

arms race are widely shared today and it is important to harness these forces to put a similar kind of pressure on politicians to reach a political consensus. Particularly, public campaigns are necessary to urge more action on the part of the leaders of the U.S., Russia and China. It should be reminded that politicians are driven in no small part by public opinion.

— **KIM Won-soo** In the Cold War era, it required only the two countries' agreement and effort to reduce nuclear arsenals. In contrast, trust-building as a stepping stone to a sound security environment is essential these days. It will be long before the WMD-free zone in the Middle East is finally established. We should first think about how to enlist these countries into disarmament. While Syria declared that it would scrap its nuclear weapons program, Israel was not able to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran is apparently moving towards a peaceful use of nuclear power. Such a transition has to be encouraged even further as to take part in bolstering regional security. If China joined CTBT, India and Pakistan would follow suit. Civil society and parliaments should take initiative and urge the government. For CTBT, each country should actively engage to generate a virtuous cycle.

— **Rakesh SOOD** Nine review conferences were held: four of them failed to adopt a final report and a declaration, while the other five conferences, with the exception of the 1995 meeting, brought forth four reports. There were remarks on the Middle East, WMD and a nuclear-free zone, and an indefinite extension was agreed to once. However, this extension ironically also extended intrinsic limitations and problems of the NPT indefinitely. An active engagement is imperative for a better operation, not simply the maintenance of the existing framework. In case of JCPOA, substantial and continued verification of Iran is necessary regardless of Iran's positive attitudes. We should determine contingencies for Iran's non-compliance.

— **SHA Zukang** The NPT itself has clauses on revision, and an additional protocol could be adopted. If it were to be updated eventually, we should be aware

that the consequences cannot be foretold. I suppose that a much more chaotic situation could develop. Obviously, there is a need to reflect on the changing reality, and India and Pakistan should be enlisted as well. If South Korea and the U.S. continue joint military exercises, North Korea will not suspend its nuclear tests. It is dangerous to presume that the U.S. and South Korea alone can solve the North Korean nuclear issues through negotiation and dialogue without China. It should be reminded that the denuclearization of North Korea should accompany a systemic transition, from the armistice system to a peace treaty system. We should keep in mind that North Korea is still at war with the U.S. and it will not readily give up nuclear options in today's security environment.

● ● ● Policy Implications

- As in the case of CTBT, it is not always desirable to expand the scope of a treaty through step-by-step negotiations. Granting that the NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the success of JCPOA suggests that success can be obtained through dialogue and negotiations outside the NPT framework. As was seen in Iraq's case, NPT clauses should be updated to reflect the current, more developed nuclear technologies, possibly by way of adopting an additional protocol. The signing of the SALT between the U.S. and Russia shows that public awareness of and interest in the risk of nuclear arms race are necessary for pressuring leaders into pursuing regional security within the framework of NPT.
- While substantial nuclear arms reduction has been made after the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms reduction ahead calls for a two-track approach by adopting an agreement other than NPT. To this end, non-nuclear states with the interest in the object should be encouraged to take part, along with nuclear powers. With the emergence of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, it is time to consider incorporating the Nuclear Terrorism Convention into the non-proliferation regime. For regional nuclear security, a multilateral and expansive approach is called for rather than the old Cold War approach.
- As North Korea and Iraq's cases suggest, NPT did contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons so far, but new nuclear technologies should be incorporated to ensure effective verification. As an adaptable regime, the NPT has been reinforced in the process of application and is expected to survive for the time being.

Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: Making a Breakthrough



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— **Rajmah HUSSAIN** The whole world is deeply concerned about the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. We need to find realistic alternatives and ways to denuclearize the peninsula. Tension is rising in the region as North Korea test-fires missiles continuously, and the U.S. tries to build a Missile Defense system in response. We have already seen the consequences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We must do everything to avoid repeating the tragedy by eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons. Debates have been ongoing over nuclear proliferation and some even raise the idea that South Korea should be armed with nuclear weapons. All these controversies come down to the question of whether tactical nuclear weapons need to be redeployed on the Korean Peninsula.

— **John CARLSON** We need to comprehend the goal of North Korea before making a breakthrough in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We cannot make an appropriate response to North Korea until we figure out whether it wants nuclear weapons for deterrence or for aggressive purposes. It can be confirmed through dialogue, and if the intentions

turn out to be deterrence, then there is room for negotiation toward a new solution.

As North Korea perceives the U.S. as the prime enemy, it is only the U.S. that can play a key role in the denuclearization process. It would be most desirable if North Korea's main opponent, the U.S., and other key negotiating party, China, signed a peace treaty with North Korea. This is because North Korea is still at war. To be more precise, they are in the state of a ceasefire after the armistice pact among China, North Korea and the U.S., and this is why these three countries cannot help but act as the key parties concerned, who will have to replace the armistice with a peace treaty. A peace treaty has also been part of North Korea's persistent demands, an indicator that the North would be willing to make compromises for the peace treaty.

China does not want North Korea to pose another nuclear threat but it does not want the regime to collapse and thereby cause disruption and disorder, because China prefers North Korea to keep acting as a strategic buffer. That is why it has been taking an ambiguous stance on reunification. China is wor-

ried about a potential situation where the U.S. forces could be deployed right across its border with a unified Korea. The U.S. should dispel these concerns through talks as early as possible.

The path to reunification could consist of several stages. An agreement between the U.S. and China is a precondition for a reunification formula such as a confederation, economic integration, etc. There should be an agreement addressing military issues involving the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ). Even when North Korea refuses to talk or violates the agreement, a blockade would not be a good option in the long run. It is important for neighboring countries to keep a united front with a shared stance toward Kim Jong-Un, even if North Korea engages in gradual expansion of nuclear arms.

— **PAN Zhenqiang** From a broader perspective, the most crucial step towards a better solution is to bring about a global consensus. This consensus will help build a conceptual guideline. Three principles could serve as the basis for the possible consensus. First, there should be no military option. The reason is that no one can be held accountable if a war breaks out eventually. Second, cooperation matters. In that regard, U.S.-Sino cooperation is of utmost significance, since the nuclear issue is getting more complicated and intertwined with competition among the world powers. The deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) missile is a case in point. China regards the deployment as part of the U.S. containment strategy against China, rather than as a response to the North Korean threat. If the U.S.-Sino relations could develop into what China conceives in the “New Model of Great Power Relations,” such an understanding could serve as a basis for a new type of power relations. Third, if we want to remove the root cause of nuclear proliferation, all parties concerned should reduce or exclude the role that nuclear arsenal plays in their security strategies. The five countries other than North Korea in the Six-Party Talks cannot hold its moral high ground from which to demand North Korea give up its nuclear weapons, as nuclear weapons play a key role in

their own national defense.

— **Peter HAYES** North Korea has become a pivotal point of the nuclear hegemony of the U.S. Two options are possible for the U.S. to manage North Korea. The first option is to have a pause or a gap period, anticipating a new order based on nuclear armaments and possible war. The second is to bring nuclear threat under control by shifting to a new framework based on the rule of law. Northeast Asia needs a comprehensive approach. North Korea should be recognized as an equal member of the region and the armistice should be developed into a peace treaty. Also, a decision-making mechanism for common security is needed, possibly in the form of a committee. Such a body should and could assume the role of stabilizing North Korea, not only tackling North Korea’s nuclear issues, but also promoting the stability of the region in general.

North Korea would retain nuclear capabilities even after a potential nuclear freeze. There should be some effective measures to keep Kim Jong-Un from abusing these capabilities. Ten years would be sufficient for full transition and management, backed by a regional agreement with the endorsement of the UN. Also of importance is to form a non-nuclear zone set by the UN, which would be joined by North Korea, so that the perils of nuclear weapons and Weapon of Mass Destruction(WMD) could be reduced in the region. It took 18 years before all states in Latin America began to comply with the nuclear-free zone agreement. We should exercise a similar amount of patience with North Korea. The multilateral framework will and should be equally applied to Japan and South Korea as well as North Korea, so that it could serve as a deterrence and security guarantee for every member including North Korea.

The policy of the Trump administration is unbalanced. While coercion and dialogue should go hand in hand, Trump’s diplomacy revolves almost exclusively around coercion. From a strategic perspective, Japan’s participation is crucial in actualizing the nuclear-free zone. Japan’s participation is a prerequisite for China’s participation, and if Japan abandons

its idea of preemption, it will not only be a boon for Sino-Japan relations but also meet China’s strategic interest. Once China joins the non-nuclear zone, it could even encourage North Korea to get involved.

The new South Korean President is expected to play a leadership role in resolving these issues of Northeast Asia. Although it is not or plausible for South Korea to spearhead negotiations with Kim Jong-Un all the time, it will have to take on more than a secondary role. This is because South Korea needs to devise solutions to an array of complicated and complex issues simultaneously. Through interdependent steps, many other countries than South and North Korea should be enlisted in this multilateral initiative.

— **HAN Yong-sup** An alternative to the existing Six-Party Talks is of utmost significance, since the talks have remained suspended for the past decade. North Korea now claims the status of a nuclear power. It is imperative to appreciate the gravity of this situation, and the denuclearization process must begin with negotiation because North Korea is intractable at the moment. We cannot say for sure whether the U.S. will recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. For one thing, it cannot leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) regime to be undermined or weakened by North Korean maneuvers. Still, North Korea should be made to join the NPT irrespective of whether it is recognized as a nuclear power or not. We also ought to admit past failures to that end, such as the Geneva Accord and the Six-Party Talks. The main reason all these efforts came to naught was that there was no consensus among parties concerned on the terms of the denuclearization, sanctions on North Korea.

The negotiations failed largely because all five participating countries had different aims. The U.S. took a firm stance in the pre-negotiation stage; however, it failed to remain consistent toward North Korea each time a new administration took office, not least because the cost of negotiations fell solely on neighboring countries, namely South Korea and Japan. This naturally left the negotiations incomplete,

as the U.S. settled for a freeze at best, seldom picking up where the previous administration left off. China was relatively more active and deemed it important to give additional incentives to North Korea’s freeze. South Korea engaged in Sunshine Policy at first and then took a hardline stance as soon as the government changed hands, and now reports of a new Moonshine Policy is flowing out of the presidential office. Japan and Russia were mostly passive, and Japan, particularly had a separate agenda. Kim Jong-Il insisted he had already achieved peace and security of his country while condemning the U.S. Repeating this all over again would be simply a waste of time.

I suggest four conditions for a breakthrough. First, the UN Security Council and the five permanent members of the Security Council(P-5) should agree to the measures of the sanctions. Second, an agreement to a partial resolution is inadequate. A Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement(CVID) mechanism must be designed. Third, a security guarantee mechanism proposed to North Korea should incorporate a step-by-step, conditional lifting of the sanctions. We cannot afford to simply let North Korea have what they want. Last but not least, we will have to devise a formula for the Eight-Party Talks instead of the Six-Party Talks since the interest of the P-5 countries should be coordinated.



Policy Implications

- The negotiation attempts so far have foundered because participating countries not only failed to agree on the exact ends and the means for a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issues, but also failed to grasp the ultimate motive behind North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.
- The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved by either sanction or negotiation exclusively. The U.S., China, South Korea, and Japan should engage in both.