term ‘Global Society’ to be realized. In addition, the audience could also enjoy being enlightened about the hotspots of the industrial community. Some of the prominent speakers today will provide us with insights into how IT might change the future through topics such as: the ICT Co-opetion in East Asia, the Evo-

lution and Globalization of the IT Industry and the Challenges for the Future. Those presentations will enable us to draw a clearer picture for specific ways of how IT could bring peace and harmony in the region by opening a better, brighter future.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I cannot hide the excitement I have as the host of this meaningful meeting. I am sure discussions of this Special Session will become the seeds for flowers of everlasting peace and cooperation in the global society. Today may only be a small step in history, but I am sure it could turn out to be the beginning of a huge change. Furthermore, I am confident that today will become the stepping stone for better understanding that not only Asia, but every country in all communities can enjoy in the future. I hope the Special Session on "IT Cooperation in East Asia" becomes an occasion where the discussions fully satisfy the intention of the Peace Forum. Once again, thank you very much for your kindest attention and do enjoy your time here.

Congratulatory Remarks

Jun-Hyong Roh

Honorable Mr. Suk Hoick, President of the Korea Information Society Development Institute, Mr. Kim Cae Won, Chairman of the International Peace Foundation, and distinguished guests. It is a great pleasure to deliver my congratulatory remarks at the Jeju Peace Forum. The Jeju Peace Forum is an important international meeting where experts from various areas gather to discuss ways to promote peace and co-prosperity in East Asia including the Korean peninsula.

As Minister of Information and Communication working toward the development of Korea's IT sector, this year's forum is especially meaningful because, unlike past forums, an IT special session has been prepared. In today's world, bilateral and multilateral relations are being forged in different shapes and forms, not only in traditional areas, such as politics, security and economy, but in all kinds, including environment, culture and welfare. IT development, for one, has inevitably become a source of complex international problems, such as cross-border flow of private information and online infringement of copyright.

However, IT development is also an answer to many existing problems, just as telemedicine and scientific research through international cooperation. This is possible due to the advent of the information society, where the source of value creation gradually shifts from goods and services to knowledge and information. In this new society, IT development brings change and innovation to all facets of society. And for this

very reason, the IT sector is gaining significance in the global cooperation arena more than ever before.

Speaking from experience, reinforcing IT cooperation continues to be raised as an important agenda in various summit meetings. This confirms my view that IT has a great impact on international relations. Against this background, I think it is most appropriate and timely that the 4th Jeju Peace Forum will be dedicated to discussing ways to cooperate in the IT field in order to ensure peace and co-prosperity in the East Asian region. I hope that an in-depth and constructive exchange of views between experts from home and abroad will produce meaningful outcomes.

In closing, I would like to thank the participants for taking time out of your busy schedules to be here today, the organizers of this forum for your amazing efforts, and lastly, the staff of the Jeju Peace Institute and KISDI. Thank you.

Keynote Speech

*– The IT Agenda of the European Union:
Opportunities for Cooperation with Asia*

Brian McDonald

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is my immense pleasure to be with you here today for the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. As you might know, EU-Republic of Korea relations are moving to a new level with the opening of the negotiation for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This is an obvious recognition of the high interest that exists on both sides to enhance our co-operation. In particular, we are all impressed with what the Republic of Korea has achieved during the last years to become one of the leaders in information & communication technologies (ICT) — especially with the IT839 initiative and the “Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007” which is instructive for us all. A sign of the importance that Europe attaches to the relations with the Republic of Korea on ICT was the visit to Seoul last April of Commissioner Reding in charge of information society and media. She had extensive discussions with the Minister of Information and Communication and the Minister of Science and Technology in view of fostering cooperation and dialogue in the field of information society technology and communication. Today is an opportunity to look, learn, and understand from each other.

European Information Society Policy

First, let me say a few words on “i2010,” the European Information Society Policy and explain the European experience. i2010 is a comprehensive strategy for modernizing and deploying all EU policy instruments to encourage the development of the digital economy through regulatory instruments and through research and partnerships with industry. In its initiative, the Commission outlines three policy priorities, namely i) a common information space, ii) more investment in ICT research and development and iii) an inclusive European information society.

Common Information Space/Regulatory Environment

To create an open and competitive single market for information society and media services within the EU, we strive to break down barriers to emerging sectors — such as IPTV, mobile TV or wireless applications. Accordingly, two big legislative reforms are being carried out: modernizing the EU rules on audiovisual content and reviewing the electronic communications regulatory framework. To step back in time a little, the telecommunications regulatory process in the European Union (EU) is not confined to i2010, and it should be seen as a part of the wider process of the economic integration of Europe initiated by the Treaty of Rome.

The European telecommunications sector has historically been characterized by a strong public service monopoly tradition together with an industrial policy of creating ‘national champions’, often run in conjunction with postal services. This environment began to change in the early 1980s, with privatization and the introduction of limited competition in some Member States. The mechanisms chosen to liberalize telecoms in the EU were Commission directives based on Article 86 of the Treaty (ex Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome) relating to competition. In the telecoms sector, the Commission considered that giving certain public enterprises special and exclusive rights to produce telecommu-

nications equipment, or to provide telecommunications services and operate networks breached Treaty competition and internal market rules. The various directives abolished those rights, requiring Member States to permit the provision of competing services. (However there has been no requirement for privatization). Today, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications comprises a series of legal texts and associated measures that apply throughout the 27 EU Member States. The framework provides a set of rules that are simple, aimed at deregulation, technology neutral and sufficiently flexible to deal with fast changing markets in the electronic communications sector.

Europe believes that competition is the best way to ensure a quicker and cheaper roll-out of new information society and media services. An open, predictable and coherent regulatory environment would ensure competition. A strong, independent regulator, as well as clear rules for market access is crucial in that respect. More importantly, an adoption of open, interoperable global standards brings significant benefits to citizens and is increasing competition and innovation levels. This comprised the message that Commissioner Reding passed to her Korean counterparts during her visit last April. She therefore invited Korea to consider international standards in the framework of close cooperation with the European partners.

The Free Trade Agreement Korea and the EU are discussing will increase competition both for ICT related products and services. It will also provide a mechanism where obstacles derived from regulatory issues could be addressed. Both the EU and Korea enjoy a high level of development in ICT, and the FTA will facilitate closer cooperation between the two regions in the global scene.

ICT Research & Development

i2010 also sets to increase EU investment in research on information and communication technologies (ICT) by 80%. Industries have an enormous potential to innovate and deploy new ICTs. Yet this can only be brought about by combined actions on research and deployment of

applications. Today, I would like to present the 7th Research Framework Programme and TEIN2 as examples of European efforts towards this goal.

Over many years, the research and development framework programme has been helping to build excellence on a European scale. The 7th Framework Programme (FP7), which started at the end of 2006, will last until 2013 with a total budget of 48.8 Billion Euro, of which a quarter is dedicated to ICT. Changes in markets, technology and industry have been reflected in the implementation of the ICT Programme under FP7. It answers current well-identified industrial requirements and also it is sufficiently forward-looking in order to prepare the ground for future markets.

The new research Framework Programme will be ever more open to international cooperation. It will have dedicated actions that will address issues jointly identified between European and non-European countries or regions of the world. International co-operation is essential to ensure exploitation of research results on a global scale but also to build interoperable technology solutions. Specific actions may for instance include supporting the development of advanced and low-cost technologies for electronic communications. The Framework Programme contributes to building the European Research Area, a European "internal market" for research where researchers, technology and knowledge freely circulate. The Korean research community can participate on a self-financing basis with the initiatives that are implemented and funded at the European level.

By working with a consortium of the best European scientists, Korea could build on their strengths as well as gain access to other specialist knowledge and S&T capacities in Europe. We could also address specific problems that have a global character on the basis of mutual interest and mutual benefit. More intense research cooperation could also prove useful to open the country to international standards and competition. I would like here to inform you that Korean organizations were involved in 10 European ICT research projects during the last 4 years in a wide variety of sectors such as telecommunications, e-health or embedded systems. However, I acknowledge that the potential of

EU-Republic of Korea co-operation is not reflected in this limited number of projects.

We both could do more to enhance our co-operation. To start with, a seminar will be organized in February or March 2008 with the objective of fostering more joint research projects. The Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation which entered into force in March 2007 will also provide a basis for furthering these efforts. What is also critical for good co-operation is the existence of modern ICT based infrastructures — so-called e-Infrastructures. This is why Europe has established a high speed research network for education and research called GÉANT2 that supplies unprecedented computing power to an estimated 3 million users from over 3,500 academic institutions in 34 countries across Europe.

GÉANT continues to expand the network both by increasing its transmission speeds and extending its geographic coverage in particular at the intercontinental level by connectivity with Latin America, the Mediterranean region and Asia. Connectivity with Asia is ensured through the Trans Eurasia Information Network 2 (TEIN 2) and the ORIENT project. TEIN2 offers direct connectivity to GÉANT2, Europe's multi-gigabit network, and allows researchers from Asia to collaborate with their counterparts in Europe and thus to operate on a truly global scale. TEIN2 has been largely funded by the European Commission to consolidate a regional network. The developed partners in the Asia Pacific, not least the Republic of Korea, are investing in the network alongside the European Commission.

TEIN2 is the enabling factor for the Asia-Europe research collaboration. One recent example of successful collaboration between Asia and Europe is the use of the grid for drug discovery applications against the avian influenza virus. TEIN2 has therefore a powerful catalytic effect which will develop a strong long-term regional backbone and which can help Asia play a leading part in future global research collaboration.

Inclusive European Information Society

The last pillar of i2010 that I would like to mention is the promotion of an inclusive European information society. We try to make sure that ICT benefits all citizens, makes public services better with easier access at low costs, and improves the quality of life. ICT is becoming more widely used and is benefiting more people. But still over half of the EU population either does not reap these benefits in full or is effectively cut off from them. Korea shares many social challenges with the EU, in particular a rapidly ageing society and environmental/energy or sustainable development concerns. Reinforcing social, economic and territorial cohesion by making ICT products and services more accessible, including in regions lagging behind, is an imperative for all of us. In i2010 ICT flagship initiatives were selected to give critical mass to our work in important and visible areas where ICT has a positive impact on citizens in particular eHealth and digital libraries.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope you agree with me that regional integration in Europe and in Asia and the development of ICT influence and shape each other. I would also like to underline elements which are for me essential for a prosperous development of Europe and the Republic of Korea: research and dialogue on ICT. I am convinced that it is crucial that we work together to address the technology challenges of the future for the benefit of our citizens. Combining our efforts and complementing each other is of mutual benefit. There are a lot of opportunities for growth between our two regions and many new jobs can be created in these high potential sectors, if we work in synergy. I count that this is what we will be doing in the near future in this important field and in many others. Thank you very much for your attention.

Keynote Speech

*– ICT Co-opetition in East Asia:
Value Creation by Co-opetition in the Convergence Era*

Shin-Bae Kim

It is a great honor for me to have this opportunity to make a presentation at the East Asia IT Community Special Session of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. My theme is ICT (Information and Communications Technology) competition and cooperation in East Asia. First, I would like to define the current key word of ICT as convergence, and stress the need for ICT service providers and governments in East Asia to promote co-opetition in order to create new values in the convergence environment. Then, I would like to talk about what should be done to create such new values.

ICT has been the growth engine for economies in East Asia as it has created huge added value. It is also expected to continue to play a leading role in economic development in East Asia in the future. According to ITU statistics, as of 2005, East Asia and Europe have a similar number of mobile subscribers, as East Asia has about 704 million mobile subscribers and Europe has 683 million. However, the East Asian mobile communications market grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 40.6% from 2000 to 2005, while the European market expanded at a CAGR of 18.6% for the same period. A potential market size comparison based on population shows that East Asia has a huge 2 billion market, while Europe has an 800 million market, as of 2005.

In the 21st century, the most significant change in ICT is the emer-

gence of convergence, where industries, services, and networks are increasingly converged. ICT convergence has been facilitated based on technological advancement including the spread of digital information, connectivity expansion, faster processors, and longer battery life. However, in order to ensure that ICT convergence becomes the next growth engine for East Asia, we need something more than technological development.

In short, we need to provide new value to consumers who use services we develop. I believe that one of the ways for ICT service providers and governments in East Asia to maximize value creation in the convergence environment is “co-opetition,” which seeks both fair competition and effective cooperation.

I expect that co-opetition will enable the East Asian region to play a leading role in the global ICT industry and provide each nation in East Asia with a new growth opportunity. Now, I would like to focus on what governments and service providers should do in order to promote co-opetition. Co-opetition can be divided into three levels: inter-firm, inter-governmental, and government-firm.

Inter-Firm Co-opetition

First of all, as for inter-firm co-opetition in East Asia, ICT service providers should compete to innovate business models and cooperate within and across value chains to utilize comparative advantages. Let me talk about the need for inter-firm competition to innovate business models. In the convergence environment, ICT service providers should innovate their business models, going beyond the legacy business models, to survive and grow in the market. Innovation can be promoted, when service providers actively compete with one another to provide the value that consumers want both in the domestic and international markets.

The value consumers want can be simply defined as access to any service from any platform whenever and wherever. For example, MelOn, a monthly music rental service offered by SK Telecom, pro-

vides subscribers with as many as 1.35 million pieces of music. MelOn is a ubiquitous music service and a typical convergence service that combines two different services of music and communications. MelOn creates new consumer value as it allows consumers to listen to or download music from a variety of devices such as mobile phones, PCs, and MP3 players via wired and wireless networks.

MelOn reminds us of the importance of consumer-oriented value innovation and the fact that we had been stuck in the supplier-oriented perspective to provide all the functions from a single integrated device. The reason why MelOn successfully offered music to consumers via various devices was that telecom operators collaborated with the music industry in sourcing music, while closely cooperating with device manufacturers in adopting digital rights management (DRM).

As for the existing services provided in a new way, a good example is Mobile TV, one of the new services in the spotlight in ICT convergence. "TU," Korea's DMB (Digital Mobile Broadcasting) service, has now 1.16 million paid subscribers and offers subscribers 15 video channels and 20 audio channels. TU is not positioned as a simple alternative to traditional broadcasting, but a brand-new TV watching environment. "TU" offers users a new experience of "the media that I enjoy on my own" as well as a new TV watching environment for digital broadcasting with high quality video and audio.

Convergence literally means that the ICT industry works together with other industries to provide more affordable and convenient services to customers. Therefore, ICT service providers should cooperate with other industry players within and across ICT value chains to ensure that each player makes the most of its capabilities and maximizes mutual benefits.

In particular, the ICT industry in East Asia has a huge potential that can create mutual benefits by taking advantage of specialization and comparative advantages of each nation. Korea and Japan have expertise and experience in network operation and service offerings, while China has the vast consumer market and it is so competitive in manufacturing finished goods that it is called "the world's factory."

As for the "TU" service I mentioned earlier, it was possible to be

serviced to users because communications service providers and media service providers in the ICT value chain were eager to cooperate. Also, a satellite for DMB service was successfully launched thanks to the cross-border collaboration between SK Telecom in Korea and MCo in Japan. In the future, new services such as U-payment will be able to be adopted in the East Asian market, only when various players including communications service providers, financial institutions, retailers, and broadcasting service providers collaborate with one another.

Inter-Governmental Co-opetition

Second, let me move on to ICT co-opetition among governments in East Asia. Governments in East Asia should not only compete to lay the institutional framework to help service providers in their own country become the world leaders, but also cooperate to support the East Asian region to lead the global ICT market of the next generation. Each government should eliminate regulations hampering the convergence environment in order to lay the institutional framework to help leading service providers in its own country become the global market leaders. As for Korea, China, and Japan, each has a leading ICT service provider in the domestic market. The governments should establish a policy framework for a new competition landscape to help the leading service provider in its own country become the world leader, not just the national champion.

Some developed countries have already shifted to a “horizontal regulatory framework,” where networks and content are separately regulated. They have expanded service categories and reduced entry barriers by revising the telecommunications law. They are also making efforts to increase transparency and predictability in regulations. Therefore, governments in East Asia should also compete with one another to develop industrial policy to nurture world leaders and pursue de-regulation to ensure that regulations are not obstacles to innovation in the ICT industry.

In addition, East Asian countries should reinforce government-level

cooperation in technology standardization and joint R&D projects to make sure that the East Asian region leads the ICT market of the next generation. In this sense, it is desirable that since 2002, ICT ministers of Korea, China, and Japan have held the “East Asia (CJK) ICT Summit,” to meet together on a regular basis to discuss various ICT issues including the next-generation mobile communications, the next-generation internet, RFID, digital broadcasting, and telecommunications service policy.

In order to establish an East Asian ICT community based on a government-level cooperation, East Asian countries should focus on standardization of networks and platform technology to achieve economies of scale. In particular, if Korea, China, and Japan cooperate in the process of 4G technology standardization, they will be able to achieve economies of scale and lead the global market.

Joint R&D projects are needed for standardization of the next-generation ICT technology including the 4G. Establishing a joint R&D center or a test-bed can be an option to facilitate standardization.

Government-Firm Cooperation

Third, for cross-border collaboration for a win-win strategy for local governments and foreign ICT service providers, governments should first define clear objectives for the ICT industry of their own countries and select a strategic foreign partner for the objectives, if necessary. At the same time, foreign ICT service providers should be positioned as an insider contributing to development of the local ICT industry in the long term.

Each government should make a decision on whether it needs a strategic foreign partner considering the objectives of the ICT industry of its country. In the convergence era, connectivity and mobility are increasingly important in the way of life in Asia. Considering that the penetration rate of mobile communications is higher than that of fixed communications in Asia, mobile-oriented infrastructure is likely to dominate the Asian communications landscape. In this regard, the cri-

teria to select a strategic partner can be the capability to meet consumers' needs for ubiquity.

In particular, the reason why regional collaboration in mobile communication service within East Asia can be relatively easily made is that both the private and public sectors of Korea and Japan are very active in introducing and applying new technology and standards. Also, as other East Asian countries have less legacy burden in network and platforms than countries in North America and Europe, they can easily adopt new technology or standards.

Governments also need to change their traditional attitude to see foreign firms as simple capital and technology providers. Rather, they need to view foreign firms as long-term partners who can contribute to the introduction and penetration of new services. In this sense, ICT service providers with experience in development and commercialization of advanced services should be given more opportunity to share their knowledge with other countries. A good example of government-firm cooperation is the TD-SCDMA project, which is jointly carried out by the National Development and Reform Commission of China and SK Telecom of Korea with the objective of sharing Korea's experience in the world's first CDMA technology commercialization with China.

On the other hand, ICT service providers that want to advance into other East Asian markets need to seek insider positioning to share the benefits of industrial growth with the local industry and governments. Foreign partners need to recognize that advanced technology and huge capital investment is not the only way to positioning as an insider in the local market. Another way is to contribute to the development of the ICT industry and society of the nation where they do business with a long-term commitment.

A good example of attempts to become an insider in the local market is SK Telecom's efforts to be localized in the Vietnamese market. SK Telecom has educated and trained local staff of S-Fone, the Vietnamese counterpart, to help them become the leader of the Vietnamese ICT industry in the future, and plans to launch a Training and Technology Transfer Contract (TTTC) to facilitate technological know-how transfer. In addition, SK Telecom has undertaken corporate social responsibility

in Vietnam by supporting libraries in major universities, building primary schools, providing scholarships to students who study IT overseas, and launching Operation Smile, which provides financial aid for surgery for children with facial deformities.

Conclusion

As I mentioned earlier, the ICT industry in East Asia should continue to serve as a growth engine by creating new value for consumers. I believe that one of the most effective ways for governments and ICT service providers in East Asia to offer new consumer value through ICT convergence is co-opetition, which seeks both fair competition and active cooperation. I hope the ICT industry will increase business efficiency and improve the quality of life in East Asia by promoting co-opetition in the market. Thank you.

Opening Remarks

Tae-Hwan Kim

Today, I would sincerely like to convey my deepest welcome to all of you attending the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. In particular, I would like to extend a welcome to the political, economic, and academic leaders who have joined us from all over the world. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to our distinguished guests for showing their exceptional benevolence towards Jeju and their offering of congratulations upon this significant event. Joining us are the honorable former Philippine President, Fidel Ramos; former Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov; former Japanese Prime Minister, Kaifu Tishiki; and Chairman of Teltschik Associates GmbH, Horst M. Teltschik. I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to their boundless efforts to promote peace and to strengthen cooperation in global exchanges.

The Jeju Peace Forum was launched with our common goal of prosperity and peace both on the Korean peninsula and throughout the broader East Asian region. It is my belief that the Jeju Peace Forum offers a significant dialogue towards the establishment of a new order of peace in the East Asian region, as a movement towards the genuine and substantive end of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.

In particular, I would like to call your attention to a strategy of great importance adopted by the 4th Forum. This strategy is developed by learning from the experiences of the European Union and applies those experiences towards the establishment of peace in the East Asian region. Europe has transcended its ideological conflicts and is moving

forward towards the creation of a unified and peaceful Europe. Today's Europe offers the world many lessons on many different levels, and we, in East Asia, ought to learn from the European vision of the future. With such a wind of change blowing towards East Asia, it is time for us to measure up and move towards a collective peace.

The entire East Asian community must pursue peace from a foundation of trust and goodwill. Distinguished guests, on January 27, 2005, the Korean government proclaimed Jeju as the 'Island of World Peace.' And the people of Jeju have learned that peace does not come only with shallow slogans. Instead, there is a price that must be paid for peace. Jeju was an early victim of the Cold War, as it suffered the hardships of having a number of its innocent residents slaughtered in 1948. The people of Jeju have forgiven and granted pardon for the ravages of those times, and as an alternative to the continuation of conflicts and confrontations, Jeju is becoming a new ground for peace through the endeavors of reconciliation and mutualism. History often repeats itself, but we now have the option of taking a new course. Thus in order not to return to our desolate past, Jeju is taking the true path towards peace.

We shall not limit ourselves in what we can do for world peace. Jeju will serve as a venue and a stepping stone towards discussing and solving a range of crises and conflicts that humanity now faces from war to poverty to conflicts between different cultures. From a foundation of peace between humans, we will foster our desire to fully realize the island of world peace where humans and nature co-exist harmoniously. Such a mission can be fulfilled when harmony exists between Jeju's human and natural world, which is being considered as a future World Natural Heritage site.

Distinguished guests, while we are currently enjoying a state of peace, the potential for war looms over us like a double faced coin. This can be seen by the fact that there have been only 26 days of world peace since 1945. Nevertheless, a healthier future can unfold if we work together and, consequently, we can attain a more resilient peace than anything humanity has known.

I sincerely hope that the Jeju Peace Forum can offer us a significant

opportunity to bring about sustainable peace and prosperity. I would like to close by asking for your continued interest in and attention to this Forum. I wish every one of you a memorable time during your stay in Jeju.

Welcoming Remarks

Cae-One Kim

His Excellency President Roh Moo-Hyun, Governor of the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum Kim Tae Hwan, Distinguished Guests, Excellencies, Colleagues, and Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my great honor and pleasure to welcome all of you to the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. On behalf of the International Peace Foundation and the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI), I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to all those who are attending this forum despite busy schedules, especially at the beginning of the vacation season.

The 4th Jeju Peace Forum is organized by JPI as part of the International Peace Foundation. As you are all aware, President Roh designated Jeju as an “Island of World Peace” back in January 2005. Fully sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, JPI was established to realize this vision. The fundamental goal is to contribute to world peace by facilitating security cooperation, promoting peace, and fostering the economic integration of the region.

Dearest distinguished guests, the grand theme of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum is ‘Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: Exploring the European Experience.’ First of all, the Forum will provide an opportunity to explore the possibility of applying the lessons of the European experience to the issues of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia from a broad perspective. In line with this focus, many in-

depth discussions regarding measures for enhancing economic as well as political, diplomatic, and security cooperation in Northeast Asia will be dealt with. Especially, special Session II on "IT Cooperation in Northeast Asia" will closely examine the possibility of a Northeast Asian IT Community.

In the Forum, world-wide political, diplomatic, and media leaders as well as internationally well-known scholars and experts on various issues gather to share their opinions during the three days of the forum. I sincerely hope that, through lively discussion, the 4th Peace Forum will successfully end with productive and practical suggestions for achieving peace and prosperity in East Asia. Thank you and welcome again all of you to this forum. I hope you will enjoy the beautiful and spectacular scenes of Jeju, "The Island of World Peace," and enjoy a moment of relaxation even though your schedule during the forum may be very tight.

Lastly, I would like to conclude my welcoming message by expressing how grateful I am to those who made this forum possible, especially the ROK Ambassador for International Security, professor Moon Chung-in; Executive Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum, Ambassador Kwon Youngmin; and other members of the Organizing Committee. Thank you very much for your support for the forum. Let us all celebrate the beginning of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum with a big applause! Thank you!



*Visions of Peace and Prosperity
in East Asia*

Keynote Speech

The Challenge of the Times in East Asia:
The Quest for Peace and Prosperity

Harmony, Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia:
Exploring Historical Experiences

Visions of Peace and Prosperity in East Asia

Challenges to Security and Stability in Northeast Asia

German Unification and the European Union:
Implications for Korean Unification and Northeast Asia
Community Building

Challenges for the Next US President in Northeast Asia

Keynote Speech

Moo-hyun Roh

Distinguished former President, Fidel Valdez Ramos of the Philippines; former Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu of Japan; former Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov of Russia; Governor, Kim, Tae-Hwan of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and guests from home and abroad. I congratulate you on the opening of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. I wholeheartedly welcome all the participants who came from afar. Jeju is an island of beauty and peace where everyone wants to visit and to stay as long as possible.

This island, however, sustained an unspeakable tragedy 59 years ago when tens of thousands of people were victimized under the unfortunate history caused by Cold War rivalries and the division of the country. The Government belatedly embarked on a truth-finding investigation into the heartbreaking incident only after a half century had already passed. I made an official apology in 2003 on behalf of the Government for the illicit exercise of power by authorities in the past. Then, Jeju citizens responded with a spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation.

With the aim of translating the unfortunate historic experience into a spirit of reconciliation and peace, we designated Jeju as the Island of World Peace in 2005 while empowering the island to take the lead in the peace-making process for the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. I hope this forum will give rise to opportunities for Jeju to further solidify its standing as the Island of World Peace once again and to disseminate the spirit of peace throughout the world.

Distinguished participants, the theme of the forum is “Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia,” which is also one of the most important guiding principles of our Participatory Government, and which constitutes the basis of its foreign and security policies as well. Just before I was inaugurated as President, the so-called second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted, plunging the security environment surrounding Northeast Asia into an unpredictable tense situation of zero visibility. In response to the US decision to halt oil shipments, the North removed seals and surveillance equipment from its nuclear facilities and expelled the IAEA nuclear inspectors from the country. At that time, even talk of a possible military strike by the United States percolated. Concerns over the North reached another peak last July and October when the country first test fired missiles and then conducted a nuclear test.

Preventing the situation from being blown out of proportion, the Participatory Government has brought inter-Korean relations under stable management with consistent principles. With a firm policy of “peace first,” we have worked toward building trust with the North through dialogue and persuasion while rising to the challenge of political difficulties at home and patiently restraining any hostile action in response. The North Korean nuclear issue is now moving on to take the path to peaceful resolution. The North recently invited back the IAEA delegation after the stalemate stemming from frozen North Korean funds in Banco Delta Asia finally came to an end. The initial steps delineated in the February 13 Agreement are now being implemented. The Six-Party Talks are also likely to resume soon.

Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation have vastly improved as well. More than 100,000 people traveled between the two Koreas last year, and inter-Korean trade is forecast to reach US\$1.7 billion this year. In the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, there are currently 15,000 North Korean workers working with South Korean entrepreneurs, and their number will rise to 70,000 once the first phase of the industrial park is completed. What once used to be a North Korean strategic military post has been reborn as the nexus of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Last month, trains crossed the DMZ and ran along the Seoul-

Sinuiju and East Coast Lines for the first time since the division of the peninsula.

All these events took place against the backdrop of confrontation and tension stemming from hard-line sentiment toward North Korea within and outside South Korea in the wake of the North's test-launch of missiles and its nuclear test. What has been achieved despite these circumstances is the fruit of our efforts to persuade North Korea and build trust by showing tolerance and patience to the maximum extent possible. My government will continue to hold fast to the principle of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.

Fellow participants, my government is moving forward with a peace policy that looks far ahead. Looking far beyond the existing narrow confines of inter-Korean relations and the ROK-US alliance, the Participatory Government plans for a future order in Northeast Asia shaped by changing circumstances in relations between Japan, China and Russia. In this way, we seek to bring security in the present and future into harmony. In Northeast Asia, there remains a residual bitterness over history and ideology that has arisen from years of imperialism and the Cold War era. Unless the mistrust and instability concerning the potential confrontation among the US, Japan, China, and Russia are clearly resolved, the arms race among them might continue and escalate.

Northeast Asia needs to address its confrontational approach at its core. Unless the region establishes a community of peace, it stands no chance of becoming a center of civilization no matter how much it develops economically. Each nation in Northeast Asia needs to look beyond its own self-interest and make an effort to create an order of coexistence through mutual respect and cooperation. This is the basis of the idea for the era of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia that we have pursued. With this vision in mind, the Korean Government has coped with the issue of the North Korean nuclear program in the context of broad concerns about peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This approach has focused on delivering a fundamental resolution of the issues surrounding peace and security in Northeast Asia, as opposed to merely dismantling North Korea's nuclear

program.

It is my belief that the Six-Party Talks, even after the North Korean nuclear issue is settled, should be developed into a multilateral consultative body devoted to peace and security cooperation in Northeast Asia on the strength of its experience and capacity for resolving the nuclear problem. The consultative body should function as a permanent multilateral security cooperative organization that will control armaments and mediate disputes in Northeast Asia where competition in an arms race is feared. We already included this aspiration in the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement.

The Northeast Asian cooperative organization should not limit its functions to only security matters. It should evolve into cooperation in logistics, energy, intra-regional free trade and monetary and financial policies, ultimately putting a Northeast Asian economic community in place. Another task that has to be solved for the future of Northeast Asia is the history issue involving Korea, China and Japan. More than anything else, Japan is called upon to change its recognition of past history as well as its attitude. It should reflect on its past sincerely, and demonstrate clearly that it does not have any intention of repeating what it did to other countries by changing its behavior so that it corresponds to the apologies it has offered a number of times. Since resolution of history issues will require a long time, they may be able to be tackled as we endeavor to bring about a regional economic community.

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, the evolution process of the EU gives Northeast Asia ample guidance for its future course of action. Reeling from World War II, European countries embarked on the Helsinki Process to realize the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe while launching the European Coal and Steel Community with a view to eventually inaugurating the European Union; the European experience should serve as a good model for Northeast Asia. Also the German experience of thoroughly reflecting on its past, settling issues and publishing joint history textbooks should give Northeast Asian countries a good clue on how to go about resolving history issues.

An integrated regional community will signal the dawn of a new era in Northeast Asian history, indeed, contributing to world peace and common prosperity. The first step is to advance the peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The most urgent thing to do is realize denuclearization of the peninsula without delay. The armistice regime that is more than half a century old will have to be turned into a peace regime as well. Normalization of diplomatic ties between Pyongyang and Washington and between Pyongyang and Tokyo will have to be pushed, too. Through bringing about peace on the peninsula, the last relic of the Cold War, Northeast Asia will have established a firm foundation for regional economic and security collaboration.

There is no doubt in my mind that a new, bright future is in store for Northeast Asia. We all have to work together to carry out the September 19 Joint Statement and February 13, 2007, Agreement, the two milestones laid by the Six-Party Talks; in this way, we will nurture our hopes for peace. I expect that the Jeju Peace Forum will yield many viable ideas for materializing the peace process on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. I am grateful to Jeju citizens as well as the staff and affiliates of the International Peace Foundation and East Asia Foundation for preparing such a nice meeting. Thank you.

The Challenge of the Times in East Asia: The Quest for Peace and Prosperity

Hae-Chan Lee

Your Excellency Fidel Ramos, former president of the Philippines, Your Excellency Kaifu Toshiki, former prime minister of Japan, Your Excellency Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, former prime minister of Russia, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, as former Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, I sincerely welcome you to Jeju-do, the Island of World Peace. For centuries, Jeju-do has been such a peaceful island that it was known as, “Sam-moodo,” or “the island without three things” — thieves, beggars and gates—and its beautiful scenery has made it a favorite destination not only for foreign tourists, but also the favorite meeting place for summit talks held in Korea.

In 2005, when I was serving as Prime Minister, the Korean government declared Jeju the Island of World Peace. Since then, the Korean government has worked in many ways to make the island into a focal point for efforts to bring about world peace. The people of Jeju-do also hope that the island, which is located between China, Japan and the Korean peninsula, will play an important role in creating a framework for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. I would like to ask the distinguished guests attending this forum to share with the world the endeavors that the Korean people, and especially the Jeju islanders, are making to establish world peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, the most basic things that all human beings need are communal security and the material necessities required to

sustain our lives. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of mankind is the history of our collective efforts to secure peace and the necessities of life for our families and our communities. I don't think we can say whether peace is more important than material necessities because both are essential to our survival. However, if we were forced to put one before the other, then I would say that peace is more fundamental because, as history has shown, people are more than capable of creating the material foundations of their society once peace has been secured. The history of mankind has taught us that, beyond national and continental boundaries, the eras of greatest prosperity and cultural achievement were also eras of peace. Although there have been no periods of world history when prosperity has been secured through plunder and war, there are countless examples of societies which have been prosperous and culturally creative because their peace and security have been guaranteed. Therefore, I believe that, without a doubt, global peace is the most basic precondition for the wealth and prosperity of all mankind.

Distinguished guests, I have been observing the European Union for a long time because I see it as a model for securing international peace, at least at the regional level. This ongoing experiment represents the most ambitious attempt to build a framework for peace and prosperity on a continental scale since the peaceful time of the Roman Empire. As you are well aware, for the 15 centuries following the collapse of the "Pax Romana," the history of Europe was a history of constant warfare, and the two major wars of the 20th century — wars that were so great in scope that they are known as "world wars" — originated in Europe. But Western Europe, whose conflicts ignited the Second World War, has put the tragedy of war behind it. It has established a common political, economic and cultural community and is now making progress toward an era of unprecedented wealth and prosperity.

As with Rome, though, the European Union was not built in a day. In the early 1950s, the Europeans began to think about what they had learned from this history of war and violence and how they could go about seeking peace and integration. Then, in 1952 six nations gathered

to found the European Coal and Steel Community, which gave birth to the European Economic Community in 1957 and eventually paved the way for a peaceful and united Europe. One thing is clear: the European Economic Community was established to secure political unity as much as economic integration. Dr. Walter Hallstein, the first president of the EEC, declared that “We are not just integrating economies, we are integrating politics. We are not just sharing furniture; we are building a new and bigger house.” I believe this statement accurately describes the European hopes for peace. These European efforts ultimately bore fruit when the European Commission was reborn as the European Union in 1997. Certainly, many more things can be done to strengthen the European Union internally, and obstacles still need to be removed in order to go beyond a union of sovereign states to create a truly unified Europe. However, there is no doubt that the people of Europe are advancing toward a greater goal — building a peaceful Europe, and ultimately, a European Federation.

In comparison to Europe, East Asia has yet to take even the first step towards regional unity. Perhaps the past 60 years has not been enough time to leave behind the savagery of imperialism, overcome political chaos, and achieve economic development. The scars and mutual distrust resulting from imperialism, war, and the Cold War may well be so deep that we can not yet talk seriously about regional peace. The issues of “comfort women” and nuclear development in North Korea, which have recently drawn much attention worldwide, are powerful examples that clearly show how deep such scars can go and how long they can take to heal.

However, I think that it is time for East Asia to seriously start seeking ways to establish peace throughout the region. The level of economic cooperation and cultural exchange among the countries of East Asia is not far behind that of the countries of Europe, and even within the divided Korean peninsula, which is the last remnant of the Cold War in the region, the February 13th Agreement has brought about progress toward the nuclear disarmament of North Korea and peace in the region. Thanks to the sincere efforts of the countries that participated in the Six-Party Talks, we were able last week to resolve the issue of

Banco Delta Asia's transfer of money to North Korea. This will soon be followed by the IAEA inspections and further six-party discussion on related issues, and we expect that this will lead to the destruction of North Korea's nuclear capacity. Soon there will be another round of the Six-Party Talks at the ministerial level, and this will be followed by a meeting of the ministers of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China to discuss further steps towards ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.

I am optimistic about the results of all of these conferences, and I sincerely hope that both the summit talks between North and South Korea, which I expect will take place later this summer, and the four-party summit will together lay a strong foundation for peace on the Korean peninsula. If everything goes well, the six-party conference will create the framework for a multilateral-security system that will ensure peace in Northeast Asia. I will do my utmost to bring about this result. Should the multilateral security system proceed well together with the mutual FTA that has been seriously considered by many East Asian countries lately, then in the very near future we will have the emergence of an East Asia FTA, namely EFTA. I am confident that historians of the future will mark the next decade as a turning point for the beginning of the era of East Asian peace and prosperity.

Ladies and gentlemen, the economic and cultural potential of East Asia, Northeast Asia including Russia and the ASEAN nations, is truly great. The region accounts for one-third of the world's population, and its economic, military and technological capability are equal to that of both North America and Europe. If permanent peace can be established in East Asia, which is currently experiencing extremely rapid economic growth and cultural change, it will soon economically outperform these other two regional economies. The most critical factor in realizing this vision is mutual trust. Confucius, whose wisdom is the common heritage of the nations of East Asia, spoke 2,500 years ago of trust as the most vital element in politics. Today, greater mutual trust among the countries of East Asia is the most important precondition for peace and prosperity. Once a degree of mutual trust has been established in the region, the movement to establish a collective security sys-

tem and a more integrated economic community will gain greater momentum. We will then be able to heal the scars of the 20th century and begin a new era of peace and prosperity in East Asia.

The experience of the European Union is the theme in this year's Jeju Peace Forum. As we look at the European Union as a model, let us join forces to turn East Asia into a better, more advanced model that can be emulated by the countries in Southwest Asia, South America and Africa in the not-too-distant future. Let this moment be recorded in the history of the 21st century as the starting point for peace and prosperity in East Asia. Those living today must overcome the challenges that they face so that the next generation can surmount the even greater challenges of tomorrow. Laying a foundation for peace and prosperity in East Asia is, I believe, the challenge of the age that must be faced successfully by the people of East Asia today.

I hope the Jeju Peace Forum will provide an opportunity to sow the seeds of future peace, and I'd like to express my gratitude both to the people of Jeju-do for inviting me to this island of peace for such an important gathering and to the leaders and distinguished guests for their attention. Thank you.

*Harmony, Peace and Prosperity
in Northeast Asia:
Exploring Historical Experiences*

Fidel Valdez Ramos

Introduction

The controversy over North Korea's nuclear ambitions seems to have died down, at least for the moment. The Six-Party Talks have, at long last, become surprisingly successful — thanks, apparently, to China's bottom-line opposition to Northeast Asia's nuclearization. Under the aegis of the Six-Party umbrella, Washington and Pyongyang have even been able to hold the bilateral talks that North Korea's Kim, Jong-Il covets — as a token of his graduation to a leader of international rank. Just now, Northeast Asia is temporarily calmer and less unstable. But it remains a potential flashpoint of conflict.

South Korea Beginning Own Course

Meanwhile, an increasingly self-confident South Korea (whose GDP is already larger than that of the whole of ASEAN) is beginning to chart a course independent of its American patron. But, it may not have been entirely passive in the face of North Korea's nuclear provocations. In November 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

accused Seoul of having enriched a tiny amount of uranium — to a level close to what would be useful in an atomic weapon. The ROK Government denied the experiments had its blessings, explaining that these were carried out by academic researchers “for scientific interest, without the knowledge of the Government.”

If Japan is moving closer to the US, South Korea may be moving closer to China — as Korean nationalists join the Chinese in venting their historical anger against the Japanese over rival claims to potential hydrocarbon deposits in the East China Sea and in the Sea of Japan. Apart from a harmonious surge in Seoul-Beijing relations, analysts also discern a creeping reconciliation between the two Koreas, which contrasts with apparently increasing strains between Seoul and Washington. New generations of South Koreans — who have no personal recollections of, and perhaps only casual interest in, the Korean War — apparently resent what they regard as Washington’s undermining of Seoul’s efforts to reconcile with Pyongyang under a “sunshine policy.”

Japan’s Most Immediate Concern

For Japan, North Korea’s missile capability is the most immediate concern. But a sweeping defense review that Tokyo recently carried out reaffirms Japan will continue to ban the possession of nuclear arms by its immediate neighbors. Of course, Japan itself already possesses nuclear technology — and the solid-fuel missiles to match. Not military self-sufficiency but the strongest ties with the US provide the basis for Japan’s present-day core defense strategy. Senior statesman, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, clearly articulated Japan’s security concerns in his summation at the East Asia Senior Leaders’ Forum (EASLF) at Fukuoka in April, thus:

“It is desirable that the existing Six-Party Talks remain an effective platform for resolving the North Korean nuclear development issue. North Korea, for its part, should refrain from practicing brinkmanship diplomacy, learn lessons from the development of China and South Korea, and consider seriously how it

can become self-reliant. Should this happen, a peaceful and stable order can be formed in Northeast Asia. We think it is important for each country in the region to intensify efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to work together to persuade North Korea to behave in a responsible manner for the security of the region. The stability of Northeast Asia is indispensable for the security of East Asia and the establishment of the East Asian Community. It is very important in this connection to hold regular summit meetings among the leaders of Japan, South Korea and China, and to establish close relations between these three countries, as well as with the countries of Southeast Asia."

Viewing the larger Asia-Pacific region, Nakasone stressed:

"We recognize the reality that the alliance between Japan and the United States and that between South Korea and the United States, security cooperation among ASEAN countries as well as between individual ASEAN countries and the United States, play a foundational role in ensuring the security of East Asia. Additionally, we hope a broader security network will be established through the fostering of the functions of the ASEAN Regional Forum and through confidence-building measures in the East Asia region and in the larger Asia-Pacific region."

Basic Lesson from the E.U.: A Common Purpose

All in all, the calmer situation in Northeast Asia might seem to be a fragile basis for creating long-term peace and prosperity in this region, but not if we consider the history of Western Europe over this last half-century. For, after fighting three great wars in 70 years, Europe's greatest powers — France and Germany — have made conflict unthinkable between them. And the basic lesson from Western Europe is this: The only lasting solution to conflict is to embed neighbor-countries in dense networks of economic, political, and security relationships — and the building of regional communities that serve their mutual interests. Given the increasing destructiveness of new weapon-systems, *Community* must become the wave of the future — if humankind is to survive and enjoy a bountiful future at all.

As visionary leaders, Western Europe's post-World War II generation of statesmen — Monnet and Schuman of France, Adenauer of West Germany, de Gasperi of Italy — did not start by calling for a wholesale abrogation of national sovereignty. Their basic principle in building Western Europe's economic and political unity, Robert Schuman (who was Prime Minister in 1947-48) expressed memorably:

“Europe will not be built in a day, or as part of an overall design. It will be built through the practical achievements that first create a sense of common purpose.”

Accordingly, what was to become the European Union started modestly — inconspicuously, in fact — with the integration of the industries of France and Germany that had been most directly associated with war production — first, coal and steel; and then, atomic energy? Then, bit by bit, economic integration progressed: through a customs union, a common external tariff, and the beginnings of a shared economic policy. Only after economic integration was well along did the first serious efforts at political integration take place: first, through a common Assembly and a High Court, and then through an Executive Commission and Council of Ministers. (A premature effort to set up a Defense Community failed in 1954). As integration deepened, membership in the Community was enlarged gradually — until the European Union had spread deep into Eastern Europe and southward into the Mediterranean states. Since then, the European model has inspired other regional communities, as peoples everywhere acquired an enhanced awareness of their common future.

We have all come to realize that anarchic forces threaten every state in the world-system; and that all of us must become concerned by poverty, disease, oppression, terrorism, and despair anywhere. To protect themselves from these destructive forces, individual states must attune their policies to those of neighbor-states and to global developments — if they are to deal effectively with problems that go beyond national boundaries. This is why we are seeing everywhere in the world the spread of regional movements toward Federation, Commu-

nity and, ultimately, Union — starting from Western Europe, to Southeast Asia, to Latin and North America, Africa, and then to South, West, and East Asia.

Meanwhile, the world continues to track the progress of European solidarity: the E.U.'s steady enlargement; its launch of a common currency; and its effort to agree on a "Common Security and Foreign Policy," to include a European Armed Forces separate from NATO. Given the excesses of 'dog-eat-dog' Anglo-Saxon competitive capitalism, the European concept of the "social market" is also generating acceptance — as a model of how to reconcile the workings of global markets with society's need for a measure of equity, justice, and compassion for those that development leaves behind. The rejection — by French and Dutch voters — of the E.U.'s draft Constitution reminds us all of how difficult it is to balance national diversity and supranational unity. But a Union such as Europe's should certainly be strong enough to withstand the occasional "No" from its national constituencies.

Integration in East Asia and the Market System

In East Asia, integration is being fostered primarily by the market system, which most of our countries have adopted, despite their differing political systems. Now that the 10 Southeast Asian States have been gathered into ASEAN — and are promulgating an ASEAN Charter — the concept of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) that would incorporate the ASEAN States and the three Northeast Asian States of China, Japan, and (a presumably unified and nuclear-free) Korea is progressing steadily. The initial phase of this grand ambition — a Free Trade Area between ASEAN-10 and China — started in 2004, and should be completed by 2010. And, concurrently, ASEAN-10 plus Japan FTA is being negotiated. India, too, has manifested interest, since 2005, in an ASEAN-10 plus India free trade configuration.

If the prescription of Community is to apply to Northeast Asia's aches and pains, the region must start from scratch. Alone among the Asian regions, it has no regional organization handy. (Analysts have

suggested institutionalizing the ad hoc Six-Party Talks). North Korea would have to be drawn out of its isolation without applying a replay of the East German social explosion that toppled the Berlin Wall. This is why Northeast Asia needs a concert of powers to sustain the fragile stability it has won for itself — if only for the time being. But the two halves of the Korean people must begin the work of reconciliation and community building on their own initiative. As Paris and Bonn did in 1952, so must Seoul and Pyongyang resolve face-to-face the roots of their differences — just as Kim, Dae-jung tried to do, through his talks with Kim, Jong Il in the North Korean capital, in June 2000.

Popular dialogues, too, must begin — in which ordinary people could take part. The people of the North — atomized by their totalitarian regime — must regain their solidarity. Trade, investment, tourism, and technology transfer must intensify across the 38th Parallel. Economics must once again outflank politics. Every weapon in the global armory of community-building must be deployed to bring about enduring peace and prosperity to Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the instruments for a larger Asia-Pacific economic community have already been laid — starting with APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Beyond economic integration, however, is the imperative for durable peace and security.

Over these next 10-15 years, the task for our statesmen would be to replace the American Peace (or *Pax Americana*) that has enforced stability in the Asia-Pacific region with a *Pax Asia-Pacifica*. Unlike the American Peace — which is at bottom exclusively based on America's military might — an Asia-Pacific Peace would be the peace of virtual equals. A shift from *Pax Americana* (or peace and security guaranteed by the power of American arms) to a *Pax Asia-Pacifica* in our region could well be the answer to which the major countries and sub-regional blocs contribute and share in the maintenance of Asia-Pacific security and stability. The common geopolitical threats against all of us are international terrorism, the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the instability arising out of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, the protracted war in Iraq, and the current structural fissures in the U.N. system.

As regional neighbors and partners, we now should exploit the convergence of interests that the United States; Japan; China; India; Russia; ASEAN; Canada; a unified, nuclear weapon-free Korea; Pakistan; Australia-New Zealand; and others share in a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific — just as the western Europeans exploited the Cold War stalemate between the US and the USSR to consolidate and expand the European Union. The overstretched US forces in various hotspots — Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea, Haiti — plus the insistent clamor of Americans for better homeland security against terrorism and more effective public safety mechanisms in the aftermath of hurricane “Katrina” provides the irrefutable rationale for a deep restructuring of Asia-Pacific security. An important offshoot of all this could be a lighter burden on US taxpayers by the reduction of defense expenditures. In the next decade, it is foreseen that neither Uncle Sam nor the United Nations can be depended upon to provide — by themselves — the effective mechanisms for human security everywhere.

The Pacific Peace will be a security cooperation based not on the “balance of power” but on the “balance of mutual benefit.” Clearly, this concept will involve burden-sharing by all nations in the Asia-Pacific in contributing forces to insure the region’s peace and security, and will have to be built on a cooperative understanding among the most affluent, and most powerful, countries in our part of the world — the United States, Japan, China, and South Korea. Enduring harmony, peace and property in the entire Asia-Pacific region, not just in Northeast Asia, should be our higher ambition. Thank you and *Mabuhay* — Best wishes!

Visions of Peace and Prosperity in East Asia

Toshiki Kaifu

My relationship with former President Ramos began long ago. I was part of the first group from the Japanese Youth Overseas Party, and was sent to the Philippines. This took place forty years ago. I visited the farmlands near Mt. Apo on Mindanao Island with my colleagues Mr. Konoyohei and Mr. Hujinami Dakai. Even more memorably, in 1992, after I finished my term as Prime Minister, I attended President Ramos's inauguration ceremony as the representative from Japan. I've also known former Prime Minister Primakov for a long time. We met often during the London summit meeting of 1991. During the Gulf War, Prime Minister Primakov took a leading role in trying to end the fighting by meeting with Saddam Hussein. I also met Prime Minister Lee, Hae-Chan in 2002 in Japan. We had a productive meeting during his visit.

My fellow participants, I am very thankful for being given this opportunity to speak at and take part in the 4th Jeju Peace Forum. I sincerely hope that this meeting on the beautiful island of Jeju will have a lasting effect. Before I go any further, I would like to say something about my history with Korea. I was elected to the Japanese Diet in 1960 as its youngest ever member. My young colleagues and I shared a first goal of building peaceful and friendly relationships with our neighboring countries. At the time, Japan had no basic agreement with Korea, but I was able to visit various parts of Korea with assistance from the Korean National Assembly, sharing our views together. I also visited

the 38th parallel. After the establishment of a basic agreement, I spoke in Japan about the role of the peaceful diplomacy among young generation in reaching the agreement. This was over forty years ago. Afterwards, when I was prime minister in 1990, I met with former president Roh, Tae-Woo over the fingerprinting problem with Japanese-Koreans. The resolution of the problem improved relations between our countries. The Korean government requested that Japanese-Koreans follow the law and act as good citizens.

There is a vital step which must be taken to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This is the resolution of the ongoing conflict on the Korean peninsula. The issue of kidnapping is a significant problem between Japan and North Korea that has yet to be resolved. South Korea and North Korea have a similar problem. In order to solve the problem and normalize relations with North Korea, Japan has confirmed the intent to resolve the problem in the Pyongyang Declaration during the Six-Party Talks. This was not an easy task, but we expect North Korea's sincere and speedy response. I believe that in speaking of Northeast Asian peace and security, it would be well to speak of peace and security on the Korean peninsula as the same thing. The progress that has been made during the six-party talks by South Korea and the other participants is a positive trend. We strongly urge North Korea to implement its initial promises.

This year is the 400th anniversary of the Chosun Embassy to Japan. My Japanese ancestors received many cultural gifts from the Korean peninsula long ago. I believe that such personal exchanges are important today, especially between the younger generations of our countries. I myself was friends with the famous ceramics artist Shim Soo-Kwan when he was working as the secretary for a member of the Japanese Diet when he was younger. We were college classmates, and he was using the name Osako Keikichi. Annual travel between our countries has grown from 10 thousand in 1965 to over 5 million today. Korean movies, music and food are popular among Japanese people of all ages today. I believe that this is related to and will help advance Korea-Japan relations in the future. I also expect that this growing cultural exchange will lead into increased political exchange as well. The

Japanese government plans to invite six thousand young visitors to Japan annually through the “Plan of Big Exchange for Youth in East Asia.” We expect about a thousand visitors to come from Korea. In the future, Japan plans to cooperate with Korea in working towards peace and security in Northeast Asia, and will do whatever we can to fulfill our role. During my summit with former President Roh, Tae-Woo, we agreed to work towards overcoming the historical differences of the past and creating a better future for the Asia Pacific region. In the future, Japan’s senior volunteers will fulfill their roles when called upon. Thank you for your attention.

Challenges to Security and Stability in Northeast Asia

Evegeny Primakov

The issue of peace building and stabilization in Northeast Asia has two dimensions. First, it should be viewed in the global context, within the framework of world relations. The NEA region is part of the world. At the same time, security and stability have their region-specific aspect in the NEA. I see five major global processes that influence the situation in the NEA:

- Prevailing trend toward multipolar world order;
- Crisis of unilateralism: the USA policy based on the might of this world's strongest country in economic and military terms and also in terms of its political influence;
- Emergence of new and escalation of "old" threats: nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, domestic and regional conflicts, a real possibility of intertwining of such major threats to security and stability of states — all this requires stronger and more effective multilateral international organizations;
- Development of globalization in the form of transnationalization of entrepreneurial activities and regional integrations;
- Crisis of dialogue of civilizations that led to aggravation of extremism in the Islamic form (this world phenomenon does not exercise any direct influence on the NEA countries with the Muslim minority — Russia and China, while the positive dialogue between non-Islamic civilizations is confirmed by the coming together of Japan, South Korea and now China with the Western civilization whereas they are able to preserve their national identity).

When identifying the regional aspect of peace and stability problems in the NEA, one should first pay attention to major intraregional threats and security challenges in the region. Many of them have already emerged or can certainly emerge on the global level, but I regard them as intraregional threats as they come directly from the countries in the region.

The first of them is the North Korean nuclear problem. The outcome of the G6 meeting in Beijing in February 2007 when Pyongyang agreed to abandon its military nuclear program in exchange for energy and financial assistance was encouraging. However the next meeting in Beijing in March showed that the parties still had a long way to cover.

The second is territorial disputes that involve Japan, Russia, South Korea, China and some member countries of ASEAN in the South China Sea. These disputes so far remain unsettled. However, bilateral negotiations aimed at finding solutions and deeper economic integration that will run in parallel and be independent of the issue may mitigate the negative impact of territorial problems on regional security. Peaks of tension remain within the framework of "diplomatic wars."

The third problem is associated with Taiwan. The military-political confrontation in the Taiwan Straits hasn't escalated to a military conflict yet. Beijing started to exercise more diplomatic and psychological pressure on the authorities of Taiwan in order to weaken their anxiety for independence. As the main tool, they use their contacts with the opposition, primarily, with the Gomindan, encourage Taiwan's investments into continental China, promote tourist exchange, and develop cultural and scientific connections, etc.

The fourth problem is energy security in East Asia. Higher world energy prices suppress the economic growth in East Asia, while in terms of politics these price escalations cause the countries to look for ways to diversify their sources of supply of oil and gas. This strengthens the competition, above all between China and Japan for access to hydrocarbon resources in Russia, Africa and the Middle East. The Republic of Korea and the ASEAN also attempt to take their niches in the new global "energy redistribution." However, energy confrontation does not develop into a political conflict due to ever deeper interdepen-

dence of these regional economies. I believe that under the current conditions and in the near future, the intraregional threats won't develop into such factors that can destabilize the situation in NEA.

It's only natural that we are mainly focusing on a possible conflict related to the military nuclear programme of the DPRK. On the current stage of settlement of the problem, apparently, we can draw the conclusion that a real impediment to implementation of the programme is the lack of vital resources in North Korea not only for the purposes of development but for economic and public reproduction. At the same time it is extremely undesirable and even dangerous to use this situation to exercise constant pressure on Pyongyang. Not only the countries in the region but the world in general want to settle the problem through political and economic means. If they push too hard, the escalation of pressure may become counterproductive. At the same time, the international community and primarily the DPRK's neighboring countries — the Republic of Korea, China, Russia, Japan — are objectively interested in the evolutionary development of the domestic situation in North Korea. Though there has been no fast progress in nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, the fact that there are on-going hexalateral negotiations is positive in itself. For the first time in history, such powers as the USA, Russia, China and Japan have an opportunity to jointly identify and discuss mutual security problems and look for ways out of this crisis.

Economic factors also help to neutralize quite a number of intraregional threats. Rivalry between the key players is as if "balanced" by economic cooperation, energy cooperation, the fight against terrorism and atypical threats (natural calamities, avian flu, etc.), thus preventing direct military and political conflicts. The dialectic interaction of cooperation and rivalry between the USA and China shows the trend towards convergence. China attaches importance to its relations with the USA and is ready to cooperate on the basis of concurrence of interests. We can come to the conclusion that human rights, democratization of the Chinese society, freedom of speech, Tibet, the exchange rate of the national Chinese currency, the surplus in trade with the USA — all this recedes into the background today in the relations between

China and the USA.

Relations between China and Japan remain tense. The fight for a more influential place in the international arena is intensifying. At this, China is actively resisting Japan's becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. At the same time, large economic interdependence makes China and Japan look for options of mutually beneficial co-development in the region. When late in 2006 S. Abe came in, this promoted some improvement in the general climate of relations between China and Japan. However the parties still have to find out if such changes for the better would be long-lasting. Stronger competition between China and Japan in the fight for regional leadership hampers regional integration and on the other hand pushes both Tokyo and Beijing to extend their cooperation with the USA for the same purpose of strengthening their own positions in competing with each other. The "arms race" in the region may also result in a negative effect. Higher military expenses of China will be matched by countermoves on the part of Japan and the Japanese-American military union, while military expenses in other countries of East Asia would likewise grow. Although this does not lead directly to military conflicts, the elements of competition and confrontation will be stronger in the structure of international relations in East Asia.

If we look into the future, we can assume that in the next decade the economy of Northeast Asia will witness the continued economic rapprochement of three countries- China, Japan and South Korea — on the subregional level in the NEA. The search for the best forms of cooperation will continue within the framework of this "triangle." At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that in the short prospect there will be any integrational union like the EU formed in the NEA. The NEA is a part that fits into a broader integration structure of East Asia. In any case, the NEA countries tend to develop economic relations with other parts of East Asia, and also with the ASEAN countries. The main emphasis is still put on bilateral relations of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Therefore, lower customs tariffs and creation of the free trade area are likely to result by 2010-2020 in a phased liberalization of tariffs within the framework of tariff liberalization within APEC, ASEAN and

“ASEAN plus 3.” Rapprochement in sectors of the “knowledge-based economy” as well as financial interaction is initiated largely by the need to draw lessons from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. At the same time, in 2020 East Asia, regardless of the intensified discussion of the subject, won’t be any closer to a common currency because neither Japan nor China are ready for that. However, once again within the framework of East Asia the interaction between national central banks will strengthen in order to be able to respond in case of a monetary and financial crisis and uncertainty regarding the US Dollar movements.

In the area of the military and political security of East Asia, the main emphasis most likely will not be on dismantling of the structures that build on the American-Japanese and American-South Korean military and political unions. Creation of new security bodies can be seen as promising. An important new development in the negotiations on the North Korean nuclear programme is the Beijing agreement of G6 that was reached in February 2007, according to which negotiations about security and cooperation in the NEA will be held within the separate “Fifth Group” led by Russia. Thus, the North Korean problem becomes one of the parts, though the most important one, of the negotiations process. Five countries — Russia, China, the USA, Japan and the Republic of Korea — will be able to discuss a wider range of regional problems, whereas such discussions won’t any longer depend on Pyongyang’s desire to participate in meetings or lack of such. This will lay the foundation for turning the hexalateral negotiations on North Korea into a permanent format of multilateral diplomacy in the NEA. The Agenda of the Group on Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia (NEA) could feature the following essential topics:

- Strengthening of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms providing for military confidence building measures in the NEA;
- Development of mechanisms to fight WMD proliferation (outside the framework of the North Korean nuclear problem), terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, other regional crimes;
- Safety of regional fishing; Energy security in the NEA;
- Visa issues, protection of rights of foreign workers in the countries of the region, etc.;

- New ways to approach territorial disputes in the light of interests of regional development and security in the broad sense of the word.

We can forecast a growing role for Russia in the region. As the Russian Federation will be turning into a large player in the global power engineering, there will be more interest in Russian energy resources and energy cooperation with the Russian Federation on behalf of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Interest in Russia as a transport area between Europe and East Asia will increase due to the Russian policy of development of transport infrastructure in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. There are grounds to believe that with the progress of the Russian scientific and technical policy of reviving domestic science, that suffered large staffing losses in the 1990s, there will be more interest in Russia as a partner in the “knowledge-based economy.”

We must not understate such an important factor as Russia’s attractiveness for foreign investments, especially in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. Social and economic development of this part of Russian territory has been identified as a national task for Russia, especially taking into account a pressing demographic problem.

A part of the Russian political elite may erroneously believe that some of the NEA countries pose a threat of demographic or economic “seizure” of Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern regions of Russia. The key trends of the NEA’s development minimize such threats and bring forward the problem of lost profit because Russia does not take part in the regional transformation process.

In conclusion, I would like to mention the stabilizing role played by such multilateral bodies that cover the NEA as APEC, ASEAN plus three (Japan, China, South Korea), ASEAN’s Regional Forum (ARF). We attach special importance to the fact that in 2012 the APEC summit will for the first time be held on Russian territory, in Vladivostok.

German Unification and the European Union: Implications for Korean Unification and Northeast Asia Community Building

Horst M. Teltschik

There is a saying, I believe, that is valid for all our countries, which says, we must learn from history. Frankly speaking, I often have doubts whether people are really learning from past events. There is another saying: History does not recur. Talking about German unification and its implication for Korean unification, I do believe, both sayings are right. On the one hand you can learn what went right and what wrong with the German unification. On the other hand the political and economic framework of Korea today is quite different from Germany in 1989/90. Nevertheless there are some lessons we can learn.

Till 1990/91 the globe was dominated by two world powers and their alliances: the USA and NATO and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The East-West conflict had cast a shadow over the entire world. Containment, confrontation, political isolation and sanctions had set the tone for the relations of the Atlantic Alliance with the Warsaw Pact countries since the end of World War II.

In December 1967 the Atlantic Alliance had come to the conclusion to change its strategy towards the East. There was a simple reason: The situation in Europe was still unstable and uncertain and full of risks, including military confrontations. But the Communist world was no

longer monolithic. The Soviet doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” had changed the nature of the confrontation with the West, and Western Europe was on its way towards unity. The new, so-called Harmel doctrine of NATO was the following:

- The “Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.”
- “Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary, each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.”
- “But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe.”

This NATO doctrine was very convincing and at the end very successful: The first priority had been and should be: Take care of your own security by yourself and together with allies. The most important ally for the Europeans had been and still is the Americans. On the basis of security the NATO member states started a policy of detente, dialogue, cooperation and negotiations on arms control and arms reduction with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, bilaterally and multilaterally. The German governments played a leading role by signing bilateral treaties (the so-called Ostverträge) in the years 1970 to 1975 with Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and even with East Berlin. In 1971 a Four-Power Agreement on Berlin was signed by the United States, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The high point was the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by 35 countries from North America and Europe. This important document included various issues:

- Security in Europe,
- Cooperation in economy, science, technology and environment,
- Collaboration in humanitarian and other areas.

For the following fifteen years the Final Act became the main document individuals, NGOs and governments referred to in order to change the communist regimes. Can this strategy be a model for Korea and her neighbors for how to tackle their current problems? I strongly believe the Harmel doctrine can be a model for today as well for how to deal with dictatorships or with authoritarian states, whether it is North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Syria or others.

The lesson for Korea from my point of view would be: Take care of your security. The Alliance with the US is your guarantee for external security, for permanent access to the American market and technology and for a strong anchorage into the Western system of democratic values. Moreover, because of their military presence and their bilateral military alliances, the US is still the strongest guarantor for peace and stability in the whole Asian-Pacific area. The Free Trade Agreement with the US is another important milestone to strengthen the bilateral relations. On such a strong basis of security the Republic of Korea has to develop and to intensify good and friendly relations with its big neighbours China, Japan and Russia as well. This might not be so easy for historic reasons, for political reasons and because of the close relations with the United States. But there is no alternative, because you are squeezed as a "prawn between whales" and they all pursue their own goals towards Korea. And they all are members of the talks of six.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl had tried hard from the very beginning to develop a very friendly relationship with President Ronald Reagan and all his successors, based on mutual trust. This was fundamental when the Berlin wall came down and mainly when Chancellor Kohl delivered a speech on November 28, 1989, officially proclaiming that he would now strive for the unification of Germany. He did not consult with the American President at each step, but the President was the only one, who had confidentially been informed about all the decisions of the German Government either by the Chancellor himself or by his Security Adviser. Therefore there had not been any mistrust of any side at any time.

There was another critical point: the US-Soviet relations. From 1983 until 1986 we experienced the peak of a new Cold War after the Geneva

talks about the middle range nuclear missiles had failed. The Soviet Secretary General Juri Andropov threatened the West with a third World War. For about three years there was no contact or meeting between the US and the Soviet Union.

This standstill was not of interest to the German government. It limited the room for manoeuvre of Germany towards the Soviet Union and its allies as well. The German interest was to get both world powers back to negotiations. After the re-election of President Reagan in 1985, Chancellor Kohl immediately went to Washington and Reagan promised Chancellor Kohl to restart bilateral summits and arms control negotiations with Moscow. Meanwhile President Gorbachev had come into office, which would do a lot.

I am telling you this story because I do believe that for similar reasons, Korea must have a strong interest in good and constructive US-Chinese relations. If there is a chance to contribute, you should do it. If the US-Chinese relationship deteriorates, it will harm Korean interests. The same will be true of the Russian-Chinese, the Russian-Japanese and the Japanese-Chinese relations. The better they are, the better it will be for Korea. Therefore whatever can be done to improve relations, it should be done.

Let me come back to the Harmel doctrine: Security first, but being safe you should continue your "Sunshine policy" or — as you call it today "Policy for Peace and Prosperity," including co-operation with North Korea on economy, culture, security and humanitarian issues. We called these efforts a 'step-by-step policy.' The aim was:

- Strengthening the sense of togetherness and
- To bring relief to the people in East Germany.

This step-by-step-policy was questioned a lot, whether it was right or wrong. Opponents had argued that such a policy, including financial credits, was prolonging the survival of the GDR. Well, it is obvious, that as a rule you will never get an adequate return. But what would be the alternative? Tensions would increase.

The priority of my government till the Berlin wall came down was

not the reunification of Germany. Our strategy had been another one: by supporting the process of liberalization, which had started in Poland in 1980, later on in Hungary and since 1987 in the Soviet Union accelerating the pressure on the GDR. We were absolutely sure, either the GDR would start reforms too; or if not, the GDR would be isolated. In both cases the GDR would not survive on a long-term basis and then there would be a chance for re-unifying Germany. As you know, history proceeded in a different way. The fall of the Berlin wall came as a surprise to everybody, to the GDR leadership, to the Soviet leadership (the Soviet Ambassador had fallen into a deep sleep because of a sleep — inducing medication); it came as a surprise to the three victorious Western powers — the US, France and Great Britain — and the Federal Government was surprised as well. Chancellor Kohl had just arrived in Warsaw to sign a very important agreement with the first democratic Polish government, when he got the message the wall was open.

Well, this could happen to Korea as well, tomorrow, in some months, next year or in some years. Nobody is able to make the right prediction, when and what might be the case for Korea. North Korea is still an incalculable security risk on the one hand but you might be confronted with a humanitarian and economic disaster on the other hand as well.

The GDR was politically and economically bankrupt and nobody could provide sufficient help, neither the Soviet Union nor the Warsaw Pact Allies. The Federal Government was the only one.

If the North Korean regime were to collapse, would China be ready to help? If yes, for how long? In the future China itself might face growing internal difficulties.

I have been often asked whether my government had complete plans in our desks how to unify Germany. No, fortunately not, because all plans would have been misleading. What you can and should prepare are plans for the economic recovery and reconstruction of North Korea and how to bring families together. You should know how to integrate the army and how to deal with the officials and party members.

The earlier mentioned famous Ten-points speech of Chancellor

Kohl was an attempt to elaborate a strategy for unifying Germany. He had mentioned three international prerequisites which have contributed to international changes:

- The double-track-decision of NATO 1983: It was the decisive test for the stability of NATO and its ability to guarantee its own security.
- The economic and political integration of Europe: developing a model of a union of countries, which had partly been enemies for centuries. This European Union has become more and more attractive beyond its own borders.
- The CSCE process: trying to reduce tensions through dialogue and cooperation. Being firmly embedded in these international processes was the fundamental prerequisite for all neighboring countries, for the West and for the East to agree on a reunified Germany.

What might be the lesson for Korea? The Republic of Korea is already an essential factor for the security and stability of Northeast Asia, and for a unified Korea even more. Therefore for the future it will be important whether Seoul pursues a co-operative policy of integration or whether it aggravates the tensions. During the last years there have been several efforts for a closer co-operation, economically and politically: The negotiations of the six states to settle the nuclear issue of North Korea; the proposal of a Free Trade Area of the ASEAN group plus China, Korea and Japan, including political and security co-operation; the Japanese proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund; a permanent security forum, including the US, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea or establishing a kind of CSCE between the six states. I do believe that it will be fundamental for Korea to promote these efforts, establishing an international framework which will take care of the security of all neighboring countries. All neighbors have to be sure that a unified Korea will contribute to the security and stability of Northeast Asia.

In 1990 Germany together with the United States initiated the so-called 2 + 4 negotiations: the two German states together with the US, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain, settling successfully all problems. The ongoing talks of six might be a similar body in future to

negotiate the prerequisites of a peaceful unification of Korea. But there might be another parallel: In April 1990 Chancellor Kohl had suggested to President Gorbachev a bilateral treaty of partnership and co-operation between a united Germany and the Soviet Union, including guarantees for security to assure Moscow that a united Germany would in future be a friend and partner of the Soviet Union. This proposal was well received in Moscow. It was the main breakthrough into bilateral negotiations. The treaty had been negotiated before Germany was united and ratified by both sides after the unification. In 1989/90 Germany signed 22 treaties and agreements with the Soviet government to assure Moscow of the close partnership. I do not know whether a similar initiative by Korea towards China, Russia and Japan would make sense as well.

Will there be a chance of unifying Korea? I am deeply convinced of that. In our world of today an artificial division of a country can not last forever. Even when the Berlin wall had come down, many Germans and most of our allies and neighbours, including President Gorbachev, did not believe in the unification of Germany. But it happened after 329 days, peacefully, and at the end all had agreed. I am always quoting the former Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, who once said: "He who does not believe in miracles, is not a realist."

Challenges for the Next US President in Northeast Asia

Samuel Berger

Introduction

I would like to begin by thanking the organizers of the 4th Jeju Peace Forum, including Executive Chairman Kwon and Ambassador Moon, for the wonderful job you have done in developing the central theme of this year's conference — "Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: Exploring the European Experience." Looking around the room, I see so many distinguished former heads of state, diplomats, government officials and international business executives that I feel confident the people here can accomplish the challenging task we have set for ourselves: helping to institutionalize peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula. I have been asked to speak on a topic which I know is of great concern to you — "Challenges for the Next US President in Northeast Asia." What I would like to do today is to set forth my views on the general direction of US foreign policy toward Asia — and discuss the policies that a newly-elected president is likely to embrace, regardless of his or her party affiliation.

China

Let me begin with China — a country I visited often as National Security Adviser and which I still visit frequently as a business strategy adviser to major international companies. The changes in China since 2000 have been nothing short of breathtaking, and the United States must take these changes fully into account to get our China policy right. During this period, China has expanded its output of goods and services by better than 10% per year, increased its foreign exchange reserves from a few hundred million to well over 1.2 trillion dollars, and become a central nexus in a newly-emerging, regionally-integrated East Asian manufacturing system. Beijing has also expanded the scope and sophistication of its international diplomacy as the global political, economic and diplomatic effects of China's development have sharply escalated.

Never before in history has such a large percentage of humankind gone from poverty to middle class status in such a short period of time. This holds out great promise, but there are challenges as well. American policy must move beyond old paradigms to better assure long-term success. The measure of success of US diplomacy toward China will be the extent to which China moves forward with us as a partner on the issues critical to our future relationship. I call this US policy approach *effective engagement*.

Let me give you a few examples. America and China are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Currently, we each point at the other as an excuse for not doing more on this vital issue. We must find ways to work cooperatively to address global climate change. We also face potentially devastating new challenges in the near term from pandemic diseases such as avian flu — diseases that do not respect national boundaries. We must develop maximum possible cooperation to address these public health threats. Energy security is another key challenge. The US and China will be the world's largest oil importers for the coming several decades. A constructive and cooperative approach holds the promise of increasing both energy security and price stability. Strictly competitive approaches will reduce the chances of achieving

either one.

Effective engagement thus goes beyond business as usual with China. It means eliciting China's active cooperation in working toward mutual goals that also maximize benefits to the international community as a whole. This will not be an easy task. Chinese increasingly feel that America seeks to constrain China's rise. Americans are concerned about some of China's trade practices and how its domestic system operates and fear that China seeks increasingly to marginalize the US in Asia, the most vital region in the world. In seeking China's cooperation, the US should devise policies that engender China's trust by demonstrating that America does not seek to hobble China's long-term development. Washington should also make clear that China's impact is now so large that Beijing must take more seriously than ever before its obligations as a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

Effective engagement has a substantial bilateral component, but it will be enormously more successful if the US works with the other countries of Northeast Asia to implement it. This will require the US to devote more attention to this region than we have in recent years. We must make our diplomacy more creative and responsive to regional as well as global concerns. We must also be aware of the real outcomes of our policies toward China. For example, in seeking to end rampant violations of intellectual property rights and widespread subsidies for Chinese enterprises, US economic and trade policies must take into account a crucial reality: most of the value of Chinese exports to the United States consists of parts and components that China imports from our friends and allies in Asia. Consequently, the trade remedies we adopt must be carefully crafted and targeted because they will potentially impact the entire region.

US human rights policy should not flinch from addressing the enormous problems that many citizens of China still confront. Our military posture in the region should do everything necessary to protect our interests and obligations to our friends and allies. But we should also take care not to trigger the very kinds of arms races and tensions that we seek to avoid. The next half decade will likely determine the extent to which America and China can build a foundation of long term trust

which enables them to cooperate together on the most pressing bilateral and multilateral issues we face. The next American administration in 2009 - Republican or Democratic - will have to take a hard look at how to pursue effective engagement. The domestic politics in the US may complicate this, but I believe the new administration should and likely will move down this path.

Japan

Let me say a few words about US policy toward Japan under a new US president. A few words are all that is necessary, it seems to me, because I believe the guiding principle of US policy, in either a Republican or Democratic administration, will be continuity. The Bush administration has put Japan at the center of its Asia strategy. Practically speaking, this means Washington has focused on strengthening political and security ties with Japan while downplaying economic and other differences. The leading candidates of both parties in the United States are either known to be friends of Japan or are generally supportive of strong US-Japan relations. All these candidates understand the importance that Washington attaches to Japan as a key strategic ally in the region. If we were to see a change after January 2009, it would not be any weakening of US-Japan relations but rather a US policy of giving greater attention than the Bush administration has to other US friends and allies in the region. A new Administration would likely want to avoid relying too heavily on Japan from a strategic perspective.

South Korea

Perhaps the issue of greatest interest to the eminent participants in this conference is the likely policy of a new US administration toward Korea. Let me begin by saying how personally gratifying it is to me to see that the Korea-US alliance is stronger today than the last time I visited in early 2006. Our two countries recently achieved a

Free Trade Agreement that is the most significant US trade negotiation in more than 15 years. Once this agreement is ratified by Korea's National Assembly and the US Congress, the FTA will open up major opportunities for Korean companies in the US market and encourage significantly greater investment and activity by US companies in Korea. The FTA is not without controversy in our Congress and in the coming weeks, US and South Korean negotiators will incorporate new Congressionally-mandated guidelines on labor and environmental concerns.

As important as the economic impact of the FTA is — due, in large part, to Korea's standing as the world's 12th largest economy — it would also deepen and strengthen the Korea-US alliance, which already goes well beyond a security relationship. General Bell, the commander of US forces in Korea, put it this way: the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement “demonstrates the degree of trust and fidelity between our nations” as well as “the strength of our shared history and the tremendous possibilities of our future.”

President Roh, who has shown great leadership in achieving a Korea-US FTA, takes an even broader perspective. In noting that the US and South Korea have now agreed on transferring wartime operational command of our combined forces to South Korea by 2012, President Roh believes “the bilateral relationship is changing from the type of lopsided dependency to the type of mutual respect and cooperation.” I believe the next US president of either party will work hard to strengthen a Korea-US alliance based on the principle of mutual respect and cooperation that President Roh has rightly emphasized. In my view, this is the only foundation on which to continue an alliance that has served both our countries very well for more than fifty years.

North Korea

Let me turn now to North Korea. Although there is serious concern in Washington about North Korea's nuclear program as well as its human rights record, the preferred course is to seek a negotiated reso-

lution of North Korea's nuclear program which would then lay the basis for a comprehensive settlement of Korea-related security and diplomatic issues, through a series of agreements which would replace the 1953 Armistice. I hasten to say that an effective denuclearization agreement is the most critical component of a comprehensive settlement in Korea. So it is imperative that Pyongyang move forward on the February 13, 2007, joint agreement, after receiving back funds from the Banco Delta Asia.

If North Korea proceeds down the diplomatic path negotiated by US Ambassador Chris Hill with a strong assist from China — to complete denuclearization — then I believe the US should and would move toward a fundamental settlement of all outstanding disputes with North Korea. A comprehensive settlement would, in the first instance, embrace a denuclearization agreement leading to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It would also include a Four Party Agreement among South Korea, North Korea, China and the United States — the principal belligerents of the Korean War — to replace the 1953 Armistice with a new overall political and legal structure for long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

A further component of a comprehensive settlement would be a US agreement with North Korea that settles bilateral political and legal issues, normalizes diplomatic relations, and provides US assistance for fostering economic development and economic reform in North Korea. Even before achieving a comprehensive settlement, we should lay the foundations for a new multilateral organization for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia, both to manage North Korea-related issues and to help realize US strategic policy goals for the region as a whole. A multilateral security and cooperation forum would assist significantly in developing a regional security community in Northeast Asia which could mitigate tensions, resolve disputes and engender all-important "habits of cooperation." By fostering communication, promoting common interests and creating greater transparency, such an organization would help manage inevitable crises and lessen the chances of military confrontation.

As we have recognized here at this conference, US leadership is necessary for realizing a multilateral security and cooperation forum in Northeast Asia. I hope that the new US president, of either party, will understand this reality and move toward the creation of just such a multilateral mechanism.

Conclusion

On this note, let me conclude and again express appreciation to the organizers and distinguished participants in this conference for truly fruitful and enlightening discussions over the past few days. I can assure you that America has a fundamental interest in continuing its deep engagement in Asia and in fostering stability and economic well-being throughout the region. It is my firm belief that a new president in 2009, Republican or Democratic, will work realistically, steadfastly and wisely toward these ends. Thank you very much.



*Learning from the European
Experience*

OSCE, Multilateral Security Cooperation,
and Lessons for Northeast Asia

EU, Economic Community Building,
and Implications for Northeast Asia

OSCE, Multilateral Security Cooperation, and Lessons for Northeast Asia

Bertrand de Crombrughe

Your Excellency, Mr. President, Your Excellency, Mr. Foreign Minister, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, This wonderful stay in Jeju, Korea, looks like a reward for all the hard work I delivered last year as Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in 2006 in Vienna. Way above it, however, is the huge honor given to address this distinguished audience on a subject, the OSCE that understandably has acquired a very particular meaning for me.

Session I of yesterday was an opportunity to study how the CSCE/OSCE experience could be relevant for the Northeast Asia region. Several parallels were drawn between the Europe of 1975 and the Northeast Asia of today. To summarize, then in Europe as now in Northeast Asia, there are divided countries too many and peace treaties too few. In retrospect, the CSCE in 1975 appears as an intermediary step. Fifteen years later, Germany was reunited. In reality of course, over such a length of time, there were highs and lows. As you know, success is not permanent. It does not come by itself. It hangs permanently by a thread and as current discussions in Vienna about the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe demonstrate, can slip away rather quickly. This being said, the development of the CSCE/OSCE process over time contains three implied messages. They deserve further reflection.

The first implied message is that the states concerned have to take the initiative in their own hands. It is the discomfort of the European

states with the Cold War stand-off that stimulated the search for alternative security arrangements. Very much so indeed, had the European states not drawn conclusions from their precarious strategic position, the CSCE might have never emerged. The Great Powers, by which is meant the United States and the Soviet Union, of course had to agree to the initiative but they were not the driving force. The willpower and energy came from the states in the European region, those who held a prime interest.

The second implied message is that accepting realities at one stage of history does not mean that they will remain permanent. In the '70's, it took quite some courage on the part of German Chancellor Willy Brandt to push through with his project of bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Germany. At the time, they appeared as enormous and overgenerous concessions. Indeed, there was no way to tell then that events would eventually turn out as they did. Yet, that is the direction they took. In retrospect, Brandt's actions were the best investment ever. His policy took away the tensions that kept the undesirable stalemate in place. It allowed events to revert to a more natural course. Other factors such as economic development and dynamics of inter-state relations could then come back into play. With them, the scope for diplomacy was restored and the CSCE, as a security initiative, would get a chance to blossom.

The third implied message is that a set of shared principles is helpful, if not required, in order to build stable relations over time. At the beginning, these need not be ambitious or comprehensive. Yet, to start work on a few key principles and to look for formulae that are accepted by all participants is a very useful exercise. It provides structure and direction to the emerging relationship all the while it gives a better understanding of the States' respective positions. Also, once first sentences are agreed upon, the evidence is at hand that progress is possible. Then, very quickly, demand grows and there are calls for more.

The CSCE "Decalogue" served this purpose in 1973-1975 Europe. The principles it contained appeared quite universal and accessible, meaning, Northeast Asian States could likewise have an interest in emphasizing among themselves fundamental items such as sovereign-

ty, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, or peaceful resolution of disputes including territorial ones. These are but a few taken from the CSCE. Of course Northeast Asian States might wish to emphasize different ones, taking into account their specific situation. For instance, one may be struck by the magnitude of economic and trade relations among Northeast Asian States. This clearly is at variance with the Europe of 1975 where economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union were at a virtual standstill and hardly offered any perspective. Could consensus in the security field in Northeast Asia find a starting point in the widespread agreement prevailing about the need to protect beneficial economic and trade relations? Articulating more precisely how these contribute to present day stability in the region might suggest valuable cooperative security initiatives. Besides, different political systems compete in the region, but as in the Europe of 1973, that should not be an obstacle to "talk them through." The same might be said about the variety of approaches to human rights. In this region, much consideration is given to the concept of human security, perhaps a more tangible basis to seek agreement about the fundamental human values embedded in United Nations documents.

National minorities' issues might not be as prominent here in Northeast Asia as they were then and presently are in Europe. On the other hand, memories and recollection of past history, just as in present day Europe, are still vivid. This is a natural and an inescapable part of international neighborliness, anywhere in the world. It is very rare that people and for that matter also states fully forget or that memories are fully reconciled. Sources take time to open up and historians have to do the detailed research. People also end up accepting facts only after years of dialogue and collective reflections. Yet, even then, only "a slowly emerging and probably perpetually partial account of all that has happened" will be at hand. Today, in the OSCE, historic disputes continue to simmer, be it in relation to events in Eastern Turkey in 1915, be it when war monuments are being rearranged at the occasion of celebrations of the end of World War II or be it in connection with the division of Cyprus. There is no need for further proof that history is

very important indeed to everybody and that the question of how to handle it is a question common to all. Surely it requires specific engagement but also a measure of empathy and understanding.

The more general point to be noted here is that states belonging to a specific environment are to identify themselves which issues are cause for preoccupation. No outside observer, no foreign model can substitute for this crucial and necessary homework by the very governments seeking to improve the security environment of their people. Security, after all, is a rather individual affair. It questions personal perception. It requires engagement and effort. No one can claim to feel comfortable or secure in lieu of, or in place of, somebody else. Just taking over someone else's recipe can not and will not do the trick.

Should one then conclude that the CSCE is not transposable to Northeast Asia? Not quite. To emphasize the differences and use them as excuses to "do nothing" would not befit a responsible attitude. In the interest of serving the future of both country and people, a harder look would seem commendable. Yesterday was the opportunity to go at length through some of the characteristics of multilateral security cooperation as practiced by the CSCE/OSCE. Here follow a few indications. At the outset, in 1973, there seemed to have been on the part of participants on both sides a "readiness to come to grips with reality." Essentially, it consisted of the recognition that the other side could not be outperformed in the short term. Such ambition had to be reined in. The relationship was not to escalate further. If not resolvable, it had at least to be attended.

Thus it became obvious that the other side had its place in the security system and, hence, that the "search for a common system" was to start. That search itself had a confidence building virtue. In the CSCE, the acceptance of the other states' interest in one state's own security policy appeared early on. In the words of the Code of Conduct, signed in 1994, "a state should not attempt to increase its security at the expense of the others." Ever since, "cooperative security" has been the hallmark of the OSCE. For this, a dose of "voluntarism" was required. The natural inclination to confine oneself to one's own views had to be overcome. Participants in Helsinki made a step beyond. They proved

“willing to take risks.” That became possible when it was understood that the other side also was taking risks. Reciprocity was crucial. The fact that nobody was asked to give anything up on issues of substance naturally helped. The “Decalogue,” one might recall, devoted much language to confirm each side in its fundamental sovereign prerogatives and convictions. Each took the view that under those conditions, it would preserve its own integrity while benefiting from the advantages of a more relaxed relationship.

It also helped that the initial steps were small. From the outset, the approach was to be “gradual.” The first military confidence building measures either provided for a very high threshold or were purely voluntary. They later evolved into more significant ones. Furthermore, a “process” started where more and more issues were brought to the table and hence ever more people got involved. In each Government or Administration, a constituency grew that emphasized and pursued the potential for cooperative alternatives over one-sided security policies. In the end, this was bound to influence decision-making. In the beginning, the Helsinki process was purely “inter-governmental” because sides were taking considerable political and diplomatic risks. Today, it is different. A wide range of parliamentary and civil society representatives participate. Considering the level of economic integration in Northeast Asia, a substantial involvement of academics and of non-governmental human resources could probably be envisaged, as indeed this very Jeju Peace Forum is strongly suggesting.

The commitments in Helsinki were of a “purely political nature.” Up to this day, the OSCE is “only” a political process. It provides for dialogue, some form of international courtesy, behavioral norms, advisory and assistance services, but certainly not rigid contractual obligations. The advantage is that texts are easier to negotiate and that initiatives get faster off the ground. The drawback is that commitments may be abandoned faster under the pressure of political developments. This actually explains why the OSCE is so sensitive to the prevailing political climate. Indeed, one should recognize that the fortunes of the Helsinki process were then and still are today heavily dependent on “international political circumstances and developments.” But is this

not the case for any diplomatic initiative? How much then has the Helsinki process been capable of influencing events in return? That is a valid question. Some might claim that it actually was the CSCE process that brought down the Berlin Wall. We all know this to be an exaggeration. At its origins, the Helsinki process was the expression of a prevailing mood of "detente." When "detente" fell down the ladder of priorities in the later '70s and in the early '80s, it might have provided no more than a "safe-conduct" for necessary if not comforting communication. Thereafter, when the Soviet Union melted away, the CSCE/OSCE had the chance to surge back to the front, producing some of the most vanguard political language seen in the history of international diplomacy.

One way to look at the Helsinki process is to consider that "the chance favors the prepared minds." For the time of its existence, the CSCE has prepared or kept prepared the minds for things that might come. When the chance lured around the corner, it was duly seized. And as the fortunes of East-West relations go through new episodes, the lessons on dialogue, confidence building and cooperative security might come in handy once again. As long as the Northeast Asian States can afford it, would they not be well advised to take on this kind of insurance policy? This is what this Fourth Jeju Peace Forum seems to leave with us, I would like to stress, "with some insistence." It is all in the hands of the governments of this beautiful region.

EU, Economic Community Building, and Implications for Northeast Asia

Klaus Regling

Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, It is a great honor to participate in the 4th Jeju Peace Forum and to talk about the European Integration Experience, particularly on the economic side. The success story of European economic integration has been unfolding over more than half a century. During the last 2 years, the rejection of the Constitution by French and Dutch voters has sometimes overshadowed the great achievements of European integration in the last decade: The introduction of the euro in 1999 and the enlargement of the EU to twelve new member states in 2004 and 2007. But let me go back in history to give you a better idea of how European integration — particularly on the economic side — has evolved up to today.

The first institutional step was taken in 1952 with the pooling of sovereignty in the coal and steel industries of the six founding nations of Europe (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). This happened under a supranational institution, the so-called 'High Authority'. The next step under consideration was the creation of a 'European Defense Community'. But this project failed in 1954 and from then on, for several decades the project of European integration was driven mainly by economics. In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) was created.

Nevertheless it is important to remember the political context which helped to push European integration forward. In Korea, I do not need

to talk about the Cold War; but in 1956 there was also the Suez crisis and the Soviet Union crushed the revolt of the Hungarian people against Soviet domination. This had also happened in East Germany in 1953. Western European countries therefore felt that they had to combine their forces if they wanted to remain free and prosperous with a global influence. This was the political background against which economic integration in Europe progressed.

The creation of a customs union — i.e. an economic area without internal trade barriers and with common external tariffs — was completed by 1968. Capital account liberalization and the pooling of foreign exchange reserves began also in the 1960s and a commitment was taken to create a common market in which goods, services, persons and capital could circulate freely. In order to guarantee the proper functioning of the common market, certain powers were given to the supranational European Commission. Sovereignty has been transferred from Member States to this European body. The EC has the sole right of initiative, which means that it is the only body that can initiate EU legislation. Also, the European Commission, in close cooperation with Member States, negotiates international agreements in certain areas, such as trade.

Actions by the Commission and Member States are subject to control by the European Court of Justice. The Commission, in its role as the Guardian of the Treaty, is in fact obliged to take Member States or other third parties to court if they breach EU Treaties or laws. These two supranational institutions, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, have been instrumental in shaping and overseeing the integration process. Economic integration received another considerable boost after the end of the Bretton Woods system with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The idea behind the EMS was to create an area of increased exchange rate stability in Western Europe. The EMS was instrumental for achieving convergence of economic policies, a precondition for monetary union.

The Maastricht Treaty was negotiated in the early 1990s, against the background of the fall of the Berlin wall and German reunification.

Maastricht determined the convergence process towards Monetary Union. Launched in 1999, the euro is now the currency of 13 EU member states and has fast become the second most important currency in the world. The euro area will continue to grow — on the first of January next year, Cyprus and Malta will join. Over the years, the EU has grown from its 6 founding members to 27 member states today. This has made the EU truly European. But it also means that decision-making has become much more difficult because the institutional framework of the EU today is still very similar to the one 50 years ago for only 6 countries.

While it is often true that — as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder once put it — the battles of our fathers and grandfathers are now fought in countless Council meetings in Brussels, the experience of ongoing cooperation between nationals from EU Member States at all levels of administrations has created a degree of trust and confidence among Member States, which would have been unimaginable in the past. This trust, built up over decades, was also an important precondition for the reunification of Germany in 1990. The European Commission, the biggest of the EU institutions, with its pan-European staff, represents a daily experience in confidence-building among Europeans. I believe this rise in mutual confidence and understanding is one of the key achievements of integration in Europe.

Regarding the future outlook for Europe I am convinced that we will see further progress in integration not only in the economic, but also in the political sphere, although at a speed which will necessarily be slower than in the past because the 'easier' integration steps have been taken, and because additional steps, for example in foreign and security policy or justice and home affairs, are difficult to implement. Since yesterday, the 27 Heads of State and Government of the EU are meeting in Brussels for another important European Summit. I am confident that they will agree on how to amend the existing European Treaty. Even though we will not have a "Constitution" for some time, the essential institutional reforms foreseen in the draft Constitution should be implemented.

Now, what lessons can be drawn from the history of European inte-

gration for East Asia? I believe economic integration has been the basis for confidence-building and conflict settlement in Europe and, potentially, this is also possible for this region of the world. Of course, I am fully aware that there are significant differences between the situations in Europe and East Asia and simplistic analogies should be avoided. For example, it is probably true that there are many more historical, economical, political and cultural differences between the countries of Northeast Asia than between the countries of Europe 60 years ago.

On the other hand, I agree with what Stephen Leong, Director-General of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur recently said at an EU-sponsored conference in Osaka: “[As in Europe], the economic field, including trade, investment and finance, can be expected to serve as a catalyst in the comprehensive community-building process [in Asia].” Regional trade liberalization in Asia has already led to more regional economic and financial integration, just as it did in Europe in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. In recent years, trade relations between China, Japan and Korea have intensified rapidly even in the absence of a strong institutional setting. This is often referred to as the ‘market-driven approach’. However, sooner or later a point will be reached where increased integration of markets might be limited by the absence of an institutionalized framework; the regional economic integration these three countries have achieved so far has mainly been through bilateral action or in an ASEAN framework such as ASEAN +3. The next step toward stronger economic integration would probably be a free trade agreement, involving China, Japan and Korea. But following the example of Europe in the 1950s, the functional or institutional approach might be called for one day in Northeast Asia, with the creation of a supranational trilateral institution capable of balancing diverging trade and economic interests, to take integration forward.

What would such a High Authority or (new) Trilateral Commission for Northeast Asia be asked to achieve? As in Europe it would not only balance national interests, but it could be charged with designing and implementing further steps towards increased regional economic integration. This would not only bring economic benefits to the partici-

pants, but the gains in mutual confidence would be conducive to an atmosphere facilitating the solution of potential conflicts in the region. In my personal view, such a 'High Authority' or 'Commission' could have its seat in Korea, in the same way that the relatively small Belgium located between the big neighbors France and Germany was chosen to host the European institutions.

**PART
IV**

*Recasting the Helsinki Process
and Security Cooperation in Europe:
Searching for Relevance
for East Asia*

Moving from Mutual Assured Destruction to Cooperative Security

The Politics of the Helsinki Process—
How Did It Arise During the Cold War?:
An American Perspective

The Politics of the Helsinki Process—
How Did It Arise During the Cold War?:
A Russian Perspective

Moving from Mutual Assured Destruction to Cooperative Security

Bertrand de Crombrughe

This contribution is about an international political process that has been in effect for over 30 years. It recounts the politics and the development phases of the CSCE now OSCE. It also briefly explains the functions that the OSCE accomplishes today. In the end, the paper identifies the characteristics that seem to have ensured its longevity and that may be exportable to other situations, including the region of Northeast Asia. These include: readiness to attend prevailing tensions rather than wait them out, engagement in the search for a common security system, a dose of voluntarism, a willingness to take prudent risks, a gradual approach, a process involving a growing constituency of people, an initially purely inter-governmental approach, an exclusively political process, the adoption of fundamental principles as a start, a recognition of interconnection among issues and regional ownership and specificity. Naturally, any diplomatic process is sensitive to international political circumstances and developments. The CSCE/OSCE grew out of the spirit of “detente.” When this was not any more the top priority, as was the case in the later ‘70s and in the early ‘80s, it has nevertheless functioned as a “safe-conduct” for comforting communication. When the Soviet Union imploded, it surged back to the surface. Today, it keeps alive an attractive model for multilateral dialogue, confidence building and cooperative security in parallel with other forms of international cooperation.

The Helsinki Process 1973-2000: Achievements, Potential, Limitations

This contribution is about an international political process that has been in effect for over 30 years, and keeps impressing by its longevity. Over such a length of time, there were of course highs

and lows. There were times of celebration and times of skepticism, moments of strong progress and moments of hesitation and interrogation. With hindsight, this paper argues, the Helsinki process made and continues to make enormous sense. Its relevance for building security in the Euro-Atlantic region remains, and this is, despite criticism that today is being voiced, including from the inside, by States participating in the process. One could hardly choose a more appropriate starting point for the present conference devoted to "Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia," in fact an original attempt to encourage multilateral security cooperation in this region.

I. Similarities and Differences

Indeed, one shall be struck by the number of common features between the Europe of the Helsinki Final Act and the Northeast Asia of today. In 1975, the geo-political configuration of Europe was the one inherited from World War II, much as is the case of Northeast Asia today. The borders between states, the territorial structures that were in Europe, and that are in Northeast Asia, are those of 1945. Europe in 1975 had a divided country, Germany, just as today Northeast Asia has a divided country, Korea. In Europe, communist revolutions had brought clearly different, one should say opposite, political, economic and social systems to face one another. Northeast Asia still has some of these features. In Europe in 1975, nuclear weapons and mutual assured destruction challenged the security system. Northeast Asia, today, also struggles with a nuclear issue. In Europe in 1975 as in Northeast Asia today, a strong out-of-region power is involved, namely the United States: it exercises its influence from across an ocean. As still another common feature, the Soviet Union was an important factor in Europe in 1975, actually a main actor in the Helsinki process. In Northeast Asia today, the Russian Federation is likewise a necessary partner in regional security. These parallels should be enough to arouse curiosity. Yet, to compare is not to equate. There also are some clear differences, which go beyond geography and culture.

Northeast Asia is more than the result of World War II. The communist revolution in China, the Korean war and the developments that have since taken place have shaped the regional relationships in a region-specific manner. In particular, there are not, in today's Northeast Asia, two neatly defined blocs pitted one against the other. There are fewer players than in the Europe of 1975. The system of alliances is different from the one prevailing before in Europe where NATO confronted the Warsaw Pact. In addition, there are fewer parallel structures comparable to those existing in Europe at that time. In Northeast Asia, there are no equivalents to the then existing European Communities, the Council of Europe or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe.

Every geo-political situation is unique of course, but similarities stimulate the imagination. They make the exchange of experiences and the development of comparative study particularly attractive. Actually, some of the specific features of Northeast Asia — the highly developed economic and trade relations to name one — may make it easier to build a regional security system than was the case with the Helsinki process in Europe.

II. The Road to Helsinki 1975

To understand the Helsinki process, one has to consider the precise circumstances of the time. Diplomatic initiatives, indeed, do not usually take place in the abstract. Europe in the '60s was in the grip of the Cold War. Communist parties had taken full control of Central European governments and had successfully put down the popular insurrections in June '56 in Poland and in October '56 in Hungary. Two Berlin crises had been overcome, in '49 and in '58, after tests of strength, which got no further than confirming the status quo. In succession, the communist victory in China, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile crisis, the development of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Cold War divide and the expanding Vietnam conflict made an onslaught in Europe imaginable. Superiority in conventional weapon-

ry was clearly on the side of the Soviet Union. Hence, western security strategy came to rely increasingly on "Mutual Assured Destruction" with the means of nuclear weapons. This defense posture placed the United States in the safe center of the security system. The European Continent lay on a dangerous periphery.

Western European Governments, naturally, were quite conscious of the precariousness of this position. It actually was their sense of vulnerability that triggered the Helsinki process. At the risk of simplifying, the sequence ran more or less as follows.

The then President of France, General Charles De Gaulle ('59-'69), became vociferous in his dislike of the dependency on the American nuclear umbrella. He resolved to take the lead of an alternative European approach. In 1966, he withdrew the French military from NATO's integrated structures and started his own initiatives in the direction of the Soviet Union. NATO received this move as an embarrassing vote of diffidence in its capacity to ensure European security. It was the more so that it came from a leading European nation. Clearly, the policy of the alliance would have to be adjusted, in other words, to be "Europeanized" if it were to remain relevant. In many European capitals, the urge was felt for a policy that would address, in a consistent manner, the various security interests of all European countries, including those expressed by France.*

Consequently, in December 1966 and on the initiative of Foreign Minister of Belgium Pierre Harmel, NATO resolved to "study the future tasks which face the Alliance and its procedures for fulfilling

* In this context, it is worth noting that the Helsinki Process would provide one of the first occasions for Foreign Policy Cooperation among the Member States of the European Community. In 1970, the Ministers of the six EC Governments adopted the "Davignon Report," named after the Belgian Political Director who negotiated it. The report mandated consultations among EC Members before finalizing national positions. As the preparations for the Helsinki negotiations began, consultations among the six EC Members proved particularly successful, with the help of the convergence among the European Government concerned on the subject of "détente." This initial success contributed to the "Davignon Report" becoming the successful forerunner of the present EU Common Foreign and Security Policy embedded in the EU Treaties.

them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace." A year later, when the study was completed, NATO's tasks emerged as two-fold and were defined as follows: "the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression" AND "the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved." This amounted to the parallel policies of maintaining adequate means of defense while at the same time seeking relaxation of tensions, or "détente," the word used further in the text. The two were explicitly said to be: "not contradictory but complementary."

Shortly thereafter, in August '68, Soviet tanks brutally repressed the Prague Spring. This actually suggested that detente would remain a gentle illusion for some time. However, such a quick conclusion was without reckoning with a determined West-German politician who, for years, had been denouncing the paralysis of Cold War politics and its detrimental effects on the relations between the separated halves of Germany (the "Hallstein Doctrine"). This politician, Willy Brandt, would get his chance. He became Chancellor in 1969 at the head of a coalition of Socialists and Liberals, leaving him with a freer hand than with the preceding "Grand Coalition" involving the conservative Christian/Social Democrats. He embarked on his long advocated "Ost Politik," a policy, one could summarize, of accepting inescapable realities in order to allow a move forward. Under his leadership, Germany ratified the Treaty of Moscow of 1970, whereby it accepted the wartime changes on its eastern borders, and the Fundamental Treaty of 1972, whereby it formally recognized Eastern Germany as a separate country.

At the same time, under First Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was looking, at least in Europe, for consolidation, normalization and cooperation. This was a departure from the assumed universalistic communist policies and seemingly inspired by a lagging economy and a worsening of the international situation. The era of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons was dawning. That renewed the sense of military vulnerability. Also, the split from Communist China, evident from military border skirmishes along the Amur river,

seemed to have escalated beyond repair.

Similarly, the United States also became interested in detente. Seeking to extract itself from the Vietnam predicament and inclined to exploit divisions in the communist camp, it was ready to mend fences with both Moscow and Beijing. One should remember that in '71, President Nixon visited China and that in '72, both the SALT 1 and ABM Treaties were concluded. The risk of conventional warfare was the other concern left unattended. It supplied the argument for a confidence building approach. In fact, the '68 NATO (without France) proposal for negotiations on Mutual Balanced Forces Reductions would be finally taken on. They started in 1972.

Summarizing, on the eve of the first Helsinki meeting in 1973, there existed a substantial, one can even say, global constituency in favor of detente. Western European states favored it as a way to overcome the dangerous bloc-to-bloc stalemate and as an occasion to discourage superpowers negotiating over their heads. Neutral states like the Scandinavian and Alpine countries as well as independent minded Non-Aligned states like Yugoslavia also saw an opportunity. It was a chance for alternative security arrangements in Europe, based on genuine multilateralism instead of opposing alliances. As indicated, the great powers were likewise interested in it.

Hence, in 1973, states engaged the search for points of agreement. Indeed, it was not sufficient to talk about *détente*. Adequate political language, concepts and formulations had to be found. What negotiators came up with was a "decalogue" of fundamental principles. It was adopted by the Summit Conference in Helsinki of 1975, which assembled the Heads of States and of Governments of NATO countries, of Warsaw Pact countries and of neutral countries. They met on an individual basis, not as members of blocs. This was an agreed formula.

III. The Helsinki Final Act

The title clearly indicates the intention. It says "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States." revealing the

ambition to establish a new predictable and consensual basis for relations between countries. Ten principles then follow with, each time, some elaboration in two or three paragraphs. They are worth examining, because they reveal what constituted a start between governments who, one should remember, disagreed otherwise about everything else. The principles ran as follows:

- ***Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.*** There was, right from the start, a reference to the dogmatic differences between western style democracies and communist systems. The text specifies: “*They [the participating States] will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.*”
- ***Refraining from the threat or use of force.*** This was a key concern for the West as much as for the East, and a key element of “*détente.*”
- ***Inviolability of frontiers.*** Moscow insisted heavily on this. Yet, under Principle I, the participating States had said: “*They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.*” This was hotly disputed language demanded by Western countries in order not to foreclose totally the possibility of reversing territorial gains made by the Soviet Union in the course of World War II. Moscow eventually conceded but at the condition that the language concerned would not figure under Principle III. That is the reason why it was moved to a paragraph under the first one.
- ***Territorial integrity of States.*** It reinforced the first and third principle.
- ***Peaceful settlement of disputes.*** It reinforced the second principle.
- ***Non-intervention in internal affairs.*** It complemented the first principle and was to offset, in the mind of the participants from the East, the next, seventh, principle.
- ***Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.*** This principle resulted from the insistent demand of the West. Its adoption proved possible because of the ambiguity maintained around the issue of where these rights and freedoms were best respected or sustained: in western style democracies as argued on the one side or in popular democracies as argued by communist governments.
- ***Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.*** The participating

States were keenly aware of the difficulty of this principle, in particular of its relationship to Principle IV above relating to territorial integrity. Hence, they specified that they “*will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.*”

- **Co-operation among States.** Here the participating States explain the kind of relations that they call for: “*They will equally endeavor, in developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfillment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favorable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.*”
- **Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.** This is a reaffirmation of the legal order applicable to the participating States. The UN Charter is at the top of this order. The Helsinki Final Act would however serve in support of it.

Admittedly, these ten principles are very “basic.” To a certain extent, they only reiterate UN Charter provisions. Several references to the UN Charter actually figure in the text. One might wonder then, why were they necessary at all? They could have “gone without saying.” However, this would miss the point. The European continent lived in the fear of armed confrontation and relented from ideological divide and tensions. An iron curtain separated people who for centuries had belonged to a single political system or indeed, to a same country. Under those conditions, basic principles went better said explicitly. At close study, they reflect a clever combination of reassuring conservatism (see the language about preservation of borders, respect for political systems, non-interference...) and prudent revisionism (see the encouragement of cooperation, the actual reason for the whole exercise).

After stating the principles, the Helsinki Final Act sets down to the task of describing what kind of cooperation would precisely take place. This part of the Act is much longer than the straightforward “Decalogue.” In sixty rather dense pages, political intentions, initiatives and steps are described in detail. They concern (1) military and general security, (2) economic and environmental issues, (3) social, cultural and human development as well as people-to-people contacts. In the text, they are clustered in these three chapters, traditionally referred to since then as the “*three baskets*.” In brief:

- On military security: participating States committed to notify major military maneuvers involving in excess of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components. This was at the outset a first mandatory confidence building measure. In addition to this, participating States could on a voluntary basis notify other maneuvers involving lesser numbers of personnel, or exchange observers, or else organize military visits and promote disarmament.
- On economy, science, technology and environment: participating States expressed the intention to promote meetings and exchanges involving trade, industry, technical norms & standards, science, environmental protection, transportation, tourism, migration and professional training.
- On human issues: participating States encouraged people-to-people contacts (families, youth, sports), mutual acceptance of written, spoken and televised information, and cultural and education exchanges.

So, these are the means through which the Helsinki Final Act got all participating states concerned on a common line. Two types of political messages were mingled. One comforted each party in its presumed position (sovereignty, borders, non-interference, human rights, self-determination). The other opened a window for interaction and further development (cooperation). Actually, a static message was combined with a dynamic one.

The logic was impeccable. First, there was the renunciation to force, figuring prominently in the ten principles and expressed as something that is in the shared mutual security interest of all the parties. Then, a

start was made with confidence-building measures, helping to consolidate a nascent and stabilizing relationship. Then, the move to further confidence building was encouraged, suggesting growing degrees of transparency, arms control and even outright disarmament. In parallel, additional forms of cooperation on a growing number of themes and subjects of mutual interest were laid out, some in very specific language. Between '75 and '86, the record of implementation of the first military confidence building measures was quite good. Notification of no less than 130 military maneuvers were made, some even way below the mandatory threshold (just 4,000 troops in one instance). In 72 cases, observers of the opposing side were invited, though there was no obligation. In the other two baskets, one must admit, the record of implementation was less convincing.

IV. Overcoming Doubts After Helsinki

In fact, relations between East and West did not immediately cash in on the virtuous logic of the Helsinki Final Act. In the late '70 and early '80's, the follow-up meetings to the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) did no better than muddle through. The first two review conferences in Belgrade ('78) and Madrid ('80-'83) were hardly occasions where new or higher spirits were expressed. Though the fundamental goal of peaceful coexistence was upheld, the priorities seemed to have shifted. US President Jimmy Carter ('77-'80) moved the issue of human rights up to the top of his agenda. It tilted the delicate balance, which the Soviet side thought it was holding. The approach under US President Ronald Reagan ('81-'87) was altogether different. It resulted from the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan ('79), the repression of the strikes initiated by the first independent trade union 'Solidarnosc' in Poland ('80) and the Soviet inroads into Africa. These led the United States to a policy of defiance, not of cooperation. It would take the transition of power in Moscow from Brezhnev, over Yuri Andropov and Constantin Tchernenko, to Mikhail Gorbachev in March '85 to restore maneuvering space for the Helsinki process. As it

turned out, 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' created new openings for the spirit of cooperation.

Thus, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and Disarmament in Europe became a success when it convened under the aegis of the CSCE from January '84 to September '86. The threshold for mandatory notification of military activities was lowered considerably: the Helsinki 25,000 troops became 13,000 or alternatively 300 battle tanks or 200 air sorties or a landing of 3,000 amphibious troops. The commitment to invite observers became firm. Additional undertakings concerned the exchange in advance of calendars of military activities and the mandatory acceptance of at least three inspections of areas where military activities could hypothetically take place. Thus, the possibility was created to verify whether the obligation to notify military maneuvers was indeed fully respected. With this, the atmosphere clearly changed.

A further qualitative leap occurred with the third review conference of the CSCE in Vienna ('86-'89). Its concluding document laid the basis for an intense calendar of activities, developing the CSCE into the genuine communication and confidence building channel it had been intended to be all along. The document provided for:

- The creation of an arbitration mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes. Eventually an Arbitration Convention was signed in December '92. It entered into force two years later though, to this day, no dispute has ever actually been submitted to it.
- The negotiation of a new generation of CSBM. This became the Vienna Document '90, with updates in both '94 and '99, each time with strengthened disciplines.
- The negotiation of a Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Treaty became a reality a year later in '90 and entered into force in '92. An adaptation Treaty was negotiated in '99 to take into account the new political realities following the implosion of the Soviet Union. This adaptation, however, is still not in force for failure of ratification.
- The stimulation of economic and environmental cooperation. Conferences were held in Sofia and in Bonn respectively in '89 and '90, with mixed results.

- The stimulation of media and cultural exchanges. Meetings took place in London and Krakow in respectively '89 and '91.
- The development of the Human Dimension. Conferences opened in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow in respectively '89, '90 and '91. The last two ones turned into landmark conferences. Copenhagen laid standards in the areas of democratic government, independent judiciary, free and fair elections, freedom of association, open and unrestrained media, prevention of torture, freedom of movement, protection of minorities and participation of non-governmental organizations in CSCE meetings. Moscow further developed these and in addition, generated a specific follow-up mechanism.

The plan was that these overall efforts would smoothly converge into the next (fourth) review conference of the CSCE scheduled for 1992 in Helsinki. However, the political dynamics of the time required faster action.

V. From 'Conference' to 'Organization'

As is well known, events took a dramatic turn. The Berlin Wall fell in November '89 and Germany reunited in October '90. A Special Summit of the CSCE was called shortly thereafter, in November in Paris. It adopted the Paris Charter, which capitalized on the thaw in Europe and on what was perceived as an increased convergence of political systems in the European continent. An institutionalization phase set in. So far, the CSCE had only been a sequence of inter-governmental conferences. In Paris, permanent bodies were created with a view to accompany the states emerging from the former communist bloc and assist them in their political and economic transformation. Clearly, the CSCE was the place where the new consensus on inter-governmental relations found expression. The mistrust of the '70s and '80s had subsided. The "defensive attitude," which appeared the conservative 'major' in Helsinki in 1975 and thereafter, gave way to a more proactive attitude of "cooperation," the one that had gone as the dynamic 'minor' in Helsinki. Henceforth, the latter would be the hallmark of the post-

cold war Helsinki process.

Yet, at the same time, violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia, in the Caucasus and in other parts of the CSCE region erupted. This was unexpected. It called for an important addition to the existing cooperation tools. Instruments for conflict management and resolution became urgently required. The years '90-'94 testify to an explosive development.

- **Participating States vastly increased in numbers.** The newly independent States emerging from the Soviet Union and from Yugoslavia quickly joined the CSCE. It was a flexible gathering in which they could easily affirm their freshly found or recovered sovereignty. It was also a convenient international family to which they could turn, one open and ready to welcome them in times of political disorientation. From 31 at the time of Helsinki, there now are 56 participating States. In addition, interested countries lined up as "Partners for Cooperation." There now are 11 of them, five in Asia and six in the Mediterranean region.
- **The array of norms and values on which they agreed increased exponentially.** The Treaty on Conventional Forces, the Vienna Document, the comprehensive commitments in the Human Dimension issued from the Copenhagen ('90) and Moscow ('91) Conferences were already mentioned.

Some of the progress was truly without precedent. At the Moscow conference, participating States agreed that *"the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned."*

This did not affect the principle of the Decalogue related to non-intervention in internal affairs, however, since the participating States also *"express their determination to fulfill all of their human dimension commitments and to resolve by peaceful means any related issue, individually and collectively, on the basis of mutual respect and co-operation."*

In addition, a remarkable Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was adopted at the CSCE Summit in Budapest

(‘94). Among others, it established principles in regard to military capabilities, which appear relevant from the point of view of addressing the collective security interests of all the participating States:

“Each participating State will determine its military capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability. No participating State will attempt to impose military domination over any other participating State.” (§13)

The code also addresses issues such as the use of armed forces for internal security missions.

“Each participating State will ensure that any decision to assign its armed forces to internal security missions is arrived at in conformity with constitutional procedures. Such decisions will prescribe the armed forces’ missions, ensuring that they will be performed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities and subject to the rule of law. If recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.” (§36)

The provisions adopted in this Code of Conduct are politically binding. They illustrate how far participating States went in those years in expressing their convergence. The code did not provide for specific follow-up mechanisms. However, this language constitutes the starting point, the common denominator, for the dialogue among participating States when relevant issues are up for discussion.

- **New institutions and instruments were put into place:**
 - Summit meetings at Head of State/Head of Government level,
 - Regular (annual) Ministerial meetings placed under the guidance of an annually rotating Chairmanship to whom the political leadership of the organization is entrusted,
 - A permanent body of the participating States, now the Permanent Council (Vienna),

- A Conflict Prevention Center, meant as a repository for the information exchange in the context of CSBM, by now a fully developed support tool for conflict management and for field action, integrated in the Secretariat (Vienna),
- An Office for Free Elections, now a full-fledged agency promoting human rights and democratic elections, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/ODIHR (Warsaw),
- A Parliamentary Assembly (Copenhagen),
- A Secretariat (Vienna), with a Secretary General at its head since '92,
- A High Commissioner for National Minorities since '92 (The Hague), designed as a conflict prevention tool, not as a norm setting mechanism,
- An Open Skies Treaty, organizing reciprocal surveillance from the air, negotiated in '92, entered into force in '02,
- A separate Forum for Security Cooperation since '92 (Vienna) to better address the technicalities of politico-military issues,
- Annual Economic Forum meetings since '93 (Prague) to address economic and environmental issues,
- Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings since '93 (Warsaw),
- Field missions and operations to address conflicts and assist in institution building. In the early days, missions were deployed in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Estonia and Latvia. The Minsk Conference was established to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Other initiatives were taken in ex-Yugoslavia and Albania. There now are 18 permanent missions complemented by a variety of other structures.
- A Representative for the Freedom of the Media since '97 (Vienna), a watchdog for ensuring the freedom of media and journalists.

Under existing rules, the Chairman-in-Office, after consulting the participating States, can in addition create temporary functions and mandates in order to address issues of a political nature requiring focused attention. Presently, there is an OSCE Special Representative against Human Trafficking. Three other Representatives have been appointed to combat different forms of intolerance. To reflect all these developments, the Budapest Summit in '94 decided to change the name

of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organization on Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE).

VI. The OSCE Today

As might be clear from this listing, the simple conference of 1975 has grown into a sophisticated network designed to stimulate dialogue and political cooperation. Today the OSCE addresses a wide range of concerns and issues in the military, political, economic, environmental and human fields considered to be at the “root” of durable stability and security. These have earned the OSCE the label “multidimensional,” a more comprehensive and diffuse concept than the ‘three’ baskets approach of the early days. The OSCE can boast continuity in the business of building military confidence. In addition to various forms of exchange of information, the organization ensures very concrete measures: visits to air bases (15 in ‘06), visits to military formations (18 in ‘06), demonstrations of new types of major weapons systems (5 in ‘06), inspections (81 in ‘06, organized within 3-10 days of the request) and evaluation visits to military deployments (39 in ‘06). Work continues on improving control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in conformity with the 2000 Document (almost 1 million units destroyed in ‘06). Projects to secure or destroy surplus ammunition make steady progress.

Annually, a Security Review Conference takes place. Periodically, a Military Doctrine Seminar is organized, last under Belgian Chairmanship in March ‘06. Dialogue on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in particular, on ways to help participating States implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was restarted under the Belgian Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Cooperation in December ‘05. Participating States fight jointly against terrorism, adopting very concrete measures relating, for instance, to the security of identity documents and to the control of man-portable anti-air devices. They encourage OSCE-wide the modernization of border security and management. They stimulate police reforms, including the introduction of community policing, and finance to this effect assistance pro-

grams. Belgium in '06 specifically led an effort to intensify the fight against organized crime. Concrete tools for problem analysis and resolution were developed to help design and implement projects. The structural issue of democratically governed criminal justice systems was addressed. Networking was stimulated through a first time meeting of the police chiefs of all 56 participating States in Brussels in November '06.

The OSCE runs projects to help States stimulate the creation of small and medium enterprises, train young professionals, improve the investment climate and identify environmental risks. Desertification and water management were on the agenda of the Economic Forum in '02 and are back today under the aegis of the present Spanish Chairmanship. Last year, the Belgian Chairmanship emphasized transportation as a theme where participating States could develop common ground in regard to infrastructure development, border cooperation, economic governance and network security. The design of cross-border transportation projects not only has symbolic reconciliation value but also helps build confidence. A follow-up conference is scheduled to take place in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in October '07. Early in '06, because of the Russia-Ukraine standoff on gas prices, energy security became an issue. A fact-finding mission undertook to identify avenues for preventive dialogue and efforts were engaged to generate consensus on an actual agenda. Awareness exists that energy issues could become divisive if dialogue is not pursued as agreed by the Brussels OSCE Ministerial in December '06.

In order to promote respect for human rights, the OSCE holds every year five implementation and review meetings and seminars. At these, participating States hold each other to their commitments. They exchange experiences and best practices, with the valuable support of the ODIHR. The latter also organizes, as one of its main activities, the observation of elections. This constitutes an original way in helping States to gradually improve their democratic record to conform to the Copenhagen commitments of '90. On a yearly basis, 8 to 12 presidential or parliamentary elections are watched by several hundreds of observers from a wide diversity of participating States. Several other

elections are more modestly assessed through the deployment of a small professional team.

Through its field missions and operations, the OSCE helps with building institutions. Where conflicts are concerned, it serves as a channel of communication, encourages confidence and assists in the search of compromise solutions. It handles incidents, as the Belgian Chairman-in-Office did in October '06 with the return of Russian nationals out of Georgian custody. These are no easy tasks. The conflicts in Moldova and in the Caucasus in particular endure despite the efforts of successive Chairmanships and of local OSCE representatives. They seem to have become the stakes in a region-wide geo-political competition, which incidentally also explains the lasting delay in the ratification process of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Despite this, as a consensus-based multilateral forum where all stakeholders hold a representation, the OSCE probably is the organization best suited to design the structural elements of hypothetical settlements.

In '06, the OSCE had a budget of 168 Mio € and employed in all 3.500 people. These are modest means and do not represent a substantial transfer of resources. Nor are they meant to be the OSCE's added value. The real contribution of the organization is the structure it provides for the exchange of ideas, concept, experiences, good practices and expertise in the areas of confidence building, of conflict resolution, of economic and environmental governance and of open democratic government accountable to their citizens. As the Brussels OSCE Ministerial Meeting put it,

“Participating States are encouraged to take advantage of the assistance offered by the institutions and the field operations of the OSCE to implement their commitments” (MC.DEC 19/06).

Since the end of the Cold War also, the door has been open for contributions from civil society and non-governmental organizations. Participating States increasingly recognize that real long-term security and stability cannot be achieved but with the participation of the pop-

ulations concerned. The conferences, seminars and events of the OSCE now are designed to facilitate the participation of non-governmental organizations. Literally, the OSCE provides opportunities for thousands of individuals belonging to government and non-governmental circles from all corners of the region to meet and learn from each other's experiences. It helps to spread the culture of dialogue and cooperation.

VII. The OSCE with Hindsight

What explains this overall solid record of the OSCE? A number of characteristics spring to mind. Surely, some of them are context driven but also, some of them may be exportable. At the outset, in 1973, there seemed to have been on the part of the participants on both sides a "readiness to come to grips with reality." This is not a natural propensity. The international community is highly dynamic. States routinely have political ambitions, which may lead them to clash. In the case of Europe, the perception had taken hold that the prevailing tensions had to be addressed. Governments were uncomfortable with them and perceived them as dangerous. The ambition to trump or outdo the other side had to be reined in. The stalemate could not be allowed to escalate. It had to be attended to.

This provided the basis for recognizing that the other side had its place in the system and, hence, for starting the "search for a common system." In the CSCE, the acceptance of the other states' interest in one state's own security policy appeared early on. The "mutuality" of what was being pursued dominated the discussions right from the start. Today, the terms "cooperative security" or "collective security interests of participating States" or "indivisible nature of security" give expression to this lasting idea. Naturally, there is no such thing as a final ideal security system. Nor, of course, is the OSCE such a system. Rather, since security is a result to be pursued and catered to over time, the common quest appears as a crucial element in itself. The CSCE got started based on the expectation that multilateral coopera-

tion could be an alternative to containment policies in the pursuit of mutual security.

A dose of “voluntarism” was obviously required. The natural inclination to hold on to one’s positions had to be overcome. There clearly was an issue of dominating the events rather than to wait them out. The Helsinki Final Act is quite explicit on this point:

“Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and cooperation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world.”

Participants in Helsinki, thus, were “willing to take risks.” They took the risk to move away from the existing situation and to engage on new territory. This became possible when it was understood that also the other side was taking risks. Reciprocity was crucial. The fact that none of the sides was asked to give anything up on issues of substance naturally helped. The “Decalogue,” one might recall, devoted much language to confirm each side in its fundamental sovereign prerogatives and convictions. Each side took the view that under those conditions, it would preserve its own integrity while benefiting from the advantages of a more relaxed relationship.

It also helped that the initial steps were small. At the outset, the approach was “gradual.” The first military confidence building measure provided for a very high threshold: 25,000 troops is the size of an army. Many of the first measures also were on a voluntary basis. They later evolved into ones that are more significant. The present Vienna ’99 Document provides for a threshold of 9,000 troops, which is still relatively high, but contains a comprehensive set of mandatory obligations with far-reaching results in terms of military transparency. Full advantage was taken from experience gained over time, from what one might call a deliberate and consensual trial and error process. The effort, which started in Helsinki, developed into a larger “process.” At first, the discussions were among a few representatives. Then, as more issues were brought to the table, more and more people needed to

become involved. In each Government or Administration, a constituency grew that emphasized and pursued the potential of cooperative alternatives to one-sided security policies. In the end, this has influenced decision-making. Involving an increasing number of people proved a useful side effect.

The Helsinki process in the beginning was purely “inter-governmental.” This was unavoidable since both sides needed to keep a narrow control over the political and diplomatic risks. When confidence reached a high level, as it did in the early '90s, participating States could afford to expand to a parliamentary dimension and to a civil society dimension. However, such would not have been imaginable in the early stages. The commitments in Helsinki were of a “purely political nature.” Up to this day, the OSCE is “only” a political process. It provides for dialogue, some form of international courtesy, behavioral norms, advisory and assistance services, but certainly not rigid contractual obligations. The advantage is that texts are easier to negotiate, that initiatives get faster off the ground. The drawback is that commitments are abandoned faster under the pressure of political developments. No rigorous implementation mechanisms can be devised. This actually explains why the OSCE is so sensitive to the prevailing political climate. Exceptions to this are the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies, both of which are legally binding documents, though negotiated under CSCE auspices. They actually lead their own life: not all participating States of the OSCE are bound by these treaties. A separate budget and a separate follow-up structure are in place for each of them.

The starting point of the Helsinki process was a Decalogue of “fundamental principles.” These were not innovative and their compatibility with the UN Charter was essential. Yet, they constituted initial common ground, which participating States over the years have successfully expanded to include ever more areas of agreement. Over time, an ‘acquis’ of norms and values has emerged, which addresses not only international behavior but also internal governance and political systems as root “causes” of security and stability. One might get the impression from present day discussions within the OSCE in

Vienna that this aspect of the Helsinki process is now contested. Still, this 'acquis' now provides a solid basis for further political dialogue. It serves as a bulwark against conflict through misunderstanding. It probably also contributes to the softening of territorial or statutory disputes.

In fact, the drive to expand the 'acquis' can be traced back to the founding text of the CSCE. The Helsinki Final Act itself suggests in several places the "interconnection among issues" enticing the participating States to explore one new area after another. For instance, it asserts in a sweeping manner "*the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security*" (part III, General considerations under the first basket, CSBM's). It asserts further:

"Convinced that their efforts to develop cooperation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole" (first 'considerans' under the second basket, Economic and Environmental Cooperation).

It finally interconnects peace and the human dimension:

"Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." (first 'considerans' under the third basket, Cooperation in the Humanitarian field).

Typical of the CSCE process is its "regional ownership and specificity." The initiative came from European states themselves, conceived and designed by and for themselves and meant at the outset to be inclusive of all states in the region. Out-of-region powers participated to preserve the indispensable balance. The inclusiveness of the process also ensured its continued relevance. After all, what it amounted to was some kind of neighborhood regulation. Today, one could argue even a step further. The fact of belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community united in the OSCE appears to produce a sense of comfort and international advantage.

Finally, one should recognize that the fortunes of the Helsinki process were heavily dependent on “international political circumstances and developments.” This dependency probably still exists, but is this not the case for any diplomatic initiative? How much then has the Helsinki process been capable of influencing events in return? That is a valid question on its own. All kinds of claims exist in this respect too. At its origins, the Helsinki process was the expression of a prevailing mood of “detente.” When “detente” fell down the ladder of priorities in the later '70s and in the early '80s, it might have provided no more than a “safe-conduct” for necessary if not comforting communication. Thereafter, when the Soviet Union melted away, the CSCE/OSCE had the chance to surge back to the front of the scene, producing some of the most vanguard political language seen in the history of international diplomacy. One way to look at the Helsinki process is to consider that “the chance favors the prepared minds.” For the time of its existence, the CSCE has prepared or kept prepared the minds for things that might come. When the chance lured from around the corner, it was duly seized, at least in Europe. As the fortunes of East-West relations go through new episodes, the lessons on dialogue, confidence building and cooperative security might come in handy again.

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The Politics of the Helsinki Process— How Did It Arise During the Cold War?: An American Perspective

James E. Goodby

In 1969, the appearance of new leaders and new policies in the West coincided with a renewed Soviet push for a European Security Conference designed to counteract the political costs incurred by the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Western Europe, the desire to give East Europeans more freedom of action propelled the idea of a European conference to the forefront of the East-West agenda. In Washington, two separate strategies soon emerged. The Nixon-Kissinger White House believed that the conference should be as empty of content as possible so that it could not damage the US position in Europe. In contrast, the State Department and the US Mission to NATO believed that Moscow should be pressed for concessions in the human dimension to prevent an outcome that would only perpetuate the division of Germany and of Europe. Detailed negotiations among the NATO allies at NATO headquarters in Brussels led to the concept of the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE), including a call for freer movement of people, ideas, and information. These positions were strongly advocated by the European Community (now Union) in the multilateral East-West talks that began in 1972 and ended with agreement on the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The choice made by the West to try for a transformative conference instead of a "non-event" contributed to the end of the Cold War.

Assumptions and Strategies

In August 1968 the combined armies of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia to suppress modest experiments with liberalization that the Prague government had initiated. The assessment of West-

ern governments, including the US Government, following that event was that at a minimum the strategic objective of the Soviet Union was to consolidate Soviet dominion over Eastern Europe and to legitimize the frontiers established following World War II, thus forever dividing Germany and the two halves of Europe. Many in the West thought Moscow's objectives also included undermining the cohesion of NATO and of the European Community. This view was only strengthened by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's revival in 1969 of a hoary Soviet proposal to convene an all-European security conference.

The new Nixon Administration's policy towards the Soviet Union in 1969, and after, was based on the principle that Moscow should be encouraged to believe that it had a vested interest in the status quo.¹ This was seen as the only realistic policy compatible with American interests, given the weakened international posture of the United States at that stage of the Vietnam War and the steady growth in Soviet military strength since Moscow's humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. A European Security Conference that would do nothing more than legitimize the status quo in Europe was therefore compatible with a key premise of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, especially since West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, aimed at normalizing relations with West Germany's eastern neighbors, seemed likely to permanently divide Germany anyway.² The problem for the US foreign policy establishment was how to limit damage to American interests if a European Security Conference were ever held.

There were two proposed solutions to this problem. One, favored in the White House, was to ensure that all serious security issues—those that might affect the US troop presence in Europe—were detached from the European Security Conference and the Conference itself be

¹ Note, for example, Nixon's definition of "the first stage of detente: to involve Soviet interests in ways that would increase their stake in international stability and the status quo." From *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), p. 618.

² On the effect of Ostpolitik, Henry Kissinger wrote that "I thought Ostpolitik was more likely to lead to a permanent division of Germany than to healing its breach." From *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 411.

drained of any potential political consequences. This thesis assumed that the Conference would be a non-event and that negotiations on troop reductions would help the Nixon Administration control the pace and timing of any eventual US troop withdrawals from Europe. A corollary of this assumption was that it would be desirable to have negotiations on troop reductions precede or at least proceed in parallel with a European Security Conference.

A second solution to the problem of limiting damage if a European Security Conference were ever held—one favored by the State Department—was to counter Soviet demands for ratification of the territorial and political gains Moscow had made in Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II with Western demands that would tend to neutralize the effects Moscow hoped would flow from a European Security Conference. At first, the Western idea of counter-demands focused only on negating the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of “socialist states” that Moscow had invoked to justify the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. As 1969 wore on, the idea of another counter-demand began to take hold in several allied capitals. This idea was captured in the phrase “freer movement of people, ideas, and information” or simply “freer movement.” It appeared in the communique of the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting of December 1969.³

During the first term of the Nixon Administration, the White House was content to keep both these ideas in play. The idea of beginning negotiations on troop reductions was clearly seen as being in the realm of high politics, however, while the idea of a European Security Conference belonged in the realm of do-goodism, an impractical notion not to be taken very seriously because of the unlikelihood of its producing useful results. The disparaging image of “diplomats playing in their sand box” was often evoked by “realists” in the National Security Council staff. Nonetheless, the State Department’s Bureau of European

³ In speaking of “human rights” in the Final Act of 1975, the freer movement provisions are the operational elements and the human rights principle in the declaration of principles is the statement of a general obligation. The specific obligations have figured prominently in all of the compliance reviews since the first review meeting in Belgrade.

Affairs worked vigorously to promote Western counter-demands within the NATO alliance from late 1969 until November 1972 when the Multilateral Preparatory talks (MPT) for what had become known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) commenced in Helsinki.

The Nixon-Kissinger White House saw the CSCE, at best, as a possible useful bargaining chip to secure Soviet concessions on European security issues like Berlin and troop levels. And much of this bargaining was carried out secretly by Henry Kissinger, which had the inevitable effect of creating two American policies toward the CSCE, one conducted by Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff, the other by the State Department, primarily officials of the Bureau of European Affairs. Denying the CSCE any prospects of concrete results became the White House staff approach, in the hope that the political effect of a conference—which they assumed would be damaging to US interests—would be minimized. The strategy reflected the realist view of the Nixon-Kissinger White House.

The White House approach as it developed during the Nixon period, in fact, was not greatly at variance with Moscow's thinking about the conference. In the course of its renewed drive for an ESC in the months after the Czechoslovak invasion, Moscow made it clear that a few simple declarations would suffice for its purposes. The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Meeting in Prague on October 30-31, 1969, identified two agenda items: non-use of force and economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. While informing the State Department on November 19 that the United States could take part in an all-European conference if it wished, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin also assured his listeners that "acute questions" would be outside the framework of an all-European conference.⁴ Such a conference evidently would accomplish some specific Soviet objectives as the State Department saw them at the time: recognition of the German Democratic Republic, acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and papering over the inva-

⁴ Talking Paper left at the Department of State by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on November 19, 1969.

sion of Czechoslovakia.⁵ Moscow became aware from press reports and probably other sources that the North Atlantic Council was reviewing an extensive list of issues for negotiation with the East. Moscow's consistent response was that the work program for the ESC should be kept simple. Furthermore, while some East Europeans talked about a series of conferences, the typical Soviet view was that one conference would suffice.

Beginning the Era of Negotiations (1969~)

1969 was a pivotal year for the CSCE. Richard Nixon took office in January, French President Pompidou in April, and German Chancellor Brandt in October. The launching of Ostpolitik by Willy Brandt and interest shown by Georges Pompidou in the CSCE were critical events, without which the CSCE would at least have been substantially delayed. Nixon's public commitment to an "era of negotiations," of course, seemed to give the American imprimatur to the resumption of a dialogue with Moscow interrupted by the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968.

Ostpolitik was the critical step in the process that led to the CSCE. Brandt saw his eastern treaties as transformational steps in Central and Eastern Europe but he was counting on events in the long term to bear out his expectation. (Compare this with the Republic of Korea's "Sunshine policy" or "engagement policy" vis-à-vis the DPRK.) In the short term West Germany appeared to have given the Soviet Union and East Germany in a bilateral framework almost everything they could hope to get in the CSCE. But the new element in the CSCE, as opposed to Brandt's bilateral treaties with West Germany's neighbors, would be its multilateral character, giving it the quality of a surrogate peace treaty ending World War II. Ostpolitik lifted restraints from the other European countries in their own dealings in the East. Previously

⁵ Memorandum of Conversation of November 28, 1969, Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand and Finnish Ambassador Olavi Munkki.

they had been rather circumspect, honoring the Federal Republic's wishes, especially regarding East Germany. Now the West Europeans could act as though they had a hunting license to do what they could to advance their own interests in the East. This included, of course, taking a fresh look at the old Soviet idea of a European Security Conference.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had been a major moral defeat for Moscow. A peace offensive with the theme of ending the division of Europe into military blocs was a way to recover respectability and so Moscow launched a renewed appeal for a European Security Conference with the Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal on March 17, 1969. An air of imminence and reality was given to this effort when in May 1969 Finland offered Helsinki as the site for such a conference. Between these two events, a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Washington in April heard the new American president, Richard Nixon, speak about negotiations with the East and decided to authorize a study of East-West negotiations. And on April 28, 1969, Charles de Gaulle resigned as president of France.

Pompidou's coming to power was another major factor in the gathering momentum behind the idea of a European Security Conference. DeGaulle had not been sympathetic to Soviet efforts to launch such a conference, believing that multilateral gatherings were the antithesis of state-to-state efforts to break down the division of Europe. Pompidou changed this policy and thereby gave his blessings to the idea of a European Security Conference. By July 1969, the French were passing the word to both East and West that they were prepared to consider a conference. Furthermore, Paris wanted to promote contacts and exchanges between East and West, which it thought would have beneficial long-run effects in reducing barriers between Eastern and Western Europe.⁶

On April 21, 1969, the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs instructed the US Mission to NATO to support a study of concrete issues for East-West negotiations by NATO's Senior Political

⁶ Department of State telegram to Paris July 18, 1969; Telegram from American Embassy, Paris, to Department of State, July 22, 1969 (Paris 11066).

Committee. The procedure followed by the North Atlantic Council in those days was to assign studies on topics identified by governments to one of its committees. In this case, the Council tasked the Senior Political Committee (SPC) to undertake the study of issues for possible negotiations with the East. The SPC members were deputy permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, except in the case of the United States where the Mission's Political Counselor (the author from 1971-74) served as the US representative. The study was pursued during the summer and fall of 1969.

Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann visited Moscow in October 1969 and added momentum to the idea of a European Security Conference. The French and the Soviet Union accepted jointly the principle that a European Security Conference should help put an end to the Europe of blocs. During the same month, another meeting of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers held in Prague gave Moscow's blessings to East European bilateral talks with Western governments on matters concerning an all-European conference. The notion that a European Security Conference would give more maneuver room to the East European states became one of the West European staple arguments in support of a conference.

Secretary of State William Rogers at this time, while critical of the Soviet proposal as it stood, was telling Europeans that the best way to handle the ESC proposal was to think of counter-proposals. He thought there was some risk in being entirely critical of the idea.⁷ Seeking to gain the high ground in the exchanges between East and West, Washington authorized its NATO Mission in Brussels to introduce a declaration on European security into the preparations for the December ministerial. This was done on November 25 and resulted in the issuance of a "Declaration of the North Atlantic Council" on December 5, 1969. Paragraph 11 of the Declaration is as follows: 11. Allied governments consider that not only economic and technical but also cultural exchanges between interested countries can bring mutual benefit and

⁷ State Department Memorandum of Conversation dated November 12, 1969, Secretary Rogers and FRG Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt.

understanding. In these fields more could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West.

The last sentence of this paragraph provided the authorization for the US Mission to NATO and the State Department from then on to push for a strong “freer movement” plank in the allied positions in the CSCE and the Declaration acknowledged the possibility of holding a general conference eventually. Criteria for judging the acceptability of a conference included:

- Progress on fundamental problems of European security in other forums;
- Participation of North American members of the alliance;
- Careful advance preparation and prospects of concrete results;
- Assurance that a conference would not serve to ratify the division of Europe, but instead would represent an effort to tackle the problems that separated the nations.

These criteria guided Department of State officials during the next three years of preparation for the CSCE. Beginning in the autumn of 1970 after repeated prodding from the State Department, the NATO allies began to consider how to go beyond state-to-state relations and into the domain of a state’s relation to its own people. The follow-through was feeble at first, but a seed had been planted that led to the beginning of a profound change in European thinking about the possible uses of a security conference. It marked the beginning of the CSCE as it finally emerged. All of the subsequent reviews of compliance with human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act owe something to the shift in West European thinking that began in late 1970. The first freer movement specifics stemmed from this period. They included:

- Ending restrictions on the rights of individuals to travel abroad;
- Stopping the jamming of radio broadcasts;
- Freer circulation of books, newspapers, and periodicals and improved conditions for foreign journalists;
- Free access to foreign diplomatic missions.

Family reunification and the abolition of closed zones in the USSR appeared later in the NATO consultations. The latter idea did not survive the negotiations but the others, in one form or another; all became part of the Helsinki Final Act.

The NATO consultations in the fall of 1970 also foreshadowed the general character of the Helsinki Final Act as it emerged five years later. The allies discussed the possibility of a declaration that would define improved cooperation in several specific areas of human contacts. Other models considered were a more general declaration and a binding convention. NATO consultations had a powerful influence over thinking in the foreign ministries of the member governments, including the United States. It was significant, therefore, that in the spring of 1971, the US Mission to NATO began to move into a leadership position in the deliberations about a European security conference. The Mission had shared many of the misgivings of the Nixon White House as the conference idea began to gain support during 1969-70. In March 1971, Ambassador Robert Ellsworth cabled Washington to express his concern about wide-spread support for a hortatory conference largely devoid of substance. The US Government, he thought, should mount a study of the type that had supported arms control preparations and negotiations. Unless the United States provided the focus for discussion among the allies by submitting carefully drawn papers, in his judgment the vacuum would not be filled by others.⁸ The Mission then proceeded to draft and cable to Washington a series of papers outlining the substance of proposed US and allied positions on each major item for discussion in a Conference on European Security. The last of these papers was sent to Washington on March 26, 1971, and it dealt with freer movement of people, ideas and information.⁹

The general objective of the study exercise would be to identify real and substantial measures that could be adopted by a conference to accompany any declaration of principles.¹⁰ The specific objective of

⁸ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, March 12, 1971 (US NATO 1058).

⁹ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, March 26, 1971 (US NATO 1283).

freer movement provisions would be to obtain Soviet and East European acceptance of the fact that any durable order of peace and cooperation in Europe must include the normalization of human contacts and respect for the rights of individuals to enjoy freedom of movement and information. Concrete proposals should therefore be developed to give meaning to the propositions that:

- Everyone in Europe has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
- Each individual in Europe has the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.¹¹

The Ministerial Communiqué of June 4, 1971 strengthened the allied commitment to the freer movement topic by referring to the internal NATO studies and stating that an “agreement would be desirable in order to promote the freer movement of people, ideas and information so necessary to the development of international cooperation in all fields.” Later in the summer of 1971, the State Department identified the priority NATO objectives in the freer movement field in a cable to the US Mission to NATO:

- Reduction of restrictions on the exit of Warsaw Pact nationals;
- Cessation of radio jamming;
- Freer circulation of books, newspapers, and periodicals;
- Better working conditions for journalists.¹²

By this time, NATO members were in broad agreement on the agenda for a conference. This agenda later became the basis for the three “baskets” of the Helsinki Final Act. As identified by the Chairman of the Senior Political Committee the main topics for further alliance study would be:

¹⁰ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, March 26, 1971 (US NATO 1279).

¹¹ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, March 26, 1971 (US NATO 1283).

¹² Department of State telegram to US Mission NATO, July 30, 1971.

- Principles governing relations between states;
- Freer movement of people, ideas and information and cultural relations;
- Economic, scientific, and technical cooperation;
- Environment.¹³

The lengthy NATO studies were replete with indications of differences among the allies but they greatly strengthened the allies' ability later to deal with the issues at the East-West negotiations because they had thought about the issues and understood the pros and cons. This was especially the case for some of the smaller nations. To cite a relevant military aphorism, "plans are nothing, planning is everything." Although France and other European Community members used the essence of the NATO studies to draft "mandate" papers for use in the CSCE within the political consultations framework of the EC, the effort was compatible with the ongoing NATO work and was discussed in NATO.

While the NATO consultations were proceeding with the drafting of position papers for use by allied negotiators, Henry Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 138 on October 2, 1971. It asked for an interagency discussion of differing concepts of a Conference on European Security. The short deadline—November 1, 1971—did not allow much time for an in-depth study, even though the Memorandum invited the Interdepartmental Group for Europe to consider matters not yet agreed to within NATO.

The Bureau of European Affairs took the lead in drafting the study and it sought to emphasize the potential importance of a Conference on European Security in achieving long-term US objectives:¹⁴

To the extent the influence of the Western community can be extended eastward,

¹³ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, July 1, 1971 (US NATO 2787).

¹⁴ The description of this report is from a text sent by the Department of State (E.J. Streater) to various agencies for final clearance on October 30, 1971. This text already had been discussed and revised in the interagency process.

common Western purposes are served.... Within the longer perspective of an emerging trans-Atlantic order, involving not only Western but Eastern Europe, CES assumes heightened potential relevance....

Cautions, and even a touch of opportunism, were expressed regarding the prospects for freer movement. But the conclusion was clear that Soviet concessions might be obtainable:

The Soviets would resist any concrete concessions in this area though there are tactical and propaganda advantages in keeping the issue in play and there might be some significant Soviet concessions if the Allies press firmly.

The interagency report described US policy as “damage limiting” in its approach to the Conference on European Security. Even so, its authors thought that a compromise might result:

The Soviets make some concrete concessions on freer movement and accept a declaration on principles that would apply regardless of political or social systems, while the allies agree to a formulation pledging “respect” for existing European frontiers.

The report discussed general concepts for the CES, as requested by NSSM-138. It gave favorable notice to a new approach that would place more emphasis on permanent machinery to perpetuate and reinforce the US presence in Europe. It played down the concept of a “conference for the sake of detente.” No discernible change in US policy resulted from this study. A possible compromise outcome as sketched out in the report remained the objective of the State Department and the US Mission to NATO. The main issue at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting related to whether enough progress had been made to guarantee Western rights in Berlin in Quadripartite Talks (US, U.K., France, USSR) to permit the alliance to announce its readiness to begin multi-lateral talks in Helsinki. The US Secretary of State thought not and the NATO Ministerial Communique was a compromise between this position and that of French Foreign Minister Schumann and others, who were ready to begin the Helsinki talks.

Freer movement was not a major issue at that meeting, my first as the US official responsible for shepherding the Ministerial Communique through the gauntlet of negotiations with proud and determined NATO colleagues. That agenda item was described as “freer movement, of people, information and ideas and cultural relations” in the NATO Ministerial Communique of December 10, 1971. The chief substantive disagreement concerned the paucity of security-related proposals in the report of the Senior Political Committee. In a series of meetings of the Permanent Representatives in the North Atlantic Council on November 23, 25, and 26, 1971, several allies said that the report was weighted much too heavily towards cooperation with the East and that more work was needed on security.¹⁵ From the meeting of November 23 onward, however, the conference was no longer the “Conference on European Security” but the “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.”¹⁶

Final Preparations: 1972

Historic events far transcending the US and NATO efforts to define a satisfactory outcome to a CSCE provided the necessary impulse to launch the final phase of maneuvering towards Helsinki. Germany’s Eastern Treaties and conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin marked the end of the first phase of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. The only remaining obstacle standing in the way of multilateral preparatory talks on the CSCE was Soviet refusal to enter into negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. (MBFR) This was an obstacle for the Americans and a few of their allies but the intensity of Kissinger’s interest was not matched in NATO, generally. The French wanted CSCE but not MBFR. London thought MBFR was more dangerous than CSCE. The Germans preferred MBFR as an included item

¹⁵ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, November 27, 1971 (US NATO 4962).

¹⁶ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, November 24, 1971 (US NATO 4916).

within CSCE. Most of the smaller NATO allies were ready to go to Helsinki once the Berlin agreement was out of the way. Kissinger saw MBFR as necessary to maintaining the US military presence in Europe and, therefore, far more consequential than CSCE. Furthermore, the feeling was widespread in Washington that serious negotiations on sensitive security matters could not be given over to a forum as large and unpredictable as CSCE.

By the time that President Nixon and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev met in Moscow in May 1972, the conditions Nixon and Kissinger had set for the beginning of the CSCE process had essentially been met except for Soviet agreement to the beginning of talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). All of the NATO allies were ready to begin the CSCE, however, so the best that Nixon and Kissinger could do was withhold agreement on a date for beginning CSCE. This, they hoped, could still be traded for a date for beginning MBFR. In subsequent negotiations with the Soviet leadership culminating in September 1972, the Americans and Soviets agreed on the idea of parallel talks on CSCE and MBFR and specific dates were established for the beginning of the two negotiations. Multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE would begin on November 22, 1972, in Helsinki; MBFR preparatory talks would begin in Geneva on January 31, 1973, the formal opening of the CSCE would occur in June 1973, and MBFR negotiations would begin in September or October 1973. This sequence was not ideal from the vantage point of those favoring a serious and substantive approach to the CSCE since it made the beginning of MBFR hostage to American "good behavior" in the early stages of the CSCE. Soviet diplomacy sought to exploit the advantage.

In the fall of 1972 the British delegation to NATO introduced proposals that the British labeled a "Steering Brief." This became the subject of intense consultations in the Senior Political Committee. During the last weeks of the NATO preparatory work for the CSCE, attention shifted to tactical and strategic considerations, for which the British draft provided an excellent basis of discussion. On October 19, the Senior Political Committee completed its review of the Steering Brief. There was broad allied agreement on Western aims, and on what Soviet

aims were likely to be, on tactics for the multilateral preparatory talks, the agenda, and permanent machinery.¹⁷ In assessing whether the East or the West was likely to do better in the CSCE, the allies thought that in the long run the West might gain the advantage because of the attraction and dynamism of its political- economic system. On freer movement, the opinion was that “freer movement is of crucial interest in the West, and we should not give up.”¹⁸ The subject should be a separate agenda item and the task of a CSCE committee.

The effort on the Steering Brief was the last of the major consultations that the alliance had conducted since the North Atlantic Council had launched its study of East-West negotiations at its Washington meeting in April 1969. Summing up the three years of NATO discussions, the Bureau of European Affairs was able to report, with evident satisfaction, that:

*The US has taken the lead, during NATO consultations on CSCE issues, to develop the freer movement topic as a major Allied proposal. In the West the general belief is that European security will be enhanced by the gradual bridging of the divisions of Europe. Moreover, the West cannot accept the “legitimacy” of the political status quo in Eastern Europe. The freer movement proposal thus reasserts the Western interest in constructive, peaceful and liberalizing change, in contradistinction to Soviet emphasis on legitimizing the status quo at the level of state-to-state relations.*¹⁹

¹⁷ Telegram from US Mission NATO to Department of State, October 20, 1972 (US NATO 4325).

¹⁸ Telegram from US Mission NATO to the Department of State, October 20, 1972 (US NATO 4313).

¹⁹ Memorandum from Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/RPM: Ralph J. McGuire) to CSCE Task Force Working Group on Freer Movement. Subject: Public Affairs Guidance for CSCE — Freer Movement of People, Ideas and information. November 19, 1972.

The End of the Beginning

A persistent State Department drive, begun in 1969, to introduce human rights issues into the CSCE human rights demands had never found favor in the White House. In late 1972, the State Department's policy no longer was compatible with the Soviet-American relationship as it had developed under the stewardship of Nixon and Kissinger during the first Nixon Administration. When the Multilateral Preparatory Talks began in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, the high-profile American posture on freer movement abruptly switched to a behind-the-scenes role. There were sound tactical reasons for this. A US-Soviet confrontation over human rights would be less productive in getting results than steady pressure from all the Western nations. A human rights drive led by Europeans quietly backed by the US delegation was, therefore, the most promising approach to this sensitive subject. There were other reasons for this related to the agreements Nixon and Kissinger had reached with the Soviet Government. From the beginning of the CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks in Helsinki it was clear that Soviet representatives believed that the projected formal beginning of the CSCE in June 1973 was a done deal, not to be affected by questions of substance. They sought, and expected, to receive American cooperation in making that happen. John Maresca has commented on this in his classic book on the CSCE, *To Helsinki*:

While there was a vivid desire in the delegation and at the working level of the State Department to support the Western side, the officials concerned were afraid that if they attempted to put instructions in writing, Kissinger would not agree to a strong US position.²⁰

When the chief Soviet representative at Helsinki, Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, observed what was happening, he complained to George Vest, the senior American representative in the talks, about the Ameri-

²⁰ John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p.44.

can attitude. The Soviets, he said, had a clear understanding with the United States that the CSCE would without question take place in June 1973. The debate over terms of reference was casting doubt on this. Mendeleovich asked that the United States pass word through official channels in Moscow or Washington that it remained committed to the CSCE in June.²¹ On December 20, Secretary Rogers wrote to President Nixon that he had instructed the US delegation to avoid polemical exchanges at Helsinki. He also told the president that the US delegation had succeeded in "side-stepping several Soviet suggestions for stage-managing the proceedings through private understandings with us."²²

In the face of this challenging situation, the agreement to include the human rights topic in the agenda of the CSCE depended on firm European leadership and a Western consensus on what should be achieved in the CSCE. Both factors were present, the former because the European nations wanted a success in their newly created political consultations within the European Community framework, the latter because of three years of intense NATO consultations led by the United States. On June 8, 1973, the participants in the Helsinki talks gave their collective agreement to the "Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations."

The first stage of the CSCE began on July 3, 1973, in Geneva. A committee on questions relating to security in Europe was charged with the drafting of a declaration of principles, including "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." A committee on cooperation in humanitarian and other fields was established with several responsibilities for human contacts, information, and culture. Among them was the duty of preparing "proposals to facilitate freer movement and contacts individually or collectively, privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States." And another was to "prepare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of

²¹ Telegram from George Vest, US delegation, Multilateral Preparatory Talks, dispatched from US Mission NATO, December 20, 1972. (US NATO 5465).

²² Memorandum to the President from Secretary of State William Rogers; Subject: CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks; December 20, 1972.

information of all kinds.”

Even then, the outcome was not foreordained. The Nixon-Kissinger White House still did not share the views that American diplomats had been advocating since 1970 about the importance of human rights in the CSCE. In fact, Henry Kissinger made this painfully clear to the NATO allies in a meeting with Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, on June 30, 1973, shortly before the Geneva phase of the talks was to begin. As reported by European participants, he said: “Our only goal is now to prevent it from becoming a cosmic event which could be regarded by the public as a spectacular result.” And later he added: “I do not believe the Soviet Union is going to be eased out of Eastern Europe by some sort of declaration. The sooner the conference is over the better.”

A long and difficult negotiation resulted in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. For the United States, the Final Act was signed by Gerald Ford, who had become president upon Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974. By the spring of 1975 it had become clear that the position initially advocated by the State Department had won the day, thanks in large part to the determination of West European negotiators, quietly backed by the Americans. But, ironically, Henry Kissinger, who became Secretary of State in August 1973, finally was cast in the role of securing the human rights provisions in the Final Act. John Maresca tells the story in his book *To Helsinki*:

“Although Kissinger evidently found human rights issues largely irrelevant to superpower politics, it was he who, in Vienna in the spring of 1975, took up the remaining unresolved issues in Basket III (the human dimension) with Gromyko, thus impressing the Soviets with the need to make sufficient concessions in this area to make it possible for Western governments to accept a summit-level conclusion. This was one of the most important turning points in the Conference.” (p. 158)

The Impact

The first step toward a Europe whole and free was to deny the premise that there were two Europes. At the heart of the Helsinki Final Act was the idea that Europe and North America are not merely 35 states with their sovereign rights, but also millions of people with their own rights, needs, and aspirations. The promise of the Helsinki process was a community free of unnatural barriers and rich in diversity. Breaking down walls was a prelude to affirming and promoting common values -freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the right to self-determination free from outside interference.

Ideas do have consequences. But to help guarantee consequences, the Final Act required follow-up meetings both to review implementation of its provisions and to expand the scope of cooperation. The first follow-up meeting, held in Belgrade, established the principle that the Helsinki Final Act was not a finished product, but rather the beginning of a process. Subsequent review meetings at Madrid and Vienna firmly established the principle of accountability, and numerous experts' meetings widened the possibilities for cooperative relations envisaged in the accords of 1975. Twenty years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, wrote in his memoirs (*In Confidence*, Times Books, 1995), p. 347 that

"Its ultimate reality was that it played a significant role in bringing about the long and difficult process of liberalization inside the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. This in the end caused the fundamental changes in all these countries that helped end the Cold War."

The bipolar order that had been imprinted on a divided Europe during the Cold War crumbled with the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and ended with the unification of Germany a year later.*

* The Author participated in the events described in this paper and the description of how the Helsinki Process arose during the Cold War is therefore influenced by

that experience. Other participants have also shared with the author their recollection of events. The main sources of this account, however, are State Department records. An earlier version of this paper appears in J.E. Goodby, *Europe Undivided* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998). Key participants in the State Department during these years were Assistant Secretaries Martin Hillenbrand and Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary George Springsteen, Ralph McGuire and Edward Streater, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs (RPM), Arva Floyd, Officer-in-Charge of Political Affairs, RPM and Leo Reddy, of that office. Reddy was the line action officer in RPM and later served in the same capacity in the U.S. Mission to NATO. He originated many of the ideas for NATO consultations. At the U.S. Mission, Ambassadors Robert Ellsworth and Donald Rumsfeld were closely involved with CSCE matters. George Vest, Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires, later took on the responsibility for getting the multilateral CSCE talks underway. Gerald Helman was the U.S. representative in the Political Committee and a strong advocate of human rights provisions. John Maresca, then in the office of the NATO Secretary General, was much involved with the NATO work on CSCE and later served in a leading role throughout the CSCE multilateral negotiations. Laurence Eagleburger, Political Advisor in the U.S. Mission and later U.S. Secretary of State, and myself as his successor, represented the United States in the Senior Political Committee at NATO headquarters and were responsible for much of the negotiations with allies and interaction with the State Department. Tom Niles, later ambassador to Canada and to the E.C., and Ted Wilkinson, as members of the Political Section in our NATO Mission, contributed ideas and shared responsibilities for consultations with the allies. At the Washington end, during this time, Arva Floyd was the prime drafter of instructions to the U.S. Mission. I would like to thank all of my European colleagues for their work in advancing the preparations for the CSCE but will mention only Petrus Buwalda, the Netherlands representative in the Senior Political Committee (SPC) who was a powerful voice for human rights both in NATO and later in Moscow, as the Netherlands Ambassador, Jacques Andreani, French representative in the SPC, later ambassador of France to the United States, and John Thomson, British representative in the SPC, later UK ambassador to the United Nations and High Commissioner to India.

The Politics of the Helsinki Process— How Did It Arise During the Cold War?: A Russian Perspective

Andrei Zagorski

A series of CSCE conferences made history in Europe from the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. However, for the first fifteen years, it remained exposed to all climatic changes in East-West politics. There were rare moments when the CSCE boosted genuine optimism. It was neither the trigger, nor the major driver of change in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. However, once they occurred, it turned out to be an important tool for setting the agenda for change, and an effective steering of the complex dismantlement of the Cold War. Several structural features helped the Helsinki process to survive bad weather times and, ultimately, turned it into a success story. Those features included: a genuine interest and a shared ownership in the process by all participants and a mechanism of follow-up meetings that ensured the continuity of the Helsinki process, made states accountable for the implementation of their CSCE commitments, and allowed a balanced progress of further steps in cooperation.

Introduction

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, and its Final Act became a product, but also the culmination of the detente in Europe in the 1970s. It was not this single act, however, that was making history in Europe. The Conference provided for a series of follow-up meetings

in Belgrade (former Yugoslavia) in 1977-1978, Madrid (Spain) in 1980-1983, and Vienna (Austria) in 1986-1989. Those meetings, as well as numerous conferences and meetings of experts devoted to particular aspects of the CSCE agenda, shaped the "Helsinki process" that became instrumental in managing the change in the East-West relations at the end of the Cold War. The new structures and institutions of the CSCE that emerged since the 1990s were largely associated with the task of overcoming the division of Europe. These expectations were strongly manifested in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe endorsed at second CSCE summit meeting in November 1990. The Charter started the process of a gradual institutionalization of the Helsinki process that led to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.

It was widely believed that already in 1975, the CSCE had triggered the process that has put an end to the division of Germany and Europe. This belief brought the Helsinki process into the limelight of European politics in the moving period of change. The initial number of the participating states grew from 34 in 1975 to 56 now. The CSCE/OSCE has been able to win new partners outside its original area. The Helsinki process repeatedly inspired countries in other regions to replicate the experiences of a successful multilateral process. For years, it inspired the thinking of launching a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), or, more recently, in the Middle East. It also inspired Kazakhstan to initiate the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA).

The distance of more than thirty years tempts us to highlight the success of the CSCE particularly in the first fifteen years after the 1975. It also tempts us to forget that, from the very beginning, the Helsinki process was anything but doomed to success. It became part and parcel of the overall structure of East-West relations and was exposed to all the climatic changes in world politics. There have been rare moments when the CSCE boosted genuine optimism, as it was in 1975, or in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For the rest of its time, the prospects of the CSCE looked rather bleak. At the end of the 1970s, the US-Soviet confrontation brought about an almost complete failure of the Belgrade

follow-up meeting. The Madrid meeting was interrupted after the introduction of martial law in Poland. Even the opening of the Vienna meeting in 1986 was overshadowed by a complete crackdown on the Helsinki groups in the Soviet Union, and the considerations by the US to withdraw from the CSCE.

The Helsinki process was neither the trigger nor the major driver of the changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. However, once they occurred, the CSCE turned out to be an important tool for setting the agenda for change, intensive consultation among the participating states, and an effective steering of the complex processes resulting from the end of the Cold War. This paper can not give an overview of the entire history of the CSCE. Instead, it concentrates on a number of structural issues of the Helsinki process that have helped it to survive the lows of the East-West confrontation and, ultimately, turned it into a success story at the moment when the Cold War approached its end.

I. The Motives Behind the Conference

Contrary to the common belief, the idea of a pan-European security conference was not generated by the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, it rather represented a desire by smaller countries in Europe to develop consultation and cooperation beyond the iron curtain which would at least partially relieve them from the hardships of the superpowers' confrontation. This development largely built on an increasing emancipation of the countries of the Eastern block from the domination by Moscow. The latter trend gradually manifested itself in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a result of the destalinization policy by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The particular proposal for a pan-European security conference was put forward by Poland in December 1964. This initiative gained the support of a number of smaller states across the block borders. Romania picked it up and, in December 1965, together with eight other countries initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution 2129(XX) calling for regional measures to promote good-neighborly relations between European nations with "different

social and political systems." A "group of nine" was formed on the basis of this resolution to include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. In 1967, the Netherlands joined the group and, in 1969, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Turkey were invited to attend the annual meeting as well.

Neither of the superpowers showed interest in the initiative at that time. Though the Polish proposal was included on the list of multilateral initiatives of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965, this was a more formal act. A short period of partial emancipation of the Eastern block countries brought about an increasing number of their foreign policy initiatives. A selected list of those proposals was included on a joint Warsaw Pact list mainly in order to restore control over the policies of individual states, not necessarily in order to pursue this agenda further. In the mid 1960s, the Soviet Union was moving towards embracing the idea of detente. The growing economic gap to the West, the progressing economic crisis, the erosion of the Eastern block which could no longer be kept together without military intervention, and the prospect of military confrontation with China — all these developments largely contributed to the transformation of Moscow into a status quo power in Europe. However, the Polish proposal was not prominent on the Kremlin's agenda. Moscow gave preference to pursue detente on an individual basis and, in the 1960s particularly with de Gaulles' France that had left the NATO military organization and challenged America on a number of issues.

It was only after the Soviet led Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the Soviet Union started to seriously lobby the idea of the pan-European conference. It appeared to the Soviet leadership an opportune avenue to overcome isolation that followed the invasion, and to keep the Eastern block intact. After several months of keeping silence on the conference, the then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko raised it again in October 1968 at the UN General Assembly. Further steps followed. Moscow engaged in intense consultations. In 1969, the Warsaw Pact started to produce more concrete proposals for the conference agenda and showed flexibility in its consecutive communiqués. In 1969, Moscow indicated that it was ready to

accept the United States as a participant to the conference.

Some of the Eastern European countries became active proponents of the pan-European conference after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Particularly Romania showed increasing concerns that, eventually, it could be the target of the next Soviet intervention. The minor partners of Moscow sought to escape the unmatched Soviet dominance and to expand their freedom of maneuver through multilateral diplomacy.

From the moment in 1969 when both military alliances started to seriously consider convening a pan-European conference (with NATO countries pursuing another multilateral project since 1968 — that on a multilateral and balanced forces reduction-MBFR — in Central Europe) the issue was getting prominence on the East-West agenda. Imposing the alliances discipline on any consultations certainly deprived individual states of the flexibility they had enjoyed within the “group of 8.” At the same time, getting the Soviet Union and the reluctant US on board the project was the only way for the conference to succeed.

The major motive behind the decision of the Soviet leadership to put the pan-European security conference high on its agenda was a desire to fix the political and territorial status quo in Europe. The purpose of the Soviet policy was to consolidate the division of Europe, not to overcome it. It shall be recognized that the ultimate outcome of the Cold War in Europe was exactly opposite to what Moscow sought to achieve, *inter alia*, through the CSCE. At the beginning of the 1990s, the CSCE happened to manage not the consolidation of the political and territorial status quo in Europe but, rather, its dramatic erosion. The collapse of the communist regimes in the Eastern block, the break apart of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union itself — all these developments, for sure, were not on the mind of Leonid Brezhnev when he was signing the 1975 Final Act. It was rather the conservative forces in the Soviet leadership which warned Brezhnev of the eventual consequences of detente, and of particular provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Had Brezhnev known that the CSCE would be supposed to help manage the demise of the Soviet Union one decade and a half after the conference in Helsinki, he might not have remained an enthusiastic champion of the CSCE.

II. A Comprehensive Agenda

One of the widely spread myths tells us that the founding fathers of the CSCE already in the early 1970s laid down the foundation for one of the most important competitive advantages of the contemporary OSCE by including on its agenda virtually every security relevant aspect of cooperation, such as democracy and the rule of law, or the security relevant economic and environmental issues. This myth has little to do with the reality of the early years of the CSCE, however, because those who shaped the agenda of the Conference in the consultations in Dipoli in 1972 and 1973 did not design it according to an intellectual master plan. The agenda was born in tough bargaining over what was supposed to be covered by the CSCE and what was not. In the end, it was a compromise of diverging positions of different groups of countries pursuing particular interest in the conference.

It is important to note, however, that the final CSCE agenda was both exclusive, as it excluded different issues from being part of deliberations, and, at the same time, it was inclusive, as it sought to include all relevant issues in order to ensure a balance of interest which would give every participating state a stake in the process, and a feeling of ownership. The inclusive and open nature of the CSCE/OSCE agenda was and remains one of its major strengths. Every country was and is free to raise any issue. However, the final set of issues to be included into the CSCE documents would require consensus of all participating states. This implies that no single nation is able to impose its agenda on the others. At the same time, no single participant's interest could be ignored. It is significant to observe which issues were not included on the CSCE agenda.

In the early stages of the discussions over a pan-European conference, the Eastern Block and particularly the Soviet Union considered turning it into a sort of substitute for a peace conference drawing a final line under World War II and thus legitimizing the status quo that was established with the division of Germany and of Europe. The recognition of the two German states, including the German Democratic Republic, would be one of the objectives of Moscow for the conference.

Once engaging in the discussion of what the CSCE could be about, the US and NATO made it clear that the conference could only be convened after the respective issues had been sorted out in bilateral arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and its eastern neighbors. The treaties that the Federal Republic concluded with the Soviet Union and Poland (both in 1970), the GDR (1972), Czechoslovakia (1973), as well as the quadripartite agreement on Berlin (1973) established the principle of inviolability of frontiers as a basis for a *modus vivendi* without prejudice to the legal doctrines of either country as regards the prospects for the unification of Germany. This was a major step forward to paving the way for the CSCE.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union was largely reluctant to embrace a particular disarmament agenda while NATO was pushing towards multilateral negotiations on armed forces in Central Europe. Since the CSCE was likely to engage neutral and nonaligned countries, NATO (with the exception of France) and particularly the US were reluctant to negotiate reductions of armed forces within the wider CSCE framework and preferred separate talks between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus the US made the beginning of consultations over the CSCE conditional on a parallel beginning and conduct of the MBFR talks in Vienna.

Many individual countries were coming to the CSCE with their particular desires and agendas. Most notably, Malta and a number of Southern European states (such as Spain), at different moments sought to include the Mediterranean on the Conference agenda threatening to abandon consensus on other issues. In the early stages of the CSCE, some countries and particularly Austria sought a role for the CSCE in the solution of the Middle East conflict. After repeated heated debates, however, most of the participating states proved reluctant to overload the CSCE agenda with issues beyond the agenda of East-West relations. The filling in of the agenda for the pan-European conference was otherwise subject to compromise and tough asymmetric bargaining among the different participating states with asymmetric interest in the CSCE.

The Soviet Union and the Eastern block wanted the Conference to

elaborate on a set of principles governing inter-state relations in Europe, first and foremost emphasizing the principle of inviolability of frontiers. The Warsaw Pact also added economic and environmental cooperation to its initial agenda in order to balance Western proposals regarding cooperation. While the NATO countries were prepared to talk about the principles, already in the late 1960s they pursued a wider agenda that included, in particular, military confidence-building and the promotion of human contacts and a freer flow of information across the borders of the two blocks. Both sets of proposals meant to introduce some transparency and openness to the rigid communist societies. They also sought to resolve practical humanitarian cases that existed between East and West. The NATO countries also included on their list of principles the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The final compromise on the agenda fitted into the “three baskets” that included the security relevant issues (principles and confidence-building measures), economic and environmental cooperation as well as humanitarian cooperation (*inter alia*, human contacts and information exchanges). Those three baskets are now known as the three major dimensions of the OSCE activities. Although, in the text of the Final Act there are many compromises that have been reached within each specific basket, the major tradeoffs included the inclusion of the principles of inviolability of frontiers and of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as between the first (security) and the third (humanitarian cooperation) baskets. This established the substantive balance of interest which each party considered to be sufficient to justify the acceptance of the outcome of the negotiation.

III. A Single Comprehensive Political Document?

The Final Act as a single document was anything but granted by the beginning of the major negotiations at the expert’s level that took place in Geneva in 1973-1975. The Dipoli recommendations that had sent the rules of procedure and the agenda for the CSCE left it open whether

the Conference was supposed to produce one final document or several documents. The final decision to have one single comprehensive document, again, was a compromise to reflect the comprehensive balance of interest reached by the participating states. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries represented diverging views on what form the product of the Conference should have. The Soviet Union, following its major interest to get the status quo in Europe endorsed, preferred to give the declaration of principles a binding legal form while, at the same time, it showed little enthusiasm to accept any legal obligations as regards confidence-building measures, human contacts, or information exchange. This explains why, for quite a time, Moscow was considering the idea of developing separate documents in different baskets with different status.

The Western countries, on the contrary, did not want to give the declaration of principles the status of an international treaty in order to avoid the impression, that the CSCE was a substitute for a peace treaty with Germany. They also wanted to avoid the impression that the Conference was establishing a final European order after the end of the Cold War — either in a political sense (by dividing Europe into the communist East and the democratic West), or as regards several specific issues. Particularly, they wanted to escape the impression that the West had recognized the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Western countries wanted to make commitments regarding confidence-building, human contacts and a more liberal flow of information across the borders as binding as possible.

The final way out was found only in the late phase of the negotiations. The Helsinki summit was supposed to approve one single document to include and reflect a comprehensive agreement of the participating states implying numerous closely interrelated cross-basket tradesoffs. At the same time, none of the commitments in the Final Act were given the power of legal obligations. The document consisted of politically binding commitments thus establishing what got known at a later stage as “soft law.” The word “binding” in this formula was important, however, as all provisions of the Final Act without excep-

tion were supposed to equally bind all participating states who were not allowed to implement them selectively.

IV. The Static and the Dynamic Elements of the Helsinki Accords

When the Final Act was signed, it was the subject of hectic controversies. Its critics in the West saw the balance of interest distorted — if not in the text of the document itself, then in the timeline on the implementation of the enshrined commitments. In particular, they saw that the Soviet Union obtained its major interest in ensuring the inviolability of borders in Europe from the very moment of signing of the Final Act. At the same time, the interest that the West sought in the CSCE — to achieve freer flow of people and ideas between East and West — was yet pending implementation. In obtaining this goal, the West would remain dependent on the good will of the Soviet Union. This tension between the “static” and the “dynamic” elements of the Helsinki commitments was yet to be resolved in a series of follow-up meetings. It was not surprising that here, as well, the initial and final positions of Western and Eastern countries were opposite. It was the Soviet Union that launched the idea of institutionalizing the CSCE but was fast losing interest in following this proposal as it learned what other commitments particularly in the humanitarian field the Helsinki Final Act would include. Short of the Helsinki Conference Moscow would be prepared to limit itself to the single event of signing the Final Act.

The West, which initially was extremely hesitant to consider any institutionalization of the CSCE, on the contrary, was getting increasingly interested in a follow-up process that would enable it to claim the implementation of the “dynamic” commitments at later stages. This gave rise to the concept of follow-up meetings that, at a later stage, became most instrumental in shaping the Helsinki process. The follow-up meetings were to serve, in particular, three major purposes:

- To ensure the continuity of the CSCE process
- To make participating states accountable as regards their implementation of the relevant CSCE commitments, and
- To discuss further proposals as to developing the CSCE commitments

As the practice of the CSCE after 1975 showed, it was not an easy task to meet those ends but it was largely solved by the end of the 1980s.

The provisions of the Helsinki Final Act as regards the follow-up meetings were an ambiguous compromise. They did not establish at what intervals such meetings would be held but only provided that the first CSCE follow-up would open in Belgrade in 1977. Its modalities and the agenda were to be established by the preparatory meeting. The follow-up was also to determine when and where the next meeting would take place. These provisions did not exclude the scenario that, should the meeting in Belgrade not reach consensus, there would be no next follow-up at all, and the Helsinki process would be interrupted. Apart from the controversial discussion of both the modalities and the agenda in Belgrade, the ambiguous commitment to hold follow up meetings persisted until the end of the 1980s when the Vienna follow-up decided about the regularity of the meetings.

It was neither easy to make the participating states accountable particularly for the implementation of their commitments concerning human rights, human contacts and information exchanges. Although the Helsinki Final Act provided that both the implementation of its commitments and further proposals would be the subjects of deliberations at the follow-ups, it was not at all granted that this formula would really work. The preparatory meetings, both in Belgrade in 1977 and in Madrid in 1980, were paralyzed exactly over the issue of how to structure this debate.

While the Soviet bloc wanted the meetings to immediately proceed to the discussion of proposals submitted and opposed to the discussion of its human rights record dismissing it as interference into internal affairs, the West sought to separate the implementation discussion, to allocate as much time for it as possible, and not to allow submission of

proposals until the implementation debate was over. While the Belgrade meeting had set the precedent of separating the discussion of implementation and of the proposals, the preparatory meeting in Madrid again got deadlocked over the issue of how much time would be allocated for that particular purpose, and whether or not the participating states could return to discussing the implementation of the Helsinki commitments at any time after during the meeting. It was only the Vienna follow-up meeting that finalized that debate by fully accepting this structure of discussion.

As a matter of compromise, many commitments included in the Helsinki Final Act were formulated in a general way and/or in an ambiguous language. This triggered endless controversies at the follow-ups as regards their interpretation as well as their appropriate implementation. Many proposals put forward at those meetings were therefore aimed less at breaking new ground but, rather, to spell out the more general Helsinki commitments in greater detail avoiding controversial ambiguities. Only slowly, step by step, did the CSCE manage to reach a clear language on those issues and to spell out the relevant commitments in details sufficient to prevent a controversy over their interpretation. This task was completed only later in the 1980s — early 1990s largely due to the change that took place with the end of the Cold War. It was exactly the period of time when the CSCE was most effective in setting the agenda for change in Eastern Europe. As the current controversies within the OSCE indicate, however, even a more detailed elaboration of relevant commitments does not necessarily exclude a controversy over their meaning, and does not automatically produce the political will to implement them.

V. The Concept of Balanced Progress

Once a comprehensive balance of state interests had been achieved in the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, at every follow-up meeting, it took the participating states another effort to identify the new balance at every moment in the progress of the multilateral process.

Without such a balance, the Helsinki process was always put at risk of getting into a deadlock. Until the end of the Cold War, any progress within the CSCE was based on balancing the provisions reached in the field of security, and those in the area of human rights and the human dimension. The first two follow-up meetings illustrate the contrasting effect of seeking or failing to find a balanced agreement at the end of the meeting.

In Belgrade, the US put the emphasis on the human dimension issues and pushed on the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act while the Soviet Union arrived in Belgrade with a wide (largely declaratory) disarmament agenda and Europe-wide economic projects. The US showed little interest in discussing disarmament and insisted first and foremost on improving the human rights record in the Soviet block. The Soviet Union dismissed this approach as “changing the balance” of the Helsinki process and clearly indicated it would not go beyond the Helsinki commitments as regards the human dimension. The attempt of a number of European nations to establish a balance by showing interest in some economic projects suggested by Moscow in exchange for some improvement in the human dimension failed on both sides, the US and Russia.

As a result, the Belgrade Conference did not produce any substantive concluding document which would take the Helsinki commitments any further in any of its baskets. The US apparently learned the lesson and, prior to the Madrid meeting that opened in 1990, persuaded France to put its proposal for a European disarmament conference into the CSCE framework instead of seeking a separate forum to discuss it. As the Soviet Union was coming up with a similar initiative, linking the decision of the Conference on security and confidence building measures and disarmament in Europe to some improvements in the human dimension, as well as to the decision to convene CSCE meetings of experts on human contacts and on human rights, proved a success despite the extremely tense atmosphere in East-West relations in the early 1980s.


The follow-up meetings obtained a crucial role in watching the balance of progress within the CSCE by discussing both the progress that

had been achieved in the implementation of the CSCE commitments in different dimensions between the meetings and, on that basis, considering further balanced progress both in terms of accepting further commitments, and in scheduling new specialized CSCE forums. With the increasing compartmentalization of the OSCE's structures and institutions since the 1990s, this crucial function is no longer performed by any of the institutions of the Organization, however.

Conclusions: Lessons to Be Learned

While learning from the CSCE experiences, it would be wrong to focus on the substance of the Helsinki process. Structural and procedural issues tell more about how the CSCE succeeded wherever and whenever it did. Those would include the following few elements. No successful multilateral process can ignore the existing regional security and political architecture. Nor can it voluntarily exclude any major regional or extra-regional power relevant to the issues on the agenda. The most difficult disputes underlying the structure of regional security problems shall not necessarily be explicitly put on the agenda of the multilateral process which can operate on the basis of a *modus vivendi* leaving the outstanding problems to future solution. Ensuring that every participant in the process has a stake in it and develops a sense of ownership over the process is crucial. The agenda has to be as comprehensive as the complex and different interests of the participating states require.

A multilateral process is better suited to address controversial issues over time than a single conference. And it will take as much time as it takes to exhaust the initial agenda of the process. The respective commitments shall be binding and as precise and detailed as possible. Governments shall be kept accountable for their implementation. The interests of different participants shall be balanced at every stage of the progress of the multilateral process.



*Security in Northeast Asia:
Traditional and Non-Traditional
Agendas*

Traditional Security Issues and Measures

Non-Traditional Security Issues and Counter-Measures in East Asia:
With a Special Focus on the Maritime Dimension

Regional Security Issues and Measures:
A Japanese View

Traditional Security Issues and Measures

Canrong Jin

Since “China’s New Diplomacy” came into being in the mid-1990s, China has been a major advocate of East Asia security cooperation. Although East Asia is now facing ever-increasing non-traditional threats as are other parts of the world, the major security challenges in this region are still traditional ones. One prominent feature of the traditional security situation in East Asia is the lack of a workable pan-regional mechanism based on multilateralism or regional cooperation. The immediate security challenge in East Asia is the DPRK nuclear issue. For the sake of putting this issue under control, China supports the idea to have a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and then to have a pan-region multilateral security mechanism. One way to improve what we are doing in East Asia is to learn something from colleagues in the EU.

I. What Is China’s New Diplomacy?

Definition

Since two young American scholars (Evan Medeiros and Tayler Fravel) published their article about China’s New Diplomacy in *Foreign Affairs* (March/April, 2003), the term “China’s New Diplomacy” gradually has become popular among Chinese scholars. For Chinese academia, “China’s New Diplomacy” is actually a concept imported from the outside world. It’s a typical case that shows the weakness of Chinese academia: their effort of theory building lags far behind the practice of the Chinese public or practitioners: They

lack the intellectual confidence to interpret today's China in their own words, but rather to follow a concept invented abroad, especially a concept from the US 28 years ago, by leading China to enter the era of Reform and Open Door, during which Mr. Deng Xiaoping dramatically changed Mao Zedong's philosophy of governance and nearly all the domestic and foreign policies. To some extent, a kind of "China's New Diplomacy" emerged at that time. But here, the term "China's New Diplomacy" just refers to China's philosophy, policy and practice of diplomacy since the mid-1990s.

"China's New Diplomacy" started when Chinese leaders and diplomats put forward the so called "New Security Concept" in the mid-1990s. The official definition of "New Security Concept" is a security based on the principal of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. The official definition of "New Security Concept" sounds hollow, but for later Chinese diplomacy, it is really significant. Some Chinese scholars try to interpret the "New Security Concept" by comparing it with some western equivalents, like cooperative security, common security, comprehensive security, etc. In my understanding, "New Security Concept" relates to the three "New"s, that is a new mentality, a new attitude and a new approach to diplomacy. Here, the new mentality means China escaping from the victim psychology that is a result of the collective memory of the so called "century of national humiliation." The new attitude means China accepting the current international regime. The new approach of diplomacy mainly refers to China's participation in multilateral activities.

Evolution

In October 1996, the annual retreat of high-ranking officers of ARF was held in Manila, the Philippines. Madame Fu Ying, the director-general (at that time, who is now China's Ambassador to Australia) of Asian Affairs of China's foreign ministry, raised the "New Security Concept." As I know this is the first time the term appeared. Then this phrase appeared frequently in the speeches of Mr. Qian Qichen, China's foreign minister at the time, and President Jiang Zemin's speech at the

UN Assembly in 1997. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 gave China a chance to practice its new thinking. By resisting the pressure of devaluing the RMB, China helped the region to stop the further spread of the crisis. China's behavior was highly appreciated by the international community, and encouraged by the applause of the outside world, Chinese leaders would like to do more in regional cooperation. The financial crisis itself told the Chinese, there are some problems in the world economy that can't be tackled by a single country. For China's own interests, we need more regional cooperation. In 2001, with the China-ASEAN(10+1) FTA coming into being and with the Shanghai Five reshaped into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), "China's New Diplomacy" became true.

Components

"China's New Diplomacy" involves both thinking and behavior. It is mainly composed of the following elements:

- Recognizing the current international regimes and to behave in accordance to the international norms. Being aware of this fact that China benefited a lot from the international system, China will not isolate herself from the system but rather will join it.
- Unlike the former China that always waited for others to take the initiative and stuck to a reactive diplomacy, today's China would like very much to take the initiative and show a strong diplomatic activism.
- Appreciating multilateralism and regional cooperation, not so heavily relying on the bilateral approach, as China always preferred in the past
- Welcome to globalization! Appreciating the value of interdependence, seeking a win-win game.
- Try to establish China as a responsible power in the international community
- Economy first, focusing on trade interests
- A friendly neighborhood diplomacy
- Pragmatism first, minimizing the differences of ideology
- Basically a realism philosophy, combining with liberalism and constructivism

Achievements

In the past decade, “China’s New Diplomacy” led to quite a few achievements. Here are some just to name a few:

- Stabilizing relations with the only status quo super-power, the USA
- Expanding ties with other status quo powers, the EU, Russia, etc.
- Entry into the WTO
- China-ASEAN FTA
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- Six-Party Talks
- More voices in international organizations, like the UN, World Bank, IMF, etc.
- Expanding ties with Africa and Latin America

Reasons

The reasons behind “China’s New Diplomacy” should include the following:

- The newly gained confidence related to ever-lasting economic growth and social freedom.
- Resulting from a learning process.
- Modeling the effect of the advanced countries.
- The strategic considerations, like reducing the impact of the “China Threat,” to show “China Opportunity.”

Problems and Prospect

Comparatively speaking, China is still a freshman in the game of modern international relations. Before 1949, China was not a fully qualified player in the international game. Between 1949 and 1979, China was a self-isolated country. So this country has played the international game in accordance to the international way for no more than 28 years. And China has been involved with multilateral and regional cooperation for only 10 years. As a beginner in multilateral and regional coop-

eration, China is full of enthusiasm, but does not fully understand the costs and difficulties it will face in the future. So whether China's willingness for multilateral and regional cooperation is sustainable, nobody has the answer. Another uncertainty is its strategic suspicions of the outside world regarding "China's New Diplomacy." Some people in the US are afraid of this scenario, that is a China with new diplomacy will be more skillful to compete with the United States. Having stated the problems, we can still have a strong confidence about "China's New Diplomacy." China's entry into the current international regimes will benefit both sides, China and the external world. The legitimacy of the international system will be strengthened by including China, and China will get help from the outside world in its modernization through participating in international cooperation.

II. China's Attitude Towards Regional Security Cooperation in East Asia

China as an East Asia Power

Although China is a multi-region country, neighboring with Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia, the mainstream of Chinese society identifies China, culturally speaking, as a Northeast Asian country. For many years, Northeast Asia was always the top focus of China's neighborhood diplomacy. Only in recent years has China paid more attention to other neighboring sub-regions. Since "China's New Diplomacy" came into being in the mid-1990s, China has been a major advocate of East Asia security cooperation. East Asia includes two sub-regions, Northeast and Southeast. China prefers to have a pan-East Asia cooperation, which is why China is actively involved with the 10+3 dialogue. At the same time, China is also involved in sub-regional cooperation with both Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Five Components of China's Foreign Policy

Unlike Germany and Japan in the early 20th century, China has no intention of challenging the status quo of international arrangements. Learning the lessons from Japan's modern history, namely the de-linkage of Japan with Asia, and learning from German history after the Second World War, namely integrating itself into Europe, China will integrate itself with other parts of Asia, East Asia in particular. Today, China's foreign policy is composed of five parts:

- Diplomacy with neighborhood countries
- Diplomacy with big powers, mainly referring to the relationship with the USA, the EU, Russia, Japan and India
- Diplomacy with developing countries, Africa in particular
- Participation in international organizations and other multilateral forums
- Soft-power building, symbolized by the Chinese government's decision to set up over 100 Institutes of Confucius Studies abroad in 2005

East Asia regional cooperation involves all these five parts. First, regional cooperation in East Asia is in accordance with China's "Good Neighborhood Diplomacy." Second, one of the topics in the strategic dialogues between China and another big power (the US, Japan, Russia or India) is East Asia regional cooperation, and to some extent, the strategic dialogue itself is an important part of regional cooperation. Third, quite a few East Asia neighbors are developing countries and it is a commitment of China's diplomacy to maintain solid ties with them. Fourth, participating in institution-building in East Asia is the most important part of China's participation in the international community. Fifth, the soft-power building of China should be practiced in the neighborhood and then in other parts of the world.

Regional Security Cooperation in East Asia Today

Compared to Europe, East Asia cooperation is much less institutionalized. The dream of an East Asia community is still far from reali-

ty. But, on the other hand, the train of regional cooperation in East Asia has already left the station. Comparing the regional cooperation situation in the cold war era, today's cooperation is far beyond the most optimistic expectations of two decades ago. Now, regional cooperation in East Asia consists of mechanisms such as 10+3, East Asia Summit, ARF, the Grand Mekong River Project, the Six-Party Talks, etc.

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Economic cooperation accounts for the major area of regional cooperation in East Asia. One advantage of East Asia economic cooperation is the faster pace of growth here than in most parts of the world and the eagerness for international cooperation is stronger. The economies in the region are usually export-oriented and rely on markets abroad, another reason for them to cooperate economically. In 2006, intra-region trade accounted for two-thirds of the entire amount in the region, based on purchasing power parity. The economies of East Asia are not as dependent on the US market as they were 10 years ago. The record of security cooperation in the region is much poorer than that of economic cooperation. On the other hand, the security challenges here are very serious, including Japan's territorial disputes with China, South Korea and Russia, tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea, etc. There are many tasks and challenges related to building up security arrangements in the region. Actually, the extent of regional security cooperation should be considered as an indicator of the success of the entire regional cooperation in East Asia.

Features

East Asia regional cooperation has the following features:

- Economy first
- ASEAN takes the lead and other major powers in the region follow it
- Issue-oriented cooperation, rather than institution-based cooperation
- Open door to the participants from outside.

Problems

Although the future of East Asia regional cooperation, including security cooperation, is very promising, there are a lot of obstacles which the countries in the region have to face. The major problems ahead of us include:

- The US is the most important presence from outside the region, but its attitude towards East Asia cooperation is not clear
- The lack of strategic trust among the major powers in the region, especially referring to the situation between China and Japan
- The sustainability of economies in the region is questionable
- The low level of institutionalization in regional cooperation.

III. Traditional Security Issues: The Nature of Security Challenges

Fact-Finding

Although East Asia is now facing ever-increasing non-traditional threats (terrorist bombings, tsunamis, earthquakes, SARS, bird-flu, etc.), as are other parts of the world, the major security challenges in this region are still traditional ones. The three areas in today's world where power and wealth are now concentrated are East Asia, North America and Europe. But compared to the other two areas, there are more potential conflict spots in East Asia: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, South China Sea and East China Sea (between Japan and China), etc. The context for managing the traditional security challenges in this region is more complicated than in any other parts of the world: there are more big powers here (the US, China, Japan, Russia, India); there are bigger gaps in the development, with the co-existence and proximity of the richest countries (like Japan) and the poorest countries in the world; there are more complicated cultural and religious traditions here; there are more differences in geo-political situa-

tions here, etc.

One prominent feature of the traditional security situation in East Asia is the lack of a workable pan-regional mechanism based on multi-lateralism or regional cooperation. Three different types of security arrangement co-exist in the region: the US system, centered in Washington and composed of various bilateral military ties; a multi-polar system, based on the fact that both China and Russia are independent of the US system and seek their security mainly through their own strength; the multilateral system advocated by the ASEAN countries. The latest development is that “China’s New Diplomacy” narrowed the gap between the second and third systems.

New Developments in East Asia Related to Traditional Security Challenges

The US is paying more attention to East Asia and its military deployment, stressing the increased importance of this region. But at the same time, major military resources of the US are embedded in Iraq. Other important issues concern:

- The ‘coming out’ of Japan, which refers to the effort of Japan to be a “normal country.”
- The effort of the Republic of Korea to play a more independent role in security affairs, as a balancer.
- India’s emergence as an important player in East Asia security affairs.
- With the creation of cooperation in the “10 plus 3” and several “10 plus 1” forums, ASEAN has become a more important player in regional cooperation. But after this expansion of forums, a big challenge to ASEAN is its own consolidation.
- The influence of China in the region is expanding with its economic growth. This has complicated China’s relations with the outside world, especially US-China and China-Japan relations.
- State of sensitive issues such as: relieving tensions between Japan and China to some extent through the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Abe to Beijing and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s trip to Japan; the context change (including the policy change of Mainland China,

the policy change of the US and the emerging indifference in Taiwan to its relations with Mainland China), the Taiwan issue is also temporarily under control; but, the DPRK nuclear issue became hot after its missile test and its claimed nuclear test, and countries in the region and beyond hope the Six-Party Talks can play a substantial role in resolving this issue.

Positive Signs Related to Traditional Security Challenges in East Asia

The impact of globalization strengthened the interdependence among the countries in the region. And this makes the costs of traditional confrontation policies higher. Achievement of regional security cooperation offers a better starting point to control traditional security disputes in a manner consistent with 21st century conditions, requirements and options. While economic growth results in some uncertainty in the regional security situation, the dominant impact of economic growth is positive. China's new diplomacy, focusing on the economy first and multilateral cooperation, gives new momentum to East Asia regional cooperation.

Prospects

- Multilateralism is the best principle to coordinate the three different security systems mentioned previously. ASEAN can play a more important role in this way.
- China's effort to be more multilateral-oriented would be endorsed by the outside world.
- A stable China-US relationship is always a key part of a stable regional security situation.
- To stabilize China-Japan relations is of immediate importance.
- China should share its economic growth with its neighboring countries.

IV. China's Attitude Towards the Establishment of a Permanent Peace Regime on the Korean peninsula

China's General Attitude

China supports the idea to have a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. From a realism perspective, this development is in the national interests of China. As a country neighboring the Korean peninsula, China does like to see the stability there being strengthened. As a country at its critical stage of modernization, China does want to invest all its energy into domestic development and avoid being disturbed by events in the outside world. As an East Asia country, China does welcome any effort to reduce the tension in the region, in order to reduce the excuses for intervention by the outside powers. From a liberal institutionalism perspective, a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula is a key step for peace institution building for the whole Korean nation and then for the whole region. A peace based on institutionalization is much more reliable than a peace only based on a balance of power, especially when people are aware that the balance of power on the peninsula is so fragile. From a perspective of constructivism, the process to build a permanent peace regime is also an identity shaping and perception changing process. This peace building effort will help the DPRK to reshape her identity internally and externally, reduce her insecurity and change her perception about the outside world. Generally speaking, government officials perceive the situation more from a realism perspective, and scholars perceive it from a perspective combined with realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism.

China's Policy Focus

At the moment, China's policy focus on the Korean peninsula is still on the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. Although the permanent peace regime building and the nuclear issue resolution can go hand in hand at the same time, China considers the nuclear issue a

more immediate challenge. On the DPRK nuclear issue, China's principles are always as follows: (1) The Korean peninsula should remain as a nuclear free zone. It's in the interests of China, and it's in the interests of all the parties involved, including the DPRK. The nuclearization of the DPRK led to the tension immediately, it will also lead to great uncertainty for the geopolitical scenario in the future and will lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, which will hurt the interests of all. In the short run, by producing and possessing nuclear weapons, the DPRK can increase its security, but in the long-term, it will hurt its security. Definitely, nuclearization is not the best way to assure its security. It's a logic originated from common sense. (2) The DPRK nuclear issue should only be resolved in a peaceful approach. China wants to resolve the nuclear issue while avoiding any situation that will hurt its economic growth. China does not want to involve itself in another military conflict because of the DPRK. China opposes the strategies like regime change, military threat, etc. In China's policy tool kit, there are mainly things like persistent persuasion, economic aid, and the limited economic sanction legally based on the UN Security Council's resolution, etc. (3) The DPRK's concerns over economic and security issues should be addressed. Any resolution proposal should include development aid and energy aid. But the more important job is to relieve the insecurity the DPRK side. On this point, China is pleased to see the relations between North and South being improved and also appreciates on the progress in the DPRK and the US bilateral ties. (4) The resolution of the nuclear issue should lead to a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean peninsula.

Different from the first DPRK nuclear crisis between 1992 and 1994, in that period China deliberately restrained itself from stepping into that confrontation. In the second DPRK nuclear crisis, China became involved at the very early stage. The results include the Four-Party Talks in April 2003 and the ongoing six-party talks, which started in August 2003. Just like the situation in the outside world, some people doubt about the value of the six-Party talks, but the dominant opinion is the six-party talks effectively avoid the logic of war. It forced the two key players in the game, the DPRK and the US, to focus on the negotia-

tion rather than on war preparation. According to that dominant opinion, since the six-party talks has achieved something like the joint statement of September 19, 2005, and the joint document of February 13, 2007, the six-party talks mechanism should remain as a main forum for final resolution.

The DPRK's nuclear test on October 9, 2007, shocked China, and the Chinese government showed its strong disapproval by its statement and its UN Security Council resolution vote. But China has tried not to allow the disagreement to collapse the relationship with the DPRK and has continued to behave like a responsible stakeholder. The immediate reason for the DPRK nuclear program is insecurity in that country. This insecurity first comes from the structural competitiveness between North and South, and the related tension between the North and the US. The hostile attitude of the first term G.W.Bush administration played a particular role. Along this line, China tends to think the progress in the North-South relations and the DPRK-US relations is rather positive. China appreciates the attitude change on the US side in recent months. Some people within China are concerned about the progress in the DPRK-US relations, but the dominant opinion is that this development is helpful for the resolution of the nuclear issue and it's in the interests of China. The dominant group bears more confidence in China's power and influence than those suspicious people.

The second origin of the insecurity in the DPRK is the post Cold War geopolitical situation becoming worse in the eyes of the DPRK people. The balance of power in Cold War East Asia was a Northern triangle (the DPRK, the Soviet Union and China) versus a Southern triangle (the ROK, the US and Japan), but now, while the southern triangle is still there, the northern one is finished. On this line, to have a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula and a multilateral security arrangement for the region is really important.

Besides the insecurity, there exist other reasons behind the DPRK nuclear effort, like the concern related to the domestic governance, the strategy of reunification and the regional geopolitical calculation, etc. That means even if the insecurity is removed, there are still other problems. It will be a long march to have all the issues resolved. But just

because it will be a long process, the institution building should always be an important part of the resolution strategy.

China's Expectation

The establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula is a critical step for the whole resolution strategy. But the Chinese people would more like to seek a region-wide security arrangement based on multilateralism, and the peninsula regime should be a key part or a basis for that larger arrangement.

V. Relevance of the European Experience

In contrast to the European Union, where the concept-building of elites was ahead of the public, in China the public and practitioner's policies and actions are ahead of the concept-building of the elites. Chinese elites are facing the challenge to do a better job to interpret the fast development in China and to contribute something with vision to the society. As for regional cooperation in East Asia, the same situation exists. The intellectuals in the region have not been doing well. One way to improve what we are doing is to learn something from our colleagues in the EU. For example, some aspects of the European experience which could usefully be studied are:

- How to start institution-building with issue-oriented cooperation?
- The rapprochement between France and Germany was a key prerequisite for the success of European regional cooperation. What does this mean for East Asia, and for China and Japan in particular?
- The experiences and results of institution building, such as the common European currency (Euro), common trade policy, etc.
- The experience of European identity building.

The future of East Asia regional cooperation will be decided by the countries and peoples of the region. But to know and understand the history and experience of pioneers is always helpful.

Non-Traditional Security Issues and Counter-Measures in East Asia: With a Special Focus on the Maritime Dimension

Seo-Hang Lee

Over the past several decades, the term “security” has largely meant military security. However, since the end of the Cold War and outbreak of the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, non-military security issues have become increasingly prominent and many states have come to take a broader approach to security. There are various sources and offences that might fall within the domain of non-traditional threats at sea. They may include, among others, maritime terrorism and movement of WMD at sea, piracy, drug trafficking, human smuggling, pandemic diseases and natural disasters and offences against the marine environment. These threats are frequently transnational by nature with more than one national jurisdiction involved. To counter the divergent non-traditional threats at sea in East Asia, it is very important to establish regional cooperative mechanisms among states. We may set out a hierarchy of measures that might be considered at the bilateral, regional (or multilateral) and global levels. For East Asia, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional security issues at sea could provide a platform for developing the habit of cooperation within a formal multilateral setting. Such an endeavor is a fundamental requisite not only for enhancing security at sea but also for further cooperation among states in the region.

I. Introduction: Changing Security Concept and Newly Emerging Threats

For several decades, the term “security” has meant — by and large — military security. However, since the end of the Cold War (particularly with the outbreak of the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001), non-traditional (non-military, non-conventional or transnational) security issues¹ have become increasingly prominent in the policy and research agendas of governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), scholars and international organizations. Traditionally, security has been defined in geo-political terms, encompassing aspects such as deterrence, power balancing and military strategy. Such aspects are by no means irrelevant, given the continued salience of the state, but the traditional understanding of security has increasingly been questioned in terms of how security should be defined and for whom.

If we look back in history, events such as the political and social impacts of the oil shocks of the 1970s highlighted the existence of other causes of insecurity and contributed to a realization that the concept of security should extend beyond narrow military terms. However, it was the end of the Cold War (and more recently, the outbreak of the 9.11 terrorist attacks) that proved to be the crucial event in placing non-traditional security issues on the security agenda. The Cold War had imposed an intellectual straitjacket that in many ways restricted the security discourse along purely military lines in the context of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the

¹ The terms “non-traditional (non-conventional or non-military) security” and “transnational security” have been used freely, often interchangeably, and, unfortunately, with little precision. Generally speaking, non-traditional security issues (such as terrorism and drug-trafficking) are transnational in nature. However, we cannot say that all non-traditional security issues are transnational, and vice versa. Experts say that transnational security issues involve the crossing of a border either by people or by things, taking divergent forms; and the international recognition that such an act constitutes a security threat.

Cold War released strategic studies from this intellectual myopia and allowed the discipline to explore new dimensions. Furthermore, the innovative and brutal nature of the terrorist attacks in 2001 has amplified concerns that this kind of attack, organized by non-state actors, will take on more lethal and destructive forms, using unconventional and unexpected means.

A number of factors have contributed to the acceptance that the threat of inter-state war does not constitute the sole cause of insecurity. Outbreaks of ethnic conflict, problems of identity in many parts of the developing world, the contagious impact of economic crises in an increasingly integrated global economy and related issues of governance and institutional development, increasing awareness of the seriousness of environmental degradation, and the problems caused by resource scarcity in the context of poverty and the population explosion have all figured prominently in this approach.²

The impact of this broad range of security threats has been magnified by globalization, which has become increasingly evident since the early 1990s. The processes driving globalization are not new phenomena but have intensified due to the dramatic developments in telecommunications, information technology and transport, which has eroded traditional economic boundaries and transnationalized the impact of local issues and problems. For example, the degree of global financial integration now means that financial crises will spread quickly to other countries. Similarly, a number of deaths resulting from the outbreak of "bird flu" in East Asian nations in recent years sparked world-wide panic that it would develop into a pandemic, while the information age technologies of the internet and computers have provided new channels for international crime and terrorism. Simply put, regional security is a seamless web whose parts cannot be separated from each other as a consequence of the erosion of national borders wrought by increasing interdependence, the ICT revolution and other forces of globalization.

² Andrew T.H.Tan and J. D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 2.

With this background, non-traditional security issues have several distinguishing characteristics. First of all, they are different from traditional security in terms of sources and actors. Traditional security is mainly the result of actions by states or governments, reflecting typical international issues. In contrast, actors and sources of non-traditional security issues are more difficult to identify. Many non-traditional security issues are instigated by non-state actors rather than being the result of direct outcomes of actions of nation-states. Secondly, non-traditional security issues often relate directly to actions by individuals of certain specific social groups. With the enlargement of action areas of those specific social groups, non-traditional security issues may easily surpass various types of limitations of politics, geography, and cultures, and begin to spill over from one country or region to another, resulting in problems of certain individual countries evolving into global issues. The last, but not least, feature of non-traditional security is the difficulty, long process and comprehensiveness concerning its management. Unlike many traditional security issues, non-traditional security problems have their roots in the social, economic and cultural soil of different countries. Threats of non-traditional security are rarely confined to certain single states or regions and often have transnational significance. Once set in motion, they tend to show strong inertia, ineradicable in a short period of time and difficult to resolve by efforts of a few countries.³

With the above features of non-traditional security issues, there has also been a growing sense that individual security may not derive from and in fact may be incompatible with a nation's security. A competing notion of "human security" has emerged, suggesting that security centers around the conditions of daily life — food, shelter, employment, health, public safety and human rights — rather than stemming from a country's foreign relations and military strength. Indeed, the United Nations Development Programmer's definition of "human security" in

³ Xu Jian, "Facing the Challenge of Unconventional Security," in Bertrand Fort, ed., *Overcoming Vulnerability: Managing New Security Challenges in Asia and Europe* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), pp. 24-25.

1994 included issues such as unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism.⁴ The security implications of processes and issues such as globalization, ethnic conflicts, refugee flow and environmental degradation are increasingly occupying the attention of both policy makers and scholars. The broadening of the security agenda has been reflected in the decision-making process of government as well as in the structure of academic discipline.

Over the last decade, many states have come to take a widened approach to security. For example, the Clinton administration of the United States made extensive use of academic advisers and a burgeoning literature on the national security imperative of taking on board non-military concerns now that the Soviet threat had receded. The impact of this was explicit in the *1994 National Security Strategy*, an annual foreign policy manifesto. The document states: "Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy."⁵ President Clinton's widening approach to security owed much to his special adviser Strobe Talbot who, in turn, was inspired by Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power." Soft power for Nye denotes the non-military dimension of state power, particularly rooted in the world of information.⁶

Non-traditional security concerns have also been mounting in East Asia over the past years. Since the region of East Asia encompasses a huge maritime area, the widened approach to security has been noticeable and those non-traditional security issues have maritime dimensions. This paper examines non-traditional security issues in East Asia with a special focus on the maritime dimensions, many of which are

⁴ Tan and Boutin, eds., *Non-traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 2.

⁵ Cited in Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 13-14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.14.

transnational in nature, that pose serious danger to security and stability in the region, and explores appropriate counter-measures to overcome such threats, thereby enhancing regional security.

II. Major Sources of Non-Traditional Security Threats at Sea

There are many sources and offences that might fall within the domain of non-traditional threats at sea. They may include: maritime terrorism and movement of WMD⁷ at sea, piracy, drug trafficking, human smuggling, maritime theft and fraud (including container crime), illegal fishing and offences against the marine environment. These threats are frequently transnational by nature with more than one national jurisdiction involved. The following is a brief analysis of the major non-traditional threats connected to the sea, which pose a danger to human security and a stable environment in the East Asian region.

Maritime Terrorism and Movement of WMD

Terrorist activity in the maritime domain began to emerge in the 1980s with various operations being conducted by the IRA, the Palestine Liberation Front and of course the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) to name a few. However, from the mid-1990s, terrorism in this arena began to show signs of increasing frequency and levels of sophistication. In recent years, after terrorism reached new heights with the outbreak of 9.11, actual plans have been uncovered involving deliberate attacks by Al-Qaeda upon shipping in the Straits of Malacca. To date, terrorist groups of numerous typologies have demonstrated the ability to execute the following operations: hijack passenger ships at

⁷ WMD (weapons of mass destruction) itself is a military threat to national and human security. It can be possessed and used by non-state actors. Thus, it now dominates both military and non-military security agenda.

sea with well-armed cells; generate revenue to support operations ashore by means of legitimate maritime trade; seize hostages from vessels at sea and precipitate sizable ransoms; attack the world's most sophisticated warships with suicide craft packed with shaped explosive charges (as seen in the incident involving the *USS Cole* in Yemen in 2000); VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) as she was making her way using a suicide craft offshore; deliver large consignments of weapons, explosives, ammunition, training personnel and tech-support by sea; develop underwater delivery/attacking craft and "stealth" boats; and, transport terrorist operatives by sea inside containers.⁸ Based upon the various terrorist activities at sea, "maritime terrorism" can be referred to as the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (a) within the marine environment, (b) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (c) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities.⁹

Over the past years in fact, civilian shipping has been subjected to armed attacks or seizures by known terrorist groups, ports have been subjected to terrorist bombings, offshore petroleum platforms as well as pipelines carrying oil and gas have been subjected to terrorist attacks, tourist resorts and facilities have been the target of terrorist bombings, and even coastal settlements have suffered from terrorist raids. Maritime terrorism has enormous potential to cause extensive civilian casualties, environmental disaster, property damage, economic losses, political instability, and damage to inter-state relations, especially in the East Asian region which is overwhelmingly dependent on seaborne trade and maritime economic activities.

Just like maritime terrorism, WMD, which now dominates both military and non-military security agenda, also has tremendous potential

⁸ Rupert Herbert-Burns, "Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain," a paper delivered at the IDSS Maritime Security Conference, May 20-21, 2004, Singapore, p. 7.

⁹ The definition was adopted at the 2002 meeting of Maritime Cooperation Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), which was held in Seoul, Korea.

to cause huge civilian casualties. The gravity of the international community's WMD problem increases precisely because of their possible use by terrorist networks or other non-state actors. In a feature article on WMD carried on July 9, 2002, the influential British daily *The Financial Times* had the following to say upon collating the results of interviews with security experts: "The possibility of WMD possession and use by terrorist groups is no longer unthinkable."¹⁰ In fact, the danger of WMD terrorism can be said to have lingered in international society since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Based on the evidence acquired since the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, experts agree that international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda are seeking nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons capabilities. Recent attacks in Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere serve as reminders that international terrorist networks remain active, resourceful, and determined.

Piracy

Piracy is one of the newly emerging major sources of non-traditional and transnational threats to security in East Asia. According to data released by the ICC-IMB, more than one-third of all the world's reported cases of piracy occur in East Asia (about 90 cases in 2006), with Southeast Asia accounting for a majority of them. As shown in Table 1, the number of piracy attacks within East Asia has been in decline and in 2006 it was the lowest in the past 5 years. However, it is too early to tell if this figure will remain in the years to come.

Piracy acts cause widespread regional economic disruption, posing a serious threat to the safety of seaborne trade as well as navigation. The increasing incidences of piracy have also the potential to trigger major environmental disasters, given the fact that oil tankers are a major target of piracy attack. The security concerns were further underscored by the March 14, 2005, hijacking of an Indonesian cargo ship transporting the combustible chemical methane.¹¹

¹⁰ *Financial Times*, July 9, 2002, p. 6.

<Table 1> Global Trend of Piracy Attacks, 2002-2006

Region		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
SE Asia	Indonesia	103	121	94	79	50
	Malacca Straits	16	38	48	12	11
	Malaysia	14	5	9	3	10
	Myanmar			1		
	Philippines	10	12	4		6
	Singapore Straits	5	2	8	7	5
	Thailand	5	2	4	1	1
Far East	China/Hong Kong/Macau		1	3	4	1
	East China Sea	1				
	Papua New Guinea	1				
	Solomon Islands	2				
	South China Sea		2	8	6	1
	Taiwan	1	1			
	Vietnam	12	15	4	10	3
Sub-total		170	189	173	122	88
Other Areas		200	256	156	154	148
World Total		370	445	329	276	236

Source: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, Annual Report (January 2007).

According to Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as illegal acts of violence or detention against a ship on the high seas or in other areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state. Under international law, all states have the right to arrest pirates on the high seas and to punish them for acts of piracy. Under Article 58 (2) of UNCLOS, these rules apply to other areas outside of territorial waters (for example, in the exclusive economic zone), but do not apply when piracy occurs within the territorial sovereignty of a state. This, of course, is suggested by the very restrictive UNCLOS definition of piracy — which refers to “high seas” and other areas beyond state jurisdiction. UNCLOS also recognizes the existence of archipelagic

¹¹ “Sea Pirates Strike in Strait of Malacca,” *ISN Security Watch*, March 14, 2005.

waters — those waters within straight baselines drawn to connect the outmost islands in the archipelago. Archipelagic waters are also legally within the territorial sovereignty of the archipelagic state and, hence, not subject to definition or rules regarding piracy on the high seas. UNCLOS also recognizes responsibilities of states that border international straits — but where those straits lie within territorial sea limits or a state of states, only the sovereign state can exercise jurisdiction in its respective area.

To realistically address problems of piracy in the East Asian region, we need to go beyond the narrow (“high seas”) legal definition of UNCLOS to something more like the definition made by the IMB in 1992: “piracy is the act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in furtherance of the act.” The IMO has also expanded the concept to include “piracy and armed robbery against ships.” This broader definition — piracy and armed robbery against ships — obviously includes ships in territorial waters or even at anchor or in port. Understanding these definitions — both legal and realistic — is important because, whatever the reality of the location where an act of piracy occurs, potential cooperation among nations to address that piracy must be conditioned by maritime legal definitions.

With the understanding of the above wider definition, piracy is considered to be taking place when a ship is berthed alongside, within a port, at anchor, whilst underway and whether in territorial waters or on the high seas. In East Asia, the piracy attacks, in general, take the form of intruders coming alongside a ship underway, usually during the night, boarding it and then taking possession of whatever cash and negotiable valuables come easily to hand. The notable feature of this type of attack is the degree of skill that is used to board the ship; coupled with the fact that violence is normally not used unless resistance is offered.

However, we find three noticeable characteristics in the recent piracy attacks in the region. First, the pirates are becoming increasingly well-equipped. They usually use small speedboats and often have modest radar systems to help them locate their targets. Access to

machine guns, mortars and grenades has become easier, heightening the potential for violence during raids.

Second, pirates in this region sometimes seize a merchant vessel, dispose of the crew by setting them adrift or even killing them, then bring the stolen ship into port. There the vessel is repainted, given a new name and provided with fake registration documents. Once refurbished, the “phantom ship” offers its service to careless cargo owners. The case of the cargo ship “Tenyu,” which was reported missing on 13 October 1998 and was located two months later in the Chinese port of Zhanjiang, is a typical example of this kind of piracy attack. The ship had been renamed “Sanei 1,” and there is still no report on the whereabouts of the two Koreans and thirteen Chinese who formed the original crew.

Third, pirates in this region are becoming increasingly organized with support networks. That is to say, piracy in the region tends to be more sophisticated and lucrative crimes, supported by organized criminal gangs. Hence, some attacks have been masterminded by transnational crime syndicates, who often commit other transnational crimes such as illegal drug trafficking and human smuggling.

These are totally new trends and developments compared to what has been called “Asian piracy” in the past, where ships are boarded and cash and valuables are stolen from the ship’s safe and the crew with a minimum use of force. Whatever the types, these new trends and developments in piracy in the region pose a real danger — not only to the lives of crew but also to the safety of ships — and need to be countered with a sustained and coordinated regional effort.¹²

¹² Recently, with the increase of piracy in the region, some scholars argue that the piracy, which encompasses a wide spectrum of violent behavior, has the potential to develop into maritime terrorism. However, the objectives of piracy and terrorism are usually different. The motivation for piracy is economic while that for terrorism is predominantly political and religious ideology. For more details, see Mark J. Valencia, “Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Similarities, Differences, and Their Implications,” in Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, eds., *Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 77-102.

Marine Pollution and Natural Disasters

The East Asian region, Northeast Asia in particular, contains two huge semi-enclosed seas: that is the Yellow / East China Sea encompassing 362,000 square miles; and the East Sea (Sea of Japan) encompassing 445,000 square miles. In terms of marine pollution, the following general observations need to be made. First, the littoral and adjoining areas have the heaviest population concentration in the world. Second, these areas have one of the heaviest concentrations of industry in the coastal zone in the world. Third, this area has a heavy concentration of shipping routes of the world, with its susceptibility to pollution from collision, groundings, and discharges from tank cleanings, leaks or human error being a major concern. Finally, there is considerable potential for oil and gas offshore.

With these conditions, the region obviously faces the potential of large-scale deterioration, which could interrupt the navigation of ships. In fact, the coastal waters of the Yellow / East China Seas already suffer from heavy contamination mainly by pollutants from dangerous cargoes and from the fast growing industrial activities of the littoral states. The East Sea (Sea of Japan) is also showing serious signs of pollution, and large coastal areas, mostly off Japan, are already heavily polluted. It can be easily foreseen that situations will deteriorate unless great care is taken. As public and national awareness of the importance of the environment grows, marine environmental degradation could constitute a serious potential source of threat to maritime security in the region.

In addition to this problem, there are many other non-traditional and transnational sources of threats to maritime security in the region. They are rooted in the natural, non-living world, from physical phenomena originating in the earth's interior, its atmosphere and even from beyond our planet. Recently, the report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies several ways global warming will devastate world agriculture, thus recognizing the security implications of climate change.¹³ The phrase "Acts of God" encapsulates the notion of human helplessness in the face of such dangers

which are out of our control, but the truth is that natural disasters are as much socio-political as geological or meteorological phenomena.¹⁴

Among these, noteworthy is the “tsunami.” The Japanese term tsunami (meaning literally “harbor wave”) is the more correct term for what are still sometimes referred to as “tidal waves.” These giant sea waves are not produced by tides but by seismic activity such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. Tsunamis have a wavelength of between 100 and 150 kilometers (around 100 times the size of an ordinary sea wave) and can travel hundreds of kilometers at speeds ranging between 640 and 960 km/h. On the high seas, however, they can be very difficult to detect since their height may be no more than a meter. The most deadly of recent tsunamis occurred on the northwestern coast of Indonesia (Indian Ocean) on December 26, 2004, when nearly 300,000 people died as a result of an earthquake-generated wave. It had an enormous impact on Asia, well beyond the dreadful loss of human life. Numerous social, economic, environmental and political issues have arisen from or been exacerbated by the disaster.¹⁵

<Table 2> The 2004 Tsunami by Numbers

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 2nd largest earthquake ever recorded• 6 million affected• 298,000 dead or missing• 500,000 injured• 1.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)• 5,000 miles of coastline affected• 2 million lost jobs• 410,000 housing units destroyed or damaged• 4 million more people likely to fall into poverty due to the Tsunami

Source: “Tsunami and Human Rights: 100 Days After,” The Full Report by FORUM-ASIA, April 2005, p. 4.

¹³ *International Herald Tribune*, April 25, 2007, p. 6.

¹⁴ Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 180.

¹⁵ The devastation wrought by hurricane Katrina that hit the United States in late August 2005 is also noteworthy as a natural disaster which seriously threatened human security.

Pandemic Diseases: SARS and Avian Flu

Among non-traditional and transnational security threats in East Asia, a final area of concern is a divergent form of pandemic diseases such as SARS, HIV/AIDS and avian flu (also known as bird flu). For instance, the region's security environment was shaken by the eruption of the SARS epidemic in 2003. It spread quickly from Southern China to Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, and Canada. Together with the terrorist scare, SARS severely affected the region's tourism industry — a major source of foreign exchange earnings of countries like China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. While the disease has abated over the past years, it could recur at any time due to the region's poor system of governance on the issue.

On the other hand, the spread of avian flu in the past few years from China to Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia caused another threat to the physical and economic security of people, particularly those that are in the poultry business. Millions of chickens were slaughtered across the affected countries in an effort to stem the spread of the disease.

Furthermore, the recent spate of avian flu outbreaks throughout many parts of Asia is prompting a renewed pandemic risk, bearing semblance to the thirty-country tally last year. Early this year, China confirmed its first case of H5N1 virus in months. Indonesia has already experienced four deaths from the virus in 2007, bringing the new tally to a world record of sixty-one. The lessons of the SARS epidemic appear to have been lost in some countries where lack of immediate and full disclosure of the outbreak of the disease and its spread could have led to its wide contagion effect.

III. Counter-Measures to Non-Traditional Security Threats

The best way to counter various non-traditional security threats in East Asia is to establish regional cooperative mechanisms among states since the threats are largely transnational by nature and states cannot solve them through unilateral means. They can be effectively prevent-

ed and overcome with active international cooperation. In turn, such non-traditional security issues can be used as a platform for institutionalization of multilateral security cooperation in the region. For maritime cooperation, there have been a variety of suggestions and we may set out a hierarchy of measures that might be considered at the bilateral, sub-regional (or multilateral) and global levels. Cooperation will be facilitated, however, if regional countries have in place appropriate legislation and institutional arrangements at the domestic level; for dealing with a variety of non-military threats and other maritime crimes; are parties to relevant international conventions; and fulfill their obligations with respect to those conventions.¹⁶

First, bilateral measures include such arrangements as information exchange and coordination and border control agreements between neighboring countries. The information exchange and coordination is a minimal form of cooperation to prevent various non-military threats in the sea (such as marine environmental pollution), while the border control arrangements between neighboring countries might include the countries agreeing to common measures with respect to certain activities that might occur at sea within the vicinity of their maritime boundaries and cross those boundaries. Within East Asia, bilateral cooperation to address non-traditional security issues would serve as the most important building block for wider multilateral cooperation.

Secondly, sub-regional (or multilateral) measures are extremely beneficial in East Asia in combating maritime crimes such as piracy, drug trafficking, illegal migration and others. The sub-regional cooperative activities to combat such maritime crimes include, *inter alia*, the development of common operating and reporting procedures, establishment of information and data bases, joint patrolling and training for enforcement professionals. Over the past years, regional cooperative measures have been actualized in the Strait of Malacca. For instance, in October 1992, the IMB established the Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as a free 24-hour information center to alert ships

¹⁶ *Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea*, CSCAP Memorandum No. 5, February 2001, p. 7.

<Table 3> Major International Arrangements Regarding Maritime Safety: Conventions and Others

Arrangements	Notes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) 	to take steps to prevent and suppress terrorist acts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) Security Code (2002) 	to increase ship and port security
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMO Resolution A. 924 (22)-2001 	to counter criminal and terrorist acts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974) – SOLAS Protocol 78 (Tanker Safety) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Convention on Load Lines (LL1966) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS 1972) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety of Fishing Vessels Protocol 1993 (SFV-P) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR 1979) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1998 (Rome Convention, SUA) 	to prevent piracy attacks

Note: There exist also many international conventions, adopted by IMO, to protect the marine environment. Among these, MARPOL 73/78(Annex I-V) is a good example.

and law enforcement agencies, issue regular marine broadcast piracy status reports, and maintain records on piracy. Following an increase in piracy and armed attacks in the region, the three littoral states (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) recently stepped up cooperative measures to protect the Strait from piracy, terrorist attack, and drug and arms trafficking, by starting their coordinated naval patrols.¹⁷

¹⁷ Most recently in September 2006, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was adopted by sixteen regional countries (namely, the ASEAN+3) to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. ReCAAP is a very signifi-

Finally, in view of the comprehensive nature of non-traditional security threats at sea, countermeasures are necessary at the global level to prevent them. Through the initiatives of the UN and other specialized agencies, a variety of international conventions and resolutions have been adopted to increase maritime safety and combat violence at sea (see Table 2). In recognition of such international actions being taken to enhance maritime security and counter threats at sea, states are strongly urged to cooperate fully with those international instruments and to take all necessary and appropriate measures to implement them, including through regional cooperation, and to investigate or cooperate in the investigation of any maritime incident.

IV. Conclusions

Over the past several decades, the term “security” has largely meant military security. However, since the end of the Cold War and outbreak of the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, non-military security issues have become increasingly prominent and many states have come to take a broader approach to security. There are various sources and offences that might fall within the domain of non-traditional security threats at sea. They may include, among others, maritime terrorism and movement of WMD at sea, piracy, drug trafficking, human smuggling, pandemic diseases and natural disasters and offences against the marine environment. These threats are frequently transnational by nature with more than one national jurisdiction involved. The analysis of existing and newly emerging threats to the maritime environment indicates that while traditional military threat has declined, a host of new non-military (non-traditional and non-conventional) security issues are on the rise at sea. It should be noted, however, that many of those threats are directly or indirectly related to the growing uncertainties coming from the fundamental transformation of the existing

cant achievement for the region that provides the basis for regional cooperation to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships.

political, strategic and legal order of the region and the world.

To counter the divergent non-traditional threats at sea in East Asia, it is very important to establish regional cooperative mechanisms among states since those threats are, by and large, transnational in nature and states cannot solve them through unilateral means. They can be effectively prevented and overcome with active international cooperation. No single state, no matter how strong and determined to deter and defeat transnational threats, can succeed without the cooperation of others. For maritime cooperation, we may set out a hierarchy of measures that might be considered at the bilateral, sub-regional (or multilateral) and global levels. Cooperation will be facilitated, however, if regional countries have in place appropriate legislation and institutional arrangements at the domestic level; for dealing with a variety of non-military threats and other maritime crimes; are parties to relevant international conventions; and fulfill their obligations with respect to those conventions.

Along with this arrangement of a maritime cooperation scheme, the urgent task of all regional states in East Asia is to build a stable and secure maritime regime as well as implement various maritime confidence-building measures such as prior notification of major naval activities and exchange of fleet schedules among navies.¹⁸ Currently, states in East Asia share significant maritime interests but sources of conflict exist at sea largely because of the uncertain strategic environment, maritime sovereignty disputes, and major jurisdictional problems at sea, especially the lack of agreed maritime boundaries. For East Asia, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional security issues at sea could provide a platform for developing the habit of cooperation within a formal multilateral setting. Such an endeavor is a fundamental requisite not only for enhancing security at sea but also for further cooperation among states in the region.

¹⁸ In East Asia, coast guards are now expanding rapidly. Therefore, we need to acknowledge that some states might prefer to use their coast guards in implementing maritime CBMs. Coast guard vessels may be more suitable than warships for employment in sensitive areas where there are conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction and/or political tensions between parties.

Regional Security Issues and Measures: A Japanese View

Akiko Fukushima

In sharp contrast to Europe, where the Berlin Wall—the symbol of the Cold War—was torn down in 1989, in Northeast Asia hard security issues involving the divided Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and other territorial disputes have not yet been resolved. Moreover, Northeast Asia increasingly embraces nontraditional security issues, most notably energy and environmental issues, which are transnational in nature and which, therefore, demand multilateral cooperation. Yet, Northeast Asia has been known for its lack of regional measures to cope with such issues. This does not mean that the sub-region has been complacent. On the contrary, efforts have been made to promote regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Abundant proposals for regional cooperation have been offered since the 1990s. These initiatives have, however, so far proven to be stunted or stalled. Moreover, in recent years a tense political China-Japan-Korea relationship has been blamed for these failures and even for the lack of progress in regionalism in the wider East Asia. This paper reviews the historical evolution of regionalism in Northeast Asia and then asks whether Northeast Asia is ready to cooperate. It looks at what issues the region has already cooperated on or is ready to cooperate on and then concludes with suggestions for regional measures for peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Introduction

Aaron Friedberg contended in the mid-1990s that East Asia was “ripe for rivalry” and a place likely to emerge as the “cockpit of great-power conflict.”¹ This applies more to Northeast Asia

than elsewhere in East Asia, though the geographic definition of Northeast Asia is not sufficiently clear. The United States is physically outside the sub-region, but it is deeply involved in the region, be it for economic, political, or security reasons. Northeast Asia has certainly been crowded by major powers of the present and future and has still been haunted by the Cold War legacy but with changing power dynamics, symbolized by the rise of China. Moreover, Northeast Asia comprises potential hotspots for war, namely on the Korean peninsula and over the Taiwan Straits. The sub-region also contains remaining territorial disputes. Thus comes Friedberg's contention.

In sharp contrast to Europe, where the Berlin Wall — the symbol of the Cold War — was torn down, the Cold War has not ended in Northeast Asia. These "traditional" security issues have continued to confront the sub-region for sixty years. However, the sub-region is increasingly embracing "nontraditional" security issues, such as energy shortages, environmental degradation, infectious disease, and terrorism, which are transnational in nature and that demand regional cooperation.

Yet, there is no operative permanent institutional mechanism for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia comparable to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, the sub-region of Southeast Asia created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. ASEAN could not gain momentum during the Cold War but has turned out to be a core of East Asian regionalism, ranging from the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to ASEAN+3 and lately ASEAN+6, also known as the East Asia Summit (EAS). The East Asian region, therefore, seems unbalanced with ASEAN in the southeast and no comparable organization in the northeast. The lack of a regional cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia does not mean, however, that we have been either lazy or complacent. In fact,

¹ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 5-33.

efforts have been made in Northeast Asia to build regional measures, interestingly most often involving the United States as an initiator or a key player, although the United States geographically does not belong to the sub-region. In the 1990s, a myriad of regional initiatives were proposed, particularly dealing with nontraditional security issues, the most notable example being an energy and environment community emulating the European Coal and Steel Community.² With the exception of the Six-Party Talks on nuclear development in North Korea, track one-level regional institutions have not been created. At the track-two level there are some that have been created and are currently underway. All of the initiatives have proven to be either stunted or stalled at best. Even those regional measures that have been achieved remain in the realm of ad-hoc multilateralism for discussion, if not for confidence building or socializing, and have not reached the level of multilateralism needed to operationalize regional cooperation. Natural questions to ask are "Why not?" and "Can regional measures in fact be built in Northeast Asia?"

This paper attempts to answer those questions by asking what multilateralism is; reviewing the historical evolution of regionalism in Northeast Asia; examining trilateral cooperation among Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea, which are the key players in Northeast Asia; exploring regional issues that are potentially amenable for, and would merit from, regional cooperation; and asking whether such functional cooperation could pave the way for regional architecture in Northeast Asia. In other words, the paper asks whether Northeast Asia loses anything by not cooperating and whether Northeast Asia gains anything by cooperation that is significant enough to entice regional cooperation. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

² Shinyasu Hoshino, president of the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), at a North Pacific Conference in Sapporo, Japan, 1993.

What is Multilateralism?

In examining multilateral cooperation, the historical evolution in Northeast Asia offers a starting point. Moreover, a discussion of multilateralism is best begun by posing the questions “What is multilateralism?” and “What do we gain from cooperation and lose by not cooperating?” In the world of international relations, the term multilateralism means much more than its simple quantitative definition of relations among three or more parties. John Gerald Ruggie has characterized multilateralism as 1) generalized principles shared by members; 2) indivisibility of welfare among participants; and 3) diffused reciprocity.³ Generalized principles are rules that govern the behavior of multilateral institution members regardless of individual preferences. Ruggie illustrates generalized principles of conduct by offering up as examples most-favored nation treatment in the economic sphere and collective security in the security sphere. Indivisibility of welfare means that costs and benefits are spread equally among members. For example, if troubles afflict one country, there would be ramifications for other institution members. Their stakes are indivisible. International public goods are examples of indivisibility. Diffuse reciprocity means that a member of a multilateral institution, in cooperating with other members, expects rewards — members do not necessarily expect rewards on every issue all the time, but they do expect to benefit eventually. In other words, benefits to members of a multilateral institution are not immediate but are diffused over a longer timeline. Can we observe this kind of multilateralism in Northeast Asia or over a wider Asian sphere?

³ John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Gerald Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-47.

Historical Evolution of Regional Cooperation in Asia

Multilateralism has painted very contrasting landscapes in Europe and Asia. Europe has a rich history of multilateral cooperation dating back to the European Concert of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, leading to the post-World War II multilateral constructs of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, to name a few. In contrast, Asia has experienced nothing on a scale comparable to Europe, though Southeast Asia did establish ASEAN in 1967 for multilateral political and economic cooperation. ASEAN, however, could not gain the kind of substantial momentum during the Cold War that it has today. Northeast Asia, on the other hand, did not produce even a single mechanism comparable to ASEAN. International relations in Asia grew mainly along bilateral lines, leaving the region devoid of inter-governmental multilateralism.

Nevertheless, there have been some attempts to create multilateral organizations, with evolving footprints of Pacific, Asia Pacific, and East Asia. On the economic front, in 1968, business leaders in Pacific Rim countries created the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) to exchange views, and they have annually hosted plenary and steering committee meetings ever since. In 1980, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was launched in Canberra, following a meeting sponsored by Japan and Australia to examine the idea of economic cooperation in the region. Participation in PECC has been by three major groups: government officials in their private capacities, members of the private sector, and academia. PECC hosts a major conference every two years and sponsors forums and working groups on functional areas such as energy and trade policies; however, PECC has not developed into an inter-governmental process.

Under the Truman administration, the United States considered the idea of a collective security system for the Pacific. The Eisenhower administration pursued the idea further and in 1955 set up the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to counter communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, but its limitations soon became apparent. Asian states were unwilling to discuss embarrassing security problems in the SEATO forums, and the United States was unwilling to have its

activities scrutinized by SEATO. The wars in Laos and Vietnam illustrated SEATO's inadequate handling of counter subversion. By the mid-1960s, the SEATO alliance was no longer in the mainstream of security cooperation in Southeast Asia. Following the fall in April 1975 of the US-supported regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia, SEATO started to crumble and eventually dissolved on June 20, 1977.

Why did Asia lack regional multilateral institutions? Essentially, the region did not satisfy three features of multilateralism cited in the section above. The factor most frequently cited is the lack of indivisibility of welfare in the region. The region is extremely diverse in terms of population, per-capita gross domestic product (GDP), economic and political systems, military preparedness, cultural heritage, religion, historical experience, and ethnicity. Differences in population range from China's at 1.2 billion to Brunei's at 300,000; per-capita GDP ranges from Japan at the high end of the scale to Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos at the low end. Ethnic makeup also ranges from countries like Japan and Korea, which are ethnically homogeneous, to Singapore and Malaysia, which have a dynamic mix of ethnic groups.

Another reason often given for the absence of regional institutions is the lack of a shared perception of threat as well as a lack of shared values to uphold for generalized principles. Nations in Asia have been more or less afraid of each other and have thus lacked a perception of a common external threat, which prevented them from cooperating. Another reason given is the history of domination by external powers in the region. Imperial China's long-standing colonial dominance up until the middle of the nineteenth century was followed by Western colonial domination and then by the Japanese prewar attempt to create the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Wary of being ruled by other powers and having their interests marginalized, Asian countries had thus avoided forming a multilateral institution. Loss of sovereignty is not a distant memory in some Asian countries.

This landscape, however, started to change in the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the tide of industrialization and democratization came ashore in Asia. Combined with the external stimuli of European regional integration and the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA), regionalism in Asia started to bud. Perceived growing economic interdependence, including an increase in intraregional trade, led to the launching of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference as a dialogue on economic cooperation in November 1989. With the successful evolution of APEC, despite initial skepticism of such an inter-governmental regional framework, the impetus to create a regional security organization gradually followed. When Australian and Canadian foreign ministers first proposed an Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the region was not ready to accept the idea. The two proposals were slightly different. Whereas Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's proposal was an adaptation of the CSCE to the North Pacific, the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proposed that the whole of Asia adopt the CSCE model and call it CSCA. These proposals, strongly influenced by the success of the CSCE, were received coldly, if not rejected outright, by ASEAN and China. Japan also rejected the CSCA idea by saying that "Japan doubts if such a grouping could produce fruitful results. . . . Conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region would be better settled through meetings of the concerned parties rather than at an international security forum."⁴


As signs of the Cold War dissipated, however, countries in Asia became more positive toward multilateral security cooperation. The Institute of Strategic and International Studies in ASEAN countries (ASEAN-ISIS) in June 1991 recommended the creation of a multilateral security dialogue, the Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific. This new ASEAN position on regional security cooperation was said to have stemmed from its concern about a possible withdrawal of the US military presence from Asia. Regional security cooperation was designed to be an insurance policy in the event of an American departure. In July 1993, the ASEAN-PMC in Singapore agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The first ARF meeting was held in July 1994 in Bangkok between the ASEAN ministerial and PMC meetings.

⁴ FBIS East Asia, 90/149, August 2, 1990, p. 12 and "Security Plan Fails to Impress," *The Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, August 13-19, 1990.

The ARF is a security dialogue, and it agreed to promote dialogue on political and security issues of common interest and concern in the Asia Pacific region and committed itself to a gradual three-stage evolution from 1) confidence building, and 2) preventive diplomacy, to 3) a body capable in the longer term of developing approaches to conflict resolution as stipulated in the Second ARF Chairman’s Statement made in Brunei. The ARF has sustained itself over almost two decades but has remained a venue for confidence building or for socializing and has failed to operationalize its cooperation as it sits between the first stage of confidence building and the second stage of preventive diplomacy, although it is still very much in the first stage.

Meanwhile, ASEAN has solidified its place as a driver of regionalism in East Asia. As shown in Figure 1, regionalism emerging in the last decade has centered around ASEAN, such as ASEAN PMC, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, or the EAS.

<Figure 1> Regional Architecture in Asia



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

There are several key features of these regional frameworks created in the past decade: first, they have an East Asia rather than Asia Pacific footprint; second, ASEAN was a core or a driver for wider regional cooperation, which has made regional frameworks palatable to both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia; third, they are mainly for socializing or confidence building and not yet for actions or operations; fourth, regional cooperation tends toward a web of bilateralism as was the case in the Chiang Mai Initiative; and fifth, initiatives were led by *de facto* regionalization followed by functional cooperation rather than being institution led — they were most often on economic issues and not much on security issues, particularly hard security issues; and sixth, Northeast Asia still embraces the ad-hoc multilateralism of the Six-Party Talks. Whether we can operationalize regional cooperation in Northeast Asia or not is a challenge. Moreover, in the context of East Asian regionalism, the tense relations between Japan and China have been pointed out as the major stumbling block for regional cooperation. Can we really fill the void?

Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia

When ASEAN-driven regional cooperation emerged in the form of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, the lack of regional cooperation measures, if not outright tension, in Northeast Asia was most conspicuously pointed out. In December 2005, when the first East Asia Summit was held, Sino-Japanese relations were tense over the visits of then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine, where the war dead are enshrined. The sour Sino-Japanese relations were pointed out as an obstacle to East Asian community building.

Although Northeast Asia did not initiate regional measures even for socializing at the track-one level, in the 1990s it did create track-two multilateral dialogues. In Northeast Asia, numerous track-two dialogues have flourished. A notable example is the North Pacific Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which is a group of think tanks in the Asia Pacific region. Another

example is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a security dialogue launched in 1993. Its origin traces back to the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) initiated by Canada. In September 1990, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark proposed the NPCSD, which held seven conferences and workshops between April 1991 and March 1993 on topics such as unconventional security issues, regional confidence-building measures, the connections between history and culture, and prospects for regional security cooperation. Participants in the NPCSD included academics and officials in their private capacities from Canada, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and the United States.⁵

Professor Susan Shirk, director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, attended the last meeting of the NPCSD in March 1993 and saw value in multilateral security/political discourse such as the NPCSD. She approached the Clinton administration and others informally with an idea for hosting a track-two conference for Northeast Asia that would be less inclusive than the NPCSD. The reaction to her proposal from the State Department was positive.⁶ Professor Shirk invited government and academic representatives from China, Japan, Russia, the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK to attend the planning conference on security in Northeast Asia. Participants in the meeting supported her proposal and agreed to call the conference the NEACD. It was agreed that two academics and two government officials from each of the six countries would attend. It was also agreed that the NEACD would operate on the basis of consensus. It was agreed that the agenda of the meeting would include hard security issues as well as unconventional security issues.

⁵ Steward Henderson, "Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue—Recent Trends," *The NPCSD Working Paper Series*, No. 1, and David Dewitt and Paul Evans, "The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective," *The NPCSD Working Paper Series*, No. 3, The Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University.

⁶ David Brown, "Korea's Role in the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue," *Korea's Economy 1996* (Korea Economic Institute of America, Washington, DC), p. 92.

The first meeting of the NEACD was held in October 1993 in La Jolla, California, at which participants agreed to expand the participation of defense experts by extending invitations for participants from both the defense ministries and the armed forces of each participating country.⁷ The DPRK participated in the planning session but did not attend the first meeting and was consistently absent until the meeting in Moscow in 2002. Since 2002, the DPRK has sent its representatives to the NEACD, which means that the participants are identical to those of the Six-Party Talks. In April 2006, the NEACD meeting in Tokyo offered a venue for participants in the Six-Party Talks to confer. There has been an attempt to upgrade NEACD to the status of a track-one dialogue, but that arrangement has not yet materialized. Meanwhile, the Six-Party Talks were launched as ad-hoc multilateralism on the question of nuclear development by the DPRK. As a matter of fact, the original idea for the Six-Party Talks was proposed by Mr. Keizo Obuchi, then Japanese Foreign Minister, in 1998. Obuchi stated in his policy speech on February 16 that "In the Asia-Pacific region, to which Japan belongs, it is essential to ensure cooperation among Japan, the United States, China, and Russia toward the establishment of a framework for peace and stability in the region. ... [With a view toward this goal,] I believe that as these quadripartite relations [Japan, China, Russia, and the United States] evolve, we should be aware of the possibility of the four nations meeting together in the future to have discussions on various matters of mutual concern."⁸ Obuchi visited the United States as prime minister in September 1998 and told President Clinton to hold the Six-Party Talks instead of four-party talks on Korea sometime in the future.⁹ Already in relation to the first North Korean nuclear

⁷ Akiko Fukushima "Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan," *Policy Paper 51* (Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1999).

⁸ Keizo Obuchi, Foreign Policy Speech to the 142nd Session of the Diet, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/archive_3/142nd.html

⁹ Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Reisen Shuryugo no Nihonno Henyou [Japan's Transformation after the End of the Cold War,]" in Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, eds., *Nihon no Higashi-Ajia Koso* [Japan's East Asian Initiatives] (Tokyo: Keio University, 2004), p. 290.

crisis in 1993-94, the Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established in 1995 and four-party talks began in 1996. Five years after Obuchi made his proposal, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's development of nuclear weapons were created as ad-hoc multilateralism, and the first meeting was held in China in August 2003, after it was revealed in October 2002 that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. The second meeting was held in February 2004; the third in June 2004; the fourth in July-September 2005; the fifth in November 2005; and the sixth in February and March 2007. There was a long interval between the fifth and the sixth rounds of the Six-Party Talks because North Korea fired ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea in July 2006. On February 13, 2007, in Beijing, North Korea agreed to take steps to shut down and seal the Yongbyong nuclear facility and allow inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency within 60 days as an initial phase. The other parties agreed to provide North Korea with energy equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. North Korea also demanded the transfer of all previously frozen funds at the Banco Delta Asia in Macau. Although the initial phase took more time than agreed, the group is now at the stage of negotiating the details of disabling North Korea's nuclear facilities in exchange for assistance from the other five parties.

Comparing the Six-Party Talks with the Vienna Conference two decades ago, Fuji Kamiya, professor emeritus of Keio University, observes that the Six-Party Talks are less successful than the Vienna Conference because the members do not share any common concerns. Kamiya argues that the time has come to decipher the cessation of a chain of interruption and resumption of the Six-Party Talks.¹⁰ Do the six countries share indivisible welfare, which is a pre-requisite for multilateralism? Yes, the five countries do in terms of deterring North Korea from developing nuclear capabilities, but North Korea does not. While the future of the Six-Party Talks seems uncertain, and it is unclear how serious North Korea is about giving up its nuclear weapons, it is

¹⁰ Fuji Kamiya, "*Rokusha Kyogi no Fumo no Rensa wa Tate* [Cut the Futile Chain of the Six-party talks,]" *Sankei Shimbun*, January 14, 2007, p. 11.

clear that a phased negotiation process remains the only strategy with any chance of success. Nevertheless, participants in the Six-Party Talks have agreed to establish five working groups, namely on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, normalization of North Korea-US relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, economic and energy cooperation, and a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. The last one can potentially lead to the creation of a concrete institution for security cooperation in Northeast Asia, which has attracted renewed attention to more institutionalized cooperation in Northeast Asia.

When we take a closer look, there are many frameworks for cooperation- functional cooperation among the three core countries in Northeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan, most often led by common challenges and shared interests, ranging from trade and investment to the environment, perhaps more common than those shared by ASEAN countries. Despite the perception of politically tense relations among the three, there is more functional cooperation underway than otherwise perceived.

First and foremost, there is a trilateral summit held almost every year. At the suggestion of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, the leaders of the three countries have met since 1999 at the margins of the ASEAN+3 Summit almost every year.¹¹ Furthermore, what was significant was that the three leaders, Junichiro Koizumi, prime minister of Japan; Wen Jiabao, premier of China; and Roh Moo-hyun, president of the ROK, issued a Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation in Bali in 2003, which stated that "We were convinced that advancing and deepening the tripartite cooperation will not only serve to further promote the stable development of bilateral relations between Japan-China, Japan-Korea, and China-Korea but also contribute to the realiza-

¹¹ The first trilateral meeting was held in November 1999; the second in November 2000; the third in November 2001; the fourth in November 2002; the fifth in October 2003; the sixth in November 2004; and the seventh in January 2007. China cancelled the meeting in 2005 due to Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and the ASEAN+3 summit was postponed from December 2006 to January 2007 due to a typhoon. Thus, one trilateral summit was skipped.

tion of peace, stability, and prosperity throughout East Asia.”¹² The three countries have prepared biannual progress reports of trilateral cooperation.

In January 2007 at the trilateral summit held in Cebu, the Philippines, Shinzo Abe prime minister of Japan; Wen Jiabao; and Roh Moo-hyun, issued a joint press statement and stated that “The three leaders ... shared the view that, as important countries in Asia, China, Japan, and the ROK shoulder great responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia. They also believed that the strengthening of future-oriented trilateral cooperation among the three countries both serves the fundamental and long-term interests of the peoples of the three countries, and is of great significance for peace, stability and prosperity in Asia.”¹³ It is again significant that the three agreed in the joint press statement to cooperate *for the future, not mentioning past historical problems*. They have agreed to start negotiations on a trilateral investment agreement in 2007¹⁴ and have also agreed to promote the creation of a secure, efficient, cost-effective, and seamless logistics system among the three, which is the key infrastructure of trade and investment. They also agreed to send observers to the trilateral joint study on a trilateral FTA by the private sector. This study has been promoted since April 2002 by three think tanks, namely, the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) of Japan, the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC) of China, and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) of the ROK. The study groups

¹² Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, Bali, Indonesia, October 7, 2003, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/joint0310.html>.


¹³ Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, January 14, 2007, Cebu, the Philippines.

¹⁴ NIRA, KIEP, and DRC study groups recommended a trilateral investment agreement as a win-win scenario in 2002. It was observed that further improvement of the investment climate, particularly in China, would expand investment from Japan and Korea. Kazutomo Abe and Shujiro Urata, eds, *Nichi-Chu-Kan Chokusetsu Toshi no Shinten* [Progress of FDI among Japan, China, and Korea], NIRA Challenge Books (Tokyo: Nihonkeizai Hyoronsha, September 2003), pp. 40-42.

have submitted their reports annually and have recommended a trilateral investment agreement and an FTA.

In fact intraregional trade among Japan, China, and Korea has recently increased as shown in Figure 2. This de-facto integration of economic activities motivates the three countries to look into an FTA among the three. The Trilateral Study Group has analyzed the impact of an FTA among China, Japan, and Korea and has recommended a trilateral FTA as a win-win scenario, including logistics, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors.¹⁵ Even without the legal framework of an FTA, Japan-China trade has increased to US\$209,492 million, Japan-Korea trade to US\$72,932 million, and Korea-China trade to US\$115,467 million in 2005. The share of trilateral trade on the import side has increased to 27.7% in 2005, which is a significant share of the total imports in these three countries, which have a natural base for promoting trilateral, or a web of bilateral, FTA agreements to further these trade relations.¹⁶

<Figure 2> Deepening Trilateral and Intra-Regional Trade in East Asia



Source: JETRO, available online at www.jetro.go.jp (accessed May 15, 2007).

¹⁵ <http://www.nira.go.jp/newsj/research/dat/r1970.html>.

¹⁶ Shujiro Urata and Kazutomo Abe eds, *Chugoku no WTO Kamei* [Chinese Accession to the WTO], NIRA Challenge Books (Tokyo: Nihonkeizai Hyoronsha, 2002).

Along with the economy, environmental issues pose common challenges for the three countries. In addition to the circular economy and eco-labeling, the three agreed to deal with dust and sandstorms, marine litter, and illegal trans-boundary movement of toxic and hazardous waste in 2007. They have agreed to explore concrete measures through the Tripartite Environment Ministers' Meeting. This should lead to actual cooperation to reduce environmental problems among the three and beyond. On socio-cultural cooperation, China has designated the year 2007 as a Year of Cultural Exchange among China, Japan, and the ROK in order to enhance mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of the three countries. In addition, Japan plans to invite 6,000 young people to Japan every year for the next five years from East Asia, including China and the ROK.


The three leaders have also agreed to promote specific cooperation among the three through a foreign ministers' meeting and also to set up a trilateral consultation mechanism at the level of senior foreign affairs officials. Despite political tensions, China, Japan, and the ROK share common issues and an agenda to cooperate, perhaps much more so than their southeastern counterparts. As a matter of fact, the three have indivisible welfare and diffuse reciprocity in cooperating, as defined by Ruggie. Whether they can share generalized principles to promote trilateral cooperation depends on whether or not their political will is endorsed by mutual trust relations.

Northeast Asia's "Stunted Regionalism"

A decade ago in 1998, Robert A. Scalapino, professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkley, projected that in Northeast Asia "bilateralism will continue to dominate interstate relations ... but multilateralism will gradually expand, with a concert of states the most logical route. ... The growth of NETs [natural economic territories], however, is already taking place and is destined to play a major role in bringing the region into greater economic integration."¹⁷ His projection has proven to be on the mark except regarding multilateralism in the

region. Certainly bilateralism continues to be the mainstay of relations in the region with some elements of tension. Ad-hoc multilateralism in the form of the Six-Party Talks is playing its role in the denuclearization of North Korea, but it has not reached the level of a concert of powers. Scalapino used the term NETs to mean economic entities that cross political boundaries, taking advantage of complementarity of neighboring regions, combining resources, manpower, capital, technology, and managerial skills. He projected the NETs to grow when political barriers are reduced. Although the region does not use the term NETs, the trade and investment relations in the sub-region have deepened as described above.

<Figure 3> Mutual Feeling Among Japan, China, ROK and USA



Source: 'Tables and Figures' in Takashi Inoguchi et. al. "Human Beliefs and Values in Striding Asia." (pp. 482-483)

Multilateralism has not taken root in Northeast Asia, despite the higher hopes embraced by the region soon after the end of the Cold

¹⁷ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Prospects for US-Japan-China-Korea Relations*, a paper prepared for a joint East-West Center/Pacific Forum seminar held in Honolulu, August 13-28, 1988.

War. Ranging from Gorbachev's proposal for greater cooperation on the rim of the Japan Sea, a myriad of proposals have been tabled. Nevertheless, institutions for regional cooperation did not take shape. Today, in 2007, the sub-region only has the ad-hoc multilateralism of the Six-Party Talks and some track-two dialogues. There are several reasons why the regionalism has been "stunted" in Northeast Asia.

One is mutual suspicions if not mistrust among Japan, China, and South Korea. Mutual trust is a prerequisite for developing the political will that is needed for regionalism to work. The three, however, currently lack such trust, illustrated by an *Asiabarometer* survey. The survey has been conducted annually by Professor Takashi Inoguchi of Chuo University (formerly of the University of Tokyo) and his group since 2002. The survey covers East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Included in the questionnaire is the question "Do you think the following countries have a good or a bad influence on your country?" Figure 3 shows the good/bad influence with net figures for Japan, China, and Korea, which clearly show the lack of trust among the three Northeast Asian countries, while higher trust is shown by Southeast Asian countries toward Japan, China, and Korea respectively. The second reason is an emerging nationalism or assertion of national identity. Third is a lack of political will for regional cooperation.

Cooperating for a Better Northeast Asia

European experiences with developing regional integration on issues ranging from coal, steel, and uranium to trade suggest that a plethora of regional frameworks for functional cooperation, perhaps ad-hoc, would certainly lead to regional cooperation. The non-legal flexible approach by the CSCE/OSCE rather than the *aqui communautaire* of the EU could be a good reference point for Northeast Asia. Currently, the Six-Party Talks face numerous difficulties in solving the problem of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, but a negotiated solution is the only option we have, other than an attack on North Korea. Should this option prevail, it opens a venue for comprehensive security cooperation.

Some countries in Northeast Asia are already partner-country members of the OSCE. This can be further enhanced for effective cooperation in the future, responding to a call from the European side. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier have suggested that NATO should be expanded globally. In addition to its traditional collective defense function, NATO has broadened its geographic reach and the range of its operations. For example, it has played a role in peace operations in Afghanistan and assisted with tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia and earthquake rescue operations in Pakistan.¹⁸ European countries assisted with the peace accords in Aceh, Indonesia, after the tsunami, and the EU has sent a reconstruction mission. Given the transnational nature of many security issues, Northeast Asia may consider a possible partnership with NATO.

Some scholars have suggested cooperative security approaches in Northeast Asia or more broadly in East Asia. One such approach is to extend the current Six-Party Talks beyond nuclear issues to other functional issues and to build a cooperative security structure such as the CSCE. Francis Fukuyama, professor of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, has proposed "Five Power" talks, emulating the OSCE.¹⁹ Within the ongoing Six-Party Talks, Russia is in charge of a working group on peace mechanisms in East Asia, which may develop a permanent structure for peace in the region. Akio Watanabe, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, proposed a reworking of the Helsinki Final Act in a Northeast Asian context.²⁰

Another proposal, by Hitoshi Tanaka, a senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and former deputy minister for foreign affairs, is to create an "East Asia Security Forum."²¹ Although the

¹⁸ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (September/October 2006).

¹⁹ Francis Fukuyama "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 105-173.

²⁰ Akio Watanabe, Think Piece prepared for the Fifth Japan-Russo Forum, held in March 2007.

²¹ Hitoshi Tanaka, "East Asia Community Building: Toward an "East Asia Security Forum," *East Asia Insights*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Japan Center for International Exchange, April 2007).

ARF has been a venue for Asian Pacific security dialogue, Tanaka observes that the ARF has not been effective in facing the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and in implementing measures following the December 2004 tsunami. The ARF could be ably complemented by an East Asia Security Forum. Tanaka conceives of an East Asia Security Forum that would deal with nontraditional/cooperative security issues "such as non-proliferation of WMD, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and human security issues."²²

Given the transnational impact of security issues, particularly non-traditional ones, Northeast Asia would certainly benefit from cooperating and lose by not cooperating. Evidence presented in this paper suggests that the process of building regional measures matters for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It is time to go beyond dialogues and to translate ideas into operational mechanisms such as the Jeju peace process. In developing sustainable regional mechanisms for Northeast Asia, there are five elements with which the sub-region will need to come to grips. First, can Northeast Asia capitalize on the economic interdependence and further regional cooperation in non-economic areas, in particular traditional and nontraditional security issues? Second, can Northeast Asia share a common vision for regional cooperation? One option is to have a vision of building a better Northeast Asia, which should be harnessed by concrete practical objectives for functional cooperation. Third, should Northeast Asia opt for ad-hoc regionalism or for institutionalized regionalism? Should Northeast Asia use the working group on peace and security mechanisms in the Six-Party Talks? Or should it create a separate platform for regional cooperation? Fourth, who should lead regional cooperation, larger powers or smaller powers? Fifth, who should participate in Northeast Asian cooperation? In responding to these five questions, the European experience can offer a frame of reference. If the sub-region can ably respond to these questions, Northeast Asia can finally create a mechanism for a concert of powers, as projected by Robert Scalapino a decade ago.

²² Ibid.



**PART
VI**

*Cooperation on Institution-Building
for Regional Peace, Security and
Prosperity in Northeast Asia*

The Political-Military Dimension of the OSCE

The Relevance of the Helsinki Process and the OSCE Experience
to Regional Cooperation in East Asia

Regional Cooperation and Regional Organizations
in the 21st Century

The Political-Military Dimension of the OSCE

Dov Lynch

This event provides an excellent opportunity for sharing the OSCE experience and the OSCE approach to political-military questions. The paper will not address directly the relevance of the OSCE experience for Northeast Asia. The argument centres around three themes. First, the paper will examine the normative framework of the OSCE work in the political-military dimension. Where, indeed, is the place of political-military issues in the overall OSCE context? Second, the paper reviews the CSBMs framework that the OSCE has developed to prevent armed conflict between States. Third, the paper explores OSCE political-military activities inside States. The discussion throughout will also highlight the limits of the OSCE approach to political–military questions. The OSCE approach is not appropriate for everything or on all questions; however, it has been and remains very useful and effective on specific issues and policy areas. Realism and sobriety should guide the discussion.

It may seem paradoxical, but among the founding fathers of the Helsinki process, there is scepticism that the experience of the CSCE and the OSCE as an Organization may provide lessons that may be generalisable and that could be transferred to other regions. For the most part, the CSCE/OSCE is seen as *sui generis*. The weakness of this view is highlighted saliently by the deep and abiding interest shown in other parts of the world to the experience of the CSCE and the OSCE. Of course, in essence, accepted wisdom is correct in affirming that all regional processes must be *sui generis*, reflecting the partic-

ularities of each region. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that there is much for other regions to learn from the CSCE/OSCE experience. Not enough has been done to collect this experience in a coherent analytical manner.

All the more so as the CSCE and OSCE have a rich history to draw upon and even to learn from, whether one's concern is with issues relating to process itself, or to particular dimensions of its evolution. This paper examines one dimension of OSCE activity, which is the Organization's approach to political-military questions. The paper does not address directly the relevance of the OSCE experience for other regions but seeks to provide the room necessary to draw more general conclusions that might be useful and relevant. In so doing, the paper explores three themes;

- First, the normative framework of the OSCE works in the political-military dimension. What, indeed, is the place of political-military issues in the overall OSCE context?
- Second, to review the CSBMs framework that the OSCE has developed to prevent armed conflict between States.
- Third, to explore OSCE political-military activities inside States.

Throughout the argument, the discussion will highlight also the limits of the OSCE approach to political — military questions. Certainly, the OSCE approach is not appropriate for everything or on all questions; however, it has been and remains very useful and effective on specific issues and policy areas. Realism and sobriety should act as guides for the discussion.

Before exploring specific features, it is important to understand the wider philosophical and political context of the political-military dimension of OSCE activity. A basic underlying objective of the OSCE, as indeed the CSCE process previously, has been that of preventive diplomacy; that is, to develop and deploy diplomatic and other instruments to identify early on and prevent conflicts between and within States. This, in essence, is a *raison d'être* of the Organization. OSCE efforts in the political-military sphere flow from this objective. The

main features of the OSCE approach to preventive diplomacy are three-fold: First, to act as a forum for permanent dialogue; second, to build and make use of structures, institutions and field missions; and third, to be guided by a wide conceptual approach to security. All three are well developed; First, the permanent dialogue in Vienna features the continuous exchange of views on all issues of concern between the 56 participating States, complemented by high-level consultations by the Chairman-in-Office and by discussions among Foreign Ministers at the Ministerial Council has come to constitute a rich network that can provide the participating States (pS) with the ability to identify problems and possible ways to defuse them at a very early stage. Such permanent dialogue, combined with the principle of consensus governing the decision making process, has the benefit of encouraging full participation and a strong sense of ownership of the Organization — especially that of smaller countries. The involvement of all participating States in the decision making process also facilitates efforts to better take into account and factor into OSCE activities the aspirations of the countries themselves. This also improves wide knowledge of complex local situations.

In addition, OSCE preventive diplomacy benefits from a rich network of Institutions acting at multiple levels to assist the States, and identify potential problems and provide recommendations. Note should be taken here of the multiple and different roles played by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM), the Secretary General and the Secretariat, which includes a Conflict Prevention Centre. In addition, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) provides an interface with parliamentarians from the 56 participating States. Special importance should be given to the role played by the 19 OSCE field missions, which conduct a dialogue at the local level with representatives of governments and local administration, and also civil society.

Together, these institutions translate into practical initiatives the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security that links the politico-military, economic and human dimensions. The premise of all OSCE efforts

has remained quite unchanged since 1975. In essence, it is that States cannot be secure measured only by military strength; they must have strong and legitimate institutions, healthy civil societies, and good economic governance. This comprehensive approach is the OSCE signature strength (one, incidentally, that has been adopted by many other international organizations). Founded upon this corner stone, the activities of the OSCE's 19 field operations, deployed from the Balkans to Central Asia, range very widely.

Taken together, these three elements constitute the wider context within which OSCE efforts in cooperation in the political-military dimension are embedded. At a more specific level of analysis, the OSCE political-military dimension is embedded also in a well-developed normative context, represented in foundational terms in the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act on refraining from the use of force and more recently in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. It is worth highlighting some of the main points of the Code of Conduct, which was adopted in 1994 and that is one of the most important normative documents in this area since the Helsinki Final Act.

In essence, the Code is a comprehensive document regulating the military and defence policies of States both in peacetime and in the case of armed conflict. Its political significance lies in the fact that the OSCE participating States, for the first time, agreed to base internal regulations for their armed forces on agreed international guidelines. The fundamentals of the Code pertain, first, to the need for civilian and parliamentary control over the armed forces and, second, to ensure the protection and respect of human rights within the armed forces. The cross-dimensional nature of the Code links the politico-military dimension with the human, economic and environmental aspects of security. In addition, the Code also provides a political guideline for States' activities on preventing and combating terrorism. A major element in the Code concerns the human rights of individual service members, obliging States to ensure that the recruitment or call-up of personnel for service in military, paramilitary or security forces is consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In addition, the Code emphasizes and strengthens adherence to the international laws of armed conflict including the Hague and Geneva Conventions and Protocols Additional thereto. It obliges States to instruct their armed forces in international humanitarian law and to ensure that such personnel are aware that they are individually accountable for their actions as well as orders contrary to such international obligations. The Code is interesting also in establishing something that approximates in the spirit if not in the word the principle of proportionality in the internal use of force. Thus, given the rise of intra-state conflict in the OSCE area and the tensions that often accompany difficult political transformations that many participating States of the Organization have been undertaking, the Code should be seen as a vital and integral part of the OSCE approach to comprehensive security and to developing a framework for political-military cooperation.

Having reviewed the wider framework in which the political-military dimension of the OSCE is embedded, we may consider now specific features of OSCE efforts. First, the development of confidence-building measures between participating States. The first effort at CSBMs was developed by the *Helsinki Final Act*. In the basket on military security, participating States, indeed, committed themselves to notify regarding military manoeuvres involving over 25,000 troops (independently or in combination). In a sense, all OSCE efforts in the political-military dimension stem from the principle for States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations — this was among ten basic principles, indeed, to guide relations between CSCE States incorporated into the *Helsinki Final Act*.

In order to implement this principle, participating States have agreed to fulfil this duty in every way they deemed appropriate. Attention should be drawn here to the *Vienna Document 1999*, which contains the most comprehensive set of mutually complementary Confidence and Security Building measures (CSBMs) shaping the relations between OSCE participating States in the politico-military sphere. The Vienna Document includes a wide variety of different, tailor-made instruments aiming at building confidence and security in the military field. In particular, the areas of regulation comprise:

- Transparency measures;
- Verification regimes;
- Mechanisms for consultation;
- Military contacts;
- And military co-operation.

However much these measures may appear routine today in the OSCE context, it is worth reminding oneself — and for this reason alone comparing with other regional contexts is useful — just how revolutionary were and are such measures as the exchange of military information or the right to conduct inspections in other states' territory, especially as they were introduced some 15-20 years ago. The package of CSBMs was gradually expanded during the 1990s.

At the same time, it is important to note that the Vienna Document is not the answer for solving all security-relevant problems. Indeed, the Document is geared specifically to conventional armed forces and related problems and threat scenarios, and not others. As such, the Vienna Document can only be one element of a politically or legally binding system of standards and regulations in the area of military and security policy in the OSCE region. The Vienna Document regime was developed largely with inter- rather than intra-state conflict in mind, and, although it has done much to ensure stability in Europe, one may argue that it is not as well-suited for the internal conflicts that have prevailed in recent years. We should note in this respect that the question of applying CSBMs in crisis situations have continued to be a topic of regular discussion in the Forum for Security Co-operation.

What does this all add up to? Currently, some 90 inspections, 40 evaluation visits and a few visits to the airbases or military facilities take place every year. By any accounts, this is a remarkable figure and, insofar as these visits are constantly put into practice, it implies a strong level of trust among States and among military structures in the OSCE region. This is, indeed, a major building block for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. The considerable improvement of the security situation in Europe after the end of the Cold War has had consequences on the OSCE political-military dimension. In essence, a

shift of attention occurred from State level and inter-State focussed armed conflict to resolving other security related issues and focusing on intra-State problems. This evolution has quite naturally followed from the decreasing likelihood of *inter-State* conflict after the collapse of the two-bloc system.

What has this meant in practice? A good example of the shift is that concerning small arms and light weapons. As the Cold War collapsed, the increasing availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) heightened tensions and deteriorated the security situation in many OSCE participating States. Small arms and light weapons are, in a sense, real weapons of mass destruction because of the vast damage they cause in conflict regions, particularly in Africa. Indeed, they are comparatively easy to buy and move around, and so simple to operate that even a child can use them. The illicit trade of these weapons is connected with the spread of terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime. SALW and the related ammunition also are often legally produced far away from the conflict regions to respond to countries' legitimate security needs. In addition, small arms used in conflicts can be procured from a variety of sources, and differences in national control systems, gaps in laws and human errors result in weapons entering the illegal market.

Although these arms have been a serious problem in the OSCE region and beyond (in African conflicts especially), the main producers and exporters of SALW continue to be mainly OSCE participating States themselves. OSCE States have recognized special responsibility to fight the illicit trafficking of SALW. As such, in November 2000, participating States agreed to the *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*. The Document is a politically binding agreement which contains norms, principles and measures covering each stage in the life of a weapon: production, transfer, storage, collection or seizure and destruction.

On the basis of the Document, participating States have agreed to share information, on a one-off basis, on issues concerning: national marking systems; national procedures for the control of manufacturing; national legislation and current practice in export policy, procedures

and documentation, and control over brokering; small arms destruction techniques; and small arms stockpile security and management programmes. In addition, participating States have committed themselves to exchange annually data on exports to and imports from other OSCE participating States, as well as on small arms deemed as surplus and/or seized and destroyed on their territory in the previous calendar year.

Since the adoption of the SALW Document, the OSCE has been looking into new and innovative ways to support implementation of small arms commitments. Currently, the OSCE is curbing the illicit trafficking and proliferation of SALW in two ways: first, through developing and implementing normative measures, such as politically binding agreements on export controls in the OSCE area; and second, by undertaking concrete assistance projects aimed *inter alia* at improving stockpile controls of SALW and CA and destroying surplus weapons. In addition, in 2003, the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) adopted the *OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*, which enabled the OSCE to address the problem of large amounts of military hardware deemed as surplus and waiting for destruction in the territories of many participating States.

A related problem concerns conventional ammunition. It has been estimated that there are up to 300 million tons of surplus conventional ammunition in the ex-Soviet territories. The precarious conditions in which some of these stockpiles are held pose serious security and environmental threats. An especially alarming substance in this regard is a highly dangerous liquid fuel known as *mélange*. During the 1950's and 60's, this was widely used in the production of anti-aircraft, close and medium-range rockets. After these rockets were withdrawn from military service, up to several thousand tons of this hazardous liquid fuel remain in some states. It is often stored in aluminium containers, which are subject to continuing corrosion, and thereby gradual deterioration. The highly toxic nature of these substances, which can no longer be used, requires that they be disposed of most urgently. To date, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Armenia have requested help to rid their territories of these lethal substances, and the OSCE has started implementing

projects to assist.

Thus, the OSCE is actively helping participating States, upon request, address their security concerns regarding surplus small arms and ammunition, deteriorating toxic rocket fuel and unexploded ordnance. Since 2003, the Organization has received 15 requests for assistance to destroy surplus SALW and CA and/or to build up national capacity for better stockpile management and security. To take an example from Ukraine: In May 2004, in the Zaporozhye region of Ukraine, a fire broke out at an ammunition depot, where 92,000 tons of ammunition was stored. Over half of this ammunition detonated, causing an explosion, killing five people and injuring ten. In 2005 and 2006, fires occurred at this same depot. In an effort to cope with the hazard posed by remaining, unexploded ammunition, Ukraine asked the OSCE for assistance. The OSCE is now supporting national Ukrainian efforts to clear this territory of dangerous munitions by providing personal protection equipment, as well as specialized equipment used to search for unexploded ordnance.

The results from the work done thus far are quite encouraging. According to the data exchanged between participating States, some 43 States have destroyed some SALW during the period of 2001-2005, and the total number of weapons destroyed amounts up to almost 9,600,000 items, of which 8,600,000 items were deemed surplus and close to a million were collected and /or seized from illegal possession and trafficking. Again, OSCE efforts in these difficult political-military situations serve to highlight the Organization's wide approach for promoting comprehensive security in the OSCE area and beyond.

All of this being said, in the spirit of sobriety noted in the introduction, it is worth considering the following limits of OSCE efforts in the political-military dimension. First, OSCE efforts are based on trust — the institutions and framework documents work only if that trust is constantly sustained. We have witnessed in the OSCE area that doubts about a state's reliability as well as insecurity with regard to its political and military intentions may lead to misunderstandings and create distrust. This can, indeed, have destabilising effects on regions and sub-regions.

Second, OSCE political-military instruments do not add up to form any defensive alliance; nor do they constitute a mechanism of defense guarantees. Applying the Vienna Document, SALW document or the Code of Conduct does not give a State any guarantee or protection against the potential aggression of another State. None of these instruments assists States in the event of an armed conflict. They are not applicable or developed to help the country to survive in a war. The point is obvious but it may be worth making. The OSCE focus falls largely on pre- and post-conflict situations, where these tools can be taken into consideration and can work. Tools designed for preventing the conflict cannot necessarily end an actual on-going armed conflict.

Third, OSCE efforts have had to be dynamic to reflect ever changing political-military needs. Political-military tools designed for bloc-to-bloc antagonism may be, indeed, less than fully adequate in the face of new security challenges and requirements. The rapid development of political circumstances, the mostly internal character of current conflict based on the great variety of ethnic, religious, social and economic contradictions, and the rise of trans-border security threats — all of these constantly challenge the OSCE political-military regime. The OSCE is responding and it is adapting, but this is not easy and it is an ongoing process, requiring constant engagement by the participating States, political will and resources.

In conclusion, on the whole, OSCE efforts in the political military dimension have proven successful in Europe — they have increased openness, transparency and predictability among armed forces in the OSCE region. In some respects, the CSCE and the OSCE have come to constitute the normative and instrumental framework for the historic changes that have occurred in Europe's military face; First is by building and facilitating a rich network of tools for confidence building between States in order to prevent a State level armed conflict; Second is in adapting to new political-military challenges, such as illicit cross-border transfers and cleaning up the military legacy of the Cold War.

The OSCE SALW document was developed, indeed, to address emerging conflicts within States as well as the factors that create instability across borders, such as the illicit trafficking of weapons. This is

quite some way from traditional arms control to the current co-operative military assistance mechanism. If anything, the shift from a traditional focus on State level conflict towards co-operative assistance is proof that the OSCE is able to adapt to new times and new needs of the security environment. Here, most of all perhaps, lays the secret of OSCE success in the political-military sphere.

Thus, the OSCE has developed as a framework to discuss challenges to security as they evolve, and the multilateral responses they require. Over time, the OSCE has emerged as an agenda-setting instrument in political-military cooperation — by catalyzing debate, by acting as a forum where concerns can be raised, and as an institution where innovative and cooperative answers can be found. In addition, combining normative frameworks with practical instruments has made the OSCE approach to political-military cooperation particularly relevant. Finally, the key point to underline is that the OSCE political-military dimension has worked because it has been intricately connected and embedded in a wider framework that includes the humanitarian and the economic/environmental dimensions. The CSCE and the OSCE have not been about political-military issues as stand-alone questions, or seen in isolation from the wider political objectives. Comprehensive security means much more.

The Helsinki Process and the OSCE Experience to Regional Cooperation in East Asia

P. Terrence Hopmann

This paper evaluates the relevance for the contemporary situation in East Asia of the European experience in regional, multilateral cooperation for security-building since 1970, focusing on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A brief history of the Helsinki process in its Cold War phase emphasizes the creation of fundamental norms of cooperative security, constructing confidence-building measures, and promoting cooperation in economic exchanges, environmental activity, and human contacts. The OSCE adapted rapidly to the changed security environment in Europe after the Cold War, emphasizing conflict prevention, management, and resolution in regions where the peace was threatened. Specific measures adopted by the OSCE in the 32 years since its formation include transparency measures, constraints on military activities, observation and early warning in regions of potential violence, and third party involvement in regions on the verge of violence, where violence is ongoing, or in the aftermath of severe violent conflict. On the basis of lessons garnered from this experience in Europe, the paper sets forth eight propositions about building a regional cooperative security regime in East Asia, and urges consideration of institutionalization of cooperative security on a long-term basis to better manage.

Introduction

This paper examines the relevance for the contemporary situation in East Asia of the European¹ experience in regional, multilateral cooperation for security-building since 1970. East Asian secu-

rity issues presently give rise to global concern, but a dearth of ideas exist about how best to manage regional conflicts. The greatest immediate concern is the development and testing by North Korea of a nuclear device and medium-range missiles; if these systems eventually prove to be operational, this could present a threat for the entire region. This is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to security challenges the region faces. Dynamic economic growth in China, accompanied by enhanced military capability, gives rise to concern as well, especially regarding the long-running dispute over the status of Taiwan. Japan's interests in a return to "normalcy" in foreign and national security policy could lead to the abandonment of constraints that it accepted after World War II. Conflicting claims by Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands, as well as similar conflicts over islands in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea also provide potential sources of conflict in Southeast Asia. Finally, ethno-national conflicts such as those involving the Moro region of the Philippines and the Aceh province of Indonesia, a return to military governance in Thailand, and the issue of human rights in Burma (Myanmar) are also potential sources of regional tension that cannot be managed adequately on an exclusively unilateral basis by the states most directly involved.

To date most efforts to manage these conflicts have been handled through one of several mechanisms. Some have been referred to the United Nations, others have been managed on a regional basis by ASEAN or the larger ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), others on the basis of essentially *ad hoc* multilateral efforts such as the "six power" talks on the North Korean nuclear program, and others have been handled through bilateral channels, unilaterally, or not at all. What is missing in East Asian is a regional, multilateral, institutionalized framework to deal with issues of security and cooperation on a region-wide, ongoing basis. The fundamental motivation should be to create an institution designed by Asian states, managed by Asians, and directed

¹ My analysis in this paper will utilize a broad definition of Europe as adopted by the OSCE, in which two North American countries, the United States and Canada, and the Asian regions of the former Soviet Union extending to the Pacific Ocean, are all included.

towards responding proactively towards Asian issues in ways that are sensitive to the particular cultural and political needs of the region, rather than attempting to apply a global "one size fits all" approach. In addition, a continuing regional institutional framework to promote cooperation may develop cross-issue linkages, reduce transaction costs, and be available immediately in case of crises, in contrast to an *ad hoc* approach that responds to each crisis as it arises. Such an institution needs to be viewed as a legitimate embodiment of specifically Asian views and approaches to national and regional security, and yet also should be able to promote cooperation on a transnational basis to serve the interests of all participating states without violating the rights of any single state.

Undoubtedly, Europe is the global region that has had the most experience with multilateral institutions to promote security and cooperation. It has become commonplace to refer to Europe, extending across the entire continent to the Pacific coast of Russia, and linked across the Atlantic to the United States and Canada, as being the global region that is most "institutionally thick." A broad network of institutions promote security and cooperation throughout this region: NATO, primarily in the military domain; the European Union, initially in the economic and technical domains but increasingly in political, security, and juridical matters as well; the Council of Europe, mostly in human rights, democratic governance, and environment; and the Organization (formerly Conference) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE).² Among these institutions, the OSCE is unique, though perhaps least well known outside of Europe. Its founding document, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was negotiated in the very midst of the Cold War, creating a framework for security and cooperation that included among its participants the major rivals in the Cold War conflict. This was a visionary document that created a normative framework for cooperation that transcended Cold War lines of division, and con-

² The conference was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994; throughout this paper, CSCE and OSCE are used interchangeably.

tributed substantially to the eventual end of the Cold War some fifteen years later.³ It also contained practical and concrete measures to build confidence in the area of military security, to reduce the threat of surprise attack, to enhance cooperation in trade and the environment, and to promote human and cultural contacts across borders. Unlike some institutions, it entailed minimal surrender of sovereignty, especially at the outset. If Europe is safer and more secure today than it was three decades ago, then much of the credit for this change in the political atmosphere should go to the central, if often quiet role played by the OSCE in enhancing security and cooperation during the Cold War and in promoting a transition to a more democratic and peaceful future after the end of the Cold War.

In short, although there is still conflict in Europe, especially in southeastern and eastern Europe, there is also general agreement that Europe has made substantial progress in reducing the dangers of widespread, generalized conflict and in creating institutions to relieve conditions that might produce violent conflict. Much of this is associated with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the bipolar divisions across the center of Europe. But the process of security-building began before the Cold War was over and may itself have contributed to the end of the Cold War. Although there are many differences between East Asia today and Europe in 1975, the process created in Europe during the Cold War suggests relevant lessons that might assist the East Asian region to escape from its present security dilemmas and to find a basis for mutually advantageous cooperation. Prior resolution of the region's conflicts is not a prerequisite to the construction of a cooperative security regime. Indeed, the experience of the CSCE demonstrates how a multilateral regime, formed in the midst of intense conflict and yet transcending those conflicts, may reduce tensions, promote the peaceful resolution of disputes, and enhance mutual confidence, which in turn allows the further strengthening of peace and security.

³ Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Several caveats are clearly required to my main thesis. First, it is clear that there are many differences between Europe and East Asia — due in large part to their very different historical experiences and cultural traditions. Therefore, any lessons from the European experience will necessarily have to be modified significantly to be relevant to international relations in the Western Pacific region. Second, Asia has already learned a great deal about international relations from Europe, not all of it necessarily beneficial. The concept of the absolute sovereignty of the territorial state appeared in Europe in the mid-17th century, and it is ironic that it has become the dominant paradigm of international relations in many parts of East Asia, at the same time that sovereignty is becoming increasingly problematized in Europe. Third, there are also many lessons that East Asians have to teach the Europeans as well; any learning must be a two-way street. Therefore, my proposals are based largely on extensive research on European security institutions, especially the OSCE, suggesting possible implications for East Asian security.

Evolution of the European Security Regime Since 1970

The process of negotiating and institutionalizing a European security regime may be dated to the early 1970's. There were two primary factors that created the climate in which these measures developed. First, Soviet-American detente in the period after the brush with nuclear war in the Caribbean in 1962 permitted greater potential for states in both blocs to cooperate on the basis of shared interests, even in the presence of conflicting value systems. The clearest indicator of this detente was the agreement by the superpowers on significant arms control measures, including the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), and the first Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (1972). Second, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's unilateral initiatives, referred to as *Ostpolitik*, also reduced tensions in the single conflict that more than any other symbolized the Cold War, namely the division of Germany. Most impor-

tantly, by their steps of *de facto* recognition, both Germanys abandoned their long-standing policy of denying the existence and legitimacy of each other.

This East-West detente created the conditions under which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) could emerge. It opened in Helsinki in 1973, and culminated on July 31, 1975, when 35 heads of state from Europe and North America signed the Helsinki Final Act. This Act established ten principles to govern relations among European states, including refraining from the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention in the internal affairs of states, respect for human rights, and self-determination of peoples. In addition, the Helsinki Final Act adopted confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary and political basis that involved advance notification of military maneuvers and invitation of observers to notifiable activities throughout the European continent extending 250 kilometers into the European regions of the Soviet Union.

However, the effects of Helsinki remained relatively modest until about 1985. Following conclusion of the Vienna Review Conference in 1989, the Helsinki process began to create more visible results as common security began to replace the Cold War balance of power and unilateral conceptions of security, which had produced a security dilemma in which one side's efforts to promote its own security were perceived by the other as undermining its security, requiring it in turn to take countermeasures, creating a vicious cycle of insecurity. In 1986 the Conference on Disarmament in Europe significantly expanded confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) contained in the Helsinki Final Act and largely made them obligatory. Challenge inspections were permitted where an activity appeared to be taking place that should have been notified, but was not.

With the end of the Cold War, a series of new documents expanded the normative foundation and practical application of the CSCE principles. The Charter of Paris in 1990 enlarged the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and established for the first time institutions to provide for the concrete implementation of those principles: a Secre-

tariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre, and an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Previously the CSCE consisted of a series of itinerant conferences; this was replaced by a small, but professional secretariat headed by a permanent Secretary-General, who was in turn responsible to a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) representing all participating states. The CSO, now replaced by a Permanent Council, is led by a "Troika" of three states rotating as Chair-in-Office. From time to time, major decisions are made by a Council of Foreign Ministers from all participating states, and occasionally Summit Meetings may take place among Heads of State.

The creation of an Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reflected the prevailing conviction among CSCE members that democratic states are less likely to engage in militarized conflict with other democracies than with authoritarian states. Therefore, creation of a zone of "peaceful democracies" has become a central goal of the post-Cold War OSCE. The primary function of ODIHR is to assist in the conduct of free and fair elections and to implement the "human dimension" of OSCE agreed principles. However, in contrast to other institutions such as the Council of Europe, a state need not have a fully functioning democracy in order to enter the OSCE. Rather the principles and norms adopted at Paris and Copenhagen in 1990 provided a series of goals to which states aspire, and the OSCE emphasizes assistance, socialization, and training in participating states to facilitate good governance and eventual transition toward its democratic norms.

In summary, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the CSCE was poised to play a fundamental role in the post-Cold War European security "architecture." It had several unique advantages in comparison with other regional institutions; 1) participation was universal, including all European states and two key North American countries; 2) it played a major role in redefining security throughout the last 15 years of the Cold War, while other institutions such as NATO and the Western European Union operated primarily within a bipolar framework; 3) its comprehensive definition of security linked human rights, self determination of peoples, humanitarian assistance, and economic and envi-

ronmental issues to the traditional military-political dimension that had been central to Cold War conceptualizations of security

However, the post-Cold War situation also created new challenges for peace and security in the region. In particular, the break-up of major multinational states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, left in its wake a number of secessionist and ethno-national conflicts that threatened the peace and security of the entire region. Therefore, the CSCE developed a set of concrete measures to promote “comprehensive security,” while also preventing or resolving potentially violent conflicts at the earliest possible stage on the assumption that the outbreak of violence would seriously impede progress towards resolving pre-existing conflicts.

In response to this outbreak of violence, the CSCE created in 1992 perhaps its two most innovative features: the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and “missions of long duration” under the auspices of the Conflict Prevention Centre. The participating states granted the HCNM authority to investigate incipient conflicts involving persons belonging to national minorities and to provide early warning to the CSCE of conditions that might endanger the peace. Similarly, the OSCE has thus far created 28 long-term missions to regions of Eastern, Southeastern, and Northeastern Europe, 19 of which are currently in the field. These OSCE missions sometimes entered when violence threatened to break out, or when it was ongoing, or after fighting had died down. In all cases, the long-term, continuous presence of a mission on the ground facilitates increased knowledge by its members of the specific issues at stake in each region and an opportunity to engage in quiet diplomacy to effect change and to head off, limit, and resolve violent conflict.

Measures to Prevent Conflict and Enhance Security in Europe

Through years of working on the ground to promote cooperative security regionally, the OSCE has developed and employed a range of methodologies. Many were intended to improve the psychological cli-

mate of security, especially the reduction of uncertainty about the intentions of opposing parties, which is often a source of conflict.

Transparency Measures

Among the first measures adopted by the CSCE were those intended to enhance transparency and communications between hostile parties. These measures were largely political and psychological in nature, designed to reduce mistrust and especially fear of surprise attack. The classic transparency measure in Europe was the provision, first established in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, for advance notification of military maneuvers with invitation of foreign observers to monitor them in order to distinguish between routine and provocative military activities. Therefore, the goal of so-called "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) was to assure all parties that routine military exercises were just that and nothing more. Although initially greeted with some skepticism, the system worked effectively and became routinized; fears that the presence of foreign observers at routine military activities would undermine a country's fundamental security interests have all but disappeared. In the event that suspicious events occurred without prior announcement, the transparency regime could provide early warning of an impending attack. Diplomacy could then be engaged immediately to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; even if that failed, the victim would have advance warning of impending aggression and an opportunity to take countermeasures rather than being caught by surprise.

Other kinds of transparency measures have also been developed, including the Open Skies Treaty; this permits an annual quota of flights by unarmed aircraft equipped with sensors over the territory of other signatory states. Similarly, the ongoing security dialogue in the Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna has included on its agenda discussion of a wide range of issues to improve confidence and reduce security dilemmas in situations of potential conflict.

As a result of the transparency measures, force levels, activities, and future military plans of all OSCE states are now quite widely known and discussed throughout the entire region. Although there is some

loss of military secrecy, on the whole the results have been beneficial for security-building. Defense planning no longer needs to be based on exaggerated fears of potential opponents that is endemic to “worst case planning,” but rather can be based on a realistic and shared understanding of the military potential and plans of other states. This reduction of uncertainty reduces the likelihood of war as a consequence of miscalculation, misperception, or misunderstanding of the actions and intentions of other states. This goes a long way towards breaking the spiral of escalating hostility and military preparations that characterize the security dilemma and replaces it with military planning based on the belief that security is indivisible. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the transparency measures adopted in Europe over the past 32 years has been its impact on how leaders and publics think about their security. There has been a substantial transformation of the very concept of security away from a belief in balance of power, alliance politics and zero-sum conflicts towards a positive-sum, integrative view of security. Such rethinking of security makes it possible to move from a security dilemma toward a security regime.

Constraints on Provocative Activities

Measures of constraint fill the gap between political/psychological actions and “hard” arms control, since they involve specific limitations on certain kinds of military activities. However, they are usually distinguished from traditional arms control in that they do not formally limit or require reductions of the quantity or quality of any specific component of the force structure. The most widely cited examples of constraints tend to come from the direct US-Soviet (later Russian) agreements such as those on “incidents at sea.” These agreements generally create military codes of conduct designed to avert provocative behaviors or dangerous actions that might unintentionally set off a more severe confrontation. They may be accompanied by consultation and crisis management provisions to enable the parties to avert escalation in the event that a provocative or dangerous action does occur. These kinds of measures are most valuable in situations where opposing mili-

tary forces operate in close proximity to one another, such as at sea. For this reason, similar measures might be even more useful in the Western Pacific region than on the European continent.

Observation and Early Warning

One of the areas in which the OSCE has been most involved in the post-Cold War period is in early warning and timely assistance in conditions of potential violence. Responsibility for these activities has fallen primarily to the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), created at the 1992 Helsinki Summit, working closely with the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Threats to the security of persons belonging to minorities became especially salient in the post-Cold War context in Europe in the unsettled environment after the breakup of two major states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the CSCE created the office of the HCNM to "provide 'early warning' and, as appropriate, 'early action', at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area affecting peace, stability, or relations between participating States."⁴ The High Commissioner operates independently, may conduct on-site missions to any CSCE state, and may engage in preventive diplomacy among disputants at early stages in a conflict. This may include efforts to promote cooperation and confidence and to reduce mistrust among the parties. When these tensions appear likely to turn violent, and when the means at the disposal of the High Commissioner are no longer adequate to contain them, he is empowered to give "early warning" to the OSCE Permanent Council.

The success of the kind of preventive diplomacy undertaken by the High Commissioner depends on his ability to engage the disputing parties in confidential negotiations. He has free access to all participating states, and he has tried to minimize any stigma that might be attached to his involvement in any particular venue. The effectiveness

⁴ CSCE, "Helsinki Decisions," July 7, 1992, p. 4.

of his mediating role is based largely on the confidence in him granted by the OSCE's major institutions and participating states and on his ability to avoid publicity regarding his activities. Most often the High Commissioner has quietly encouraged countries to modify laws and practices dealing with the rights of persons belonging to minorities or with the status of regions within the country where national minorities constitute a local majority and these are often adopted without specific reference by governments to his role. He tries to persuade states rather than to pressure them, recognizing that solutions to problems will only endure if they are based on the consent and reflect the interests of the parties themselves. He has sought to institutionalize mechanisms in each country for dialogue between the government and persons belonging to minorities.

Third Party Roles in Conflict Prevention and Resolution

Diplomacy in the form of direct third party intervention to try to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts falls mostly to the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), although at times the Secretary-General, Chair-in-Office, or other senior officials may fulfill this function. The Conflict Prevention Centre was one of the major innovations in European security introduced at the Paris Summit. The Centre is responsible for collecting data and exchanging information as called for in the various CSBM agreements from Helsinki in 1975, Stockholm in 1986 and Vienna in 1990, most recently updated at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999. Recently the OSCE has also created a registry to track the flow of light weapons and small arms across international borders. It is also empowered to send fact-finding missions to troubled regions and to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It has initiated seminars on topics such as military doctrine, in which ideas about perceived security requirements are exchanged to promote greater understanding and respect for the legitimate security needs of one another.

In part as a consequence of the appearance of violence in several parts of Europe in the first years after the end of the Cold War, the functions assigned to the Conflict Prevention Centre grew rapidly.

Beginning in September 1992, the CSCE began sending out long-term missions to sites of potential or actual conflict. To date, there have been twenty-eight missions with a wide variety of mandates sent into the field; while nine of these have been closed, 19 remain active. These missions are always based on an agreed memorandum of understanding negotiated between the OSCE and the government of the state where they are stationed. The ultimate decision to accept a field mission depends on the willingness of the government to cooperate, believing that in the long run the OSCE's presence will serve their own national interests in preventing and resolving potential internal conflicts, facilitating economic growth, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens and of other states within the region. The varied tasks of the missions have been focused on issues such as the development of good governance to promote peaceful relations among states (e.g., Estonia and Latvia), preventive diplomacy in conditions of unstable peace to avert escalation across the threshold of violence (e.g., Macedonia and Ukraine), mediation of on-going violent conflicts (e.g., Chechnya in 1995-96), resolution of underlying conflicts in the aftermath of violence (e.g., Moldova, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh), and long-term, peace and security-building in regions that had previously experienced high levels of violence (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo).

The European Experience in Preventive Diplomacy

The nature of European efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy have changed a great deal over the past 30 years, mostly due to the significant change in the European security environment brought about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Prior to 1989 most of the CSCE's attention was devoted to specific measures to reduce tensions, to build confidence, and especially to prevent the outbreak of accidental or unintended war in Europe. The principal focus was on government-to-government relations. Transparency measures and constraints were given highest priority to create a climate in which expectations regarding the likelihood of war would be lowered and confidence in the

peaceful intentions of other states could be strengthened. Indeed, the very negotiation of the transparency and constraint measures, along with more traditional arms control negotiations, became a critical channel for communication and negotiation between adversaries. Not only were specific agreements negotiated, but knowledge about one another's perceptions of threat, sources of fears and insecurity, and needs for mutual rather than competitive security became more widely understood and shared on both sides of the Cold War divide. In short, the *process of negotiating and implementing* CSBMs and arms control itself became a crucial learning mechanism, which was likely more important in the eventual change in the European security system than any of the specific measures actually negotiated. The very *idea* of transparency undermined many of the essential premises of Cold War security.

The end of the Cold War changed the entire European security *problematique* and that required a very different kind of security regime. Therefore, an adjustment of the European security order was required, with a corresponding modification of the institutional framework. For a time, the European Union appeared to be an attractive candidate due to the widespread appeal throughout Eurasia of its economic success, but it lacked experience and competence in the security field. NATO tried to remake itself as an institution capable of acting on the larger European stage, but, in spite of some success with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, it had difficulty shaking off its image as a military organization that constituted the core of one of the Cold War military blocs. This left it to the OSCE, with very limited resources, no institutional structure prior to 1991, and a very limited mandate, to fill the gap. It has done so largely by creating and expanding significantly its capacity to engage in conflict prevention and security-building. Although "back channel" and "track two" diplomacy have been around for a long time and have long been utilized in many parts of the world, the OSCE represents one of the first attempts to institutionalize these functions on a regional basis.

Tentative Lessons from the European Experience

The European experience in continuous, continent-wide preventive diplomacy and security-building is still recent, but the results thus far are encouraging. Any lessons drawn from the European experience in cooperative security to be applied elsewhere must take account of several considerations. The nature of the conflicts in Europe is frequently different from other regions. Prior to 1989 the conflicts centered on Cold War divisions, and thus were not all that dissimilar from some of the potential inter-state conflicts in the Western Pacific. After the Cold War, Europe's attention shifted to issues arising from the collapse and reconfiguration of traditional state structures, and its experience since 1991 perhaps has less in common with the current situation in East Asia. Finally, cultural differences between Europe and Asia may mean that mechanisms that work in one context may not be relevant in the other. Analysts must be sensitive to different ways of responding to conflicts in diverse cultural settings before applying lessons too rigidly from one context to another.

With these caveats in mind, I shall propose eight propositions that may be derived from the European experience that are potentially relevant to East Asian cooperative security:

#1: The timing of the creation of regional security institutions is important. Preventive diplomacy and security-building measures must be seen as part of the overall political relationship within a region. It is generally easier to manage conflicts before they become violent than it is to resolve them once they have crossed the threshold of violence. There is no substitute for early warning about potential conflicts reaching high level political decision-makers and for early and decisive intervention into potential conflict situations before they have escalated beyond the "point of no return." Furthermore, it is easier to create and strengthen conflict management processes when conflict is less severe (e.g., during periods of detente), so that mechanisms may be available if conflict becomes more intense. It is far more difficult to create new conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms in times of crisis. In addition, the very process of creating and institutionalizing measures

to prevent conflict may help to ameliorate the underlying security dilemmas and thereby contribute to long-term security-building.

#2: The process of building security must be viewed as a long-term effort that is best pursued one step at a time. At the outset, simple, easily negotiated measures may be adopted and applied in order to enlarge confidence in the process. Then over time more complex and binding measures may be negotiated. The emphasis should first be to build confidence so that participating states learn that they can trust others to abide by agreements that serve mutual interests; thus stable expectations of reciprocity may evolve. Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances as the security environment changes is key to the successful development of regional security institutions.

#3: Transparency is one of the simplest, least threatening, most easily understood and most readily negotiable measures that also contribute significantly to security and confidence. Therefore, measures that facilitate openness are useful first steps in security-building. Secrecy detracts from security by creating uncertainty and suspicions about the intentions of others. Secrecy stimulates a response on the part of potential enemies, typically based upon "worst case scenarios" when capabilities or intentions of one's potential opponent are unknown; it is easy to assume the worst. One party's preparations for the worst case will likely threaten other parties, and this vicious cycle of mutual mistrust often contributes to a security dilemma and reciprocal escalation of tensions. Alternatively, as states gain confidence about the intentions of others, the security dilemma may be broken and the foundation laid for a broader security regime. The evolution of the present security regime in Europe would probably not be as well developed as it is today had it not been for the adoption of transparency measures at Helsinki over 30 years ago.

#4: Constraints may be especially valuable in the absence of other more significant measures of "hard" arms control. Constraints may be applied to troop deployments (including the creation of demilitarized zones), to the peacetime activities of military forces (such as restricting the frequency and size of maneuvers and troop movements or testing of particular weapons), and to the kinds of equipment armies deploy or

utilize in exercises (particularly equipment of an especially offensive nature). Constraints may also include measures to reduce the risk of accidental encounters that might entail a risk of escalation. In potential regions of tension such as the Taiwan Straits or between a nuclear-armed North Korea and its neighbors, such measures might reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent violence.

#5: Preventive diplomacy usually is best undertaken by a third party, especially when that third party is a multilateral institution in which the parties to the conflict participate. All parties to the conflict must perceive the legitimacy of the third party, its fairness as an intermediary, and its capacity to provide credible guarantees that the provisions of an agreement will actually be implemented. A third party can provide “good offices,” conciliation, mediation, or even arbitration of disputes, as well as even-handed verification and enforcement if required by an agreement. Generally third party mediated agreements are likely to be reached more rapidly, be perceived as fairer, and be more readily implemented over the long run than those arrived at through direct negotiations among the parties to a dispute.

#6: Security cooperation is most likely to be effective when the mechanisms for its conduct have been institutionalized. In Europe, the institutionalization of the OSCE included assent by all participating states to a set of principles and norms to guide their behavior. When the states in a region reach a consensus that one or more participants are not abiding by those norms, the normative principles legitimize appropriate action by that institution to which the state parties have voluntarily associated. Indeed, the mere existence of the institution means that all parties to a dispute know that a third party is available to which they can refer their dispute at an early stage. Furthermore, institutionalized third parties may provide incentives for peaceful resolution, and tradeoffs may be identified across issues not directly part of the dispute, due to the linked issues that typically occupy the agendas of multilateral institutions.

#7: Multilateral institutions in the present international system depend heavily on the commitment and leadership of key states if they are to act decisively. Regional institutions like the OSCE have few

resources of their own. States supply budgets and personnel, to say nothing of military forces that may be required to implement decisions. Psychologically, multilateral efforts at preventive diplomacy will tend to be taken seriously by parties to a dispute only if they see leading states in the region actively engaged.

#8: The task of creating zones of peace is a long-term process and cannot be the result of any single decision or of the creation of any single institution. Ultimately, peace will appear when states are open, represent the freely expressed will of their peoples, follow the rule of law both domestically and in their dealings with others internationally, and institutionalize processes to prevent violence and to resolve conflicts among themselves peacefully.

Conclusion

Whether these broad lessons provide any useful guidance for governments and institutions in the Western Pacific remains to be seen. The region currently lacks the institutionalized mechanisms such as those provided in Europe by the OSCE, although the nongovernmental Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific clearly represents a step in that direction. Some may feel that it is premature to consider the creation of a true intergovernmental security organization at this time in the Western Pacific. However, the overwhelming conclusion from this examination of the European case is that an institutionalized multilateral security regime, such as that provided by the OSCE, can make a valuable contribution to the development of conflict prevention and security-building in a region long before all of the region's conflicts have been settled.

In other words, an end to hostilities is not, and should not be, a prerequisite to the creation of institutions for cooperative security. Indeed, if there were no conflicts, there would be no need for such an institution. What is required is a joint recognition by all parties that conflict, even war, is possible and, if it occurs, is likely to produce results that will be detrimental for all parties. Institutions of cooperative security

are not intended, and are unlikely to be successful, to stop a determined aggressor. But they can play an invaluable role in preventing the outbreak of conflicts and wars that nobody wants and where everybody loses. It would be tragic if the East Asian region were to tarry in the construction of more effective institutions for conflict prevention and security-building, waiting until the "time is ripe." The risk of such delay is that conflict may break out while diplomats, national leaders, and politicians are waiting for conditions to ripen, and that conflict may undermine future efforts to create even minimal cooperative security institutions in the Western Pacific.

Regional Cooperation and Regional Organizations in the 21st Century

Frances Mautner-Markhof

What is the role of regional cooperation and regional organizations in the 21st century and how could an understanding of the characteristics and requirements of multilateral mechanisms facilitate their creation, management and survival? This presentation seeks to answer these questions and to suggest why, in the 21st century, states will increasingly find it in their interests to create, participate in and support regional cooperation and multilateral organizations. Multilateral mechanisms and organizations are the result, among other things, of the political/security environment, political will and the pursuit of individual and collective interests. To ensure the dynamic stability of such cooperative mechanisms, it is useful to understand some of their basic characteristics, requirements and challenges as evolving complex systems, as well as their regional and global environments. This will also help identify the need for new, more effective capabilities on the part of the systems and also of their leadership and management. All of this is necessary to deal with the key issues, crises and threats of the 21st century, including the control of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and the associated networks/ activities of organized crime.

Introduction

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Evolution of Cooperation and Connectedness

The environment of complex systems is characterized by an increase in the quantity and quality of connections. I refer to this as 'connectedness.' Connectedness exists at all levels: local, national, regional, global. It includes, but is more than, interdependence. Multilateralism is evolving because, among other things, the concept of connectedness is evolving. From the imperative of empire we have arrived at the necessity of cooperation, in the form of a cooperative association of sovereign entities, joined by the pursuit of common interests rather than pursuit of power or control. Nation-states are characterized by connectedness — national identity, traditions and culture. Networks result from the creation of new forms of connectedness. Globalism has emerged as another manifestation of connectedness. Multilateral organizations represent a special form of connectedness. The world of the 21st century and the latter part of the 20th century has been characterized as a global world, a result of the effects of increasing globalization.

But globalization has not made the world flat. The world is complex, connected and changing. Previous centuries already experienced global trade, communication and movements. What distinguishes the 21st century is related to the new technological and other capabilities to overcome the limitations of space and time, namely global reach and impacts, instantaneous transmission of information and ideas, and new and constantly evolving networks. These are, among other things, characteristics of evolving complex systems.

Globalization has permitted the development of international systems for trade, finance, media, research, the international system (or regime) for nuclear nonproliferation, and, indeed, the international system of terrorism. Globalism is certainly characterized by the connectedness and interdependence of its component parts. Unregulated globalization is a great leveler of values, identities and societies. Only in this sense could one assert that 'the world is flat.' As far as the widening impacts of globalization, people are not, nor do they want to be considered to be, primarily consumers. They identify themselves and are connected with their local communities and ultimately with a state, not with a borderless world or market. They do not want to live in an economy but rather in a society / community, with its unique political, social and cultural characteristics. This is an essential manifestation of the power of connectedness and localism. In this sense, one may consider that all globalization is local, having local impacts, manifestations and reactions.

International and Regional Systems

The post-World War II order saw the creation of a number of international organization regimes, which have functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. It can be argued that at the present time the perceived need and tendency is in the direction of multilateral regional mechanisms, which complement and support these international regimes, helping them to achieve their original goals both regionally and globally. The EU and OSCE are examples of this, as are the nuclear weapons free zones and free trade agreements in vari-

ous regions. In this connection, we may now be in a period where security threats, trade and other issues, while having an important global component and impact, are primarily perceived regionally, as regional issues and threats, to be dealt with in the first instance on a regional basis. We may then consider that a global or international system is or can be built up from a combination of regional subsystems. If successful, the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts.

Regional proximity and connections have often provided a basis not only for cooperation but also for conflict. Both stem *inter alia* from the inherent connectedness of the countries and peoples in the region, which can lead to both common and conflicting interests. Until recently, the main driving force of nation-states has been the acquiring of military and economic power in order to prevail. Many states and leaders still see this as the *sine qua non* of sovereignty. However, after the experience of centuries of innumerable wars, including two devastating world wars, Europe tried a new approach, and succeeded. Through cooperative regional mechanisms, states were able to pursue national and higher-level interests and options unavailable to any individual state. And this was accomplished without the use of force, without creating dangerous instabilities and threats. The prime motive for European regional cooperation was political stability and security. It has exceeded all expectations, and has led to an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity.

Elsewhere, powerful states which consider themselves in possession of the capability to achieve national interests unilaterally, now acknowledge that cooperation is necessary to deal with both traditional and non-traditional threats and conflicts. This has been a clear and direct acknowledgement of the connectedness of states' interests and threats, and of the need to go to the higher level of regional and ultimately global cooperation to maintain stability and security. Thus, nation-states, no matter how powerful, acting alone, are no longer in the position to achieve and defend unilaterally all of their interests or to deal with an increasingly broad spectrum of present and future threats and instabilities. This places important limits on unilateralism. States, exercising their sovereignty to achieve a higher level of cooperation

and organization, thus gain options and benefits that would not be possible on an individual basis. Political will leading to a cooperative and creative use of sovereignty in certain issue areas can, therefore, achieve a far greater impact and deal with far larger issues than any sovereign state acting on its own. Globalism and the increasing awareness of connectedness on the regional and global levels have made this even more apparent.

Key questions are, therefore, how can a multilateral regional mechanism or organization be created to serve the interests of and create options for individual participating states, which no state acting on its own could do? How could such regional mechanisms, taken together, achieve a more robust global equilibrium and order?

Political Will and the Evolution of Sovereignty

Since political will is intimately involved with sovereignty, it is important and relevant to look at the OSCE and EU experiences in terms of sovereignty, or what may be called the creative and cooperative use of sovereignty. The issues surrounding the concept of political will and sovereignty, in particular, the equal and inviolable traditional sovereignty of nation-states runs throughout all discussions and negotiations regarding the creation and functioning of cooperative multilateral mechanisms/organizations, especially in the security area. In connection with this it is important to note that in the CSCE/OSCE as well as in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in contrast to matters concerning EU economic integration, decisions are taken on the basis of consensus; with very few exceptions. Decisions are thus directly related to and dependent on the creative and cooperative exercise of sovereignty to agree to politically binding measures and obligations which bring forward the process of enhancing transparency, confidence and security. In exercising sovereignty and demonstrating political will in a timely manner, states can create a mechanism which itself becomes an example of preventive and proactive diplomacy, trust and confidence-building. This represents an evolution in the concept of sovereignty since the mid-17th century

Treaty of Westphalia.

Preserving the prerogatives of sovereignty, and national identity, is seen as a vital interest. Thus arises, for some states, a zero-sum game between sovereignty and multilateral cooperation. While an imposed or perceived diminution of sovereignty (political, economic, cultural) with no net benefits can foster extreme reactions which can become destabilizing not only for a country but for an entire region and, by extrapolation, globally, a cooperative use of sovereignty can lead to the creation of a higher-level of organization which provides far more benefits and options for security and development than an individual state could have. The sovereignty which came to many countries with the end of colonialism, communism and other types of imposed control is guarded jealously and seen as an absolute good in and of itself. While certain former communist countries have seen their interests far better served by exchanging some of their sovereignty for the far greater benefits of EU membership, other states, not only newly independent states, have in general been unwilling or unable to accept that, as Raymond Vernon once said, "one of the most important things you can do with sovereignty is to negotiate a part of it away on favorable terms."¹ This was exactly the basis on which the EU was founded.

In connection with the diminution of sovereignty, there is increasing tension between the mostly unregulated effects of globalization and the ability of individual states to take and implement national economic and political decisions. The main impact of globalization on the nation-state is both the real and the potential loss of power and identity. Globalization thus represents the most serious challenge to sovereignty.

Multilateral Mechanisms and Organizations as Complex Systems

Looking at multilateral mechanisms/organizations as complex systems provides a useful working conceptual basis for understanding, creating and managing such mechanisms and organizations. Evolving,

¹ Raymond Vernon: *International Economics Lectures*, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1980.

self-organizing and self-regulating complex systems are found at every level of the political, economic, social and physical/biological spheres. The relevant main characteristics of such systems are:

- The system is dependent on a continuous input of resources from its environment. Order can be maintained only by the input of order-producing resources (such as energy and information).
- Communication, regulatory and feedback mechanisms are needed to utilize effectively the input from the environment to combat potential crises/perturbations (from inside the system or from its environment) and maintain the dynamic stability of the system.
- Information exchange, evaluation and feedback processes — as well as innovation and adaptability — are essential for the functioning of the system and are key aspects of the process of self-regulation and self-organization.
- Whether and how the system maintains its dynamic stability and the capability to evolve to higher levels of organization will depend on its ability to utilize information and other resources to develop options balanced by suitable constraints or regulation, in order to deal with the inherent chaos, unpredictability and uncontrollability of the system. Options here can be generally associated with the degree of diversity and possibilities, while constraints are associated with regulation or redundancy.
- Organization is thus both a state and a process. It is at the critical or branching points that the system either disintegrates or evolves via structural and other changes (through adaptation and innovation) to a higher level of order.

The development and survival of such systems is concerned with maintaining those basic elements which constitute the essence and identity of the system, including characteristic patterns, principles, values, goals, essential components and behavior. Dynamic complex systems demonstrate, among other things, chaotic behavior which can result in instabilities and disorder. Depending on the capability to deal with this, such disorder can, but need not, lead to a new kind of order. This is the idea of 'order out of chaos.' In this connection it must be kept in mind that complex systems do not necessarily survive, in fact

most do not. They can disintegrate or be destroyed — history and nature are full of such systems.

Butterfly Effect

A critical characteristic of complex, self-organizing systems is the so-called 'butterfly effect,' a result of the susceptibility of such systems to chaotic behavior. The term originated in the application of chaos theory to complex systems in the field of meteorology. The butterfly effect refers to how arbitrarily small uncertainties in the knowledge about or in changes to a system at any point (e.g. at the outset of a process) can become magnified and lead to arbitrarily large, unpredictable, uncontrollable effects and changes in the behavior of the system. Thus, small disturbances, or some deficit in key information or understanding of the system, can lead to large, uncontrollable and unpredictable results, often associated with the law of unintended consequences. The butterfly effect is closely related to Clausewitz' fog of war, and affects all other types of complex systems.

With the global span of near instantaneous communications and other networks, the butterfly effect has a large and growing impact on systems for global and regional security, trade, finance, transport and other systems. It is thus unavoidable that it will play an important role in dealing with the increasing traditional and non-traditional security threats. Thus decisions and actions — and their results and consequences — must take this behavior of complex systems into account.

Role of Cooperation in Complex Systems

A system's capability to respond to actual and potential threats and instabilities depends on its being able to achieve, through adaptability, innovation and cooperation, new options and a continuously changing, optimal balance between the options and constraints for its component parts. Through cooperation, new possibilities or options can be created and agreed to that would otherwise not exist. Here one can associate options with degree of possibilities or diversity in the system, for exam-

ple, with the unfettered exercise of sovereignty or freedoms in a society — and constraints or regulations with negotiating away a (small) part of sovereignty on favorable terms, for example, to achieve binding rules and agreements on the control and elimination of WMD (including the necessary information acquisition and exchange, transparency, verification and control). Resources can be made available on a cooperative basis that would not be available otherwise. Thus, multilateral cooperation can lead to the realization of a higher and more effective level of organization with more and better capabilities for innovation, adaptation and development.

Cooperation, however, plays yet another important role: Options which are imposed, rather than being cooperatively devised and agreed, are neither perceived nor accepted as options but rather as constraints, with the corresponding reactions, rejection and potential for instability. That is, if a situation exists in any functioning multilateral system whereby one state or a group of states regularly impose options or constraints, this will sooner or later result in real or potential crises, conflicts and destabilization of the system. Thus, multilateral cooperation is in itself an option for, and complementary to other types of, political order in the 21st century, offering new possibilities for systemic stability, crisis management and prevention, as well as for pursuing the individual interests of its participating states and of the group of states as a whole.

Despite the importance attached by some states to capabilities for unilateral action and for the use of force in an attempt to realize national policies and achieve national interests, cooperative behavior is not, nor need be, an option of last resort. On the contrary, it should be seen as the first option for dealing with real and potential crises and threats, for creating and enhancing transparency and trust, and for upholding and implementing agreed principles and values. Active cooperation, involving many elements, has a solid basis in *realpolitik* and provides the broad and binding support needed to achieve dynamic stability. *Realpolitik* also acknowledges the need for capabilities to defend vital interests by the threat or use of force as an option of last resort. Multilateral regional organizations (such as the OSCE, EU)

must be on the forefront of developing and supporting a new regional and global order with the associated cooperation and capabilities. All of this places new requirements on the leadership and management of such organizations.

Management of Complex Systems: Certainty of Response Instead of Certainty of Outcomes

Management of complex systems requires new approaches and capabilities. Complex systems encountered in the real world are subject to uncertainty, uncontrollability, surprise and chaos. Therefore, while desirable or acceptable outcomes in an event or crisis can be identified and strived for, certainty of outcomes is not even theoretically possible. One is forced to deal with too many uncontrollable and indeed unknowable factors. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to try to achieve desired/acceptable outcomes or goals through attaining a 'certainty of response.' By 'certainty of response' is meant that the complex system, its component parts and those responsible for managing or guiding these, must develop and possess the principles, processes and capabilities to:

- Anticipate and recognize potential threats/instabilities in the system and its environment
- Anticipate and take pro-active measures for, rather than simply reacting to, events, developments and risks
- Anticipate possible as well as likely outcomes of decisions and actions
- Deal with uncertainty, surprise, chaos — as the 'normal' state of affairs — on a timely basis
- Innovate and cooperate in order to develop the necessary options, policies and strategies in response to threats and actual/potential instabilities
- Balance options, where needed, by new constraints, self-regulation and rules

Certainty of response is a fundamental requirement for the effective management and dynamic stability of a self-organizing and self-regu-

lating complex system. Capabilities of response involve a new role and importance for information, communication, innovation, adaptability and cooperation. Thus, managing complex systems places new demands on the qualifications of individuals and leaders, and on the requirements for the development of political, economic, security and regional systems. Understanding and guiding a complex system thus requires something more, a new 'standpoint for seeing and judging events,'² a new concept or paradigm, in order to deal with the realities, environments and challenges of the 21st century.

Relevance of the OSCE and EU Experiences for Other Regions

In Europe there is now a relatively long history and experience regarding multilateralism and regional cooperation, which has been on balance very positive and successful, serving the interests of the individual member states and the group of states, while providing benefits and options that no country alone could have achieved. These organizations have enhanced the stability, security and prosperity of their members and of the region. The experience of European multilateral organizations is thus useful and relevant for other regions. It is important to remember that the OSCE and the EU were created to achieve and enhance political stability and security and were initially concerned with institution-building. The early phases of the OSCE were concerned with ways and means to foster peaceful co-existence and diminish threats and threat perceptions. The post-World War II EU project was basically a political project to ensure that armed conflict would not again occur in Europe. The objectives of this political project were approached and achieved primarily but not only through economic integration. Now, the EU has an increasingly active foreign and security policy.

A relevant part of EU experience for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia concerns the nascent EU process for agreeing on and

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Editors/Translators M. Howard, P. Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 606.

implementing its common foreign and security policy, whereby much has already been achieved, through unanimity, with little or no relinquishing of sovereignty (in contrast to EU economic integration). In the areas of foreign policy, security and defense the EU member states have given up and want to give up little if any sovereignty, yet have managed to agree on an EU rapid reaction force and defense agency as well as other common initiatives. But there is a long way to go. The fact that the Cold War environment is past and former communist countries are now EU members makes cooperation easier, yet these issues are still very sensitive and closely guarded, again because they are associated with sovereignty. While peaceful co-existence is no longer an issue for the EU member states, cooperation (and a cooperative pooling of sovereignty) to institutionalize a common approach to security is.

The Helsinki process leading up to the Helsinki Final Act involved negotiations that were, at that time, among states associated with opposing blocs, systems and values, and they succeeded because the prevailing political environment in that period, political will and perceived benefits to each state involved. The success of CSCE/OSCE and other forms of regional cooperation depends on recognizing that the process of realizing an effective multilateral cooperation mechanism is not a zero-sum game — what increases the security of one country need not diminish the security of others, on the contrary. The Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent achievements of the CSCE/OSCE — including its comprehensive security concept — show how necessary political will and active cooperation are if multilateralism is to succeed.

This is a period of transition for many regional and international organizations, and the OSCE and EU are no exceptions. New environments, new issues, new challenges and opportunities, but also criticism, must be dealt with innovatively and flexibly while maintaining the agreed principles, values and aims on which these organizations were founded. The OSCE and EU are important examples of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts, and of the importance of regionalism and cooperation to achieve stability, security and development in an increasingly globalized and competitive world.

Implications for Creating and Maintaining Multilateral Cooperation Mechanisms and Organizations

The idea of institutionalized multilateral regional cooperation in East Asia is not new, but one whose time may now have come. A multilateral institution cannot be created in times of crisis, and it is thus essential to have such a mechanism in place before serious crises become imminent and unmanageable. The historical, political and economic development of states in the region has reached a point where they perceive their interests to lie not only in a multipolar balance or in specific security arrangements but also in multilateral cooperation on a regional basis, which is required to address issues affecting individual states and the region generally. A stronger trend towards multilateralism and international cooperation in the region appeared in the East Asian region starting at the end of the last century, brought about not only by new political policies and aims, economic prosperity, and increasing non-traditional threats to security and stability but also by the Asian financial crises. Policies for new or enhanced cooperation focus on the economic/financial, political, security (both traditional and non-traditional), environmental, energy and cultural areas. This reflects *inter alia* the awareness that there are critical issues and challenges which no country, no matter how large or powerful, can deal with on its own, and on which it is in the interests of sovereign states to cooperate.

Initial steps towards multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia could include a roadmap for institutionalizing multilateral security cooperation in the region through gradual steps which could include agreeing on measures to enhance transparency, trust and confidence. Understanding the political motivations, environment and processes leading to agreement on the HFA, as well as the HFA itself, are of special relevance for institutionalizing a cooperative security mechanism in Northeast Asia. The three key areas or baskets of the HFA could find counterparts in such a cooperative multilateral mechanism. For example, one key area could address important traditional and non-traditional security-related issues, above all the North Korean nuclear issue

and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but also transborder issues and threats; a second key area could build upon the already intensive and extensive cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries in economic areas (trade, investment, finance) as well as cooperation on energy and environmental issues; and the third key area could focus on identifying fundamental principles, common interests and bridge-building. The content of these key areas could develop in time and in parallel. Cross-cutting issues would include all measures which contribute to trust, stability, security and development. Thus, regional cooperation and organizations can provide the basis and framework for, among other things:

- Defining and agreeing on fundamental principles, aims and values
- Bridge-building among states with different histories, cultures, perceptions and systems
- Regular, constructive dialogue and discussion
- Developing options to deal with traditional and non-traditional security threats and other issues of common interest
- Agreeing on requirements and conditions for ensuring the stability/development of the multilateral mechanism/organization, including, i.a., self-regulation, and of the region
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Crisis and conflict anticipation, prevention, management
- Flexible and practical CSBMs to enhance transparency, trust and security: for example, measures for enhancing mutual understanding and correcting misperceptions; constraints on provocative activities
- Joint risk and threat assessment
- Timely and sufficient information exchanges
- Identifying relevant and useful negotiating techniques and methodologies
- Clearinghouse functions
- Humanitarian assistance
- Links with other regional and international organizations
- Pursuing interests by and for all members

Another example of how regional cooperation can enhance not only regional but international security and stability is the creation of

nuclear weapons free zones, in various regions (Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, South Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia). This is a crucial issue for Northeast Asia and a goal which, with hard work and political will, could be attainable. Here again one encounters an example of global issues being addressed and, it is to be hoped, solved on the local and regional levels.

Concluding Remarks

While acquiring and maintaining adequate military capability to counter threats and defend vital interests is clearly necessary, it is not sufficient. Achieving a sustainable global order will demand more than this. A functioning system of regional or global order has to be based on agreed principles and aims; on moderation, not imperial overreach; on sufficient mutual respect and advantage; and on cooperation to deal with threats to stability and ensure survival and development. Force should in principle be the option of last resort. Power in its various forms is related to, and necessary to support, many options and constraints. But, ultimately, the survival and endurance of any complex system will be based not simply on power but on the capability to recognize and cope with the ever-changing environment, conditions and actual/potential instabilities which threaten the essential patterns and processes of the system both from within and without. Evolving systems and order, whether on the regional or global level, will prove to be defined and maintained not primarily by force but by basic principles, values and cooperation.

Gibbon, in his great work, *"The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,"* an empire which was the forerunner and determined many of the present political structures and issues, and from whose history much can be learned, provided a unique record and analysis of the important patterns, processes and events associated with the Roman empire, identifying particularly those factors, threats and instabilities which led or contributed to the demise of one of the great civilizations. He concludes that the Roman empire, while always suscepti-

ble to attacks and disturbances from without, basically crumbled from within, because those principles, capabilities, characteristics and resources of the empire and its people, from which it had drawn its strength, were gradually diminished, changed or destroyed.

He put great emphasis on the important role played by the spirit of the people, and the loss thereof, and on the continual and dangerous breakdown of the authority and rule of law. The empire had lost the necessary ability to comprehend and deal with the nature, sources and magnitude of the changes, threats and instabilities to which it was continuously subjected. It failed to maintain sufficient resources and necessary capabilities for *inter alia* adaptation, innovation and evolution — all required to preserve those principles, patterns and processes which constituted its unique identity. It had lost its ability to evolve through self-organization. For Gibbon, “the Decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness.”³ In history there are no straight lines, but there are patterns, and from these patterns it is possible to learn and to understand what can and should endure, and how such endurance could be achieved.

³ Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: J.M Dent & Sons Ltd., 1974), Vol. 4, p. 105.



**PART
VII**

*Shaping Peace and Community
in Northeast Asia:
Burning Issues and the New Agenda*

The US and Peace in Northeast Asia:
Historical Burdens and New Visions

China's Peaceful Development and Implications for Regional
Community Building

Nine Insights to Cope with the North Korean Nuclear Dilemma:
A South Korean Perspective

Japan as a Normal State and Implications for Asian Diplomacy

The US and Peace in Northeast Asia: Historical Burdens and New Visions

Gerald L. Curtis

There is neither the likelihood nor the need for a new security architecture in East Asia. The US centered hub and spokes structure supplemented by regional groupings such as ASEAN plus 3, APEC, the East Asia Summit and so on provide the necessary framework for peace and stability in the region. The challenge to the next US President is not to innovate a new architecture but to give the region the attention it deserves when one considers the importance of East Asia to US national interests. Sadly, however, there is no sign that any of the presidential candidates is giving much thought to East Asia beyond worrying out loud about China's growing military and economic power. In East Asia the keyword for US policy should be action, not architecture.

I am not sure what historical burdens the conference organizers had in mind when they decided on the title for this paper, and I am dubious that we either need or are likely to see new “visions” of US policy in the region. US policy in East Asia, regardless of who is elected president next year, is going to be characterized by continuity in basic goals and strategy. It will continue to emphasize alliance with Japan and South Korea, a deepening of economic and political relations with China, support for the status quo in Taiwan-China relations, and a continuing groping for a policy to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.

As a result of the debacle in Iraq, there is reason to hope that US

policy in East Asia as elsewhere will reflect a greater awareness on the part of US policy makers that the ability to use unparalleled military force in and of itself does not necessarily translate into political power. We can hope that the US will be more prudent in its use of military force, more attentive to the views of allies and others, and more restrained in using its power to spread its conception of democracy and to instigate domestic political change in other countries. In other words, we can expect that the hubris of the neo-conservatives will be replaced by a more cautious and realist approach to foreign policy, by a greater emphasis on negotiating with adversaries, strengthening multilateral institutions, and repairing the damage that has been done to the US image around the world. The change in Bush Administration strategy for dealing with North Korea suggests that salutary changes are already taking place and that the neo-conservative influence over American foreign policy is in sharp decline.

I do not worry very much about the US retreating into isolationism. That is simply not a realistic option. I also think there is reason for cautious optimism that the next President, whether Democrat or Republican, will resist protectionist pressures emanating from Congress because he, or she, will understand that America's future well-being depends on making markets more rather than less open. A lot of course depends on the state of the American economy; increasing unemployment no doubt will increase support for protectionist measures. A Democratic Administration will put more emphasis, at least rhetorically, on the need for China and Japan to take more decisive action to redress their bilateral trade imbalances with the United States but, again, unless there is a sharp downturn in the US economy, these demands will be aimed more at managing Congress than at effecting major change in economic relationships across the Pacific.

There is a strong tendency in East Asia to exaggerate the differences between Democrats and Republicans with respect to economic and political security policy in East Asia. Many Japanese leaders, for example, believe that Republicans are pro-Japanese and the Democrats less friendly. A review of the historical record gives little support for such a view. It was a Republican President who initiated the "Nixon shocks,"

another Republican, Ronald Reagan, who insisted on Japanese “voluntary” export restraints on automobiles. And it was a Democratic President quite unpopular with the Japanese political establishment, Bill Clinton, who took the initiative to strengthen US-Japan security relations with the joint declaration he signed with Prime Minister Hashimoto redefining the alliance and setting the stage for reworking the guidelines for US-Japan defense cooperation and for the subsequent expanded Japanese role in contributing to security in the so-called “areas surrounding Japan.” And finally it is a Republican President, George W. Bush, who by changing his strategy for how to deal with North Korea, has left Japan with the task of trying to figure out how to get back in step with the other parties to the six party talks.

Less emphasis on unilateralism in American foreign policy is going to be a mixed blessing for countries in Northeast Asia. It should result in closer consultation and a greater emphasis on coordination, but it also is going to mean greater demands that other countries do more to contribute to common objectives. A greater American willingness to consult and engage in strategic dialogue does not necessarily translate into greater tolerance for opinions that differ from those of the US. Japan, South Korea and China will each have to be quite nimble in managing relations with a United States government that expects others to do more for the common good, which it tends to think it is uniquely qualified to define.

And regardless of which party takes control of the White House and the Congress, security policy will be driven by the belief that we are in a “war” against terrorism. Among its many consequences for American thinking about foreign policy, 9.11 changed the American common sense definition of the term “ally.” In the postwar period an ally was a country the US helped defend against the Soviet Union and what used to be called international communism. There was little reason to be concerned about reciprocity in security relations because Americans considered their country safe from attack except in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. And after the Cuba missile crisis, there was a sense of confidence that deterrence and MAD made that virtually unthinkable.

But an ally in the post-9.11 world for the United States is a country that actively joins the war against terrorism and helps the United States protect its territory and citizens from attack not only by foreign states but by murky terrorist networks as well. In other words, alliance for Americans now means a security relationship that is reciprocal and that responds to a global threat.

This change in definition has had a direct impact especially on security relations with Japan. If Japan had stuck to the letter of the US-Japan security treaty, which obligates the United States to defend Japan and imposes no reciprocal obligation on Japan, the US-Japan relationship would be in tatters today. The Japanese response effectively redefined the security relationship and reinforced pressures that already were in play to draw Japan out into a more active role in international security affairs.

One question that will confront the next Administration is how to respond to growing East Asian economic regionalization — the growth of intra-regional trade and investment — and to East Asian regionalism — the growth of regional institutions that do not necessarily include the United States.

There are three points to be made about East Asian regionalism. The first is that it is, and will continue to be, multi-layered with the borders of the “region” ambiguous and changeable. There is ASEAN, ASEAN +3, the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, and so on, each with a different membership and different functions. This multiplicity of institutions is a pragmatic response to the dynamic and complex realities of the Asia Pacific region. The second is that building strong regional institutions will take a long time and the value is in the process more than the goal. Unlike the situation with the European Union, there is no likelihood that the countries in East Asia are going to be prepared to yield any national sovereignty to a supra-national institution for many years to come. Regionalism can be a useful add-on but not more than that. The third point flows from the above two: the United States government should relax about regionalism in East Asia. The concern that the presence of East Asian regional institutions that do not include the United States is somehow inimical

to American interests is not persuasive. The idea that China, Japan and South Korea will collude to pursue policies that violate US interests is unrealistic. A basic lack of trust is one of the salient characteristics of relations among Northeast Asian countries. The more dialogue, the more transparency, the more interaction there is between the countries of East Asia, the better the chances that potential conflicts can be avoided or resolved. And that is in the interests of the United States.

Moreover, East Asian economies are so enmeshed in the global economy, so dependent on access to out of region markets, that East Asian regionalism must necessarily be "open" regionalism. In the best of possible worlds, openness would be promoted by global multilateral trade liberalization agreements. The reality, however, is that bilateral and regional free trade agreements are now the vogue. The Korea-US free trade agreement may spark a competitive liberalization, with Japan in particular having to consider how not to miss the FTA bus, and thereby promote further economic openness between East Asia and the United States.

Regional security dialogues, through the ASEAN regional forum and possibly by expanding the Six-Party Talks format used to deal with North Korea, can be useful measures for confidence building. But the notion of a new security "architecture" for East Asia seems to me to be a rhetorical flourish that does not hold the promise of much substance. We will continue to see some remodeling and updating of structures that have been around for a long time, but the basic "architecture" is likely to remain in place.

The challenge for senior American policy makers vis a vis East Asian regionalism is not to overreact to the formation of regional institutions that do not include the United States but instead to give the region the degree of attention that is commensurate to its importance to American national interests. The danger is not that East Asia is going to exclude the United States: the entire region will continue to rely on the United States as the major market for the products of the region, as a major source of foreign capital and technology, and as the provider of security. The danger is that the United States will not be alert to the complexities and dynamism of the region and to the opportunities and

dangers they pose. One looks in vain among the leading Democratic and Republican presidential hopefuls for anyone who has a sustained interest in and knowledge of East Asia.

US policy toward China seems to be on the right track and I do not see any reason for a new vision. Whether led by a Republican or a Democrat, the US government is likely to continue to pursue a strategy to deepen economic relations with China, to encourage it to become more enmeshed as a “stakeholder” in the international system, and at the same time to hedge against the possibility that it will use its growing power in ways that are inimical to American interests. The Bush Administration, it seems to me, has handled China relations quite successfully. President Bush took advantage of President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington to state publicly that the US is opposed to *de facto* independence for Taiwan. (Interestingly, and importantly, the Japanese government refused to do the same when Wen Jiabao visited Tokyo). It is of course opposed as well to Chinese use of force to incorporate Taiwan. In other words, the most conservative American government in years has publicly taken a position in favor of sustaining the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.

Secretary of Treasury Paulson’s investment of his personal time and that of senior officials to a strategic dialogue with China at the highest levels is likely to pay rich dividends in terms of encouraging institutional innovation in China that accord with global standards and in furthering China’s stakeholder role. Since both Democratic and Republican Presidents seem to like to choose their Treasury Secretaries from among successful investment bankers on Wall Street — Robert Rubin for Clinton, Paulson for Bush — there is good reason to believe that whoever becomes President in 2009 is going to put together an economic team led by people who share an enthusiasm for globalization and who see China’s emergence as a major economic power as positive for the world economy and for the United States.

The Bush Administration also has encouraged China and Japan to strengthen their relationship. It was significant that President Bush publicly congratulated Prime Minister Abe for his decision to visit Beijing last October even before he made the visit. US interests would not

be served by China and Japan becoming too close, but that, for better or for worse, is not a realistic concern. The more realistic worry is that China and Japan would become more antagonistic, which would present the United States with unpleasant and undesirable choices. The US has an interest in a strong alliance with Japan and good relations with China. That is not possible if there is a high degree of tension between China and Japan.

The Chinese responded with enthusiasm to Prime Minister Abe's initiative to move the Sino-Japanese relationship out of the cul de sac that it got caught in because of the Yasukuni Shrine visits by Prime Minister Koizumi. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to Tokyo in the spring of 2007 was very successful. Clearly both countries want to avoid further deterioration in the relationship if possible. Bilateral trade and investment are of critical importance for China and for Japan as well. And neither country has anything to gain from a ratcheting up of tensions, especially since both need good relations with the US, something difficult to sustain if they do not have minimally good relations with each other.

Nonetheless the relationship is fragile. There are disputes over territory and access to the natural gas resources of the East China Sea. There is the history issue always ready to trigger antagonisms either because one side or the other wants to use it to pressure the other or because domestic pressures drive it onto the agenda. And there is the Taiwan issue, which for China is far more important than the history issue. Any indication that Japan was tilting toward Taiwan would be certain to elicit a sharp Chinese response. In Japan, even though Prime Minister Abe, to his credit, took the first step to improve relations, the conservative camp is deeply divided between those around the prime minister who see China as a threat and want to strengthen the US military alliance and Japan's own military capabilities to hedge against it, and a more moderate wing of the party that takes a much more positive attitude about the possibility of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

A key issue for the United States in East Asia and for the countries in the region of course, is how the US manages its relationship with Japan. The relationship is strong and in military to military relations

particularly it is growing closer and stronger. But the US-Japan relationship is entering a new phase, driven there by a new foreign policy activism and assertiveness on Japan's part that the United States is not used to dealing with. The United States has for years pressed Japan to play a larger security role and to be more active in international political affairs. It now will have to adjust to the reality that a Japan that does more has more to say about what needs to be done.

It is worrisome that Prime Minister Abe has decided to take his first step to demonstrate a more self-assertive Japanese foreign policy by staking out a position on North Korea that puts it at odds with the United States and the other parties to the Six-Party Talks. The Bush Administration publicly has expressed its support for Japanese demands regarding the fate of abductees not yet fully accounted for, but the reality is that Japan is giving priority to the abductees issue while the priority issue for the US is stopping further production of nuclear weapons and eliminating the weapons that North Korea already possesses.

The North Korean issue poses real dangers to US-Japan relations. If the US negotiations with North Korea move forward and get to the point where the United States is prepared to remove North Korea from the list of terrorist supporting states without there being progress on the abductees issue that the Japanese government deems satisfactory, the reaction in Tokyo will be that its interests have been betrayed by its US ally. Conversely, American irritation with Japan will grow if Japan is seen to be uncooperative on the nuclear issue because of its insistence on giving priority to the abductees issue. Kim, Jong-Il might take care of the problem by backing out of the February 13 agreement, thereby pushing the US back into the hard line position that the Abe administration supports. But if progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue, Japan will find itself isolated unless Prime Minister Abe makes a substantial course correction in his North Korean policy. It took the Bush Administration six years to arrive at a sensible strategy for dealing with North Korea. It is more than a little troubling that Japan is so far out of step with US policy on this the most critical current security issue in Northeast Asia.

Changes in the leadership of both South Korea and the United States should be grasped as an opportunity to initiate a new strategic dialogue between the two countries. This is particularly important for the incoming administrations in both countries because they will be overseeing the transfer of command control to the South Korean government and the redeployment and contraction of the US troop presence in South Korea. On the trade side, hopefully the Korea-US free trade agreement will clear the ratification hurdles in both countries and deepen economic interdependence as well as act as a spur to further trade liberalization in the region.

So there are number of issues that require skillful management by American policy makers. If they are managed poorly, they will create problems. A new President, simply because he/she is new and brings in a new team, will take months to get her administration organized. Mishandling of important East Asian issues can occur in that transition period. Also each new President comes into office promising to do some things different from his predecessor. Bill Clinton came into office criticizing President Bush's China policy and saying he would be tough on human rights. George W. Bush came in critical of Clinton's China policy, saying that China was a strategic competitor rather than partner. But sooner or later they all came out pretty much at the same place. It sometimes takes awhile before policy returns to pick up where the predecessor's policy left off. But we have seen continuity trump change in China policy repeatedly, and we see it finally in Bush's North Korea policy as well.

In other words, I do not think we are going to see any fundamental strategic rethinking about East Asian strategy. The more important question is how adept the United States will be in dealing with a region in which relationships are more complex than ever before. It was much easier to anticipate the consequence of actions when the Cold War imposed a kind of structural stability on international relationships in the region. The range of possible effects of particular actions is much greater now. Even though bilateral security arrangements, the so-called hub and spokes approach, still form the core of US strategy in the region, the US has to think less in bilateral and more in trilateral, multi-

lateral and regional terms.

But one has to wonder how much sustained attention senior policy makers are going to give to East Asia when their overwhelming preoccupation will be to try to figure out how to manage the fallout in the Middle East of the Iraqi debacle. We do not need new “visions” for US policy in East Asia. What we need are political leaders who understand how important this part of the world is to US national interests and invest the time, energy and resources needed to maximize the opportunities and minimize the risks for the United States there.

China's Peaceful Development and Implications for Regional Community Building

Zhaorong Mei

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and gentlemen, this is the third time that I have attended the Jeju Peace Forum. I feel honored to be invited back to this event and would like to express heartfelt thanks to the host. I was asked by the Organizing Committee to talk about Rethinking China's Rise and Implications for Regional Community Building. I would like to start with a clarification. Rise, when translated into Chinese, is often associated with *nouveau riche* — a term most Chinese are reluctant to use in reference to China's development. We in China prefer "Peaceful Development" as China's development is a long and progressive process. Even by the middle of this century, China will at best reach the level of a moderately developed country in per-capita terms. Quite a number of Chinese scholars describe China's development as "National Revitalization," because until the middle of the 18th Century, China's economic aggregate had always ranked among the top of the world. Only from the Opium War in 1840, China begun to decline sharply due to the invasion of Western powers and the ludicrous conceit of feudal rulers as well as the policy of closing China's door to the world.

History has given the Chinese people the lesson that once we lag behind we would be vulnerable to attacks and bullies. At the end of 1978, the Chinese leadership represented by Deng Xiaoping summed

up historical experiences, made a major decision to take up domestic reform and open up to the outside world, and resolutely cast away the rigid system of planned economy. The leaders took reference and made use of Western experience on the basis of China's national conditions and steered China onto the path of achieving the four modernizations and building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

For the past 27 years, achievements in China's reform, opening up efforts and development are undoubtedly great. The national economy has been growing at an annual rate of 9.6%. In 2006, China's GDP ranked fourth in the world. The volume of import and export trade ranked third in the world. China stood in first place among developing countries in terms of accumulated paid-in foreign investments. More than 550 thousand foreign enterprises have been attracted to start business and develop in China. As a result, China's overall national strength has increased remarkably and the level of people's material and cultural life has been considerably raised. The number of people living in poverty has been reduced by 230 million, taking up 75% of the total number of people alleviated from poverty in all developing countries. Particularly after entry into the WTO, China's export trade has grown rapidly. Competitiveness of its goods and services has improved tremendously and foreign reserves increased dramatically. Against such a backdrop, the whole world is now talking about the Rise of China. More and more come to realize that China's development is a positive contributor to the world economy and international peace. Some, however, conjured up the "China Threat" in one way or another, alleging that in history, the rise of big nations had posed challenges to the vested interests of existing big nations and ended up in conflicts. This can not but lead to the following questions: Is China's developing and growing strong good news to the world or bad news? What policies will China pursue? What implications will these policies have on regional community building?

Personally, I believe that China's development level and strength should be judged in an objective manner. China's development path and reform and opening up policy have proven correct. However, it would be a one-sided view to regard the achievements I have just men-

tioned as the whole picture of China's reality. The equally indisputable facts are that the big population, weak economic foundation, generally under-developed productivity and imbalances between regions and between urban and rural areas still remain China's basic national conditions. China's current per capita GDP still ranks below the 100th place in the world. All over China there are more than 23 million people living under the poverty line. According to the World Bank standard of less than 1 US dollar daily consumption, the number of impoverished people in China would be as high as 150 million.

The evaluation and China's development should not be based simply on the economic aggregate and the growth rate. Neither should the coastal regions and cities in the east be viewed as a standard for judgment. Only by taking into account the population of 1.3 billion, the central and western regions and the vast rural areas, can we come to a comprehensive and objective conclusion. It is particularly noteworthy that China's industrialization and urbanization are not yet completed. It is expected that the level of China's urbanization will reach just 47% by 2010. The transformation from the urban-rural dual economic structure to a modern economic mix still constitutes a big challenge. China will still be confronted with a series of difficulties and problems in the course of development. Mainly, the imbalance in economic structure is rather great; the growth model is still extensive in nature; the environmental and resource cost is too high; the ability of independent innovation is fairly low; the product competitiveness is not strong; and the gap between urban and rural areas and between regions is huge. Even though the developed countries in the West all had this kind of experience in their 300 years' industrialization process, it is more difficult for China to solve all these problems given that the size of China is far beyond comparison.

Undoubtedly, China's development not only concerns China itself, but also has far-reaching implications for surrounding countries and the world. I would like to make a few points here in this regard. First, it constitutes in itself a great contribution to world peace, stability and development and a useful experience for the evolution of mankind that a big oriental country of 9.6 million square kilometers and with 1.3 bil-

lion people could, after winning political independence, find a path to development based on its national conditions, and have more than one fifth of the world population live a prosperous and contented life and gradually be lifted out of poverty and backwardness. Its great significance can never be overestimated. Just think, if China were for long weak and poor, what would be the consequences for her surrounding countries or developed European countries? Probably, it is not hard for you to imagine.

Second, the fact that China conforms to the trend of economic globalization is indeed a benefit from international cooperation, but in turn it also offers great business opportunities and real profits to her partners, particularly Japan, the Republic of Korea and Southeast Asian countries which have enjoyed a tremendous amount of surplus from trade with China in recent years. It is estimated that since 1978, more than 10% of world economic growth and more than 12% of increase in international trade have been contributed by China. 2006 saw China's import value of 800 billion US dollars, and about 10 million jobs were created thereby for relevant countries and regions. The export of cheap and good Chinese commodities not only gives consumers more choices and brings them real benefits but also relieves the pressure of inflation. From 1990 to 2005, foreign-invested enterprises in China remitted 280 billion US dollars worth of profits, these figures can well make the point.

Third, China makes an effort to participate in the formulation and improvement of international rules. China is a positive participator, defender and constructor of the international system and faithfully implements her due obligations. We abide by the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, advocate for a strengthened role of the UN and support UN reform. China is, among the five permanent members of the Security Council, one of those who have dispatched the most peace keeping forces. We are firmly opposed to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and have played an important role in the effort to properly handle the DPRK and Iran nuclear issues. In particular, we have contributed to the resumption of Six-Party Talks which achieved progress. We faithfully imple-

ment our commitment to the WTO, join the Doha Round with great sincerity, oppose trade protectionism and push forward the worldwide liberalization of trade and investment. We conduct energy dialogues and cooperation with all countries, seeking concerted efforts to maintain the stability of global energy market. We have ratified a great majority of international covenants concerning environmental protection such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Fourth, we have actively provided international aid to the full extent of our capability and made a contribution to the realization of the UN Millennium Goal. The assistance provided to countries hit by the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean was our largest in scale since the founding of the new China. For years, China has undertaken some 900 infrastructure and public projects in Africa where the largest number of developing countries is concentrated and dispatched some 16,000 person-times of medical staff. Over the past 3 years, China has altogether relieved 31 African countries from 10.5 billion RMB Yuan worth of debt. China offers tariff-free treatment for the import of 190 categories of commodities from 29 least developed countries. At the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Chinese government declared that 8 steps would be taken to boost China-Africa cooperation. One step is to cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily-indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China. China endorses the build-up of democratic politics in developing countries but does not by any means impose her own will on others, and still less interferes in the internal affairs of other countries.

Fifth, China sticks to the path of peaceful development and is committed to the construction of a harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity. The path of peaceful development means that we will on the one hand strive for a peaceful international environment to develop ourselves and on the other promote world peace with our development. In order to build a harmonious world, we energetically advocate for mutual trust, win-win cooperation and coexistence and

promote common progress of different civilizations. We uphold respect for diversity of the world and recognize differences among countries in their cultures, traditions, social systems, values and paths to development. We maintain that international disputes be settled through peaceful consultation and negotiation based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit and strive for a win-win result by way of seeking common ground while reserving differences instead of a zero-sum game. The idea of a harmonious world stems from the traditional Chinese thinking of cherishing harmony. It is also in the same strain with the principles of "peaceful coexistence" initiated by China in the 1950s. In Chinese, "harmony" reads like "he xie." "He" means everybody has food to eat and "xie" means everyone has his say. Extend the meanings to international relations, we come to the point that every country and nation should enjoy the right to subsistence and development, and international relations should be democratized. This stands for a rejection of power politics, unilateralism and hegemonism.

We can not deny that China's development would also to some extent "challenge" some countries, mainly in the way of competition in commodities. Some European friends recently pointed out that China is not only a market full of opportunities and a promising place for investment, but is also becoming a competitor. This may not be altogether without reason. But it is equally necessary to point out that it is the inevitable outcome of both the competition rule of market economy and the fast development of globalization, while the west especially European countries are active advocators and promoters of both the competition rule of market economy and economic globalization. Developed countries should adopt a calm attitude towards the competition from a developing country with an ordinary mindset and uphold the principle of win-win cooperation in dealing with trade disputes. To counter competition with protectionism can go nowhere but cause great losses to both sides.

It is not hard to find out that China's development is a peaceful one, one of opening-up and cooperation. Peacefulness, opening up, cooperation, harmony and win-win has been our advocacy, principle and the goal to pursue. It is groundless to cite historical examples to assert that

the development of China will inevitably pose a threat to other countries. A careful reading of Chinese history would tell otherwise. 600 years ago, the famous Chinese navigator of China's Ming Dynasty, Zheng He, led the then most powerful fleet in the world onto seven voyages to more than 30 countries and regions in Asia and Africa. Bringing with him tea, ceramics, silk and artworks from China, he did not conquer an inch of foreign land. Instead, he brought local people peace, friendship and civilization in sharp contrast with some big powers which, after rising up, engaged in expansionism, invasion and colonization. For over 100 years since 1840, the Chinese people had been subjected to invasion and colonial rule by foreign powers. With a culture of "never administering to others what you yourself do not wish to be administered to," China does not wish to see other peoples suffer the same hardships it had endured. As early as the day when China resumed its seat in the UN, Deng Xiaoping made a solemn commitment to the world that China will never seek hegemony.

In the past, the rise of some big nations were often driven by the military industry and relied heavily on military means in vying for resources. China, however, has made progress by liberating its productive forces and engaging in trade and investment cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit against the backdrop of economic globalization. China has forged an economic relationship of mutual integration and mutual restraint with the world and become an inseparable part of the world economy. More importantly, in the foreseeable future, China will still be confronted with the arduous task of providing food and clothing for its 1.3 billion people and of striving for a peaceful external environment and safeguarding equal rights. It has neither the intention nor the power to threaten others.

China can not grow without the world and the world can not prosper without China. In conformance with the general trend of economic globalization, China will persist in participating in international economic and technological cooperation on a larger scope, broader areas and at a higher level. China has made a peaceful surrounding environment the top priority of its foreign policy and the good-neighboring policy of living in amity and partnership with neighbors the funda-

mental guideline for its relations with surrounding countries. China is committed to promoting regional cooperation in its neighborhood and takes a supportive and open-minded approach towards the construction of the East Asian Community. Achievements have been made in the 10+3 and 10+1 cooperation. The pace of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area has been quickened. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has entered into the phase of all-round and pragmatic cooperation. China's contribution in these areas has been constructive. China would like to explore the possibility of establishing the Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism, building on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

Nowadays, people are talking about how East Asia could learn from the European experience. As a Chinese long following the state of affairs in Europe, I know fully well how big the differences are between Asia and Europe. Mainly, Asia is a more diversified region than Europe in terms of social and political systems, history, cultural heritage and the level of development; there are major differences among some big Asian nations in historical and territorial issues with negative implications for the building of mutual trust; the legacy from the Cold War period still hovers over Asia, especially Northeast Asia, including the practice of dealing with neighbors by means of military alliance. However, some experiences of Europe in developing regional cooperation are indeed enlightening for Asia. To name a few: starting with economic cooperation and trade; starting with easier ones and progressing gradually to hard nuts; practicing gradualism so that all parties may benefit from the process; German-Franco reconciliation; facilitation by big nations, especially Germany which has taken a correct approach towards its aggression history during World War II and hence gained the trust of victimized countries; handling various contradictions properly with an eye on common interests of the region, including abandoning the Cold War mentality and doing away with various mechanisms left over from the Cold War era; most importantly, upholding the principle of equality and mutual benefit, striving for win-win on the basis of seeking common ground while setting aside differences and seeking integration while respecting diversity.

For Chinese, East Asian countries share common economic and political interest and cultural and historical heritage. It is an inevitable trend for East Asian regional cooperation to be quickened. China would like to work together with all parties concerned and strive for the establishment of a peaceful, stable and prosperous East Asian Community. We also believe that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the normalization of relations among Northeast Asian countries is a precondition for the establishment of a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism. The immediate priority is to enhance trust and dispel misgivings through dialogue and cooperation and to ensure the good momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to lay a solid foundation for the eventual construction of a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism. In the aforesaid process, China's peaceful development and constructive role is an important factor. Thank you!

*Nine Insights to Cope with the
North Korean Nuclear Dilemma:
A South Korean Perspective*

Chung-in Moon

More than four years have elapsed since the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002. The crisis was triggered by North Korea's alleged admission of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in October 2002 and escalated with the subsequent tit-for-tat between North Korea and the United States. A major breakthrough came during the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, held in Beijing in September 2005, at which the September 19 Joint Statement was adopted. Nevertheless, negotiations over the North Korean nuclear problem have stalled once again as the North refuses to participate in the Six-Party Talks in protest of the freeze of its bank accounts in Macau, following US accusations of its alleged involvement in counterfeit currency and money laundering. The situation was worsened when North Korea methodically test-launched its missiles and undertook underground nuclear testing in 2006. After more than a year of stalemate, confrontation and crisis, the 3rd session of the 5th round of the Six-Party Talks, held this year in Beijing from February 8-13, reversed the trend by producing an agreement on "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement."

But negotiations with the North are tough, and another nuclear standoff and crisis cannot be ruled out. Such developments can not only jeopardize peace and stability on the Korean peninsula by altering

the balance of power between the two Koreas, but also severely undermine strategic stability in the region by potentially triggering a nuclear domino effect. Furthermore, proliferation of nuclear materials through transfer to third parties by the North can threaten the very foundation of global security.

Thus, effective management of the North Korean nuclear quagmire is essential for peace and stability on the peninsular, regional, and global level. Then, how do we cope with it? I would like to suggest nine insights to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem.

I. “Don’t Treat North Korea as a Full-Fledged Nuclear Weapons State!”

I visited Pyongyang during May 14-18 this year. An official from the Korea Workers’ Party told me a very interesting story during my visit: “Chairman Kim, Jong-il has set the construction of Gangsung-daeguk (a strong and prosperous great nation) as the ultimate national goal. With the successful undertaking of an underground nuclear test, we have achieved a strong nation. Now is the time to make every effort to make our nation prosperous. When we achieve prosperity, then we can truly become a great nation.” Can this claim be accepted? My answer is ‘no.’ In order for a country to become a nuclear weapons state, the country should satisfy four pre-conditions: possession of nuclear warheads, acquisition of delivery capabilities, nuclear testing, and miniaturization technology. North Korea has satisfied two pre-conditions, namely possession of nuclear warheads and delivery capabilities, but it is believed that the other two pre-conditions are not met. Thus, North Korea should be seen as a dangerous country with enormous nuclear weapons capability, but not as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state *per se*.¹ Let me elaborate in detail.

¹ See Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), *North Korea’s Weapons Programme: A Net Assessment* (London: IISS, 2004), pp. 63-84; Jon B. Wolfsthal, “Estimates of North Korea’s Unchecked Nuclear Weapons Production Potential,”

Since the second nuclear standoff in 2003, North Korea is known to have reprocessed not only 8,060 spent fuel rods stored in a water pond, but also additional spent fuel rods obtained from reactivation of its 5 MW reactor in Yongbyon. Estimates on North Korea's plutonium (PU) bombs vary according to different analysts, but it is estimated that the reprocessing of 8,060 spent fuel rods stored in a cooling pond should have yielded one or two bombs. Reactivation of the 5 MW reactor is believed to have manufactured 5-6 PU warheads with the production of 44-52 kg PU.²

Some projected that North Korea would be capable of producing 75 kg of HEU per year starting in 2005, which would be sufficient to manufacture three HEU weapons every year.³ Despite wild speculations on North Korea's HEU-related programs, however, no hard evidence on acquisitions have yet been presented. It is generally believed that North Korea could have acquired some parts and components of a HEU program such as gas centrifuges and high intensity aluminum tubes, but is short of acquiring complete HEU programs and actual bombs.⁴ And previous intelligence estimates on North Korea's HEU program by the Bush administration have been increasingly subject to criticism.⁵ Thus, it is highly unlikely that North Korea possesses actual HEU programs and bombs. Thus, North Korea has acquired at least plutonium bombs,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/JBW/nknuclearweaponproductionpotential.pdf> (accessed Nov. 2, 2003).

² David Albright, "North Korean Plutonium Production," *Science & Global Security*, 5 (1994), p. 78.; Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "North Korean Nuclear Capabilities," www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/msl_overview.html (access Nov. 2, 2003); *Yonhap News*, January 2, 2006.

³ J.B. Wolfsthal, *ibid*; Fred McGoldrick, "The North Korea Uranium Enrichment Program: A Freeze and Beyond," working papers of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, no. 38, June 2003.

⁴ See David Albright, "North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes," The ISIS Report February 23, 2007. <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/DPRK/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf>.

⁵ See Dong-young Yoon, "Call for Re-examination on Intelligence Estimates on North Korea's HEU Program," *Yonhap News*, February 25, 2007 (in Korean).

if not HEU bombs, satisfying the first precondition of possession of nuclear warheads.

While possession of nuclear warheads is one thing, the capability to deliver them is an altogether different story. North Korea is known to have credible delivery capability. It currently possesses several types of missiles: Scud B (range 320 km, payload 1,000 kg), Scud C (range 500 km, payload 770), and Nodong (range 1,350-1,500 km, payload 770-1,200 kg).⁶ But the test-launching of both a Daepodong-I missile (range 1,500-2,500 km, payload 1,000-1,500 kg) on August 31, 1998 and a Daepodong-II missile (range 3,500-6,000 km, payload 700-1,000 kg) on July 6, 2006 are believed to have failed. Thus, it might take more than a decade for the North to develop full-scale inter-continental ballistic missiles.⁷ In view of this, North Korea has not yet developed long-range missiles capable of threatening the mainland United States, but it would be able to incur considerable damage on South Korea and Japan through its short- and medium-range missiles.

Departing from its usual opacity, the North Korean government announced that it had successfully undertaken underground nuclear testing on October 9, 2006. Despite North Korea's claim, most international nuclear experts believe that its nuclear testing failed because its explosive yield measured from the seismic analysis is estimated to be 0.5-0.8 kiloton. Given that the lowest explosive yield, which came from the Pakistani nuclear testing, was 19 kiloton, and that the nuclear bomb that destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was roughly 15 kiloton, less than 1 kiloton yield cannot be considered successful. Thus, Jung-min Kang and Peter Hayes, leading observers of the North Korean nuclear issue, make the following evaluation: "The DPRK might believe that a half kiloton 'mininuke' still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to

⁶ See IISS, *North Korea's Weapons Programmes*, pp. 63-84.

⁷ Robert S. Nerris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, "North Korea's Nuclear Program," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 59:2 (March/April 2003), pp. 76-77; David Albright, "Assessment of the North Korean Missile Threat," The Nautilus Institute. <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0320A-%20Wright.html> (accessed Nov. 2, 2003).

perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable, and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”⁸ Thus, North Korea’s claim of a successful nuclear test needs to be scrutinized.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear warheads, delivery capability, as well as nuclear testing are necessary but insufficient conditions for becoming a nuclear state. It should demonstrate the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads and mount them on Nodong and/or SCUD missiles for effective use. Most intelligence analyses indicate that North Korea is far short of developing such technology. In view of the above, North Korea does not deserve being treated as a nuclear weapons state that would strengthen its bargaining leverage.

II. “Don’t Fall Prey to Pessimism! North Korea Will Give Up Its Nuclear Ambition.”

Pessimism looms over the future of North Korea’s nuclear ambition. A great number of people express a sigh of resignation that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons. We cannot overcome the North Korean nuclear dilemma with such a pessimistic attitude. We should prepare for the worst case scenario, but until then, we should work with the assumption that North Korea will give up its nuclear ambition. When and if causes of concerns that have driven the North to the nuclear path are properly addressed, we might be able to find the final solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.

How does the North justify its nuclear ambition? North Korea’s official rationale is based on the logic of nuclear deterrence. For the North Korean leadership and even its ordinary citizens, the fear of an American nuclear attack is not contrived, but real. They believe that the United States has plans to stage nuclear attacks on the North, and the only way to deter them is to arm itself with nuclear weapons for sec-

⁸ Jungmin Kang and Peter Hayes, “Technical Analysis of the DPRK Nuclear Test,” Nautilus Institute, www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0689HayesKang.html, October 20, 2006, p. 1. Also see, IISS, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Continuing Reverberations,” *IISS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 12, No. 8 (October 8, 2006).

ond strike capability. North Korea's logic of nuclear deterrence has been further consolidated as a result of American actions since September 11. President Bush's labeling of North Korea as part of an axis of evil and a rogue nation reaffirmed North Korea's threat perception. In addition, US adoption of the preemption doctrine, its announcement of the Nuclear Posture Review that would allow the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the invasion of Iraq appear to have led North Korean policy-makers to rely on nuclear weapons as a deterrent force.

There is another dimension of the logic of deterrence, which is to balance the military equilibrium on the Korean peninsula through the acquisition of asymmetric military capabilities. North Korea maintained military superiority over South Korea until the 1970s. However, the inter-Korean military balance began to shift in favor of the South beginning in the 1980s. Whereas the North's military followed a more labor-intensive force structure, South Korea was able to surpass the North by combining its enhanced defense industrial production with the acquisition of advanced foreign weaponry. The widening gap in conventional forces between the North and the South was an inevitable outcome of the rapidly growing disparity in economic and technological capabilities. While the South has emerged as the 11th largest economy in the world, greatly facilitating its defense build-up, the North's continued poor economic performance is reflected in its slower military build-up. In 2004, South Korea's economic size was 30 times larger than that of North Korea, and North Korea's defense spending in the same year is reported to be \$5.5 billion, accounting for 25 percent of its GDP but only one third the amount of South Korea's spending (\$14.6 billion).⁹ North Korea's attempt to possess nuclear weapons can be interpreted as a calculated move to make up for its weakness in conventional forces by pushing for a non-conventional, asymmetric force build-up via weapons of mass destruction and missiles.¹⁰ This provides a less

⁹ Institute of International Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: IISS, 2005).

¹⁰ Taik-young Hahm, "Nambukhan Gunbi Gyongjaengui Ihae (Understanding North-South Korean Arms Race)," in Seung-ryol Kim and Jubaek Shin (eds.), *Bundaui Dueolgul* (Two Faces of Division) (Seoul: Yoksa Bipyong, 2005), pp. 106-107.

expensive path of offsetting the growing gap in conventional forces.

North Korea's nuclear venture also seems to be closely associated with the domestic politics of legitimacy- and coalition-building.¹¹ Chairman Kim's legitimacy stems from his succession of political leadership from his father Kim Il-sung, as well as from his role as the guardian of North Korea and its people from the American military threat. Since his political ascension in 1994, Kim, Jong-il has championed the slogan of '*gangsung daeguk* (a strong and prosperous great nation)' as the new governing ideology. That strong and prosperous great nation is to be materialized through '*sungun jungchi* (military first politics)', which gives the military the preeminent position in North Korean politics.¹² Ahn, Kyung-ho, a senior member of the Korea Worker's Party, made this point clear to me by stating, "Why are we pursuing 'the military first politics'? American military threats are real and present. If the military cannot defend the motherland from American threats, there will be neither motherland nor the Korea Workers' Party. That is why we consider the military the most important, even transcending the party."¹³ Given these considerations, the nuclear ambition appears to satisfy several domestic political purposes. It not only enhances Kim Jong-il's political legitimacy by materializing the vision of a strong and prosperous great nation, but also serves as a vehicle for consolidating his political power through the co-optation of the military. With the added benefit of enhancing its international status and prestige by joining the elite group of nuclear states, the possession of nuclear weapons can strengthen Kim's domestic rule.

Finally, North Korea appears to regard nuclear weapons as a valu-

¹¹ Mun-hyung Huh, "Bukhanui Haekgaibal Gyoehoick Injunggwa Hyanghu Jungchaek Junmang (North Korea's Admission of Nuclear Development Plan and Prospects of Future Policy)," in Jung-bok Lee (ed.), *Bukhaek Munjeui Haebopgwa Junmang* (Solution and Prospects of the North Korean Nuclear Problem) (Seoul: Jungang M & B, 2003), pp. 157-206.

¹² Chung-in Moon and Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention," in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), *Coercion and Governance* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), pp.257-282.

¹³ Conversation with Ahn Kyung-ho, Secretary General of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of Motherland, March 28, 2004, Pyongyang.

able economic asset for two reasons. One is as bargaining leverage for economic gains and the other is as a tool for export earnings. As the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework demonstrated, the North was able to win lucrative economic and energy concessions such as two light water nuclear reactors, a supply of heavy oil, and other forms of economic assistance in return for freezing its nuclear activities and returning to the NPT. Although such concessions were not fully materialized, Pyongyang learned that the nuclear weapons card can be utilized as powerful bargaining leverage in obtaining economic and energy gains. And it should not be ruled out that the North may consider using nuclear weapons and related materials as a way of generating desperately needed hard currency. The latter possibility appears unlikely because of the hostile international environment against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, its past track record on the export of missiles and other military weapons shows that Pyongyang is capable of and willing to transfer nuclear materials for export earnings.

III. "Don't Romanticize About the North Korean Nuke! Stupid!"

Some in South Korea have a tendency to romanticize about the North Korean nuclear weapons. They argue that if the North possesses nuclear weapons, those weapons will be 'our weapons' after Korean unification. What is problematic with their reasoning is that they are underestimating associated security risks for the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world.

Implications for peninsular security are quite grave.¹⁴ A nuclear North Korea is not compatible with the ideal of peace-building on the Korean peninsula because it would not only pose formidable non-conventional threats to the South, but also fundamentally alter the inter-Korean military balance and tempt the North to continue deliberation

¹⁴ Bruce Bennett, "Avoiding the Peacetime Dangers of North Korean Nuclear Weapons," *IFANS Review* 13: 2(December 2005), pp. 30-37.

of its old strategy of communizing the South. Under these circumstances, peaceful co-existence between the two Koreas is highly unlikely, and conventional and non-conventional arms races between the two will intensify. What could be even more troublesome is that since North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is bound to nullify the Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, South Korea might also venture into the nuclear arms race. According to a recent survey in South Korea, 66.5 percent of respondents advocated that South Korea should also possess nuclear weapons to counter the North.¹⁵ Equally worrisome are the negative consequences of crisis escalation. If the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be resolved through peaceful means, use of coercive measures including military options might become unavoidable. Such developments would incur massive collateral damage to the South. Given the military force structure along the DMZ and the massive deployment of non-asymmetric forces such as missiles, any preemptive North Korean military provocation or allied forces' military action and subsequent North Korean counter-attacks on the South will certainly escalate into a major military conflict on the Korean peninsula. Estimates of war casualties would exceed half a million at the initial stage of a full-scale war, as presented by William Perry and Ashton Carter.¹⁶ If the North attacks South Korea with its nuclear weapons, the collateral damage would be much higher since most military facilities, including American military bases, are located in urban areas.¹⁷

North Korea's nuclear venture can easily precipitate a nuclear arms race with the South that bears nightmarish implications for regional security. Facing new threats from North Korea, Japan may well justify a move into nuclear power.¹⁸ Japan has the financial and technological

¹⁵ *The Joonggang Ilbo*, October 14, 2005.

¹⁶ Ashton Carter and Williams Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), ch. 4. Also see Michael Schuman, "Peace and War," *Time* (March 3, 2003), p. 38.

¹⁷ Bruce Bennett, *op. cit.*, 32-34.

¹⁸ Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro claims that Japan should deliberate on having nuclear weapons for defensive purpose. *Yonhap News*, January 7, 2004.

capability, and has already amassed an inventory of 40.6 metric tons of plutonium.¹⁹ Its transformation into a nuclear power could simply be a matter of time. Taiwan could join the nuclear camp too, which would in turn foster China's nuclear build-up. The nuclear domino effect, set off by North Korea's nuclear ambition, can trap the entire Northeast Asian region into a perpetual security dilemma far worse than that of the late 19th century.

Finally, a nuclear North Korea can also threaten global security. The North is reported to be able to produce small nuclear bombs which are hard to detect and easy to sell to others. Given North Korea's past behavior, which includes the transfer of missiles and components as well as the smuggling of drugs, counterfeit currencies, and tobacco and alcohol, there is a growing concern regarding the transfer of nuclear materials, especially plutonium, to global terrorists and rogue states. As September 11 clearly demonstrated, world-wide proliferation of nuclear materials can endanger not only the US and Europe, but also the entire world. In addition, failure to block the advent of a nuclear North Korea can critically damage the existing Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime by tempting other states such as Iran to follow suit. Thus, romanticizing about North Korea's nuclear weapons seems suicidal. Even before North Korea's nuclear weapons become 'ours', the Korean peninsula may well fall into a war trap, with its peace and prosperity being critically threatened.

IV. "Military Action Won't Work!"

When North Korea undertook missile test launching on July 5, 2006, and an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, William Perry and Ashton Carter suggested pre-emptive strikes on nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and missile sites in Gilju.²⁰ I am quite doubtful whether

¹⁹ *Ohmynews*, February 3, 2006.

²⁰ See William Perry, "The Case for a Preemptive Strike on North Korea's Missiles," *Time Magazine Online*, July 10, 2006.

the US can achieve its political and military objectives through military actions. A surgical strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facilities cannot satisfy the American goal of destroying North Korea's nuclear capabilities completely. For though it might be able to resolve the present nuclear problem (i.e., reprocessing of spent fuel rods and manufacturing of plutonium) through surgical strikes over the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, it cannot root out the past nuclear issue (one or two nuclear bombs) and the future one (highly enriched uranium). It would achieve a very limited goal with the devastating consequences of major conflict escalation and massive radioactive pollution over South Korea and Japan. A preemptive all-out attack seems questionable too. No matter how backward and ill-equipped, the North Korean military is still one of the largest in the world. At the same time, the ideology of 'military first politics', widespread anti-Americanism deeply embedded in the North Korean people, hostile terrain, fortification of military bases, and asymmetric forces deployed along the DMZ would not yield an easy victory to the United States.

More importantly, South Korea will vehemently oppose American military action because of anticipated collateral damage. China, Russia, and even Japan will also oppose an American unilateral military move because of its negative consequences such as a potential spill-over of the conflict, the massive outflow refugees, and other negative effects. No matter how powerful the US would be, it cannot undertake pre-emptive attacks on North Korea without winning support from regional actors.

Both rational calculus and domestic political considerations in the US would not favor military initiatives. North Korea possesses neither oil nor other valuable natural resources, and American economic gains in the post-war era will be minimal, while the costs of war and post-war construction will be prohibitively high. Moreover, the protracted conflict in Iraq and diminishing domestic support for overseas military ventures as well as concerns regarding an overextended force deployment across the globe will make it extremely hard for President Bush to undertake another war on the Korean peninsula.

V. "Don't Underestimate Regime Durability! Hostile Neglect Won't Work Either!"

As the military option turns out to be less attractive, neo-cons and their sympathizers have advocated a strategy of hostile neglect based on isolation and containment of North Korea and eventual transformation of the Kim, Jong-il regime.²¹ The hostile neglect option is predicated on several assumptions. The most important assumption is "let North Korea go nuclear."²² This assumption implies that there is no other option but to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power either because of delayed dialogue and negotiation with the North, or because of North Korea's resolute intention to develop nuclear weapons for both survival and as bargaining leverage. Still, allowing the North to be a nuclear power would not pose any immediate nuclear threat to countries in the region since it would require more time to emerge as a full-fledged nuclear power. Another fundamental assumption underlying this option is that the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be solved without toppling the current regime. As long as Kim, Jong-il stays in power, North Korea will concurrently pursue both dialogue and the nuclear bomb. The belief is that removing him from power and creating a new regime in North Korea is the best and surest way to solve the North Korean nuclear dilemma,²³ while isolation and containment of North Korea through concerted international efforts are

²¹ Nicholas Eberstadt, *The End of North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); Henry Sokolski, "Let's Not Do It Again," *National Review Online*, October 24, 2002, www.nationalreview.com/comment; Victor Cha, "Isolation, Not Engagement," *New York Times*, December 29, 2002, D9.; Henry S. Rowen, "Kim Jong Il Must Go," *Policy Review* (October & November 2003), pp. 15-16.

²² Sonni Efron, "US Said to be Resigned to a Nuclear Korea," *Los Angeles Times*, March 5, 2003; "Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea," *The New York Times*, May 5, 2003. Some suggest a more pessimistic scenario that North Korea will not give up the nuclear bomb and that precautionary measures should be prepared to reduce threats and risks coming from a nuclear North Korea. See Bennett Ramberg, "Why North Korea will not give up the bomb," *International Herald Tribune*, January 6, 2006., p. 6.

²³ See Henry S. Rowen, "Kim Jong Il Must Go," *op.cit.*, p. 15.

vital to the regime transformation.

As North Korea undertook nuclear testing, this option has become all the more plausible. Most of all, in reaction to the nuclear testing, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1718 calling for sanctions on conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and luxury items as well as interdictions of any vessels suspected of transporting the above items from and to North Korea. And the United States has been strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on North Korea more rigorously, which President Bush proposed in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003. At the same time, the United States has been putting bilateral pressure on China and South Korea to undertake effective sanction measures on North Korea such as suspension of economic and energy assistance.

Nevertheless, the hostile neglect and eventual transformation of the Kim, Jong-il regime through outside pressure would not work. Such a move would worsen rather than improve the current nuclear standoff, leaving the North with fewer and fewer alternatives to actions that would eventually escalate into a major conflict on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the option seems to rely on faulty assumptions regarding the effectiveness of isolation and containment. It can easily become problematic if the Kim, Jong-il regime does not quickly collapse, and North Korea becomes a true nuclear weapons state by crossing critical redlines. Such actions would only solidify Kim's power base, strengthen the strategic position of the military in North Korea, and extend his regime survival. It is all the more so because of the intense and widespread anti-American sentiments in North Korean society that have resulted from both its people's long lasting memory of American air raids during the Korean War and the ruling regime's systematic indoctrination.²⁴ And most importantly, China and South Korea would not join the United States in pursuing the strategy of isolation, containment, and transformation. American pressures notwithstanding, they

²⁴ For a critical view of the regime change option in North Korea, see Robert S. Litwak, *Regime Change: US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2007), pp. 245-291.

refused to participate in PSI and to suspend economic and energy assistance to the North, and the hard-line strategy would not be effectual without these two countries' active cooperation.

VI. "Negotiated Settlement and Engagement Are the Only Viable Options!"

Negotiated settlement through peaceful and diplomatic means and the gradual change of North Korea through engagement are the only viable options.²⁵ Judged on North Korea's behavior, what is urgent is to freeze its nuclear activities. Verifiable inspection of nuclear programs and their irreversible dismantling can come later. Time is on nobody's side. The failure to freeze activities and a prolonged stalemate could turn the North into a full-fledged nuclear weapons state, making peaceful resolution more difficult. Negotiation seems the best way to ensure the immediate freeze of North Korea's nuclear activities. And the negotiation and engagement options are most desirable and feasible. Military options are too costly in all respects, whereas transformation through hostile neglect has the very probable risk that North Korea will become an outright nuclear armed state before progress is made, as well as the fact that the aggressive posture can quickly escalate into military action. Thus, policy efforts should first be committed to negotiated settlement, and only in the event of its failure should other hard line options be explored.

Active engagement with the North in tandem with the negotiated settlement will certainly lead to opening, reform, and gradual changes in North Korea. Engagement will entail trust, the most indispensable element for dialogue and negotiation. Given that the current standoff resulted from mutual distrust (i.e., the American accusation of North Korea as a violator of the Agreed Framework and North Korea's fear of

²⁵ See Jung-Hoon Lee and Chung-in Moon, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement," *Security Dialogue* 34:2 (June 2003), pp. 135-151.

an American nuclear attack reminiscent of recent developments in Iraq), trust-building should be the first step, which engagement will immediately facilitate. Trust-building cannot be enhanced without mutual recognition of identity.²⁶ Recognition, positive reinforcement, and exchanges and cooperation through a process of engagement can foster major domestic political and economic changes, making the North a constructive member of the international community.

VII. “Revive the Six-Party Talks Process! There Are No Other Alternatives.”

The track record of the Six-Party Talks process has shown a roller-coast pattern. Ups and downs as well as stop-and-go have characterized its overall process characteristics. No progress was made in the first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks. A major breakthrough through the adoption of the September 19 Beijing Joint Statement during its 4th round in 2005 immediately resulted in a major setback due to the BDA issue. After a relatively long stalemate (from November 2005 to February 2007), six parties adopted the February 13 agreement on initial implementation of the September 19 joint statement at the 3rd session of the 5th round of the Six-Party Talks. Technical and procedural difficulties associated with the transfer of North Korean bank accounts at BDA to a third party bank again stalled the Six-Party Talks process. This precarious and uncertain negotiation pattern has considerably weakened public trust in the Six-Party Talks process. But the Six-Party Talks should be revived and sustained because there are no other alternatives. North Korea has always favored direct bilateral talks with the US. The US might be able to make a bilateral security assurance to the North, but it cannot guarantee any economic and energy assistance to the North. The bilateral talks would become meaningful and effective only if they are being held within the context of the Six-Party Talks

²⁶ J.J. Suh, “Producing Security Dilemma out of Uncertainty: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” (November 2006, mimeo).

process.

More importantly, two documents adopted by the Six-Party Talks, namely the September 19 joint statement and the February 13 agreement, are critical in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem in a peaceful and diplomatic manner. The joint statement presents a promising step toward the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem.²⁷ According to it, North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as to returning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. American affirmation of non-hostile intent, mutual respect of sovereignty, peaceful co-existence and eventual normalization was also refreshing and tremendously encouraging to the overall process. In particular, American commitment to refrain from attacking or invading North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons reduces the risk of catastrophic military conflict on the Korean peninsula.

The five other countries also gave assurances that they are willing to help rebuild the failing North Korean economy by engaging in bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation with North Korea in the fields of energy, trade and investment. Such willingness sent an auspicious signal to a North Korea burdened by extreme economic hardship. The agreement produced two other positive peace dividends. One is the agreement to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and the other is that the six parties have committed to make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia by agreeing to explore ways and means to promote multilateral security cooperation. Both are vital to shaping a new peace and security architecture on the Korean peninsula and in the region.

The agreement underscored the triumph of innovative diplomacy where everyone is a winner: security assurance as well as economic and energy assistance for North Korea, abandonment of North Korea's nuclear weapons and programs for the US, and diplomatic success for

²⁷ See Chung-in Moon, "After Beijing Breakthrough, What Next?," *Korea Times*, September 23, 2005; Joseph Kahn, "North Korea Signs Nuclear Accord," *International Herald Tribune*, September 20, 2005.

China. South Korea was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of all, as the joint statement addressed most of the issues on its long-cherished wish list: a non-nuclear North Korea, no military action by the US, resuscitation of the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and multilateral security cooperation in the region. Japan and Russia must have shared similar satisfaction.

The February 13 Agreement on 'Initial actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement' is also significant.²⁸ According to the agreement, North Korea pledged to "shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility," and "invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications." And the North has also agreed to come up with "a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods." In return for these initial actions, the United States has agreed to start bilateral talks with North Korea aimed at "resolving pending bilateral issues" (i.e., removing North Korea from the list of state-sponsors of terrorism and the termination of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act on North Korea) and "moving toward full diplomatic relations." Japan agreed to resume bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize its relations with the North. And five countries (US, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) have agreed to make an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the North within the next 60 days, contingent upon North Korea's implementation of its initial pledges.

The six parties have also established five working groups (denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, DPRK-US normalization, DPRK-Japan normalization, economy and energy cooperation, and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement. If North Korea makes a complete declaration of all nuclear pro-

²⁸ For its full text, refer to http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/mk_a008/mk_b083/mk_c063.html. Also see "Faces saved all round," *Economist*, February 17th, 2007, pp. 28-30.

grams and disables all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plants, then economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of HFO, including initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons, will be provided to North Korea. It is also interesting to note that "once the initial actions are implemented, the six parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in North-east Asia." It was also agreed to hold the 6th round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of working groups and discuss actions for the next phase.

Although the February 13 agreement is nothing but a first step toward the fuller denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it deserves commendation for several reasons. First, in contrast to the Joint Statement which is rather comprehensive and declaratory, the agreement is significant because it gives a very concrete picture of actions with a clearly defined time table. Second, the agreement is also innovative in the sense that it effectively combines bilateral with multilateral approaches. Most interesting is the shifting US position. The United States has become pragmatic enough to pursue bilateral contacts with the North, departing from previous adherence to multilateral contacts. It is particularly noteworthy that all five countries have pledged to share costs of energy assistance to North Korea in accordance with the principle of equality and fairness. Third, both North Korea and the United States appear to have committed to the diplomatic resolution of the nuclear problem through the Six-Party Talks process by overcoming the inertia-driven behavior of the past. Immediately after signing the agreement, both parties have been moving fast. Whereas the United States pledged to resolve the BDA problem within 30 days and invited Vice Foreign Minister Kim, Gye-gwan, North Korea's chief delegate to the Beijing talk, to visit New York on March 1 to initiate bilateral talks on normalization, North Korea has also reciprocated by inviting Mohammed el-Baradei, head of the IAEA, to visit the North, which can be viewed as a pretext for the return of its inspectors. Finally, there appears to be a shared perception and unity of purpose among all par-

ties, even including North Korea, which the breakdown of the agreement could lead to the collapse of negotiated settlement, portending a major disaster and that no one wants to lose face by becoming a spoiler.

Nonetheless, several challenges await the Six-Party Talks. The most crucial issue is the scope of nuclear activities and programs to be declared, inspected, and dismantled. Does “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” include the highly enriched uranium program (HEU)? Obviously, the US would think so, whereas the North may continue to deny that it even exists. Factual evidence should eventually resolve this issue. Verifiable inspections pose another daunting challenge. Would North Korea allow an intrusive inspection? Given the clandestine nature of North Korean society, its extraordinarily high national pride, and the powerful position of its military, it would be extremely difficult for outside inspectors to undertake a sweeping and intrusive inspection of nuclear facilities in the North. Even if North Korea showed a passively cooperative attitude, verifiable inspections may still prove difficult, with the Iraq experience an obvious testament to the dilemma of inspections.

Let’s assume that North Korea fully cooperates with the verifiable dismantling. Such cooperative behavior is predicated on incentives; and bilateral and multilateral energy assistance, expansion of trade and investment, and other forms of assistance will be integral to the successful implementation of freezing, verifiable inspection, and irreversible dismantling of nuclear programs. Pooling financial resources for such a scope of assistance is another hurdle the parties involved must face. As it stands, it may fall to China and South Korea to spearhead such assistance. Russia has also become more proactive in extending assistance to the North. Considering other pending issues such as missile proliferation, human rights violations, and illicit drug and counterfeit currency trafficking, however, Japan and the US may discover significant domestic political opposition to assuming the lion’s share in assisting North Korea. Japan might not join such efforts unless the issue of abducted Japanese is resolved. Provision of incentives and engagement with North Korea might become less effectual without the participation of Japan and the United States. And from a logistic point

of view, it would also be a formidable task to coordinate and steer five working groups simultaneously.

These constraints and challenges notwithstanding, the negotiated settlement through the Six-Party Talks process seems most desirable. The six-party talks process itself has become institutionalized with enormous implications for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. There are no other realistic alternatives but the talks, and all parties should make serious efforts to make it successful.

VIII. "Put the North Korean Nuclear Problem in a Proper Context!"

As noted before, the North Korean nuclear issue is also deeply embedded in the structure of the Korean conflict.²⁹ North Korea claims its nuclear sovereignty because of American nuclear and conventional threats that partially exist due to the military confrontation along the DMZ. Thus, it might be difficult to completely resolve the nuclear issue without first transforming the current armistice agreement into a new peace treaty involving the North, the South, and the US tying the nuclear issue into the overall peace regime in Korea could facilitate the very process of negotiation. The peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue will eventually cultivate new trust among concerned parties, and such trust can easily facilitate the resolution of other outstanding security and non-security concerns. Thus, progress in nuclear negotiations can produce positive linkage effects on negotiations on the transformation of the armistice agreement into a new peace regime in Korea. In this regard, President Bush's remarks in Hanoi during a summit with President Roh, Moo-hyun in November 2006, which suggested the transformation of the armistice agreement into a peace treaty by formally ending the Korean War, draw our attention. However, it should be noted that a peace regime, be it based on a North-South Korean peace treaty, a North Korean-US normalization and

²⁹ Cite Selig Harrison, O'Hanlon and Mochizuki, and the USIP report point out.

peace treaty, or a four-party (North Korea, South Korea, the US, and China) treaty, does not necessarily have to be an outcome of North Korea's denuclearization. On the contrary, an institutionalization of a peace regime can be either pursued in tandem with nuclear negotiations, or settled earlier than nuclear negotiations. Of these, a basic treaty DPRK-US diplomatic normalization that includes a provision on peace and security would be the most effective catalyst in resolving the North Korean nuclear quagmire.

A peace regime on the Korean peninsula cannot be effectively pursued without first shaping a regional milieu conducive to it. It is for this reason that participants in the Six-Party Talks process should actively seek a multilateral security cooperation regime resembling the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It seems quite fortunate that the February 13 agreement mandated the initiation of a working group on Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism. If a multilateral security cooperation mechanism is set in motion, it will greatly facilitate not only the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, but also the process of military confidence-building and arms control in Northeast Asia.

IX. "Patience, Prudence, and Concerted Efforts Are the Key to Success."

Shutting down and sealing nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, inviting IAEA inspectors for verifiable inspection, disabling those facilities in Yongbyon, and declaration of all nuclear programs and weapons can be done relatively easily. Verification of all nuclear programs and weapons through even intrusive inspection and their irreversible dismantling could take a much longer time. It might take several years. And in the process of intrusive inspection, there could be ups and downs with North Korea. In dealing with this process, all parties need to show patience and self-restraint. Otherwise, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem might become all the more difficult. Patience must be an important virtue.

Prudence also matters. Reckless and unilateral policy behavior by the Bush administration worsened the situation. The US needs to be more prudent. Prudence comes from a more realistic and inter-subjective understanding of North Korea. In fact, despite its past erratic and even deceptive behavior, the North Korean leadership is not irrational. Although the North is a tough bargainer, it is willing to cooperate if the proper mix of incentives is given. North Korea has always responded positively to positive reinforcement, and vice versa.³⁰ Recognition of its identity, provision of tangible incentives, and occasional face-saving treatment has and can yield positive results. Negotiations over the Geneva Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks reveal that North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy has always resulted in negotiated settlements when its identity is recognized and proper incentives are given. Concerted efforts among the Six-Party Talks members are critical elements of successful negotiation with North Korea.

Negotiated settlement needs to be prudently linked to engagement with North Korea. Engagement aims not only at promoting exchange and cooperation with North Korea, but also fostering the process of opening and reform. Ultimately, it will lead to institutionalization of a market economy, expansion of civil society, and the rise of the middle class, resulting in the gradual transformation of North Korea. Political changes can come from within, minimizing or preventing the pains and costs of implosion or abrupt collapse. Such changes can assure irre-

³⁰ Chung-in Moon, "North Korea's Foreign Policy in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective," B.C. Koh, *North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang's Foreign Policy* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2004), pp. 355-368; Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, "Dealing with North Korea," *Proliferation Brief*, 6:23 (December 19, 2003); Selig Harrison, *Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, 2003). The United States Peace Institute, "A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean War," *Special Report* 106 (May 2003), p. 2.; Council On Foreign Relations, *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Peninsula*, Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, "Dealing with North Korea," *Proliferation Brief*, 6:23 (December 19, 2003). *Korean peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), pp. 18-21;

versible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons.³¹ But engagement should start with recognition of mutual identity, which is essential for mutual trust-building.

³¹ See Chung-in Moon, "Managing Collateral Catastrophe: Rationale and Preconditions for International Economic Support for North Korea," Choong-young Ahn, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Young-sun Lee (eds.), *A New International Engagement: Framework for North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2004), pp. 117-146.

Japan as a Normal State and Implications for Asian Diplomacy

Yoshihide Soeya

Observers have long misconstrued the substance and implications of Japan's move toward a "normal state" after the end of the Cold War, thus complicating not only the conceptual framework of Japan's foreign and security policies, but the realities of Northeast Asian security. The basic motives of Japan have been internationalist rather than nationalist, and the net impact has been to substantiate Japan's de-facto middle power security policy. The confusion in analysis is in large part a product of the statements and actions by Japanese conservative political actors, but they are not the indication of any grand strategy but simply the expression of frustrations against some of the defects deeply embedded in the postwar regime of Japan. A close look at the Japanese dedication to international peace-keeping, the strengthened US-Japan alliance, and an East Asian community reveals the substance of a new Japanese diplomacy after the end of the Cold War as that of a middle power rather than a traditional great power. In essence, Japan's de-facto a middle power diplomacy should make Korea a natural partner in Japan's de-facto middle power approach toward Asia.

Introduction

Japan-Korea relations after the end of the Cold War has suffered from a huge opportunity cost. The relationship would have been much better if the deep structure of this opportunity cost had been realized explicitly, and if this knowledge had been used as a guidepost with which to steer the relationship. The reality, however, has been

quite the opposite, which accounts for an emotionally-charged vicious cycle between the political communities of the two countries. The problem on the Japanese side, particularly among conservative politicians, lies in the lack of appreciation of the deep gap between what their political assertions might imply in the rest of the world, on the one hand, and the real substance of Japanese foreign policy characterized by internationalism rather than nationalism, on the other. In other words, a dominant political discourse led by somewhat nationalistic political actors in Japan today, often characterized (wrongly I should add) in Korea and other places as Japan leaning toward the “right” or “nationalism,” does not reflect or fails to appreciate the steady progress of Japanese foreign policy after the end of the Cold War toward proactive internationalism.

In turn, a fundamental problem on the Korean side, it seems to me, is that the Korean observers tend to pick up isolated pieces of “evidence” from Japanese arguments and actions, and put them into its own frame of reference, only to strengthen its particular belief and “conviction” about the changing nature of Japanese diplomacy toward the “right” or “traditional nationalism” (which I should argue are entirely misplaced). The good news about this perceptual/emotional gap between Japan and Korea is that, precisely because the gap is not substantiated by realities, the relationship would not deteriorate as much as the severity of the emotional gap might suggest. The bad news, however, is that national interests of both Japan and Korea are damaged to the extent that both countries cannot mobilize huge potentials for cooperation buried in the relationship. I argue that digging up these potentials would not only make Japan-Korea relations into plus-sum relations, but would even cause a paradigm shift in the future evolution of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and the entire East Asian region.

First of all, this paper will demonstrate that the changing domestic environments and political discourse in Japan have not as much affected the actual substance of Japanese security policy as the conservative tone of political assertions might imply. Secondly, on the basis of this understanding, I will argue that the changes in Japanese security policy

since the end of the Cold War, whose major characteristic is often dubbed as “Japan as a normal state,” have in reality been preparing Japan toward the path as a full-fledged “middle power”¹ rather than a traditional great power. If one can intellectually and indeed emotionally be prepared to accept such a new thinking, then the potential for Japan-Korea cooperation as genuinely equal partners could be turned into an important part of Northeast Asian realities. In order to substantiate these arguments, an examination of the changing nature of Japanese politics and security policy is first in order.

Explicating the “Assertive Diplomacy”

A brief explanation of Japan’s “assertive diplomacy,” which many in Korea (as well as other places) tend to interpret as Japan becoming nationalistic or even militaristic, would reveal that the fundamental assumptions widely and stubbornly held in Korea are essentially misplaced. Recent changes in Japan’s security policies can be categorized into two types. The first is a set of attempts to remedy exceedingly minimalist policies (often labeled as one-country-pacifism) of a postwar Japan. In essence, the concept of “Japan as a normal state” was raised in this context, presupposing some sort of “abnormality” in the post-war Japanese defense and security policies.

When Ichiro Ozawa raised the concept in the early 1990s, the “abnormality” had to do with Japanese inadequate adjustment to the end of the Cold War, in general, and its inability to respond to the Gulf War in 1991, in particular. Japan’s awakening to the new security realities after the Cold War has opened up ways toward greater participation in international peace-keeping operations, and later the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance. These changes, often seen as signs of Japan becoming a “normal state,” thus have consolidated the founda-

¹ Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon-no Middle Power Gaiko [Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 2005). The Korean translation is now available from Orum publishers.

tions of Japan's de facto middle power diplomacy.

The second set of changes has been manifest, particularly after the demise of the 1955 regime caused by the collapse of the Socialist forces in Japanese domestic politics, in the vocal protests by Japanese traditional nationalists against the postwar state of the Japanese defense and security policies and their premises. These political actors are in essence shouting frustrations sporadically against the dominant and majority consensus of a postwar Japan (basically backward-looking), without any sense of a grand strategy for the future of Japan (rather than forward-looking). In essence, statements by these people against the Japanese postwar consensus are actually the sources of complexity of Japanese domestic politics as well as its external relations, but are by no means any indication of Japan's international security role today and in the future.

The same applies to the debate about Article Nine of the Japanese postwar Constitution. Previously, simply to say that the revision should be "debated" sounded hawkish, but today, various opinion-makers and politicians have begun to debate alternative revisions with respective future images of Japan and its roles in the region and the world. On balance, this is a sign of progress in the Japanese security debate.

In addition, public opinion in support of the constitutional revision has steadily shown a sign of healthy evolution. One of the recent opinion polls conducted by the *Yomiuri Shinbun*,² for instance, reveals that while 56 percent of respondents favor constitutional revision, 70 percent do so because they believe the present constitution does not clearly justify the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, and 47 percent support the revision because they feel that the current constitution cannot adequately deal with new issues such as contribution to multilateral security. This is in line with the results of many other opinion polls, indicating that the constitutional revision is far from being an issue of nationalism for the vast majority of the Japanese public.

That said, there must also be recognition of the fact that the misun-

² *Daily Yomiuri*, April 4, 2006.

derstandings and distortions may have been fueled by political statements and actions by political leaders amid changing Japanese discourse on security policies and issues. What these statements really reveal, however, is frustration with various aspects of the postwar setup and is not an expression of any ideologically conservative strategy. Paradoxically, such isolated expressions have gained a degree of public support precisely because of a lack of an explicit strategy on their part. As the opinion polls indicate clearly, were a desire to revive Japan's prewar aspirations actually articulated clearly as an explicit conservative strategy, the Japanese public would be the first to reject it.

Were Japan's foreign policy to truly embrace the view of history espoused by the Yasukuni Shrine, for instance, Japan would infuriate not only South Korea and China but also ultimately antagonize the United States. Not even the most diehard proponents of a revisionist history are willing or prepared to accept such consequences as Japan's national strategy. Currently, domestic debate in Japan over the question of history has been narrowly focused on the issues of Chinese and Korean accusations, giving rise to a highly emotional phenomenon whereby the assertion of the nationalists has been gaining some public support. By breaking the vicious circle of emotionally charged criticism and counter-criticism, the vast majority of the Japanese public will undoubtedly identify strongly with the postwar consensus, built upon the San Francisco Peace Treaty, still the basis of Japanese proactive pacifism after the end of the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, postwar pacifism of Japan has not simply died away, but some elements of pacifism have found new forms of articulating their values and beliefs. They are usually proactive, seeking a global role, as most clearly represented by Yoichi Funabashi's thesis of Japan as a global civilian power. My assertion of Japan's middle power strategy is another argument of a similar nature. In my theorization of Japan's security profile, as well as that of Yoichi Funabashi, participation in international security and alliance management with the United States are important components of today's and future strategy of Japan. An interesting and important phenomenon in the Japanese debate is that even traditional nationalists do not deny the importance

of these basic orientations of Japanese security policy, indicating that they are not necessarily motivated by any sense of alternative strategies replacing the postwar choices. In order to demonstrate this argument, I will next review the evolution of changes in Japan's security policies after the end of the Cold War in the domains of international security and the US-Japan alliance.

Awakening to International Security

The most critical change in Japan's security policies after the Cold War has occurred in the domain of international security, where the 1991 Gulf War became a critical turning point awakening the government to the new realities after the end of the Cold War. The absolute humiliation resulting from the Japanese government's incapacity, other than through "checkbook diplomacy," to contribute to multinational efforts to defeat Iraq was a central driving force behind the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in June 1992. The passage of the law enabled the Japanese government to dispatch its Self-Defense Force (SDF) to the peace-keeping operations under the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was followed by a series of dispatches of the SDF troops to a number of other UN PKO such as in Zaire, the Golan Heights, and East Timor.³

As Japan was making this significant engagement in the domain of international security for the first time after the end of World War II, the monopoly of power by the LDP was broken in August 1993 with the birth of the Morihiro Hosokawa government as an anti-LDP coalition. When the desperate LDP came back to power with the Socialist Party head Murayama as Prime Minister of an LDP-led coalition government in June 1994, Murayama recognized the constitutionality of SDF and the legitimacy of the US-Japan alliance, thus destroying his

3 L. William Heinrich, Akiho Shibata and Yoshihide Soeya, *United National Peace-keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies* (Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 1999).

party's long-standing *raison-d'être*. This led to the catastrophic demise of the Socialist Party, and the collapse of the so-called 1955 regime.

The demise of the leftist-pacifist political forces in domestic politics has changed the context of political discourse on security matters in a somewhat fundamental manner. It was particularly significant that an overall change in the domestic atmosphere lifted long-standing taboos on national and international security including the debate over the revision of Article Nine of the Japanese postwar constitution. This phenomenon, however, was not necessarily an indication of Japan becoming "nationalistic" or "rightist" as many in Korea and Asia worried. As seen above, the initial change of significance had to do with a growing Japanese awareness of the importance of international peace-keeping efforts. Opinion polls indicate, for instance, that in the 1990s many Japanese had come to support the revision of Article Nine because they felt that it prohibited Japan from "international contribution" such as participation in UN PKO.⁴

Supported by these shifting public opinions, the development in the direction of deeper engagement in international security has been systematic and steady, while responses in the domain of traditional national security have been sporadic. After all, as stressed at the outset, the emphasis in Ichiro Ozawa's theory of Japan as a "normal state" was also placed more on Japan's participation in international peace-keeping efforts than anything else. In the course of these developments, 9.11 has opened up a yet another chapter for Japan's coping with international security. Soon after 9.11, the support of the international community for the United States was unmistakable. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also supported the United States unequivocally. This was a natural act from the standpoint of Japanese engagement in international security whose momentum has been steadily on the rise in the 1990s.

In fact, the anti-terrorism measures law, enacted speedily to dis-

⁴ Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives," Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

patch Japanese SDF to logistical support in the Indian Ocean, was legitimized in the name of the United Nations Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and not the US-Japan alliance.⁵ Invoking the US-Japan security treaty was impossible because the Japanese government has not recognized the right of collective self-defense as constitutional.

Here, the lesson from the 1991 Gulf War experiences was clearly at work. The nightmare for the Japanese government was to repeat “checkbook diplomacy.” Politically, the US factor was not insignificant in the mind of central decision-makers, particularly Prime Minister Koizumi. In the end, it was fortunate for the Japanese government that the support for the United States did not contradict contribution to international security at the time of the war in Afghanistan. This, however, was not necessarily the case regarding a war against Iraq. From a Japanese point of view, there exists a gap between the war in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq. While the war in Afghanistan was a clear case of international security, the case of the Iraq war was complicated at best. Beneath the surface, the Japanese government, too, was deeply annoyed by the unilateralism of the Bush administration to go to war against Iraq. It, therefore, hoped that some U.N. resolution would be passed justifying the US action. When time ran out, however, the Japanese government did not have any other means but to go along with the United States.

The aftermath of the war against Iraq has thus revealed a basic dilemma for Japanese security policies, represented by the difficulty in maintaining a delicate balance between international security and the US-Japan alliance. On the one hand, steady participation in international security premised on the norm of multilateral cooperation has become a central objective of Japan’s new security policy after the end

⁵ “Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations.” (November 2, 2001).

of the Cold War.

Japan's overall security policy, however, is still premised on the absolute necessity to continue to ally with the United States.

A New US-Japan Alliance

The second domain of change in Japan's security policies after the end of the Cold War had to do with the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance. In this process, there emerged important seeds for the US-Japan alliance to evolve into public goods for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Among others, the "US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty-first Century," signed on April 17, 1996, by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton, identified the primary role of the US-Japan alliance as public goods for the larger cause of regional peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It declared that "the Japan-US security relationship remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century."⁶

The immediate background triggering the administrative process of this re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance was not a "China threat," but the Korean crisis in 1994 when the Clinton administration seriously considered surgical strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities.⁷ At this juncture, the policy-makers in Tokyo and Washington came to a stark realization that they had not prepared anything on feasible military cooperation in the event of war on the Korean peninsula.⁸ Then, this realization gave rise to a serious concern about the survivability of

⁶ "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century" (April 17, 1996). Available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

⁷ Yoshihide Soeya, "The China Factor in the US-Japan Alliance: The Myth of a China Threat," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (August 2002).

⁸ Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

the alliance in the event Japan would prove to be a by-stander. Secretary of Defense William Perry later recalled to the effect that it would be the end of the alliance if Japan did nothing in the event the US soldiers were shedding blood in Korea. The deep and central motive of the re-affirmation process, therefore, was to save the US-Japan alliance from a possible collapse to be incurred by possible Japanese inaction.

This crisis in the US-Japan alliance led to the subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United States and Japan, which materialized in 1997. The new Guidelines meticulously delineated what Japan constitutionally and legally can and cannot do in the form of cooperating with the United States in the event of a regional contingency. This, in essence, deeply tied the Japanese security policy to that of the United States, rather than encouraging Japanese strategic independence.

This has become even more explicit under the Bush administration. The initial blueprint for the US-Japan alliance under the Bush administration was presented by the core people in the Washington policy community, many of whom later assumed important positions in the Bush foreign policy team. It is the so-called Armitage report, titled "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership."⁹ Although the reality falls far short of the American expectation, the message was explicit in calling for a US-Japan alliance more closely modeled on the US-U.K. relationship.

In the Bush global strategy, the expected role of allies has undergone a significant transformation. The Bush strategy basically defines the US national interests as the core, with the assumptions that the promotion of the US national interests would lead to a better world and that the end of the Cold War has given the United States a golden opportunity to transform the world. Allies are expected to support and join this US mission. This redefinition of the alliance for the Bush global strategy has changed the modality of the US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi's performance with President Bush has been quite effec-

⁹ "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership," Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (October 2000).

tive under this new US definition of the alliance relationship, although it is clear that Koizumi himself has not been inspired nor motivated by such deep strategic logic of the Bush administration.

This implies that Japan does not have the luxury of contemplating its own regional and global strategy without the alliance with the United States as its core. This does not mean, however, that Japan should be swallowed by the US strategy. I should have some kind of “autonomy” within the alliance setup, if not as an antithesis against the alliance. This is typical “autonomy” for middle powers, a common issue for Japan and Korea.

Implications for China

As argued above, that the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance was directed against China, in general, and a Taiwan contingency, in particular, is a widely held myth. The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, which called for the revision of the Guidelines, was already complete by the fall of 1995, and Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and President Clinton were scheduled to announce it at the time of the Osaka APEC summit in October 1995, both before the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Taiwanese presidential elections in the spring of 1996. Clinton simply did not come to Osaka for domestic political reasons.

In the meantime, the question of Taiwan security began to loom large particularly after a series of Chinese military pressures and exercises directed against the Taiwanese presidential election in March 1996. By that time, former US President Jimmy Carter’s trip to Pyongyang had salvaged the North Korean missile quagmire, resulting in the Geneva agreement to create KEDO to circumvent North Korean missile programs. This unfortunate combination of events had shifted people’s attention away from North Korea toward Taiwan, in the debate about the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance in general, and the revision of the Guidelines in particular.

It is fair to say that no responsible policy-maker either in Tokyo or Washington believed that a serious contingency calling for the invoca-

tion of the revised Guidelines over Taiwan would be imminent.¹⁰ A trickier part is that the revised Guidelines are theoretically applicable to a Taiwan contingency, and that the Japanese government has never denied this. This is implied by the Japanese contention that “situations in the areas surrounding Japan” is a situational concept and not a geographical one.

Yoichi Funabashi describes the role of China in the re-affirmation process as giving a “subliminal” effect.¹¹ It should be fair to summarize that the policy-makers have tacitly seen in the re-affirmed alliance the implicit function to deal with the rise of China generally and over the long run. This was also the central point in the Nye initiative as stated in the 1995 Nye report. Joseph Nye recalls that he thought the rise of China could be managed more constructively if the United States and Japan act jointly on the basis of the alliance.¹² In this regard, the central function of the re-affirmed US-Japan alliance toward China was dominantly implicit, primarily regarded as a tool to maintain general strategic stability amid the historic rise of China, rather than something directed against a specific scenario such as a Taiwan contingency.

This logic behind the revitalized US-Japan alliance has not changed until today, even including the rather explicit reference to China and Taiwan in a US-Japan joint statement issued after the “two-plus-two” meeting of ministers in charge of foreign and defense affairs on February 19, 2005, in Washington D.C. In the statement, there were three relevant points regarding China and Taiwan under the heading of the “common strategic objectives in the region.” Namely, Japan and the United States (1) welcome Chinese constructive roles in the region and the world, and develop cooperative relations with China; (2) encourage peaceful resolution of problems over the Taiwan Straits through dialogue; and (3) encourage China to increase transparency in the military

¹⁰ For a discussion on the non-strategic nature of Japan’s policy toward Taiwan, see Yoshihide Soeya, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 165 (March 2001).

¹¹ Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*.

¹² Joseph Nye, Jr., “The Case for Deep Engagement,” *Foreign Affairs* (July / August 1995).

domain.¹³ The substance of the reference to China and Taiwan was not any news to anyone including the Chinese.

The fact that they are openly stated in an official document may be novel, which indicates a stronger political determination by both Tokyo and Washington for a strengthened alliance relationship. It should not be mistaken, however, that the US side had originally wanted to include a more explicit statement concerning the Taiwan problem, and that it was the Japanese side that was reluctant. It appears that the dominant understanding outside of Japan is the other way around, which exemplifies the typical failure to grasp the realities of changing Japanese security policies, which adds to somewhat unnecessary sources of confusion to the post-Cold War development of East Asian security.

Japanese Approach to East Asian Community

Soon after the end of the Cold War, there arose awareness among central policy-makers in Japan that the predominance of the alliance relationship with the United States in Japan's post-Cold War responses is deeply related to the lack of effective multilateral forums for Japanese security policy. Facing the end of the Cold War, therefore, it was natural for the Japanese strategic thinkers to opt for multilateral security cooperation, not necessarily as an alternative to the US-Japan alliance, but as a new tool to cope with new security challenges. The initial attempt in this direction was exemplified by Japan's active involvement in the process toward the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Specifically, a high ranking official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry played a critical role in the early 1990s as a bridge between Japan and ASEAN in the initial exchange and sharing of ideas at the track II level, eventually contributing to the establishment of the ARF in 1994. This approach of Tokyo was essentially in tandem with the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, articulated in 1977 by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Manila,

¹³ http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/2+2_05_02.html.

emphasizing the central importance of Southeast Asia for Japan's regional diplomacy.

Arguably, with the realization of ASEAN 10 in 1997, the long-articulated political goal of Japan's Southeast Asian policy was about to be achieved on ASEAN's own initiative, with much economic backing provided by the Japanese ODA and private trade and FDI. In early 1997, anticipating the birth of ASEAN 10, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed the Japan-ASEAN summit to further accelerate the integration of ASEAN as well as Japan's relations with the ASEAN countries. The realization of ASEAN 10, however, coincided with the Asian financial crisis, forcing ASEAN countries to go through a set of restructuring efforts in domestic economies and politics as well as regional arrangements. Also, at about the same time, China had shifted its main strategic focus from high politics to low politics. ASEAN, following its usual instinct to carefully balance relations with external powers, turned the Hashimoto proposal into its own initiative leading to the establishment of ASEAN+3 at the end of 1997.

These developments have ushered in a new momentum toward deepening regional integration. Singapore took an important initiative to officially propose a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Japan. Japan, which had already started to study such arrangements with several countries including South Korea, responded positively and the negotiations gained momentum.

In the meantime, observing the momentum of a series of bilateral FTA initiatives and achieving the goal of joining the WTO, China also came up with its own FTA initiative, as most symbolically indicated by the Chinese proposal of a free trade agreement with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting in November 2000. In the following year, Chinese and ASEAN leaders reached a basic agreement that they would achieve a free trade area within the coming 10 years. This was quickly followed-up in November 2002, when the leaders signed a comprehensive framework agreement to carry out the plan. These China-ASEAN initiatives have prompted the Koizumi government to develop its own regional strategy built upon the ongoing

process of FTA negotiations. In Prime Minister Koizumi's policy speech delivered in Singapore in January 2002,¹⁴ Koizumi proposed an "Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership," built upon the "Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership," the so-called Japan-Singapore FTA, which Koizumi signed prior to the speech.

More importantly, the Koizumi proposal included an ambitious reference to an East Asian community. Koizumi said to the audience in Singapore that "our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances together." Koizumi expressed his expectation that, starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, "the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community."

To substantiate such a partnership with ASEAN, the Koizumi speech advanced a new approach to Japanese diplomacy with ASEAN. While stating his basic stance to promote policies of the Fukuda Doctrine, Koizumi in effect made clear a comprehensive design of Japan's regional engagement. Following this Koizumi initiative, the Japanese government hosted a bilateral ASEAN-Japan summit meeting in Tokyo in December 2003. This was the very first occasion when the ASEAN countries agreed to hold such a meeting outside of Southeast Asia.

The proposal of an East Asian Community in the Koizumi speech has ignited a process of conceptual competition between China and Japan. Particularly, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand embodied the line of division between the two. In the Japanese thinking, there still remains a concern about the China-centered process of community-building possibly developing into a closed region particularly vis-a-vis the United States. In the Japanese conception, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand holds a double function. First, they provide a venting channel leading to the United States as a security anchor in East Asia. Secondly, the membership of Australia and New

¹⁴ Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership," (January 14, 2002). Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html>.

Zealand is also important from the point of view of the values that will sustain as well as keep open the foundations of an East Asian Community to the rest of the world.

From the Japanese point of view, behind the competition over the membership composition between the ASEAN+3 formula, on the one hand, and the ASEAN+6 (involving Australia, New Zealand and India) formula for the East Asian Summit, on the other, lies this conceptual rivalry, if not a geopolitical competition, between Japan and China.

Conclusion

In the overall context discussed above, the relationship between Japan and Korea has a potential to cause what might be equal to a paradigm change in Northeast Asian politics. To put it concisely and graphically, the basis of Japan-South Korea relations is rooted in the geopolitical reality where Japan and Korea are surrounded by the three unilateralist powers, i.e., the United States, China and Russia. The conventional wisdom of the Korean peninsula being surrounded by the four great powers including Japan does not provide a realistic perspective to understanding the life-size security policy of postwar Japan in Northeast Asia, and has been even an important source of confusion in the evolution of a regional order. This, for instance, is a breeding ground for the myth of Japan-China geopolitical rivalry. South Korean self-definition of its role as a balancer between Japan and China also appears to be a product of this conventional wisdom.

Rather, this new geopolitical perspective is a reminder that an equal partnership between Japan and Korea is not a political slogan but can be a substantive foundation of the bilateral relationship. It is against the backdrop of this geopolitical reality that democracy in Japan and Korea, and civil society exchanges between the two peoples, have impacted the bilateral relationship in a fundamental way. It certainly takes political leadership to fill the emotional gap between the two nations emanating from history and territorial issues. Currently, the leadership in both countries is playing a role entirely in the reverse,

aggravating the gap rather than easing it. The emotional vicious cycle, however, is clearly based on entirely misplaced assumptions about each other. If it were not for the prejudice creating these emotional gaps, Korea and Japan would be natural partners who can cooperate on an equal basis for the stability and prosperity of the region and the world.



**PART
VIII**

*IT Cooperation and the Future
Information Society*

Nationalism, Regionalism, Globalism and ICTs

The Future of the Internet Economy:
Promoting Creativity, Building Confidence and Benefiting
from Convergence

IT and the Shaping of a New Social Order

An Achievement of Ten Years of ASEM:
GÉANT2 Utilizing Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN)
and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

APEC TEL's Partnership with the IT Industry Toward Developing
the Information Society

Cooperation on Regional Research Networks

Nationalism, Regionalism, Globalism and ICTs

John Ure

Regional cooperation in the form of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and easing entry requirements for foreign investors; collaboration in the form of joint R&D projects and funding; and alliances in the form of cross-border private commercial joint ventures, investment ventures, licensing agreements, marketing, etc., are all part of the process of Asian economic development, accelerated by the process of globalization.

Globalism

The development process comes historically at a moment of economic globalization, yet with the exception of Japan, none of the Asian economies is yet a global powerhouse, so regionalism can be seen as a 'half-way' house in several senses.

Regionalism

First, geographical reach is a factor, even within a world of the Internet and the 'death of distance' because whereas information and many services can be transmitted worldwide at the click of a mouse, this is not true of culture. Countries that are close neighbors are also culturally close for all kinds of obvious reasons such as shared ethnic

ties, shared histories, shared climates, shared cuisines, shared ways of living and customs, shared religions and social ethics, and so forth. This point is well illustrated by an amusing set of TV advertisements put out by the HSBC bank under the slogan 'the world's local bank' which depict precisely the importance of cultural differences in doing business. Second, the larger and more successful national companies from newly industrialized and emerging Asian economies have to climb a learning curve if they want to attack the international market. Good examples are China's telecom equipment manufacturers, Huawei and ZTE and China's largest telecom operators, China Telecom and China Mobile. In the case of Huawei and ZTE they have made very successful inroads into developing country markets, a great many of them within the 'Asian' region. This builds up their portfolio of reference clients and professional experience from which they can leverage entry into the primary markets of North America and Europe. China Telecom and China Mobile, cash-rich incumbent operators, face greater hurdles because overseas services markets are often protected by local 'national' interests, especially when the new entrant happens to be owned by a foreign state, but the principles are the same. Both companies are trying to enter regional markets, including the provision of international services for multinationals to and from China.

The challenge of culture faces even the largest multinationals. Japan's mighty telecom giant, NTT DoCoMo had the same problems entering the US and European markets as US and European companies have faced entering the Japanese market — witness the withdrawal of Vodafone from Japan's cellular market as a recent case. Third, regionalism has been a means by which smaller economies have been able to exert influence on the global stage, to 'punch above their weight.' This has become evident in the WTO arena, as countries such as Brazil and China, India and South Africa leverage their regional strengths. In Asia, the end of the Cold War has given governments opportunities to open dialogue on questions that have long been in dispute or have given rise to enduring suspicions. This in turn has provided an incentive to extend existing regional alliances, such as ASEAN to include new members in IndoChina, and the ASEAN 10 + 3 (China, Japan and

Korea). ASEAN's early agenda prioritized the political over the economic, and the will to reform proved not strong enough to overcome national differences to enact the necessary measures of economic liberalization. An example is the MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement) whereby the standards testing bodies in different countries could come to mutual arrangements to recognize each other's certificates of compliance. For items such as mobile phones, an MRA would save considerable time and business expense in getting new models into local markets, but progress has been at a snail's pace.

For example, the only other Asian country Japan has so far been able to reach an agreement with is Singapore. But the climate is changing. The 1990s saw the signing of the WTO's Basic Agreement on Telecommunications, the first services liberalization agreement, and in 1996 the Singapore Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (the Information Technology Agreement or ITA) which has effectively abolished import duties on a range of IT products.¹ Other examples are the growing support for AFTA, and the agreement in 2002 at the 8th ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh for an ASEAN-China FTA by 2010 for older ASEAN members and 2015 for newer members. Also agreed were five priority areas for cooperation, including ICTs.

The Rise of China

What seems to have brought about the change is the arrival of the 'new kid on the block', China. Does China pose a threat as an alternative economic pole of attraction for foreign investment, or an opportunity for more intra-regional trade and investment? China's official position is clearly the latter while sceptics fear the former, but in reality this is not the issue. The issue is how will national economies adapt to, and take advantage of, greater openness in regional trading relations? Some

¹ See Pascal Lamy speech http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/symp_ita_march07_e.htm.

are better positioned than others — hence the different AFTA timelines. One way to assist the less developed countries to face the challenge is for greater regional cooperation in developing local resources, especially infrastructure ('hard' in the form of roads, telecommunications, etc., and 'soft' in terms of the HR and institutional capacity to promote health and education, the rule of law and due process, transparency, due diligence, etc.) and policy development (an encouragement of entrepreneurship, process and product innovation, ways to pool resources cooperatively to maximise efficiency and achieve critical mass, etc.).

Cooperation and aid in the field of ICTs fits into this picture quite well. Both Japan and KOREA have been active funders of the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (based in Bangkok) and of the work of the APEC Telecoms Working Group. Most of the developing countries within the region have been recipients of grants and soft loans for telecommunications and community Internet projects funded directly by China, Japan or KOREA or indirectly through institutions such as the ADB or UNESCAP or UNDP, etc. For example, they have each become major supporters of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) development plans for optical fiber highways to link Yunnan province in the North to Thailand in the South.

Nationalism

But what drives these initiatives is national self-interest. The altruistic vision, usually espoused by academics such as myself, is the idea that development (of course, 'development' is open to interpretation) benefits all, and that as developing countries become richer they also consume more of the products from developed countries, a virtuous circle. The weakness in this argument is that as countries get richer, like individuals, they yearn for more and prosperity is perceived as a relative and not absolute good. Recent world debates about global warming and how far industrialized countries should 'sacrifice' growth to counter its effects is one illustration of this. The way developing coun-

tries complain that criticisms of their lack of environment protection is unfair coming from countries that have already been through the process is another illustration. The implications of this for regional or world peace are not good, certainly not as good as they would be if different motives were in play. One way to shift motives from the purely national towards the regional is to work towards a European Union model, but this is not a realistic agenda for the foreseeable future.

Back to Regionalism?

But are there any signs that such an outcome could eventually arise if sufficient energy were devoted to it? Clearly AFTA is one track that could lead in this direction, but it is worth remembering that the EU began life as the Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Could ICTs play a similar catalytic role? The obvious candidate to examine would be the agreement between China, Japan and Korea (CJK) which was initiated at a ministers' meeting in Morocco in 2002. Three subsequent ministers' meetings have established Technical Working Groups focused on the following areas of research and development

1. 3G and next generation mobile communications (4G)
2. Next generation Internet (IPv6)
3. Digital TV and Broadcasting
4. Network technologies and the Information Society
5. Open source software
6. Telecommunications service policies
7. 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
8. RFID (radio frequency identification)

Standards are designed to be global standards, and where they differ from other global standards they can achieve inter-operability. This is a fraught issue within standards setting bodies because the standards setting procedures are associated with the issue of royalty payments, and China has strong views about the need for reform in this area. Second, the separate markets of China, Japan and Korea are already sub-

stantial, and a 'free trade' zone for technology products and services would create a colossal opportunity for Asian manufacturers. However, moves in this direction face two types of hurdles. One is the need to conform to WTO trade rules of non-discrimination. The other is that national or even regional standards may disadvantage local companies trying to enter US and European markets or even third country markets. These are still very early days, and many of these issues have not reached a policy level, but if and when the R&D bears fruit these issues will raise themselves.

Nationalism or Regionalism or Globalism?

Each of the three partners, China, Japan and Korea, are forging collaboration agreements covering ICTs, for example Japan with Brazil, India and Russia. They each have their own agendas and there is no guarantee that all or any of the 1-8 points listed above will reach the level of joint commercial operations. Typically there are two types of collaboration that work. The first is between countries with complementary economies where the advantages of collaboration are self-evident. In the case of China, Japan and Korea the strongest area of complement, as opposed to competition, would seem to lie in China's low costs of land and labor. The second type of collaboration is where there is a commercial synergy between the resources (complementary) of individual companies. This would seem to be the case for many ICT ventures between China, Japan and Korea. In some cases it involves R&D, in some cases manufacturing, in some cases marketing and in some cases venture capital investment, for example between Korea and Japan.²

² A useful analysis and discussion can be found in Lim Yang-Taek "Towards a Dynamic Wave: IT Cooperation of China-Japan-Korea," *East Asian Review*, 16(3), 2004, at http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol16_3/16_3_3.pdf.

The Future of the Internet Economy: Promoting Creativity, Building Confidence and Benefiting from Convergence

Andrew W. Wyckoff¹

Introduction

Since its inception, which dates back to George Marshall's speech delivered at Harvard University in June of 1947, the OECD has worked to promote peace and prosperity through economic co-operation and development.² As Europe was rebuilt after World War II, the focus of the OECD shifted towards being a forum where market economies could learn from each other and exchange experiences, and coordinate their economic policies. To succeed in this objective, its membership expanded from a transatlantic organization to an organization that included the key economies of Europe, North America and Asia with the accession of Japan to the organization in 1964, Australia in 1971, New Zealand in 1973, Mexico in 1994 and Korea in 1996.

Since that time, the OECD has evolved towards what Secretary General Gurria calls a "hub for dialogue on global issues" and a forum

¹ Head of the Information, Computer and Communications Division at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (www.oecd.org). The opinions expressed in this paper do not represent those of the OECD Member countries or the OECD Council, but rather are those of the author.

² For a history of the OECD, see http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1876671_1_1_1_1,00.html.

where the socio-economic impacts of globalization can be managed.³ Globalisation represents an interdependency that takes the concept of economic co-operation to an extreme and with these links new economic opportunities are realised and political ties are strengthened. Fundamental to the phenomenon of globalization has been the accentuation of cross-border networks. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet — the network-of-networks — have been instrumental in enabling these networks to flourish and become ubiquitous.

ICTs and the Internet as a Catalyst to Economy

The ability to communicate, coordinate and innovate has become easy and inexpensive—greatly reducing the transaction costs of extending economic relationships across borders. As a worldwide network for communicating and sharing information, the Internet is an enabler of globalization, driving closer economic integration of global markets, facilitating the organisation of firms on a worldwide basis and helping to usher in the emergence of major new global economic actors such as China and India. Today, the Internet is an essential part of doing business for every business. Indeed, without the Internet planes do not fly, financial markets do not operate, supermarkets do not restock, taxes do not get paid and the power grid can not balance the supply and demand for electricity.

With increasing access and new capabilities, the Internet has moved from being primarily a commercial platform for e-commerce and static repository of information to a social network linking people, allowing consumer feedback, encouraging self-expression and enabling the formation of online communities. This ‘participative web’ is a new outlet for creativity that has altered the nature and economics of information

³ Opening statement by the OECD Secretary-General, Angel Gurría, to the Ministerial Council meeting, 15-16 May 2007 – *Innovation: Advancing the OECD Agenda for Growth and Equity*, see: http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,2340,en_2649_34487_38586713_1_1_1_1,00.html.

production and led to the democratisation of the media, empowering users, creating new user practices and stimulating creative supply. No where is the participatory web more developed than in Asia which is a frequent early adopter of new ICT: The most recent Internet survey of Korea reveals that about 50% of Koreans have their own website home-page or a blog. In Japan, 65% of the population can access the Internet via their mobile phone.

As the social use of the Internet develops it presents a real opportunity as an effective tool for *bridging differences across the globe* through exchanges between individuals many of which will build on existing relationships but many of which will be new encounters on a person-to-person level, unfiltered by mass media. These links will hopefully lead to a better understanding of the culture and language of others.

Internet at an Inflection Point

As was the case in 1998, when the modern, web-enabled Internet was becoming widespread and presented policy makers with a number of opportunities and challenges, the second half of this decade represents a transition period in the growth and development of this evolving network-of-networks. Three large, tectonic plates are shifting that will affect the topology, functionality and sustainability of the Internet:

- 1) *The changing functionality of the Internet* as convergence of previously distinct networks (e.g. TV and telephone) and applications towards Internet protocol-based integrated networks cause a change in usage patterns and place new demands on the Internet's architecture. This, coupled with the changing profile of Internet users that has evolved from a small community of scientists to a global community of 1 billion users in the near future, has repercussions on its use and systems of governance;
- 2) *The growing importance of the Internet as a key element of the economic infrastructure of OECD and non-OECD economies and societies* means that the Internet is not an ancillary activity used by a small subset of

e-commerce firms but is rather an integral part of the economy. The importance of the Internet to economies is enhanced with the increasingly widespread adoption of broadband connections by individuals. The importance of the Internet to our economies and societies is poised to further grow as it transforms into an “Internet of Things” and a “ubiquitous network” where through sensors and tags using technologies including radio frequency identification (RFID) billions of “things” will be (inter)networked through the Internet protocol.

- 3) *As our dependence on the Internet increases, so does the importance of maintaining its integrity.* The recent increase in the severity and sophistication of security threats and fraudulent practices, much of which is currently affecting end-users through unsolicited e-mail (Spam) and other types of ‘malware’ (malicious software) which can threaten this integrity. Left unchecked, these attacks may erode confidence and trust in e-business and e-society and retard the beneficial economic impact of the Internet. But a balance must be maintained to ensure that security and privacy provisions do not become oppression that stifles the ability of individuals to express themselves and freely exchange information and ideas. This is important not only as a stimulus to innovative activity, but also to democratic ideals.

These developments occur in a global environment where the fastest take up of the Internet is occurring outside of OECD Membership, most prominently in the Asian countries of China and India but also in Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. Coupled with this is the need to reflect on how to extend access to the 2nd and 3rd billion users and use this network as an effective tool in development strategies.

Each of these factors represents a significant shift in the use and functionality of the Internet — collectively they represent a major transition in the evolution of the Internet and a critical juncture in its development. Three challenges and opportunities arise from the transition that is underway:

- How to preserve and enhance the role of the Internet as a *creative* force that stimulates innovation and growth?
- How to build *confidence* in the Internet as a trusted system for conducting economic and social activities?

- How best to benefit from *convergence* of what were separate platforms (TV, telephone and data) towards the Internet?

Collective Action

At such a point policies need to be carefully crafted and coordinated across policy domains, borders and various stakeholder communities. Challenges such as these can only be addressed through collective action involving all stakeholders. For this reason, in June of 2006 the OECD Council, acting on a proposal from OECD's Committee for Information, Computers and Communication Policy (ICCP) agreed for the need to convene a Ministerial-level meeting on the "Future of the Internet Economy" to be held in Seoul, Korea in June 2008.⁴

By raising this confluence of issues above the working level, the interrelations can more easily be seen, horizontal policy links identified and a collaborative method and tone with stakeholders for addressing these issues can be established. These issues are not the responsibility of a single Ministry (already 7 of the 26 OECD policy committees have agreed to participate in this meeting) necessitating the need for horizontal, cross-Ministry collaboration. This meeting will represent the first OECD Ministerial meeting ever convened in Asia. This presents a unique opportunity to more fully engage Asian countries — not only OECD Members but many Asian non-member countries — in a meeting that will set the future direction of this key tool for economic, social and cultural development for the coming decade.

⁴ See: www.oecd.org/futureinternet.

IT and the Shaping of a New Social Order

Mun-Cho Kim

I. Introduction

A new social formation is emerging with the informational turn, a new great transformation following the agricultural and industrial revolution. It is totally different from traditional industrial society that has continued for about two centuries since the first industrial revolution in the late 18th century. While some scholars initiated an analysis and interpretation of characteristics of the information society from creative standpoints (Bell, 1973; Masuda, 1980; Lyon, 1988; Webster, 1995; Poster, 1995), M. Castells sharpened understanding of the society by examining it from a civilization perspective in his trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (1996-1998).

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the information society is a shift in the time-space concept, which long remained unchanged from ancient to modern times. Discussing the formation of the new time-space concept, Castells stressed the feature of the network society by differentiating what he called the "global economy" from what world system theorists called the "world economy.";

The information economy is global. A global economy is historically new reality, distinct from a world economy. A world economy, that is an economy in which capital accumulation proceeds throughout the world, has existed in the West at least since the sixteenth century, as Fernand Brudel and Immanuel Wallerstein have taught us. A global economy is something different: it is an

economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale. While the capitalist mode of production is characterized by its relentless expansion, always trying to overcome limits of time and space, it is only in the late twentieth century that the world economy was able to become truly global on the basis of the new infrastructure provided by information and communication technologies. This globality concerns the core processes and elements of the economic system (Castells, 1996: 92-93).


In the global network economy, everything is interconnected both vertically and horizontally. Production procedures, equipment, goods and services are all quickly becoming useless, making long-term ownership more disadvantageous than short-term connection. With the rise of the network society, the system of access is replacing that of possession, which has long defined living conditions, dominated political discourse and decided individual statuses. As described by a modified Cartesian 'cogito' dictum "I connect, therefore I exist," the age of access is likely to undergo significant changes in various aspects from economic transactions and political participation to highly private aspects of everyday lives. Here in this society, the gap between connected and not-connected is wider than the chasm between haves and have-nots (Rifkin, 2000).

II. Societal Impacts of IT

Societal impacts of IT can be analyzed in various ways, but it may be appropriate to make analyses by considering major conceptual aspects of the society which manifest technological influence. Extrovert or centrifugal effects of technology on the society can be analyzed largely in structural, institutional, cultural and mental aspects. More specifically, the structure and mentality can represent macro and micro aspects respectively, and the institution and culture, functional and symbolic aspects. Also, structure-institution and culture-mentality may each represent objective and subjective aspects, and structure-culture and institution-mentality, contextual and textual aspects. Based on

such a classification scheme, types and characteristics of the IT-based society can be illustrated in (Figure 1).

<Figure 1> Societal Impact of IT



1. Structural Impact: Network Society

The structural impact of IT works to make the material basis of network society, where its constitutive elements are closely connected with each other. An individual element called a point or a node is characterized by where it is placed in a network, rather than by its independent properties (Barabasi, 2002). With the spread of new communication media, connectivity tends to determine links between individual elements. As a result, the society is changing from a node-centered society to a link-centered one, so much as a current prevalent buzzword "Link or die." Elements of the network society are not fixedly linked. Rather, they are loosely connected and exchange repercussions with each other, making the society fluid. Accordingly, their perception of a place to live in radically changes. They perceive it not as "space of stay," but as "space of flow," generating a nomadic situation where disembeddedness takes place routinely (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1989).

2. Institutional Impact: Flexible Society

Increasing connectivity does not apply only to structural relations among elements. It also raises interaction density, weakening existing institutional boundaries and facilitating exchanges between institutional spheres. Epitomized by implosion and convergence, such process can help the institutional spheres, which have so far been considered oppositional components, coexist harmoniously (Baudrillard, 1983). It can be recognizable in such compositional words as edutainment, prosumer, faction, culduct, cyborg. As a result, social heterogeneity rises, creating pluralist and multicultural conditions in which various ideas, norms and values exist together. However, increasing opportunities or choices do not always guarantee positive effects. Sometimes they may aggravate social indeterminacy and weaken social responsibilities or civic morality (Robin and Webster, 1999).

3. Cultural Impact: Cyber Society

In a virtual space where advanced information and communication technology function as a medium, intangible symbols tend to wield their power. Cyber society is formed when such a phenomenon spreads even to the offline arena and behavior patterns on cyberspace prevail in the entire society (Jones, 1997). This is evidenced by the fact that impression management, putting more value on outward appearance than on substance, or emotional work is increasingly widespread in the society (Goffman, 1959; Hochschild, 1983).

4. Intrapersonal Impact: Self-Directed Society

A self-directed person, in contrast to an other-directed person described by D. Riesman, is born in a highly individualized society that requires individuals to plan their lives on their own, particularly in Western industrialized countries which have achieved a certain level of material wellbeing. Differentiating this trend from individualization of the 17-18th century modern western society, W. Beck and Beck-Gern-

sheim (2002) contend that today's secondary individualization maximizes personal autonomy or spontaneity, making everything, such as marriage, divorce, childbearing and jobs, something to choose subjectively. Such internal changes tend to lead to identity claims, eventually creating new forms of social conflicts called recognition struggles (Bauman, 2001; Honneth, 2001).

III. Advent of Heterotopic Society

1. IT and Infrastructural Changes of Society

With the spread of computer-mediated communications, there has been a research boom to figure out the social meanings of IT diffusion. Concerned about a possible loss of communities, many researchers expected an emergence of net communities established through electronic communications media (Rheingold, 1993; Smith and Kollock, 1999). Nevertheless, they were predominantly biased towards utopian technological determinism, failing to grasp the core of complicated dynamics.

To overcome such limitations, it is necessary to examine, based upon the principles of interpenetration, an underlying transformation of societal order that comes from interactions between technological systems and social systems (see Munch, 1984). More specifically, consideration should be given to (1) ubiquity and virtuality of the social environment that stem from changing social structure and culture; (2) multiplicity and selectivity of social organizations that are related to social structure and institutions; (3) superficiality and ephemerality of social relations; (4) social psychology characterized by self-identity and self-actualization. Only through considerations of these infrastructural social transformations mentioned above, would it be possible to decipher the nature of new social order.

A. Social Environment: Ubiquity and Virtuality

In a global network era in which both integration and disintegration occur continuously, information can flow anywhere. A digital network not only guarantees interaction between providers and receivers of information but also offers connectivity space that links network users with each other. Such networking is facilitated with the influx of broadband technology which makes it much easier to deal with massive information (Gilder, 2002). Networking individuals formulate a new relationship or establish a virtual network with others. The very logic that IT developments reorganize relations comes from this reinforced networking function.

Meanwhile, reality principle is to be gradually replaced by fantasy principle in a virtual world. Individuals can easily indulge in metamorphic fantasy in such a free-associational virtual world. Here, the past, present and future get intertwined with each other, life is cheerful rather than solemn, and it is always fluid without any rigid rules. Therefore, individuals are apt to enjoy as much esoteric imagination or experience as possible (Rifkin, 2000). In addition, Turkle (1995) argues that multiple personality is found in the youths who spend much time in a virtual world. Tiny pieces of multiple selves they use to mingle with others in the network of a virtual world often destroy their unitary self image in reality. Also, in multiple virtual worlds they contact, they play different roles in various situations, making their lives increasingly decentered and thereby reinforcing virtual networking. Therefore, the stable and integrated self-concept of the past is replaced by various competing mutable selves.

Moreover, the ubiquity and virtuality of the social environment trigger another problem: intervention of commercialized interests in the process of establishing individual consciousness. Market experts, advertisers or cultural administrators snatch entrance fees at gateways, showing accessibility to new cultural products and experience. Individual mental worlds are linked to the outside and information communication technology that affects every nook and corner of the nervous system with its insatiable commercial interests (Lash and Urry, 1994).

B. Social Organization: Multiplicity and Selectivity

Themes of a “multiple selection society” or “paradox of choice” provide a clue to understand a changing organizational aspect of life (Pongs, 1999; Schwartz, 2004). No doubt a new type of society with higher multiplicity and selectivity plays an effective role in enhancing individual freedom or capacity. However, brainwashed into believing that they should make progress, the people may fail to narrow the gap between a possible state and a real state and end up with a feeling of great frustration. They are highly likely to suffer from anxiety, doubt and pressure as they unsuccessfully struggle to achieve goals or to catch up with others. They are likely to reach the complexity system that is described by N. Luhmann (1995[194]) as “Nothing is more certain than uncertainty.”

The rising multiplicity and selectivity of the social system helps them get whatever they want at any time, while raising the prospect of the uncertain future at the same time. Uncertainty of the future mainly comes from ignorance or helplessness, and protecting the despairing class may constitute an urgent social agenda to be resolved in the age of high uncertainty. All the more, a weakening traditional familial safety net will worsen such a problem, requiring more responsibilities of individual choices or decisions.

C. Social Relations: Superficiality and Ephemerality

R. Sennett provides, in his book *The Corrosion of Character*, a keen insight into the weakening social relations in the condition of fierce competition. The main theme of the book is that as the flexibility and risks increase in institutional spheres, dedication to duties, loyalty to the organization and trust between coworkers are all disappearing. Paradoxically, strong solidarity between members is vanishing in a modern organization where teamwork and group culture are emphasized so much (Sennett, 1998). Organizational flexibility removes the need for interests in and attachment to work and fellow workers. That is because networking is becoming more important than focusing on

work itself. This is true of both those who have high work ethic and those who don't. Therefore, flexibility reduces dedication to the organization. When dissatisfied with the job, one would not struggle to remain in the workplace and instead he or she is more likely to quit. That is, adjusting to a new job has become more important than accumulating job experience.

Therefore, a change itself is accepted as valuable, while deferring it is a sign of failure. Also, short-term projects and contracts, flexible work and rising turnover rates remove an opportunity to form an enduring interpersonal association which is essential to cultivating informal trust. As a result, dedication, loyalty, responsibility, trust and friendship are all devalued (Sennett, 1998). It is true that such a sarcastic view on the utopian prospect for virtual communities could trigger many counterarguments. But it is Sennett who offers us a typical socioscape to watch the ephemeral aspect of current social relations.

Meanwhile, the superficiality of social relations basically seems to stem from modernization. That is because the modernization process is closely associated with the decline of communal ties and the rise of utilitarian personal interaction. Thus, modernization can be seen as the process in which a social system expands itself into a state of high ambiguity. Calling this loosening link between communal and personal life "de-socialization," C. Stone (2000) worries about a possible collapse of social bonds and relations. However; the superficiality of social relations can sometimes be regarded as a positive indication turning a "closed relationship" into an "open one," rather than as a negative sign of de-socialization (Putnam, 2000).

D. Social Psychology: Self-Identity, Self-Actualization

Individualization in a postmodern society can be defined as a process where historically defined forms of society are disappearing and traditional rituals, behavioral norms and pragmatic knowledge are losing their social salience. It is considered as active individual efforts to build his (her) own personal biography. While social relations in a traditional society are not conventionally established by individual


autonomous decisions and rather reflected the sociality of a community, those in a late modern condition come from fluidity, local communication, multilateral social contacts and autonomous management. In other words, they are seen as a product of not defensive but offensive identity. Individuals can secure a stronger social mastery over their lives, by determinedly cutting the chains of the past and overcoming unfair interventions to transform their future actively (Touraine, 1988).

During the late modern individualization process, individuals are required to cultivate and maintain new relations to set up their lives in an active manner. They therefore should expand and renew social contacts and attach high value to them. Explaining the concept of "life politics" aimed at escaping rigid tradition or hierarchical dominance, A. Giddens (1991) stresses the significance of individual decision-making in the age of high modernity. Because life politics is based on autonomous decision-making that influences self-identity, he argues, self-identity is a result of individual reflection.

2. The Making of a New Social Order

In the radically changing environment, an autonomous individual decision tends to be despised as outdated, whereas online group-think in an endlessly connected network will emerge as a dominant force. As autonomy is replaced with immediate social interactions, individuals come to live in a complicated interdependent order established by networks of constantly changing relationships (Wellman, et. al., 1996). In fact, people form more various social relations than ever before. In our ever-increasing global net world, individuals function as just one node of a social network, and this is also true of companies and social organizations. Even citizens and nations are reduced to one element of a complicated international cooperation community network. Accordingly, independent behaviors of a disconnected node or element are socially and globally criticized. Such a composite societal order basically characterized by heterogeneous, infinite nodes and connections come down to the notion "heterotopic society," (Figure 2) as originally suggested by M. Foucault (see Faubion, 1999).

<Figure 2> Advent of Heterotopic Society



Information communication forms a technological basis that makes it possible to take a cognitive leap from one idea to another, to get a simultaneous grasp of paratactic issues, to have a multilineal conception which presupposes a dramatic trajectory of an event and to develop a holistic thinking that makes seemingly unorganized messages an integrated version. Therefore, the heterotopic society has peculiar properties that go far beyond the epistemological horizon of a lineal worldview. To fully understand these characteristics, an alternative perspective is necessary from which a very complicated social order can be grasped as a whole.

IV. Forecasting the Dynamics of Technological Society

1. Dialectic of Technology and Society

When the conceptual layers of the heterotopic society marked by the coexistence of heterogeneous elements are classified into the four categories of ontology, relationship, quality and topology, their properties can be identified as follows (Table 1).


The heterotopic society is expected to move toward a new stage by using technology that satisfies its intrinsic desires. Based on a social constructivist view, the heterotopic society will particularly require BT,

<Table 1> Nature of Heterotopic Society

Ontology	Heterogeneity: Coexistence of Different Constituents
Relationship	Hiatus: Intercourse of Heterogeneous Elements
Quality	Hybrid: Emergence of New Synthetic Properties
Topology	Phase Transition: Transformation of the State

IT, NT and ST, the advanced technologies that could immediately fulfill not only the demand for proliferation as various elements want to mingle to step forward, but also the demand for connectivity, convergence and transgression as well. Being embedded with these new technologies, the society will move toward a higher stage of complexity. The emerging social order coming from this reciprocal process is the product of dialectic interplay between technological systems and social systems, and can be named a “neo-technosocial formation.” (Figure 3).

<Figure 3> Shaping of Neo-Technosocial Formation (NTSF)



2. Prospect of Subsequent Transformations

This neo-technosocial formation, the extension of its primitive form as a heterotopic society, has a series of characteristics as follows. First, it is marked by disequilibrium which could be analogized from the dictums “selection and concentration” or “Tendency of the 20:80 society.” Second, it has a dynamism that is detectable from such words as

“restructuring or structural innovation.” Third, it holds nonlinearity that could be figured out from an exponential growth model like “Moore’s principles.” Fourth, the neo — technosocial formation contains self-organization which is found in new organizational principles such as “learning organization.” Finally, it has autopoiesis that is decipherable from the emphases on “originality” or “creativity.”

The neo-technosocial formation is a typical dissipative system that uses self-organizing power to promote creative development in a meta-stable state far different from an equilibrium one. It has the structure of a grid society with a complicatedly intertwined warp and woof, or the shape of a “rhizome society” which expands in a more random, not predetermined way. Also, it is a “fluid society” where information circulates freely. Equipped with all these properties, the neo-technosocial formation can be defined as a “supra-open system of great complexity.”

V. Coda

As the new technologies of BT, IT, NT and ST add complexity and dynamism to the existing information society, the technosocial formation will encounter two serious problems in its development process. The first is that the society may fall into a complexity trap. Order does not automatically come out of chaos. Instead, chaos can be aggravated, possibly leading to an irrecoverable catastrophe. The second is that a substantive trap may come out as a new social problem. Vulnerability to humanistic, ethical and aesthetic issues, quite different from the issues of social engineering, could get worse. To actively respond to these problems in the high-tech society of the future, it is necessary to replace the “modern knowledge paradigm” based on a mechanical world view with a “late modern knowledge paradigm,” which is more suitable for an increasingly complicated new social environment.

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*An Achievement of Ten Years of ASEM:
GÉANT2 Utilizing Trans-Eurasia
Information Network (TEIN) and
Cooperation in Northeast Asia*

Dai Davies

For over a millennium, universities have been the source of advancing knowledge and learning in the world. They have existed physically isolated from one another, although frequent interchange among researchers and academics, in modern parlance “networking,” has been a consistent feature of university life. Thus, research networking has existed for almost as long as universities. In a European context it is impressive to look at the way the Irish saints of the fifth century AD traveled extensively in Europe, as far as Switzerland and Italy, spreading the word and transcending national boundaries. Similarly, the stay of the Dutch theologian in Cambridge early in the sixteenth century helped to develop the credibility of what is now a major world university.

Modern research networking really started in the 1980s when the power of telecommunications, particularly data communications, began to break down distance barriers. By 1980, a number of the universities in the UK were connected together by a data network which gave a new impetus to research cooperation. It was technically innovative and paved the way for many of the Internet-related developments that we take for granted today. The development of such networks on a pan-European scale, and increasingly a global basis, has meant that

ideas can now travel much faster than people. This has led to the breaking down of national barriers and resulted in improved quality and efficiency of intellectual co-operation. Research and academic cooperation, on an international basis, is a vital element that contributes to global peace and prosperity. Major global issues do not respect national boundaries. The economies of scale, generated by global technological solutions to national problems, enable huge economic benefits to be achieved. In the field of research, cooperation in some areas of research is simply too expensive to be contemplated nationally, e.g. in particle physics experimentation. Other areas, by their very nature, require the pooling of global data, e.g. climate studies. Yet others require the pooling of limited knowledge, e.g. in the field of plant biology.

All of these areas of human endeavor have been greatly improved by the ability of researchers to cooperate with one another electronically. Research networking, the cooperation among researchers using the telecommunications networks, has developed rapidly in the last 20 years. In Europe, the GÉANT2 network represents one of the most important research and education tools in the world, enabling European researchers in all disciplines to cooperate with one another without regard to frontiers. Only by implementing a network, dedicated to Research and Education, is the performance necessary for the most demanding applications achieved.

Global cooperation is an equally important element of such networking. The Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN), begun in 2000, is an excellent example of such global cooperation between Asia and Europe. The original TEIN activity was based on cooperation with Korea. This has now expanded, in the context of the latest phase of the project TEIN2, to a more general cooperation facilitating new collaboration among researchers within the region of East Asia as well as between Asia and Europe. TEIN2 itself started in 2004, with significant funding from the European Commission's development co-operation budgets and has already created a network interconnecting both the developed and developing countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and Australia.

An important element of the development of a research networking

in Europe has been the liberalization of the telecommunications market. In a period of a little over ten years, Europe has moved from a position of seeing telecommunications as something that needed to be rationed by monopoly suppliers to a liberal market position where network capacity is no longer a restriction. These are some of the challenges facing TEIN2. The important success factor of TEIN2 is that it brings together developing countries which are participating with the help of the European funding (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and the developed countries (Australia, Japan, Korea and Singapore) into a common network and organization that has created an intra-regional network which is benefiting all the participants and which is directly connected with Europe. By sharing knowledge and experience the project has assisted partner countries within the region to cooperate with one another and to address some of the market-related problems that Europe has already solved. The TEIN2 network enables intra and inter-regional cooperation in such diverse areas as health, biology, e-learning and disaster recovery which bring direct benefits not only to the research and education communities but contribute to wider societal goals.

Advanced networks, such as TEIN2, offer unrivalled opportunities especially in the field of medical education. These examples show how TEIN2 can effectively help bring the concept of a regional telemedicine network to reality. Networking with specialists physically located in medical centers of excellence will provide an additional boost to the dissemination of best surgical practice throughout Asia. A leading expert can be present instantly via video link, observing symptoms remotely and giving advice in real-time, without the need for time consuming and arduous travel. Networks remove cost and add immediacy — factors that are particularly relevant in the field of health care — more interaction with less travel!

TEIN2 gives a boost to Internet development in the region, promoting digital inclusion, fighting the brain drain and contributing towards the objective of an inclusive Information Society. Drawing on the expertise of its partners, the project stimulates national research networking in the emerging countries participating in the Asia Europe

Meeting (ASEM) initiative. By creating the first regional network and linking it to its European counterpart GÉANT2, it enables Asian-Pacific researchers to become key players in the global research community. We are proud to have helped establish the TEIN2 work, with the very active support of the Asian partners and are working with them to create a strong and sustainable programme which contributes to the positive and peaceful development of the region.

APEC TEL's Partnership with the IT Industry Toward Developing the Information Society

Inuk Chung

I. The APEC Telecommunication and Information Working Group (TEL)

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC) was established in 1989 for the purpose of facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Comprising 21 member economies,¹ APEC is home to more than 2.6 billion people and represents approximately 56% of world GDP and 49% of world trade.² Leaders of APEC economies meet annually to discuss a range of issues that are focused on economic growth and prosperity for the region. The APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL),³ formed in 1990, as one of the first established Working Groups within APEC, has been an important venue to deal with many ICT sectoral issues, ranging from IT infrastructure to information security and human resource development.

¹ Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam.

² APEC Outcomes and Outlook 2006-2007.

³ www.apectelwg.org.

Following the instructions and directives of our Leaders and Ministers, TEL has been committed to the realization of the information society, improvement of the ICT infrastructure and development of economic and social as well as technical aspects of ICT, for the purpose of facilitating cooperation in free trade, investment and sustainable development.

Since its establishment, TEL has steadily developed the number and the quality of the agendas and deliverables to the leaders. TEL meetings have been held consistently twice a year and the number of participants has risen to more than 600 participants a year from Member Economies and other relevant international institutions including Official Observers and Guests. Huge participation from the private sector and academia has been noted recently as well.

II. APEC TEL's Achievement Towards Developing the Information Society

APEC TEL has worked with industry and academia and in conjunction with other international and regional organizations to understand and develop appropriate policy frameworks to achieve sustained economic growth and societal development toward an information society. The TEL activities promote best practices, information exchange and collaborative cross-border projects in ICT. Recent projects emphasize building capacity, confidence and new technology while increasing security and penetration of telecommunications and information technology throughout society, which is the aim of building the APIS.

The basis for an Information Society is ensuring a ubiquitous access to ICT and the provision of benefits to everyone from the opportunities that ICT can offer. And in order to achieve these as early as possible, various activities are conducted and major APEC's reports from these activities to date are, in particular, *the Future Action Plan for TEL* to further assist APEC economies in achieving the Brunei Goals; the *Status Report on TEL Digital Divide Activities* and the *Key Elements in Broadband Development for APEC*.

A. Future Action Plan for TEL to Further Assist APEC Economies in Achieving the Brunei Goals

In 2000 at Brunei, APEC Leaders set a goal to triple the number of people within the region with individual and community-based access to the internet by 2005. Leaders understood that meeting this goal would require massive infrastructure development and human capacity building and technologies that were then only in their formative stages. They recognized governments alone cannot achieve this vision and that they would need to harness the cross-section approach of APEC and, where appropriate, implement market oriented policies to attract business investment and utilize the cooperation and skills of universities, training and research institution, colleges and schools.

Since 2001, the TEL has conducted the gathering of statistics on Internet access to gauge progress on the Leaders' challenges. At the TELMIN6 Meeting in Lima, Peru, in 2005, the Ministers instructed the TEL to undertake an assessment in early 2006 of progress towards the Brunei Goal of tripling Internet Access by the end of 2005. Accordingly, all member economies have been encouraged to update their Internet Access Statistics as of the end of 2005. And by the end of 2005, progress towards the Brunei goal of tripling Internet access was assessed, and according to the report, Internet access in the APEC region has more than doubled and has experienced tremendous growth in Internet provision since APEC Leaders made their Brunei Declaration in 2000.

As indicated in Table 1, during 2000-2006, significant progress in Internet access has been achieved, i.e.:

- I) 5 out of 21 APEC Member Economies have increased *Internet access more than three times*;
- II) 1 Economy more than *four times*;
- III) 1 Economy more than *five times*;
- IV) 2 Economies more than *seven times*;
- V) 1 Economy more than *nine times*;
- VI) 1 Economy more than *seventy-four (74) times*;
- VII) *In total, Internet access in the APEC regions has grown by 2.74 times during 2000-2006.*

<Table 1> Internet Access Statistics (As of March 2007)

Economies	Internet Users (2000)	Internet Users	Growth Rate (%)	Ratio of 2006 (latest) to 2000
Australia	6,599,788	14,729,209	123.20	2.23
Brunei	30,000	135,000	350.00	4.50
Canada	12,703,016	21,900,000	72.40	1.72
Chile	1,757,138	6,700,000	281.30	3.81
China	22,500,000	132,000,000	486.67	5.87
Hong Kong, China	2,283,000	4,878,713	113.70	2.14
Indonesia	2,000,000	18,000,000	800.00	9.00
Japan	47,080,000	86,300,000	83.31	1.83
Korea	19,040,000	33,900,000	78.05	1.78
Malaysia	3,700,000	13,528,200	265.63	3.66
Mexico	2,712,320	20,200,000	644.75	7.45
New Zealand	830,091	3,200,000	285.50	3.85
Papua New Guinea	135,028	170,000	25.90	1.26
Peru	2,500,000	4,570,000	82.80	1.83
Philippines	2,000,000	7,820,000	291.00	3.91
Russia	3,100,065	23,700,000	664.50	7.65
Singapore	1,200,000	2,421,000	101.75	2.02
Chinese Taipei	6,260,000	14,500,000	131.63	2.32
Thailand	2,300,000	8,420,000	266.09	3.66
USA	95,334,157	210,080,067	120.36	2.20
Vietnam	200,000	14,913,652	7356.83	74.57
Total	234,264,603	642,065,841	174.08	2.74

Source: Dr. Yan Ma, Progress towards the Brunei Goal of Tripling Internet Access by the End of 2006, Assessment Report, APEC TEL35/DSG/012, 2007

While this represents significant growth, the increase falls just short of achieving the Brunei Goal of tripling Internet access. Despite the significant growth of Internet access in APEC regions, the Brunei Goal has not been achieved yet and much work remains to be done to reach the goal of tripling access. Nonetheless, APEC Economies have made significant improvements in establishing infrastructure, and have achieved benefits through improved tele-density and better service

provision. To further expand Internet access to bridge the digital divide as well as creating digital opportunities in the APEC region, Member Economies are encouraged to continue their work in promoting the use of ICT and related services. Meanwhile, instead of continuing putting high emphasis on the growth rate of Internet access within the region, it is advisable that the TEL continues to exchange experiences/information and further co-operate with other APEC fora and regional/international organizations in related activities for bridging the digital divide among and within member economies.

B. Status Report on TEL Digital Divide Activities

One of the key elements in realizing the information society is the bridging of the digital divide. This is a measure of the gap in access to ICTs between different economies, or between different regions within an economy. In the May 2000 Cancun Declaration, Ministers of Information and Communications Industries urged and challenged the TEL to bridge the digital divide. This direction was expanded upon in November 2000 when the Leaders' Declaration of Brunei Darussalam highlighted the importance of the information revolution to the global economy and called for a tripling of Internet access in the APEC region by 2005. In response, the TEL: 1) developed a *Digital Divide Blueprint for Action*, which was endorsed at TEL 25 (2002) ; 2) initiated the ongoing gathering of statistics on Internet access to gauge progress on the Leaders' challenges; 3) conducted an internal stocktaking in 2001 on policies employed by TEL member economies to bridge the divide; 4) performed an external stocktaking of digital divide related activities in other fora; and 5) held three workshops in 2001 and 2002 to address the policies for bridging the divide and the skills shortage.

Subsequently, a great number of activities and projects, such as workshops, training programs, technical assistance, information exchange, etc., covering a wide range of policy dimensions and issues have been developed and implemented by the TEL. By means of a 2001 internal stocktaking on policies employed by member economies to bridge the digital divide, the TEL identified key attributes of successful

policies which include:

- a. Leadership** — often at the economy level but also including local and regional initiatives to create a vision and institutions/structures to address the issues.
- b. Partnerships** — including business, education and social institutions, and government.
- c. Policy Coherence** — to ensure that all policies are working together to create the desired economic and social environment.
- d. Market Focus** — among others, to develop demand that can justify investment required.
- e. Sustainability** — to ensure continuation of the services beyond the seed money stage.
- f. Scalability** — to ensure that a program or an initiative can be replicated throughout under- served areas.

Furthermore, through the three TEL Digital Divide workshops conducted in 2001 and 2002, the TEL also identified three main policy issues central to bridging the divide:

- a. Access:** Lower prices for access increase Internet uptake by consumers. Competition and liberalization are essential policies to lower the price of access and stimulate the supply of products and services to fit the variety of needs of users. Underserved areas can be served through a combination of technology deployment, supportive policy environments, and programs directed at the needs of the under-served population.
- b. Infrastructure:** An overall positive economic environment is essential to the expansion and build-out of the infrastructure to support the internet.
- c. Human Capacity Development:** Availability of skilled workers is a major concern for all economies. There is no single solution to this problem and any solution will require industry to be a partner.


The effort to apply and implement these key attributes and main policy issues are critical for the success of bridging the digital divide.

C. Key Elements in Broadband Development for APEC

Since TELMIN3 in 1998, Ministers have called upon the TEL to explore the development of broadband information infrastructures, stressing the need to extend broadband capabilities to rural and under-served areas. At TELMIN5 in 2002, Ministers underscored the need to focus on broadband technology and its implications for economic growth. Noting the *e-APEC Strategy*⁴ and the *TEL Digital Divide Blueprint for Action*, Ministers also tied the TEL's broadband efforts to the Ministers and Leaders' call to resolve Digital Divide issues of universal access to ICTs.

And in response to the TELMIN5 guidance, the TEL has executed a number of broadband related activities including workshops, steering group presentations and discussions, and testbed / pilot projects.

<Figure 1> Broadband Penetration by Technology, top 20 Economies Worldwide, January 1, 2005



Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) adapted from national reports (excludes mobile cellular broadband (e.g. 3G)).

⁴ See: http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders_declarations/2001/appendix_2_eAPEC_strategy.html.

As Figure 1 indicates, several APEC Economies include some of the world's leaders in broadband deployment. In achieving this leadership, according to the findings, these economies have utilized various approaches to address issues of deployment, access, uptake and applications, as well as the key question of what the appropriate role for the government is. And through the Key Principles for Broadband Development in the APEC region, adopted by the Ministers responsible for telecommunications and information in 2005, economies are encouraged to develop and implement key elements in domestic broadband policies that:

- a. Maximize access and usage;
- b. Facilitate continued competition and liberalization;
- c. Foster enabling regulatory frameworks;
- d. Build confidence in the use of broadband networks and services.

III. TEL's Collaboration with the IT Industry in the Region

As mentioned, APEC is a unique forum operating on the basis of open dialogue and equal respect for the views of all participants with a decision making process of consensus. Along with this principle, APEC recognizes that strong and vibrant economies are not built by governments alone, but by partnerships between governments and key stakeholders, including the business sector, industry, academia and interest groups within the community. APEC TEL has also recognized the important role of the IT Industry in driving developments and implementations of cutting-edge technologies and has involved business at diverse discussions of APEC TEL activities. Highly valuing the need to discuss firsthand the latest developments in industry, TEL proposed, in 2005, a roundtable discussion engaging both the private sector and public sectors including regulators and policy makers.

The main purpose of this Roundtable is to introduce the "latest and greatest" technologies, capabilities, products and business models to the TEL, in a manner that highlights industry leadership, identifies the

various opportunities and challenges facing its introduction, and provides guidance to policymakers and regulators regarding areas for further collaboration. Through this event, it is expected to facilitate discussion on what key industry players in the region should consider in the future. The Roundtable also intends to strengthen private-sector participation in TEL by providing a venue for business discussions, and creating an opportunity for interactions between governments, research institutes and the business community. Furthermore, it proposes to ensure policy and regulatory participants have a tangible perspective of key technological and commercial developments that affect their work.

With these views to further promote relationship with industry, TEL commenced to hold the Industry Futures Roundtable and it was agreed to be coordinated mainly by each TEL meeting host economy and its IT industry in order to encourage participation from the local industry and business sector. At the TEL33 Meeting in Calgary, Canada, the Industry Futures Roundtable was first held as a two-way dialogue between industry and regulators managed by Industry Canada. The meeting, focused on technologies and services on the advanced IP and wireless communication, turned out to be as a great success with large attendance of CEOs and high-level Executive members of global corporations in IT business. Subsequently, New Zealand hosted the Industry Futures Roundtable titled "Evolution in the Telecommunications Ecosystem" at TEL34 in Auckland. The meeting comprised of four sessions discussed topics ranging from bandwidth technologies to infrastructure investment and sustainable business models in the future. And the latest Industry Futures Roundtable was held during the TEL35 Meeting last April in Quezon City, the Philippines, with the focus on the Brunei Goal, which is to provide universal Internet access in the APEC region by 2010 through broadband and wireless services.

Holding successful roundtable talks, the Roundtable has searched a way to contribute to TEL. Since the second Auckland Meeting the Industry Futures Roundtable has submitted a take-away paper to the TEL Opening Plenary Meeting to suggest a number of policy issues and deliberations drawn from roundtable results. Through reviewing

the paper before the official TEL Meeting, TEL participants, many of whom are regulators and policy makers, would deepen their understanding and be inspired so that they could take the roundtable results into account in their meetings and policy making.

The Industry Futures Roundtable, though only three meetings were held, has established itself as the best-attended meeting as well as most productive meeting within TEL. The roundtable, with a proud record of over 200 participants since Calgary, is now attracting more people than any other business forum around the world. As a result, the APEC TEL Industry Futures Roundtable is now transforming into a forum where industry views and experience can make a valuable contribution to the work of APEC TEL by informing participants of market developments, though it used to be a venue for networking between public and private sector. I am so convinced that this is a new type of collaboration we should encourage and strengthen so that both actors in the market economy could benefit most through knowing each other better.

IV. Embracing Future Challenges in IT

APEC and APEC TEL have made efforts to promote participation from not only the IT industry but all ICT-relevant stakeholders in the market in order to consider and reflect the greatest range of views and opinions possible in the region in debates and deliberations. The TEL partakes in the endeavor toward establishing the Asia Pacific Information Society (APIS) and through the work of TEL, approximately half the population of the world has been contributing to the information society and is deeply involved in the environment changes that the ICT brings. In a word, APEC TEL offers an excellent example as a venue for regional policy cooperation toward the goal of building an all-inclusive information society.

When we imagine the future information society, scenarios create us so many topics such as technological convergence, the dissolution of sector-specific infrastructure from services and content, and the expansion of global connectivity, content and service providers and so on. In

spite of all these newly-emerging challenges, the digital divide will remain as one of our most important tasks to tackle in the region, where many economies are still at the starting point of IT development. Taking these scenarios and the goal to enhance the capabilities of economies to use ICT as the key growth elements in mind, APEC TEL will consider how national, regional and international IT policy and regulatory frameworks should develop and better adapt to the new challenges. Future policy and regulatory regimes in IT are likely more and more to be led by user groups and industries as well as governments. Therefore, I would like to finish my speech stressing again that meeting the global information society and leading the ICT-enabled growth, the industry, undoubtedly, is the most important partner for cooperation for APEC TEL and APEC.

Cooperation on Regional Research Networks

Shigeki Goto


The Internet is not a simple set of computers and wires. We definitely need coordination to enjoy the connectivity. This paper starts from the early stage of cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. We give a survey of the current activities which cover APAN, APNIC, JET and related IETF activities. This paper also mentions the near future plan.

I. Early Stage of Cooperation

It is almost trivial that we need cooperation in networks, because they connect two points at least (Fig. 1 (a)). This simple rule is applied to international activities as well as domestic networking. More serious discussion is necessary when we have two links between two countries (Fig. 1 (b)). They should avoid having a loop between two countries. It is also recommended not to utilize international links for domestic communications.

These simple diagrams were really an issue at the Internet Engineering and Planning Group (IEPG) in the late 1980s when we started to use TCP/IP, or Internet standard protocol, in the Asia Pacific region. IEPG is sometimes referred to by the combined name with CCIRN, i.e. CCIRN/IEPG. CCIRN stands for Coordination Committee for Inter-continental Research Networking.¹ CCIRN is the mother organization

<Figure 1> Cooperation on Networks



of IEPG, which deals with engineering issues. CCIRN owes its origin to the FNC, Federal Networking Council in the US. FNC was the coordinating committee among US governmental research networks.

When the international connection was realized between the US and Europe, FNC invited the European colleague to join them. Then, Professor Kilnam Chon at KAIST proposed that they cover the Asia Pacific region as well. There were PACCOM activities in the Asia Pacific region which were organized along with the cable layout around Hawaii at that time. There is an article about the early stage of CCIRN.² There are not so many documents about it because the WEB was not popular in the 1980s.


After CCIRN invited the Asia Pacific region, or *continent* according to the term in CCIRN, we need coordination to elect the delegation from the Asia Pacific region to CCIRN meetings. There is a rule of CCIRN. Each *continent* can send seven people or less to CCIRN meetings. It is a fair rule that is applied to each continent. Since there is no obvious choice of seven delegates, we decided to form a committee in the Asia Pacific region. That is the origin of APCCIRN whose new name is APNG³ shown in Fig. 2.

¹ CCIRN: <www.ccirn.org>.

² Marshall T. Rose and Daniel C. Lynch, *Internet System Handbook* (Old Tappan: Addison-Wesley, 1992).

³ APNG: <www.apng.org>.

<Figure 2> Internet Related Organizations in Asia Pacific



The current objectives of APNG are different from the original APCCIRN. The current mission of APNG is to encourage younger people to join the collaboration in the Asia Pacific region. APNG is now interpreted as Asia Pacific Next Generation.


II. Current Activities

A. Regional Network Operation: APAN


When CCIRN started, international links connected each country to the US (Fig. 3 (a)). There were a small number of *intra*-Asia links. The original idea of APAN, Asia Pacific Advanced Network, was born in 1996. The schematic diagram in Fig. 3 (b) illustrates the initial idea.

In 1997, the idea was realized to have a link between APAN and the US, which is the TransPAC project supported by the NSF, US government. Later, the link between APAN and Europe was realized by the Trans Eurasia Information Network project (TEIN) which connects Korea and France. The current map or APAN topology is shown in Fig. 4.

<Figure 3> Schematic Diagram of APAN




<Figure 4> APAN Topology



TransPAC entered in the second phase: TransPAC2. TEIN reached the second phase: TEIN2, which is illustrated in Fig. 5. TEIN2 is a good

example of international collaboration. APAN has no budget to purchase its own international links. There has been a long term issue concerning the deployment of the research networks in Southeast Asia and South Asia. The European Commission (EC) established the TEIN2 project for extending Research and Education network connections in 2006. Four NRENs, National Research Education Networks, in the region: ThaiREN (TH), MYREN (MY), VINAREN (VN) and INHERENT (ID) have been connected through the TEIN2 project.⁴

<Figure 5> TEIN2 Topology




Now we have many links which are coordinated by APAN. The traffic of APAN links is monitored in Tokyo. Fig. 6 is the *Weather Map* at the WEB site.⁵ If you have a closer look at the map, you may notice that most of the links have enough capacity to accept a new or not-yet-registered research project.

⁴ DANTE, TEIN2 Network, <http://www.tein2.net/server/show/nav.622>.

⁵ J. Tanaka, Weather Map:< <http://www.jp.apan.net/NOC/>>.

<Figure 6> Weather Map at APAN-JP



Many applications have been developed using APAN links which are well coordinated. Table 1 is the list of the current Working Groups in APAN. We pick up just one example of the bio-mirror project here.⁶

<Table 1> Working Groups in APAN

Area	Working Groups
Application Technology	Medical, HDTV, eScience, Middleware, e-Culture
Network Technology	IPv6, Measurement, Satellite, Lambda, Security, SIP H323
Natural Resource	Agriculture, Earth Monitoring, Earth System

You may notice that co-authors of the paper in Fig. 7 are in many countries: the USA, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Korea, China, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia.

⁶ Bio-Mirror: <<http://bioinformatics.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/20/17/3238>>.

<Figure 7> On-line Journal BIO-INFORMATICS




The bio-mirror project enhances the motivation to have higher speed links.

B. Network Resource Management: APNIC

It is true that we need visible or physical resources to run the Internet. We have equipment, like computers, routers and switches. We also have optical fibers and metal cables. We need human resources as well. At the same time, we certainly need *invisible* or *logical* resources. We need *IP addresses*, *domain names* and *AS (Autonomous System) numbers* to connect to the Internet.

<Figure 8> Total Distribution of IPv4 Allocated by Economy



In the earlier days of the Internet, all the registration was handled by SRI-NIC, later by InterNIC in the US. It was natural because most hosts, or connected machines, are located in the US. After the Internet was successfully internationalized, there was a proposal to have three regional registries, or Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). APNIC is one of the RIRs which started in 1994. It started the operation as a pilot project under APCCIRN in Fig. 2. The Operation of APNIC is significant in the Asia Pacific region. The APNIC annual report describes the current Internet resources in the Asia Pacific region. Fig. 8 shows the IPv4 IP address allocation.⁷

C. Standardization: Internationalized Domain Names

The Internet is a well-known example of a *de facto* standard. It is compared with the *de jure* standard in traditional telecommunications by ITU-T or formerly called CCITT. This is a good example of activities in standardization at IETF, Internet Engineering Task Force. Now in Japan, *japanese.jp* domain names can be registered and actually used. In Korea, *hangul.kr* can be used. In fact, there are 131,248 Japanese domain names registered out of 925,242 total jp domain names.⁸ The standard encoding scheme of internationalized domain names is established and well documented in a series of Request for Comments (RFC) of IETF.⁹

The actual standardization process was tough for engineers. We have formed a group called Joint Engineering Team (JET) consisting of engineers from Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan and Singapore. There is a document published as a book in Japan [10].

The book¹⁰ has described how JET engineers have collaborated in the Asia Pacific region to establish the standard in Internationalized domain names.

⁷ APNIC: <www.apnic.net>.

⁸ JPRS (in Japanese): jprs.jp.

⁹ IETF RFCs 3490, 3491, 3492, 3743, 4290 and 4690.

¹⁰ T. Ui, Japanese Domain Names, <http://home.impress.co.jp/reference/2260.htm>.

<Figure 9> Japanese.jp Domain Names (book)



III. Looking for the future

D. Application


A series of telemedicine events lead by Dr. Shimizu, Kyushu University has created the telemedicine community, especially endoscopic surgeons, and their activities are widely introduced in the USA as well as in Asian countries (Fig. 10).¹¹

<Figure 10> Remote Education via Telemedicine Event



Most of the events have adopted the non-reduction Digital Video Transmission System (DVTS) of TV quality that requires 30 Mbps end-to-end performance over RTP/UDP protocol. Quatre SDK (System Development Kit) is used as the MCU (Multi Point Control Unit) for up to 4 points communications; a single screen image is composed from 4 points images. Both DVTS and Quatre SDK have been developed in Japan, and can be easily composed by conventional PCs.¹²

<Figure 11> Telemedicine Events by Kyushu Univ.



Endoscopic surgery with an un-compressed HDTV (High Definition TV) system was demonstrated between Seoul National University and Kyushu University in March 2007 over the APII 10Gbps link between Korea and Japan. The participants could easily understand that remote guidance of surgeries is quite effective with the high-end system over a high speed network. The system is very expensive now. Still it is worthwhile for the researchers to develop the advanced tele-surgery system for society in the future. High-end applications such as telemedicine, high-energy physics and earth observation require high

¹¹ S. Shimizu et. al, *International transmission of uncompressed endoscopic surgery images via superfast broadband Internet connections* (New York: Springer Media, 2005).

¹² S. Kumagi, Video Conference System SDK and Echo Cancellation, The APAN 23rd Meeting, Jan 25, 2007.

performance networks. For example, DVTS (Digital Video Transport System) is very powerful for the teaching of medical skills, and a HDTV (High Definition TV) system with reliable networks is expected in the surgery with remote diagnosis. High-end applications called e-Science applications will drive the advanced network technologies for the dependable and high performance network infrastructure within a reasonable cost.

E. Network management

APAN-JP NOC (Network Operation Center) are operating networks based on the explicit routing policy of the administrators. APAN-JP NOC is developing the route management tool, *ComPath*.¹³

- **PathMatrix:** Three class routes can be registered: primary, secondary and tertiary. (Fig. 12).
- **RouteViews:** The University of Oregon is leading the project for obtaining real-time information about global routes with Route Views server that has the BGP-peering with the partner networks. Route

<Figure 12> Path Matrix Web (part of matrix)

AARNET <input type="button" value="GO"/> <--- Please select your organization when you input the path data			
Destination Sources	AARNET (AAR) 7575	Abilene (ABL) 11537	APAN-JP (AJP) 7660
AARNET (AAR) 7575	1 None	1 direct	1 TSG TJP
	2 None	2	2 HAW
	3 None	3	3
Abilene (ABL) 11537	1 direct	1 None	1 TP2
	2 TP2 AJP TJP TSG	2 None	2 SIT
	3 GEA AAR	3 None	3 GEA SIT
APAN-JP (AJP) 7660	1 TJP TSG	1 TP2	1 None
	2 TP2	2 direct	2 None
	3 HAW	3 SIT	3 None
APAN-TW (ATW) 9264	1 direct	1 direct	1 direct
	2 AJP TJP TSG	2 AJP TP2	2 CST
	3 SIR TSG	3	3 ABL TP2

¹³ Y. Kurokawa, ComPath, <http://compath.jp.apan.net/>.


Views of Zebra software is installed in APAN-JP NOC.

- **Real-time analyzer:** Primary routes of PathMatrix and RouteView are compared in real time. The analyzer notifies the NOC operators of an unexpected route change.

F. Network Monitoring: perfSONAR

The layer 2 monitoring scheme over Multiple Domains should be developed for the joint NOC managements and operation. The operation of Large Scale VLAN (Virtual LAN) is quite difficult in the current network environments. GEANT2 started to provide Layer 2 services to the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) in Europe.

<Figure 13> PerfSONAR with Layer 2 Monitoring



PerfSONAR is the measurement infrastructure jointly developed by GÉANT2, Internet2 and ESnet. APAN-JP is also working for the deployment in cooperation with the TransPAC2 project of the NSF IRNC program. Layer 2 monitoring over Multiple Domains will be added in the PerfSONAR system (Fig. 9).¹⁴


H. Resource Management and Standard

Since the Internet is ever growing, it is expected that we will have no IP addresses in stock in the future. That is true, unfortunately. One of the experts, Geof Huston, has predicted the following:¹⁵

- a) Projected IANA Unallocated Address Pool Exhaustion: 14-Feb-2010
- b) Projected RIR Unallocated Address Pool Exhaustion: 20-Sep-2010

It is shocking news to some people. We do not have enough time before year 2010. Fig. 14 has two curves: the steep one represents the IANA pool. The lower curve shows the RIR pool.

<Figure 15> IPv4 Address Pool Projection towards 2



The report told us nothing about the future strategy of allocation nor assignment of IPv4 addresses. It simply states that the current policy of distributing IP addresses will be no longer relevant after the projected date. We need cooperation on the new policy anyway.

¹⁵ Geof Huston, <http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html>.

IV. Conclusion

APAN is a consortium for enhancing joint research projects in the Asia-Pacific region over the members networks. APAN does not have its own links. APAN members contribute the membership fee to maintain the operation of the APAN Secretariat as well as to support the fellowship for developing countries and young researchers to participate in APAN workshops. The status of APAN member organizations and the networks can be found at: [http://www.apan.net documents/Survey2007Revised070522c-2.pdf](http://www.apan.net/documents/Survey2007Revised070522c-2.pdf).

Telemedicine is one of the key applications driving R&E networks for enriching the performance as well as dependability. Network technologies as well as network topological design should be developed by the joint efforts of network administrators, network engineers, NOC operators, and advanced application scientists including medical doctors.*

* We are grateful to our APAN friends who are working hard to coordinate network operations. We especially thank Mr. Kazunori Konishi who has contributed to APAN activities from the beginning. We also acknowledge the leadership of Dr. ByungKyu Kim for the future plan for TEIN3.

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Samuel Berger is Chairman and co-founder of Stonebridge International LLC, an international strategic advisory firm based in Washington, DC. He is also Chairman of DB Zwirn International and its International Advisory Board, an international investment fund and merchant capital provider with more than \$4 billion in management and 15 offices throughout North America, Europe and Asia. Mr. Berger has had a distinguished career in both the public and private sectors. As former National Security Advisor to President Clinton (1997-2000), Mr. Berger was pivotal in shaping America's role in the post-Cold War era. Among other initiatives, he oversaw efforts to build relations with China, drive critical peace efforts in the Balkans and the Middle East, manage financial crises in Asia and Latin America, and expand foreign trade. Prior to his service as National Security Advisor, Mr. Berger served as Deputy National Security Advisor from 1993-1996, and as Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1977-1980. His extensive relationships and knowledge of global issues are further strengthened by his corporate background as a trade lawyer. He spent sixteen years with the Washington law firm of Hogan & Hartson, where he headed the firm's international group. A graduate of Cornell University, Mr. Berger was involved in the effort to bring Cornell Medical College to Doha, and participated in the opening ceremonies. He also continues to advise President Clinton on a range of international issues, including the development of the Clinton Global Initiative.

Ambassador CROMBRUGGHE, Bertrand de, OSCE

Bertrand de Crombrughe has been Permanent Representative of Belgium to the OSCE since 2003. During the year 2006, as Belgium assumed the Chairmanship-in-Office of this Organization, he presided over the Permanent Council in Vienna. He was responsible for the day-to-day governance and the actual negotiation of the texts adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Brussels. It was a successful Ministerial, not the least because of the accomplishment of the mandate of the preceding Ministerial in Slovenia (2005) on the issue of reform relating to the OSCE. Before (2001-2003), he was Deputy Chief of Staff of Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel. He advised more particularly on European Common Foreign and Security Policy issues, on Transatlantic Relations, on Multilateral Trade issues and on the OSCE. During Belgium's Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2001, he chaired the Transatlantic Working Group of the EU. He held responsibility for the Task Force and Senior Level Group meetings with the United States, in particular those which successfully addressed the dramatic surge in the EU-USA anti-terrorism cooperation following the 11 September 2001 Al Qaida attacks on New York and Washington. His former diplomatic assignments include the Belgium Embassy in Tunisia (1986), the Belgium Embassy in Washington, USA (1989) and the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union (1994). He then was Deputy Director General for Multilateral Trade and Transatlantic Relations in the Foreign Ministry (1999)

Former Premier KAIFU, Toshiki, Japan

Toshiki Kaifu was born in Jan. 1931 in Aichi Prefecture. He graduated from Chuo University in 1951 and from Waseda University in 1954 both with a major in Law. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1960 and has since served 16 consecutive terms. He served as Chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration House of Representatives (1972), Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (1974), Minister of Education (1976 and 1985), Prime Minister (1989-91), President of the New Frontier Party (1994-97), Council of Supreme Advisor of the New Frontier Party (1995-97), Chairman of the Council of Advisors of the Liberal Party (1999), and Chairman of the Council of Advisors of the New Conservative Party

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Cae-One Kim has been Chairman of the International Peace Foundation and Chairman of the SNU-KIEP EU Center since 2006. He was a professor of the School of Economics at Seoul National University (1971-2004) and Dean of the College of Social Sciences (1995-96). He previously served as President of the

Academic Association of International Economic Studies (1988-89), President of the EU Studies Association, Korea (1994-2004), President of the Korea Economic Association (2000-01), and President of the Asia-Pacific EU Studies Association (2000-04). He was founding President (1988-91) and Chairman (1993-98) of the Korea Information Strategy Development Institute (KISDI), Korea Monetary Board Member (1991-94), and Commissioner of Financial Supervisory Commission (1998-99) of Korea. He was awarded French Government Decoration, *Legion d'Honneur* (1990). He has written many books and articles on the Korean economy and the international economy, including *Economics of the EU* (2004).

President KIM, Shin-Bae, SK Telecom

Shin-Bae Kim is SK Telecom's President, CEO & CGO, has led the company to excel in Korea's highly competitive mobile market as well as to position itself as one of the most innovative mobile carriers in the world. In 1995, Kim began his career at SK Telecom as the head of the Business Strategy Office where he was responsible for the launch and commercialization of CDMA in Korea. This laid the groundwork for the company to become a worldwide technology leader. It is in Kim's nature to push to be the first and he also led the launch of other world's first technologies including CDMA EV-DO in 2002, enabling consumers to use myriad wireless multimedia services. Another world's first service, Satellite Digital Multimedia Broadcasting was commercialized in May 2005 and the world's first commercial HSDPA service was launched in May 2006. Since becoming the President of SK Telecom in 2004, Kim has focused on finding new growth engines to secure the company's future. He has attracted millions of customers by focusing on developing convergence services such as Melon, GXG and Mobile Cyworld. In 2006 under Kim's leadership, the company achieved visible outcomes in global business. The company demonstrated significant success for sustainable growth in Vietnam, launched the MVNO service with Earthlink, HELIO in the U.S., and forged a strategic alliance with China Unicom.

Governor KIM, Tae Hwan, Jeju Special Self-Governing Province

Tae-Hwan Kim was elected as the first Governor of the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province through popular vote in May 2006. He completed his undergraduate work in law at Cheju National University. Afterwards, he received an MA in Administration at Yonsei University. In 2004, he was conferred an honorary degree from Cheju National University. He has served in various capacities including, Governor of South Jeju District County, Mayor of Jeju City, and Governor of the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province.

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Youngmin Kwon is currently Vice Chancellor of the Jeju Peace Institute, which is run by the International Peace Foundation. He studied German language and literature (Seoul National University) before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969. He served at the Korean Embassies in Vienna (1971), Bonn (1978), Amman (1982) and Atlanta as Consul-General (1992) before being appointed as Ambassador to Norway (1995-1997), Denmark (1998-2000) and Germany (2003-2005). In Seoul, he served as Director-General in the European Affairs Bureau (1991-1992) and Deputy Minister for Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His publications include *Regional Community Building in East Asia* (Yonsei University Press, 2002) and *Let's Paint a Picture in the Sky of Berlin* (Korea German Industrial Park Press, 2007) (in Korean).

Former Premier LEE, Hae-chan, Republic of Korea

Hae-chan Lee is a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, simultaneously serving as a special political affairs advisor to the President and as the Chairman of the Northeast Peace Committee of the Uri party. He studied sociology at Korea's prestigious Seoul National University. During his college years, he was imprisoned for his pro-democratic activities. At the age of 36, he was elected a member of the National Assembly and since then he has served 5 times as a lawmaker. In 1995, he held the post of Vice-Mayor of the Seoul Metropolitan city. Under the People's Government of President Kim Dae-Jung he served as the 38th Minister of Education in 1998. In addition to his lifelong commitment to public service, Mr. Lee played an instrumental role in the presidential campaigns of 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002. He took on the role of chief policy coordinator of political parties such as the Millennium Democratic Party. Soon after the participatory Government of President Roh Moo-Hyun took office, he was made the 36th Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea.

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Frances Maurtner-Markhof is director of the Austrian Center for International Studies (ACIS) in Vienna. ACIS's current projects focus on: multilateral cooperation in East Asia and the relevance of the OSCE and EU experiences; current challenges to democratic systems; and nuclear non-proliferation. Before joining ACIS she was a senior official of the International Atomic Energy Agency working on nuclear power and safety. Her publications include books and articles on multilateral cooperation in East Asia, the NPT regime, the international safeguards system of the IAEA, regional nuclear fuel cycle centers, the evolving

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 Brian McDonald has been the Head of the European Commission Delegation to Korea since 2006. His career over the last thirty years has included various trade and diplomatic postings. He has served at the GATT, the OECD, the United Nations, in Hong Kong and as Head of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan before he was appointed to his current position. A law graduate from University College Dublin and Harvard University Law School, he was called to the Bar in 1968 and has an L.L.D. from University College Dublin. He joined the European Commission in 1973 after serving in the Irish Foreign Ministry. He has published a book titled *The World Trading System: the Uruguay Round and beyond*.

Former Premier PRIMAKOV, Evgeny Maksimovich, the Russian Federation
 Evgeny Primakov has been President of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry since December 2001. He has worked as a journalist, deputy Editor-in-chief, and correspondent in Arab countries for *Pravda* newspaper (1953-1970). He was also deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Academy of Sciences of the USSR (from 1991, the Russian Academy of Sciences) (1970-1977); academician secretary, World Economy and International Relations Department, Academy of Sciences (1988-89); Presidium member, Academy of Sciences; Chairman, Council of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet (1989-91); member, USSR Security Council (1991); Director, Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (1991-96); Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1996-98); Prime Minister of the Russian Federation (1998-99); and State Duma Deputy (1999-2003). His publications include *Egypt: The Times of President Nasser*, *Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict* (1978), *History of One Plot*, *The East After the Collapse of the Colonial System* (1982), *Years in big policy* (1999), *Eight months plus* (2001), *The World after the 11th of September* (2002), *Meetings at the Crossroads* (2004), *Confidential: The Middle East onstage and backstage* (2006), and *The Mine Field of Politics* (2006, tentative title).

Former President RAMOS, Fidel V., the Philippines

Fidel V. Ramos was the 12th President of the Republic of the Philippines. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1950 as a member of Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society. He got his master's degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Illinois in 1950. Later, he also got his second master's degree in national security administration from the National Defense College of the Philippines in 1969 and he got another master's degree in business administration from Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines in 1980. He was awarded the Military Merit Medal (with Spearhead) for heroic achievement in connection with operations against the armed enemy at Hill "Eerie," Chorwon, North Korea in May 1952. Before ascending to his presidency, he served for his country. He was Secretary of National Defense and concurrently Chairman of the National Disaster Coordination Council from 1988 to 1991 and Chief of Staff Armed Forces from 1986 to 1988. Currently Mr. Ramos is working for numerous organizations and foundations for humanitarian causes. They are as follows: Chairman of the Ramos Peace and Development (RPDEV) Foundation and Chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia. He participates in the Advisory Group for the UN University for Peace. He is also an honorary member for the World Commission on Water for the 21st Century and honorary President of the Human Development Network (HDN) Philippines.

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Jun-Hyong Roh is Minister of Information and Communication of the Republic of Korea. He earned a BA in Law from Seoul National University in 1976 and a Master of Laws from Seoul National University Graduate School of Law in 1978. He was Director General of various bureaus at the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) from 1996 to 2003. He served as Assistant Minister for Planning and Management, MIC from 2003 to 2005 and also as Vice Minister of MIC from 2005 to 2006.

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Horst M. Teltschik is Chairman of the consulting company Teltschik Associates GmbH. Since leaving government, he has been Vice President of International Relations/President Boeing Germany (2003 -2006). He has been closely associated with BMW, including service as a Member of the Board of Management of the BMW Group (1993-2000) and from July 2000 to 2003, as a Representative of the Board of Management of BMW for Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East. From 1993 to 2003 he was Chairman of the Board of the BMW-Foundation Herbert Quandt. Since 1999 he has been Chairman of the Munich Conference on Security Policy. He also previously served as CEO of the Bertelsmann Foundation. From 1982 to 1990, he was Ministerial Director at Germany's Federal Chancellery and Head of the Directorate-General for Foreign and Intra-German Relations, Development Policy and External Security (National Security Adviser to Chancellor Helmut Kohl). In October 1993, he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Federal Chancellery. Earlier in his career, he was Chief of Staff of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group (1977-1982), Executive Ministerial Counselor to the Prime Minister of Rhineland-Palatinate (1972-1976) and Head of the International Policy and Intra-German Relations Group of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, 1970-1972). Dr. Teltschik holds a degree in political science from the Free University of Berlin, where he also taught as an assistant professor, and has received honorary degrees from the University of Budapest and Sogang University in Korea. Since January 2007 he has been President of the Korean-German Institute of Technology (KGIT).

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Inuk Chung is the current Vice Chair of the OECD Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (ICCP). He served from April 2005 to April 2007 as the Chair of APEC Telecommunications and Information (TEL) Working Group, which is committed to improving the telecommunications and information infrastructure in the Asia Pacific region and to facilitating effective cooperation, free trade and investment and sustainable development. He is also Director of the Asia-Pacific Information Infrastructure (APII) Cooperation Center in the Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI), the leading think-tank and government sponsored research institute in IT sectors in Korea. During his tenure in KISDI, he has been involved in many IT policymaking agendas for a variety of government agencies in Korea and been a policy advisor on many international telecommunications issues in multilateral arenas and bilateral ones, including the USA, Canada, the EU, OECD, APEC, ASEM, WTO, and ITU among others. Dr. Chung received his B.A. in economics from Seoul National University, Korea and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, also in economics, from Vanderbilt University, USA.

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Dai Davies has degrees in Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Cambridge. He is one of the founding General Managers of DANTE, the pan-European Research network organization that was set up in July 1993. DANTE's main activity is the deployment of advanced telecommunications technology to create a Research and Development platform for networking to support European University research activities. In the last ten years DANTE has implemented five successive generations of such networks, always focusing on advanced communications services. As a result Davies has very considerable experience with the translation between technology and service in a broad range of communications activities. Davies' current work involves the implementation of the next generation network called GÉANT2. This network incorporates a range of network technologies. It will include both broadcast and mobile capabilities, as well as guaranteed services offering predictable and accurate quality. With the global dimension of research becoming increasingly important, particularly in the fields of science, DANTE has become increasingly focused on the geographic expansion of the GÉANT network, both by extending its reach in a European context and by fostering and developing global co-operation, recent examples being both at a service and at an experimental level with Internet2 and Canarie in North America. A further activity has been the extension of GÉANT to provide connectivity in the Southern Mediterranean, the Balkans as well as Latin America and most recently Asia and Russia.

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James E. Goodby served during the Korean War, first as a geologist with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and then as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force. Entering the U.S. Foreign Service, he rose to the rank of Career Minister. He received five ambassadorial appointments, from Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton. His assignments included: chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements (the Nunn-Lugar program), 1993-94; head, U.S. delegation, conference on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, 1983-85; ambassador to Finland, 1980-81; member, the Secretary of State's policy planning staff, 1963-67. While political counselor to the Permanent U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council (1971-74), he negotiated NATO human rights and security positions for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Following his career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Goodby became a writer and teacher. He has taught at Carnegie Mellon, Stanford, Georgetown and Syracuse. His book *The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons*, co-authored with Sidney Drell, concerns nuclear proliferation and was published by the Hoover Institution in 2003. His most recent book is entitled *At the Borderline of Armageddon—How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb*. He also is the author of many articles on nuclear weapons issues and on Northeast Asia, especially security issues on the Korean peninsula.

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Seo-Hang Lee is Dean of Research, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), the policy research arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Dr. Lee is also Co-Chairman, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific—Korea. In 1995, 2000 and 2005 respectively, he was a member of the Korean delegation at the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh NPT Review Conference in New York. He has also participated in various international conferences since the early 1990s as a member of the Korean delegation including the UN Regional Disarmament Meeting for the Asia-Pacific and the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). Most recently, Dr. Lee served as Chairman at the 24th and the 25th meetings of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR), held in Tasmania, Australia in 2005 and 2006. Dr. Lee received a Ph.D. from Kent State University and a B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University. He is the recipient of the Killam Post-Doctoral Fellowship, Dalhousie Law School, Canada. Dr. Lee has published or edited more than 80 monographs and books on international security issues and ocean politics. His recent articles include “Changing Security Environments in Northeast Asia” (2007), “The North Korean Question in the Northeast Asian Security Arrangement” (2004), and “Maritime Strategy of the Republic of Korea” (2002).

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Zhaorong Mei was born in 1934 and studied English at the Beijing Foreign Lan-

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Andrew W. Wyckoff is head of the Information, Computer and Communications Policy division at the OECD which supports the organization's work on information society policy issues including telecommunications policy and convergence, information security and privacy, the impact of digitization on economic structure and performance and the construction of internationally comparable indicators in these areas. Current projects include efforts to combat spam and malicious software, identity management/theft, cross-border cooperation in the enforcement of laws protecting privacy and the impact of high-capacity Internet (broadband) on voice, video and data including the digitization of content like music and film and video. This work will support a Meeting at the Ministerial-level in June 2008 on the "Future of the Internet Economy" (Seoul, Korea), the objective of which is to better understand the critical role the Internet is playing in our economies and societies and to engage in a high-level, future-oriented discussion about how to strengthen the Internet as a tool for generating economic and social value. Prior to joining the OECD, he was program manager of the Information, Telecommunications and Commerce program of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment

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